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HERMES

OR

A PHILOSOPHICAL INQVIR

CONCERNING

VNIVERSAL GRAMMAR

BY IAMES HARRIS ESQ.

ΕΙΣΙΕΝΑΙ ΘΑΡΡΟΥΝΤΑΣ ΕΙΝΑΙ ΓΑΡ ΚΑΙ ΕΝΤΑΥΘΑ ΘΕΟΥΣ.

THE FOURTH EDITION

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LONDON,

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MDCCLXXXVI.

OF MICHIGAN

To the Right Honourable

PHILIP *Lord* HARDWICKE

Lord High Chancellor of *Great-Britain**.

My Lord,

AS no one has exerciſe the Powers of Speec with juſter and more univerſa applauſe, than yourſelf; have preſumed to inſcribe th following Treatiſe to you Lordſhip, its End being t inveſtigate the Principles c thoſe Powers. It has a fai ther claim to your Lord ſhip's Patronage, by bein connected in ſome degree wit that politer Literature, which in the moſt important ſcene

* The above Dedication is printed as it originally ſto the Author being deſirous that what he intended as real R ſpect to the noble Lord, when living, ſhould now be co ſidered, as a Teſtimony of Gratitude to his Memory.

of Buſineſs, you have ſtill found time to cultivate. With regard to myſelf, if what I have written be the fruits of that Security and Leiſure, obtained by living under a mild and free Government; to whom for this am I more indebted, than to your Lordſhip, whether I conſider you as a Legiſlator, or as a Magiſtrate, the firſt both in dignity and reputation? Permit me therefore thus publicly to aſſure your Lordſhip, that with the greateſt gratitude and reſpect I am, My Lord,

Your Lordſhip's moſt obliged,
and moſt obedient humble Servant,

Cloſe of Saliſbury,
Oct. 1, 1751.

James Harris.

PREFACE.

THE chief End, propoſed by the Author of this Treatiſe in making it public, has been to excite his Readers to curioſity and inquiry; not to teach them himſelf by prolix and formal Lectures, (from the efficacy of which he has little expectation) but to induce them, if poſſible, to become Teachers to themſelves, by an impartial uſe of their own underſtandings. He thinks nothing more abſurd than the common notion of Inſtruction, as if Science were to be poured into the Mind, like water into a ciſtern, that paſſively waits to receive all that comes. The growth of Knowledge he rather thinks to reſemble the growth of Fruit; however external cauſes may in ſome degree co-operate, it is the internal vigour, and virtue of

the tree, that muſt ripen the juices to their juſt maturity.

This then, namely, the exciting men to inquire for themſelves into ſubjects worthy of their contemplation, this the Author declares to have been his firſt and principal motive for appearing in print. Next to that, as he has always been a lover of Letters, he would willingly approve his ſtudies to the liberal and ingenuous. He has particularly named theſe, in diſtinction to others; becauſe, as his ſtudies were never proſecuted with the leaſt regard to lucre, ſo they are no way calculated for any lucrative End. The liberal therefore and ingenuous (whom he has mentioned already) are thoſe, to whoſe peruſal he offers what he has written. Should they judge favourably of his attempt, he may not perhaps heſitate to confeſs,

Hoc juvat et melli eſt.——

For

For tho' he hopes he cannot be charg
with the fooliſh love of vain Pra
he has no deſire to be thought ina
ferent, or inſenſible to honeſt Fame

From the influence of theſe ſen
ments, he has endeavoured to treat
ſubject with as much order, corre
neſs, and perſpicuity as in his powe
and if he has failed, he can ſaf
ſay (according to the vulgar phra
that the failure has been his misf
tune, and not his fault. He ſco
thoſe trite and contemptible meth
of anticipating pardon for a bad p
formance, that "it was the ha
"*fruits of a few idle hours; writ*
"*merely for private amuſemen*
"*never reviſed; publiſhed agai*
"*conſent, at the importunity*
"*friends, copies (God knows ho*
"*having by ſtealth gotten abroad*
with other ſtale jargon of equal fa
hood and inanity. May we not
ſuch Prefacers, If what they all

be true, what has the world to do with them and their crudities?

As to the Book itſelf, it can ſay this in its behalf, that it does not merely confine itſelf to what its title promiſes, but expatiates freely into whatever is collateral; aiming on every occaſion to riſe in its inquiries, and to paſs, as far as poſſible, from ſmall matters to the greateſt. Nor is it formed merely upon ſentiments that are now in faſhion, or ſupported only by ſuch authorities as are modern. Many Authors are quoted, that now-a-days are but little ſtudied; and ſome perhaps, whoſe very names are hardly known.

The Fate indeed of antient Authors (as we have happened to mention them) is not unworthy of our notice. A few of them ſurvive in the Libraries of the learned, where ſome venerable Folio, that ſtill goes by their name, juſt

juſt ſuffices to give them a kind of nominal *exiſtence. The reſt have long fallen into a deeper obſcurity, their very names, when mentioned, affecting us as little, as the names, when we read them, of thoſe ſubordinate Heroes,*

Alcandrumque, Haliumque, Noemonaque, Prytanimque.

Now if an Author, not content with the more eminent of antient Writers, ſhould venture to bring his reader into ſuch company as theſe laſt, among people *(in the faſhionable phraſe)* that nobody knows; *what uſage, what quarter can he have reaſon to expect? Should the Author of theſe ſpeculations have done this (and it is to be feared he has) what method had he beſt take in a circumſtance ſo critical?—Let us ſuppoſe him to apologize in the beſt manner he can, and in conſequence of this, to ſuggeſt as follows—*

He

He hopes there will be found a pleaſure in the contemplation of antient ſentiments, as the view of antient Architecture, tho' in ruins, has ſomething venerable. Add to this, what from its antiquity is but little known, has from that very circumſtance the recommendation of novelty; ſo that here, as in other inſtances, Extremes may be ſaid to meet. *Farther ſtill, as the Authors, whom he has quoted, lived in various ages, and in diſtant countries; ſome in the full maturity of* Grecian *and* Roman *Literature; ſome in its declenſion; and others in periods ſtill more barbarous, and depraved; it may afford perhaps no unpleaſing ſpeculation, to ſee how the* SAME REASON *has at all times prevailed; how there is* ONE TRUTH, *like one Sun, that has enlightened human Intelligence through every age, and ſaved it from the darkneſs both of Sophiſtry and Error.*

Nothing

Nothing can more tend to enlarge the Mind, than theſe extenſive views of Men, and human Knowlege; nothing can more effectually take us off from the fooliſh admiration of what is immediately before our eyes, and help us to a juſter eſtimate both of preſent Men, and preſent Literature.

It is perhaps too much the caſe with the multitude in every nation, that as they know little beyond themſelves, and their own affairs, ſo out of this narrow ſphere of knowlege, they think nothing worth knowing. As we BRITONS *by our ſituation live divided from the whole world, this perhaps will be found to be more remarkably our caſe. And hence the reaſon, that our ſtudies are uſually ſatisfied in the works of our own Countrymen; that in Philoſophy, in Poetry, in every kind of ſubject, whether ſerious or ludicrous, whether ſacred or profane, we think per-*

perfection with ourſelves, and that it is ſuperfluous to ſearch farther.

The Author of this Treatiſe would by no means detract from the juſt honours due to thoſe of his Countrymen, who either in the preſent, or preceding age, have ſo illuſtriouſly adorned it. But tho' he can with pleaſure and ſincerity join in celebrating their deſerts, he would not have the admiration of theſe, or of any other few, to paſs thro' blind exceſs into a contempt of all others. Were ſuch Admiration to become univerſal, an odd event would follow; a few learned Men, without any fault of their own, would contribute in a manner to the extinction of Letters.

A like evil to that of admiring only the authors of our own age, is that of admiring only the authors of one particular Science. There is indeed in this laſt prejudice ſomething pecu-

peculiarly unfortunate, and that is, the more excellent the Science, the more likely it will be found to produce this effect.

There are few Sciences more intrinſically valuable, than MATHEMATICS. *It is hard indeed to ſay, to which they have more contributed, whether to the Utilities of Life, or to the ſublimeſt parts of Science. They are the nobleſt Praxis of* LOGIC, *or* UNIVERSAL REASONING. *It is thro'* them *we may perceive, how the ſtated Forms of Syllogiſm are exemplified in one Subject, namely the Predicament of* Quantity. *By marking the force of theſe Forms, as they are applied* here, *we may be enabled to apply them of ourſelves* elſewhere. *Nay farther ſtill—by viewing the* MIND, during its proceſs in theſe ſyllogiſtic employments, *we may come to know in part,* what kind of Being it is; *ſince* MIND, *like other Powers, can*

be only known from its Operations. *Whoever therefore will ſtudy* Mathematics *in this view, will become not only by Mathematics a more expert* Logician, *and by Logic a more rational* Mathematician, *but a wiſer Philoſopher, and an acuter Reaſoner, in all the poſſible ſubjects either of ſcience or deliberation.*

But when Mathematics, *inſtead of being applied to this excellent purpoſe, are uſed not to exemplify* Logic, *but to ſupply its place; no wonder if* Logic *paſs into contempt, and if* Mathematics, *inſtead of furthering ſcience, become in fact an obſtacle. For when men, knowing nothing of that Reaſoning which is* univerſal, *come to attach themſelves for years* to a ſingle Species, *a ſpecies wholly involved* in Lines and Numbers only; *they grow inſenſibly to believe theſe laſt as inſeparable from all Reaſoning, as the poor* Indians *thought*

every horſeman to be inſeparable from his horſe.

And thus we ſee the uſe, nay the neceſſity of enlarging our literary views, leſt even Knowlege itſelf *ſhould obſtruct its own growth, and perform in ſome meaſure the part of ignorance and barbarity.*

Such then is the Apology made by the Author of this Treatiſe, for the multiplicity of antient quotations, with which he has filled his Book. If he can excite in his readers a proper ſpirit of curioſity; if he can help in the leaſt degree to enlarge the bounds of Science; to revive the decaying taſte of antient Literature; to leſſen the bigotted contempt of every thing not modern; and to aſſert to Authors of every age their juſt portion of eſteem; if he can in the leaſt degree contribute to theſe ends, he hopes it may be allowed, that he has done a

ſervice

ſervice to mankind. Should this ſervice be a reaſon for his Work to ſurvive, he has confeſt already, it would be no unpleaſing event. Should the contrary happen, he muſt acquieſce in its fate, and let it peaceably paſs to thoſe deſtined regions, whither the productions of modern Wit are every day paſſing,

——in vicum vendentem tus et odores.

ADVERTISEMENT.

The Reader is deſired to take notice, that as often as the author quotes V. I. p. *&c. he refers to Three Treatiſes publiſhed firſt in one Volume, Octavo, in the year* 1745.

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ERRATA.

Page 80, line 17, *for* υποτελικον, *read* υποταχλικον.
131, Note, l. 1, *for* Roman, *read* Romani.
252, l. 2 from the bottom, *for* An, *read* And.
328, l. 3 from the bottom, *for* οργανα, *read* οργανον.
332, l. laſt, *for* i, *read* it.
369, Note, l. 15, *for* uncleaſing, *read* unceaſing.
384, Note, l. 4, *for* ὄιδι πυ, *read* ὄιδιπυ.

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HERMES

OR A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY CONCERNING UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR.

BOOK I.

CHAP. I.

INTRODUCTION.

Deſign of the Whole.

IF Men by nature had been framed for Solitude, they had never felt an Impulſe to converſe one with another: And if, like lower Animals, they had been by nature irrational, they could not have recognized the proper Subjects of Diſcourſe. Since SPEECH then is the joint Energie of our beſt and nobleſt Faculties (*a*), (that is to ſay, of our *Rea-* Ch. I.

B *ſon*

(*a*) See V. I. p. 147 to 169. See alſo Note xv. p. 292, and Note xix. p. 296, of the ſame Volume.

Ch. I. *ſon* and our *ſocial Affection*) being withal our *peculiar* Ornament and Diſtinction, as *Men*; thoſe Inquiries may ſurely be deemed intereſting as well as liberal, which either ſearch how SPEECH may be naturally *reſolved*; or how, when reſolved, it may be again *combined*.

HERE a large field for ſpeculating opens before us. We may either behold SPEECH, as divided into *its conſtituent Parts*, as a Statue may be divided into its ſeveral Limbs; or elſe, as reſolved into its *Matter* and *Form*, as the ſame Statue may be reſolved into its Marble and Figure.

THESE different *Analyſings* or *Reſolutions* conſtitute what we call (*b*) PHILOSOPHICAL, or UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR.

WHEN

(*b*) Grammaticam *etiam bipartitam ponemus, ut alia ſit literaria, alia* philoſophica, *&c. Bacon, de Augm. Scient. VI.* 1. And ſoon after he adds—*Verumtamen hâc ipſâ re moniti, cogitatione complexi ſumus Grammaticam quandam, quæ non analogiam verborum ad invicem, ſed analogiam inter* verba *et* res *ſive* rationem *ſedulò inquirat.*

WHEN we have viewed SPEECH thus *analyſed*, we may then conſider it, as *compounded*. And here in the firſt place we may contemplate that (*c*) *Syntheſis*, which *by combining ſimple Terms* produces a *Truth*; then *by combining two Truths* produces a *third*; and thus others, and others, in continued Demonſtration, till we are led, as by a road, into the regions of SCIENCE. Ch. I.

Now this is that *ſuperior* and moſt excellent *Syntheſis*, which alone applies itſelf to our *Intellect* or *Reaſon*, and which to

(*c*) *Ariſtotle* ſays—τῶν δὲ καθ' μηδεμίαν συμπλοκὴν λεγομένων ἐδὲν ἔτε ἀληθὲς ἔτε ψευδές ἐςιν· οἷον ἄνθρωπος, λεύκος, τρέχει, νικᾷ—*Of theſe words which are ſpoken without Connection, there is no one either true or falſe; as for inſtance, Man, white, runneth, conquereth.* Cat. C. 4. So again in the beginning of his Treatiſe *De Interpretatione*, περὶ γὰρ σύνθεσιν καὶ διαίρεσιν ἔςι τὸ ψευδός τε καὶ τὸ ἀληθές. *True and Falſe are ſeen in Compoſition and Diviſion.* Compoſition makes *affirmative* Truth, Diviſion makes *negative*, yet both alike bring Terms together, and ſo far therefore may be called ſynthetical.

Ch. I. conduct according to Rule, conſtitutes the Art of LOGIC.

AFTER this we may turn to thoſe (*d*) *inferior* Compoſitions, which are productive

---

(*d*) *Ammonius* in his Comment on the Treatiſe Περὶ Ερμηνείας, p. 53, gives the following Extract from *Theophraſtus*, which is here inſerted at length, as well for the Excellence of the Matter, as becauſe it is not (I believe) elſewhere extant.

Διτλῆς γὰρ ἔσης τῆ λόγῳ σχέσεως, (καθ' ἃ διώρισεν ὁ φιλόσοφος Θεόφρας) τῆς τε ΠΡΟΣ ΤΟΥΣ ΑΚΡΩΜΕΝΟΥΣ, οἷς ϗ σημαίνει τι, ϗ τῆς ΠΡΟΣ ΤΑ ΠΡΑΓΜΑΤΑ, ὑπὲρ ὧν ὁ λέγων πεῖσαι προτίθηται τὰς ἀκροωμένας, περὶ μὲν ἓν τὴν σχέσιν αὐτῆ τὴν ΠΡΟΣ ΤΟΥΣ ΑΚΡΟΑΤΑΣ καλαγίνονται ποιητικὴ ϗ ῥητορικὴ, διότι ἔργον αὐταῖς ἐκλέγεσθαι τὰ σεμνότερα τῶν ὀνομάτων, ἀλλὰ μὴ τὰ κοινὰ ϗ δεδημευμένα, ϗ ταῦτα ἐναρμονίως συμπλέκειν ἀλλήλοις, ὥστε διὰ τέτων ϗ τῶν τέτοις ἑπομένων, οἷον σαφηνείας, γλυκύτητος, ϗ τῶν ἄλλων ἰδεῶν, ἔτι τε μακρολογίας, ϗ βραχυλογίας, καὶ καιρὸν πάντων παραλαμβανομένων, οἵσαί τε τὸν ἀκροατὴν, ϗ ἐκπλῆξαι. ϗ πρὸς τὴν πείθω χειρωθέντα ἔχειν· τῆς δέ γε ΠΡΟΣ ΤΑ ΠΡΑΓΜΑΤΑ τῆ λόγῳ σχέσεως ὁ φιλόσοφος προηγημένως ἐπιμελήσεται, τό, τε ψευδὸς διελέγχων, ϗ

ductive of the *Pathetic*, and the *Pleaſant* in all their kinds. Theſe latter Compoſitions Ch. I.

καὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἀποδεικνύς. *The Relation of Speech being twofold (as the Philoſopher Theophraſtus hath ſettled it) one to the* HEARERS, *to whom it explains ſomething, and one to the* THINGS, *concerning which the Speaker propoſes to perſuade his Hearers: With reſpect to the firſt Relation, that which regards the* HEARERS, *are employed Poetry and Rhetoric. Thus it becomes the buſineſs of theſe two, to ſelect the moſt reſpectable Words, and not thoſe that are common and of vulgar uſe, and to connect ſuch Words harmoniouſly one with another, ſo as thro' theſe things and their conſequences, ſuch as Perſpicuity, Delicacy, and the other Forms of Eloquence, together with Copiouſneſs and Brevity, all employed in their proper ſeaſon, to lead the Hearer, and ſtrike him, and hold him vanquiſhed by the power of Perſuaſion. On the contrary, as to the Relation of Speech to* THINGS, *here the Philoſopher will be found to have a principal employ, as well in refuting the Falſe, as in demonſtrating the True.*

Sanctius ſpeaks elegantly on the ſame Subject. *Creavit Deus hominem rationis participem; cui, quia* Sociabilem *eſſe voluit, magno pro munere dedit* Sermonem. *Sermoni autem perficiendo tres opifices adhibuit. Prima eſt* Grammatica, *quæ ab oratione ſolæciſmos & barbariſmos expellit; ſecunda* Dialectica, *quæ in Sermonis veritate verſatur; tertia* Rhetorica, *quæ ornatum Sermonis tantum exquirit.* Min. l. 1. c. 2.

Ch. I. poſitions aſpire not to the Intellect, but being addreſſed to the *Imagination*, the *Affections*, and the *Senſe*, become from their different heightnings either RHETORIC or POETRY.

NOR need we neceſſarily view theſe Arts diſtinctly and apart; we may obſerve, if we pleaſe, how perfectly they co-incide. GRAMMAR is equally requiſite to every one of the reſt. And though LOGIC may indeed ſubſiſt without RHETORIC or POETRY, yet ſo neceſſary to theſe laſt is a ſound and correct LOGIC, that without it, they are no better than warbling Trifles.

Now all theſe Inquiries (as we have ſaid already) and ſuch others ariſing from them as are of ſtill ſublimer Contemplation, (of which in the Sequel there may be poſſibly not a few) may with juſtice be deemed Inquiries both intereſting and liberal.

AT

AT preſent we ſhall poſtpone the whole ſynthetical Part, (that is to ſay, *Logic* and *Rhetoric*) and confine ourſelves to the analytical, that is to ſay, UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR. In this we ſhall follow the Order, that we have above laid down, firſt dividing SPEECH, as a WHOLE, into its CONSTITUENT PARTS; then reſolving it, as a COMPOSITE, into its MATTER and FORM; two Methods of Analyſis very different in their kind, and which lead to a variety of very different Speculations. Ch. I.

SHOULD any one object, that in the courſe of our Inquiry we ſometimes deſcend to things, which appear trivial and low; let him look upon the effects, to which thoſe things contribute, then from the Dignity of the Conſequences, let him honour the Principles.

THE following Story may not improperly be here inſerted. "When the Fame

Ch. I. "of *Heraclitus* was celebrated through-
"out *Greece*, there were certain perſons,
"that had a curioſity to ſee ſo great a
"Man. They came, and, as it happen-
"ed, found him warming himſelf in a
"Kitchen. The meanneſs of the place
"occaſioned them to ſtop; upon which
"the Philoſopher thus accoſted them—
"ENTER (ſays he) BOLDLY, FOR HERE
"TOO THERE ARE GODS (*e*)."

WE ſhall only add, that as there is no part of Nature too mean for the Divine Preſence; ſo there is no kind of Subject, having its foundation in Nature, that is below the Dignity of a philoſophical Inquiry.

(*e*) See *Ariſtot. de Part. Animal.* l. 1. c. 5.

CHAP.

CHAP. II.

Concerning the Analyſing of Speech into its ſmalleſt Parts.

THOSE things, which are *firſt to Nature*, are not *firſt to Man*. *Nature* begins from *Cauſes*, and thence deſcends to *Effects*. *Human Perceptions* firſt open upon *Effects*, and thence by ſlow degrees aſcend to *Cauſes*. Often had Mankind ſeen the Sun in Eclipſe, before they knew its Cauſe to be the Moon's Interpoſition; much oftner had they ſeen thoſe unceaſing Revolutions of Summer and Winter, of Day and Night, before they knew the Cauſe to be the Earth's double Motion (*a*). Even Ch. II.

(*a*) This Diſtinction of *firſt to Man*, and *firſt to Nature*, was greatly regarded in the Peripatetic Philoſophy. See *Ariſt. Phyſ. Auſcult.* l. 1. c. 1. *Themiſtius's* Comment on the ſame, *Poſter. Analyt.* l. 1. c. 2. *De Anima*, l. 2. c. 2. It leads us, when properly regarded, to a very important Diſtinction between

Ch. II. Even in Matters of Art and *human* Creation, if we except a few Artiſts and critical

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tween Intelligence *Divine* and Intelligence *Human*. God may be ſaid to view the Firſt, as firſt; and the Laſt, as laſt; that is, he views *Effects* thro' *Cauſes* in their *natural Order*. Man views the Laſt, as firſt; and the Firſt, as laſt; that is, he views *Cauſes* thro' *Effects*, in *an inverſe Order*. And hence the Meaning of that Paſſage in *Ariſtotle*: ὥσπερ γὰρ τὰ τῶν νυκτερίδων ὄμματα πρὸς τὸ φέγγος ἔχει τὸ μεθ' ἡμέραν, ἕτω καὶ τῆς ἡμετέρας ψυχῆς ὁ Νοῦς πρὸς τὰ τῇ φύσει φανερώτατα πάντων. *As are the Eyes of Bats to the Light of the Day, ſo is Man's Intelligence to thoſe Objects, that are by Nature the brighteſt and moſt conſpicuous of all Things.* Metaph. l. 2. c. 1. See alſo l. 7. c. 4. and *Ethic. Nicom.* l. 1. c. 4. *Ammonius*, reaſoning in the ſame way, ſays very pertinently to the Subject of this Treatiſe—Ἀγαπητὸν τῇ ἀνθρωπίνῃ φύσει, ἐκ τῶν ἀτελεστέρων καὶ συνθέτων ἐπὶ τὰ ἁπλούστερα καὶ τελειότερα προϊέναι· τὰ γὰρ σύνθετα μᾶλλον συνήθη ἡμῖν, καὶ γνωριμώτερα· Οὕτω γοῦν καὶ ὁ παῖς εἶραι μὲν λόγον, καὶ εἰπεῖν, Σωκράτης περιπατεῖ, οἶδε· τοῦτον δὲ ἀναλύσαι εἰς ὄνομα καὶ ῥῆμα, καὶ ταῦτα εἰς συλλαβὰς, κἀκεῖνα εἰς στοιχεῖα, ἀκέτι· *Human Nature may be well contented to advance from the more imperfect and complex to the more ſimple and perfect; for the complex Subjects are more familiar to us, and better known. Thus therefore it is that even a Child knows how to put a Sentence together, and ſay,* Socrates

 walketh;

tical Obſervers, the reſt look no higher than to the *Practice* and mere *Work*, knowing nothing of thoſe *Principles*, on which the whole depends. Ch. II.

THUS in SPEECH for example—All men, even the loweſt, can ſpeak their Mother-Tongue. Yet how many of this multitude can neither write, nor even read? How many of thoſe, who are thus far literate, know nothing of that Grammar, which reſpects the Genius of their own Language? How few then muſt be thoſe, who know GRAMMAR UNIVERSAL; *that Grammar*, which without regarding the ſeveral Idioms of particular Languages, *only reſpects thoſe Principles, that are eſſential to them all?*

'TIS our preſent Deſign to inquire about this Grammar; in doing which we ſhall

walketh; *but how to reſolve this Sentence into a Noun and Verb, and theſe again into Syllables, and Syllables into Letters or Elements, here he is at a loſs.* Am. in Com. de Prædic. p. 29.

Ch. II. ſhall follow the Order conſonant to *human* Perception, as being for that reaſon the more eaſy to be underſtood.

We ſhall begin therefore firſt from a *Period* or *Sentence*, that combination in Speech, which is obvious to all, and thence paſs, if poſſible, to thoſe its *primary Parts*, which, however eſſential, are only obvious to a few.

With reſpect therefore to the different Species of Sentences, who is there ſo ignorant, as if we addreſs him in his Mother-Tongue, not to know when 'tis we *aſſert*, and when we *queſtion*; when 'tis we *command*, and when we *pray* or *wiſh*?

For example, when we read in *Shakeſpeare* *,

The Man, that hath no muſic in himſelf,
And is not mov'd with concord of ſweet ſounds,
Is fit for Treaſons——

Or

* Merchant of *Venice*.

Or in *Milton* *, Ch. II.

O Friends, I hear the tread of nimble feet,
Haſting this way—

'tis obvious that theſe are *aſſertive Sentences*, one founded upon Judgment, the other upon Senſation.

WHEN the Witch in *Macbeth* ſays to her Companions,

When ſhall we three meet again
In thunder, lightning, and in rain?

this 'tis evident is an *interrogative Sentence*.

WHEN *Macbeth* ſays to the Ghoſt of *Banquo*,

——Hence, horrible Shadow,
Unreal Mock'ry hence!——

he ſpeaks an *imperative Sentence*, founded upon the paſſion of hatred.

WHEN

* P. L. IV. 866.

Ch. II. WHEN *Milton* ſays in the character of his *Allegro*,

Haſte thee, Nymph, and bring with thee
Jeſt and youthful Jollity,

he too ſpeaks an *imperative Sentence*, tho' founded on the paſſion, not of hatred but of love.

WHEN in the beginning of the *Paradiſe Loſt* we read the following addreſs,

And chiefly thou, O Spirit, that doſt prefer
Before all temples th' upright heart, and pure,
Inſtruct me, for thou know'ſt—

this is not to be called an *imperative Sentence*, tho' perhaps it bear the ſame Form, but rather (if I may uſe the Word) 'tis a Sentence *precative* or *optative*.

WHAT then ſhall we ſay? Are Sentences to be quoted in this manner without ceaſing, all differing from each other in their

their ſtamp and character? Are they no way reducible to certain definite Claſſes? If not, they can be no objects of *rational* comprehenſion.—Let us however try. Ch. II.

'TIS a phraſe often applied to a man, when ſpeaking, that *he ſpeaks his* MIND; as much as to ſay, that his Speech or Diſcourſe is *a publiſhing of ſome Energie or Motion of his Soul.* So it indeed is in every one that ſpeaks, excepting alone the Diſſembler or Hypocrite; and he too, as far as poſſible, affects the appearance.

NOW the POWERS OF THE SOUL (over and above the meer †nutritive) may be included all of them in thoſe of PERCEPTION, and thoſe of VOLITION. By the Powers of PERCEPTION, I mean the *Senſes* and the *Intellect*; by the Powers of VOLITION, I mean, in an extended ſenſe, not only the *Will*, but the ſeveral *Paſſions* and *Appetites*; in ſhort, *all that moves to Action, whether rational or irrational.*

IF

† Vid. Ariſtot. de An. II. 4.

Ch. II. If then the leading Powers of the Soul be theſe two, 'tis plain that every Speech or Sentence, as far as it exhibits the Soul, muſt of courſe reſpect one or other of theſe.

If we *aſſert*, then is it a Sentence which reſpects the Powers of PERCEPTION. For what indeed is to *aſſert*, if we conſider the examples above alleged, but *to publiſh ſome Perception either of the Senſes or the Intellect?*

AGAIN, if we *interrogate*, if we *command*, if we *pray*, or if we *wiſh*, (which in terms of Art is to ſpeak Sentences *interrogative*, *imperative*, *precative*, or *optative*) what do we but publiſh ſo many different VOLITIONS?—For who is it that *queſtions?* He that has *a Deſire* to be informed.—Who is it that *commands?* He that has *a Will*, which he would have obey'd.—What are thoſe Beings, who either *wiſh* or *pray?* Thoſe, who feel certain

certain wants either for themſelves, or others. Ch. II.

IF then the *Soul's leading Powers* be *the two* above mentioned, and it be true that *all Speech is a publication of theſe Powers*, it will follow that EVERY SENTENCE WILL BE EITHER A SENTENCE OF ASSERTION, OR A SENTENCE OF VOLITION. And thus, by referring all of them to one of theſe two claſſes, have we found an expedient to reduce their infinitude (*b*).

THE

(*b*) Πλέον ἔν ὅτι τῆς ψυχῆς τῆς ἡμετέρας διτλὰς ἐχούσης δυνάμεις, τὰς μὲν γνωστικὰς, τὰς δὲ ζωτικὰς, τὰς καὶ ὀρεκτικὰς λεγομένας· (λέγω δὲ γνωστικὰς μὲν, καθ' ἃς γινώσκομεν ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων, οἷον νοῦν, διανοιαν, δόξαν, φαντασίαν καὶ αἴσθησιν· ὀρεκτικὰς δὲ, καθ' ἃς ὀρεγόμεθα τῶν ἀγαθῶν, ἢ τῶν ὄντων, ἢ τῶν δοκούντων, οἷον βούλησιν λέγω, προαίρεσιν, θυμὸν, καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν) τὰ MEN τέτταρα εἴδη τῇ λόγῳ (τὰ παρὰ τὸν ἀποφαντικὸν) ἀπὸ τῶν ὀρεκτικῶν δυνάμεων προέρχονται τῆς ψυχῆς, οὐκ αὐτῆς καθ' αὐτὴν ἐνεργούσης, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἕτερον ἀποτεινομένης (τὸν συμβάλλεσθαι δοκοῦντα πρὸς τὸ τυχεῖν τῆς ὀρέξεως) καὶ ἤτοι λόγον παρ' αὐτῷ

C ζητούσης

Ch. II. THE Extenſions of Speech are quite indefinite, as may be ſeen if we compare the

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ζητέσης, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῦ ΠΤΣΜΑΤΙΚΟΤ καὶ ΕΡΩΤΗΜΑΤΙΚΟΤ καλεμένε λόγε, ἢ πρᾶγμα, καὶ εἰ πρᾶγμα, ἤτοι αὐτῦ ἐκείνε τυχεῖν ἐφιεμένης, πρὸς ὃν ὁ λόγος, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῦ ΚΛΗΤΙΚΟΤ, ἢ τινὸς παρ' αὐτῦ πράξεως· καὶ τάυτης, ἢ ὡς παρὰ κρείττονος, ὡς ἐπὶ τῆς ΕΤΧΗΣ, ἢ ὡς παρὰ χείρονος, ὡς ἐπὶ τῦ κυρίως καλεμένης ΠΡΟΣΤΑΞΕΩΣ· μόνον ΔΕ τὸ ΑΠΟΦΑΝΤΙΚΟΝ ἀπὸ τῶν γνωςικῶν, καὶ ἔςι τῦτο ἐξαγγελτικὸν τῆς γενομένης ἐν ἡμῖν γνώσεως τῶν πραγμάτων ἀληθῶς, ἢ φαινομένως, διὸ καὶ μόνον τῦτο δεκτικόν ἐςιν ἀληθείας ἢ ψεύδες, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων ἀδέν. The Meaning of the above paſſage being implied in the Text, we take its tranſlation from the *Latin* Interpreter. *Dicendum igitur eſt, cum anima noſtra duplicem poteſtatem habeat, cognitionis, & vitæ, quæ etiam appetitionis ac cupiditatis appellatur, quæ vero cognitionis eſt, vis eſt, quâ res ſingulas cognoſcimus, ut mens, cogitatio, opinio, phantaſia, ſenſus: appetitus vero facultas eſt, quâ bona, vel quæ ſunt, vel quæ videntur, concupiſcimus, ut ſunt voluntas, conſilium, ira, cupiditas: quatuor orationis ſpecies, præter enunciantem, a partibus animi proficiſcuntur, quæ concupiſcunt; non cum animus ipſe per ſe agit, ſed cum ad alium ſe convertit, qui ei ad conſequendum id, quod cupit, conducere poſſe videatur; atque etiam vel rationem ab eo exquirit, ut in oratione, quam* Percunctantem,

the Eneid to an Epigram of *Martial*. But the *longeſt Extenſion*, with which Grammar has to do, is the Extenſion here conſidered, that is to ſay, a SENTENCE. The greater Extenſions (ſuch as Syllogiſms, Paragraphs, Sections, and complete Works) belong not to Grammar, but to Arts of higher order; not to mention that all of them are but Sentences repeated. Ch. II.

NOW a SENTENCE (*c*) may be ſketch'd in the following deſcription—*a compound*

tem, *aut* Interrogantem *vocant*; *vel rem: ſique rem, vel cùm ipſum conſequi cupit, quicum loquitur, ut in* optante oratione, *vel aliquam ejus actionem:* atque in *hâc, vel ut a præſtantiore, ut in* Deprecatione; *vel ut ab inferiore,* ut *in eo, qui proprie* Juſſus *nominatur. Sola autem* Enuncians *a cognoſcendi facultate proficiſcitur: hæcque nunciat rerum cognitionem, quæ in nobis eſt, aut veram, aut ſimulatam. Itaque* Hæc ſola verum falſumque capit: *præterea vero nulla.* Ammon. in Libr. de Interpretatione.

(*c*) Λόγος δὲ φωνὴ συνθετὴ σημαντικὴ, ἧς ἔνια μέρη καθ' ἑαυτὰ σημαίνει τι. Ariſt. Poet. c. 20. See alſo de Interpret. c. 4.

Ch. II. *Quantity of Sound ſignificant, of which certain Parts are themſelves alſo ſignificant.*

THUS when I ſay [*the Sun ſhineth*] not only the *whole quantity* of ſound has a meaning, but *certain Parts* alſo, ſuch as [*Sun*] and [*ſhineth.*]

BUT what ſhall we ſay? Have theſe Parts again other Parts, which are in like manner ſignificant, and ſo may the progreſs be purſued to infinite? Can we ſuppoſe all Meaning, like Body, to be diviſible, and to include within itſelf other Meanings without end? If this be abſurd, then muſt we neceſſarily admit, that there is ſuch a thing as *a Sound ſignificant, of which no Part is of itſelf ſignificant.* And this is what we call the proper character of a (*d*) WORD. For thus, though the Words

(*d*) Φωνὴ σημαντικὴ,—ἧς μέρος τι ἐδέν ἐςι καθ' ἀυτὸ σημαντικόν. De Poetic. c. 20. De Interpret. c. 2 & 3. *Priſcian's* Definition of a Word (Lib. 2.) is as follows

Words [*Sun*] and [*ſhineth*] have each a Meaning, yet is there certainly no Meaning in any of their Parts, neither in the Syllables of the one, nor in the Letters of the other. Ch. II.

IF therefore ALL SPEECH, whether in proſe or verſe, every Whole, every Section, every Paragraph, every Sentence, imply a certain *Meaning, diviſible into other Meanings*, but WORDS imply a *Meaning, which is not ſo diviſible:* it follows that WORDS *will be the ſmalleſt parts of ſpeech*, in as much as nothing leſs has any Meaning at all.

follows.—*Dictio eſt pars minima orationis conſtructæ, id eſt, in ordine compoſitæ. Pars autem, quantum ad totum intelligendum, id eſt, ad totius ſenſus intellectum. Hoc autem ideo dictum eſt, nequis conetur* vires *in duas partes dividere, hoc eſt, in* vi & res; *non enim ad totum intelligendum hæc fit diviſio.* To *Priſcian* we may add *Theodore Gaza.*—Λέξις δὲ, μέρος ἐλάχιστον κατὰ σύνταξιν λόγου. Introd. Gram. l. 4. *Plato* ſhewed them this characteriſtic of a Word—See *Cratylus*, p. 385. Edit. Serr.

Ch. II. *To know therefore the ſpecies of Words,* muſt needs contribute *to the knowledge of Speech,* as it implies a knowledge of its *minuteſt* Parts.

THIS therefore muſt become our next Inquiry.

CHAP.

CHAP. III.

Concerning the ſpecies of Words, the ſmalleſt Parts of Speech.

LET us firſt ſearch for the *Species* of Words among thoſe Parts of Speech, commonly received by Grammarians. For example, in one of the paſſages above cited.— Ch. III.

The Man, that hath no muſic in himſelf,
And is not mov'd with concord of ſweet ſounds,
Is fit for treaſons—

Here the Word [*The*] is an ARTICLE;— [*Man*] [*No*] [*Muſic*] [*Concord*] [*Sweet*] [*Sounds*] [*Fit*] [*Treaſons*] are all NOUNS, ſome *Subſtantive*, and ſome *Adjective*— [*That*] and [*Himſelf*] are PRONOUNS— [*Hath*] and [*is*] are VERBS—[*moved*] a PARTICIPLE — [*Not*] an ADVERB— [*And*] a CONJUNCTION — [*In*] [*with*] and

Ch. III. and [*For*] are PREPOSITIONS. In one ſentence we have all thoſe Parts of Speech, which the *Greek* Grammarians are found to acknowledge. The *Latins* only differ in having no Article, and in ſeparating the INTERJECTION, as a Part of itſelf, which the *Greeks* include among the Species of *Adverbs*.

WHAT then ſhall we determine? why are there not more Species of Words? why ſo many? or if neither more nor fewer, why theſe and not others?

TO reſolve, if poſſible, theſe ſeveral Queries, let us examine any Sentence that comes in our way, and ſee what differences we can diſcover in its Parts. For example, the ſame Sentence above,

The Man that hath no Muſic, &c.

ONE Difference ſoon occurs, that ſome Words are *variable*, and others *invariable*. Thus the Word *Man* may be varied into *Man's* and *Men*; *Hath*, into *Have*, *Haſt*, *Had*,

Had, &c. *Sweet* into *Sweeter* and *Sweeteſt*; *Fit* into *Fitter* and *Fitteſt*. On the contrary, the Words, *The*, *In*, *And*, and ſome others, remain as they are, and *cannot be altered*. Ch. III.

AND yet it may be queſtioned, how far this Difference is eſſential. For in the firſt place, there are Variations, which can be hardly called neceſſary, becauſe only ſome Languages have them, and others have them not. Thus the *Greeks* have the *dual* Variation, which is unknown both to the Moderns and to the ancient *Latins*. Thus the *Greeks* and *Latins* vary their Adjectives by the *triple Variation* of Gender, Caſe, and Number; whereas the *Engliſh* never vary them in any of thoſe ways, but thro' all kinds of Concord preſerve them ſtill the ſame. Nay even thoſe very Variations, which appear moſt neceſſary, may have their places ſupplied by other methods; ſome by *Auxiliars*, as when for *Bruti*, or *Bruto*, we ſay, *of Brutus*, *to Brutus*;

Ch. III. *Brutus*; ſome *by meer Poſition*, as when for *Brutum amavit Caſſius*, we ſay, *Caſſius lov'd Brutus*. For here the *Accuſative*, which in *Latin* is known *any where* from its *Variation*, is in *Engliſh* only known from its *Poſition* or place.

If then the Diſtinction of Variable and Invariable will not anſwer our purpoſe, let us look farther for ſome other more eſſential.

Suppose then we ſhould diſſolve the Sentence above cited, and view its ſeveral *Parts* as they ſtand *ſeparate* and detached. Some 'tis plain *ſtill preſerve a Meaning* (ſuch as *Man*, *Muſic*, *Sweet*, &c.) others on the contrary *immediately loſe it* (ſuch as, *And*, *The*, *With*, &c.) Not that theſe laſt have no meaning at all, but in fact they never have it, but when *in company*, or *aſſociated*.

Now it ſhould ſeem that this Diſtinction, if any, was eſſential. For all Words

Words are ſignificant, or elſe they would not be Words; and if every thing not *abſolute*, is of courſe *relative*, then will all Words be ſignificant either *abſolutely* or *relatively*. Ch. III.

WITH reſpect therefore to this Diſtinction, the firſt ſort of Words may be call'd *ſignificant by themſelves*; the latter may be call'd *ſignificant by relation*; or if we like it better, the firſt ſort may be call'd *Principals*, the latter *Acceſſories*. The firſt are like thoſe ſtones in the baſis of an Arch, which are able to ſupport themſelves, even when the Arch is deſtroyed; the latter are like thoſe ſtones in its Summit or Curve, which can no longer ſtand, than while the whole ſubſiſts (*e*).

§ THIS

(*e*) *Apollonius* of *Alexandria* (one of the acuteſt Authors that ever wrote on the ſubject of Grammar) illuſtrates the different power of Words, by the different power of Letters. Ἔτι, ὃν τρόπον τῶν στοιχείων τὰ μέν ἐστι φωνήεντα, ἃ καθ' ἑαυτὰ φωνὴν ἀποτελεῖ· τὰ

Ch. III. § This Diſtinction being admitted, we thus purſue our Speculations. All things what-

τὰ δὲ σύμφωνα, ἅπερ ἄνευ τῶν φωνηέντων οὐκ ἔχει ῥητὴν τὴν ἐκφώνησιν. τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐστὶν ἐπινοῆσαι καὶ περὶ τῶν λέξεων. αἱ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν, τρόπον τινὰ τῶν φωνηέντων, ῥηταί εἰσι· καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ῥημάτων, ὀνομάτων, ἀντωνυμιῶν, ἐπιῤῥημάτων·—αἱ δὲ, ὥσπερεὶ σύμφωνα, ἀναμένουσι τὰ φωνήεντα, ἃ δυνάμενα κατ' ἰδίαν ῥητὰ εἶναι—καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν προθέσεων, τῶν ἄρθρων, τῶν συνδέσμων· τὰ γὰρ τοιαῦτα ἀεὶ τῶν μορίων συσσημαίνει. *In the ſame manner, as of the Elements or Letters, ſome are Vowels, which of themſelves complete a Sound; others are Conſonants, which without the help of Vowels have no expreſs Vocality; ſo likewiſe may we conceive as to the nature of Words. Some of them, like Vowels, are of themſelves expreſſive, as is the caſe of Verbs, Nouns, Pronouns, and Adverbs; others, like Conſonants, wait for their Vowels, being unable to become expreſſive by their own proper ſtrength, as is the caſe of Prepoſitions, Articles, and Conjunctions; for theſe parts of Speech are always Conſignificant, that is, are only ſignificant, when aſſociated to ſomething elſe.* Apollon. de Syntaxi. L. 1. c. 3. *Itaque quibuſdam philoſophis placuit* NOMEN & VERBUM SOLAS ESSE PARTES ORATIONIS; *cætera vero,* ADMINICULA *vel* JUNCTURAS *earum: quomodo navium partes ſunt tabulæ & trabes, cætera autem (id eſt, cera, ſtuppa, & clavi & ſimilia) vincula & conglutina-*

whatever either *exiſt as the Energies, or* Ch. III.
Affections, of ſome other thing, or *without being the Energies or Affections of ſome other thing.* If they exiſt *as the Energies or Affections of ſomething elſe,* then are they called ATTRIBUTES. Thus *to think* is the attribute of a Man; *to be white,* of a Swan; *to fly,* of an Eagle; *to be four-footed,* of a Horſe. If they exiſt *not after this manner,* then are they call'd SUBSTANCES*. Thus *Man, Swan, Eagle,* and *Horſe,* are none of them Attributes, but all Subſtances, becauſe however they may exiſt in Time and Place, yet neither of theſe, nor of any thing elſe, do they exiſt as Energies or Affections.

AND

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tiones partium navis (hoc eſt, tabularum & trabium) non partes navis dicuntur. Priſc. L. XI. 913.

* SUBSTANCES.] Thus Ariſtotle. Νῦν μὲν ἓν τύπῳ εἴρηται, τί ποτ' ἐστὶν ἡ οὐσία, ὅτι τὸ μὴ καθ' ὑποκειμένου, ἀλλὰ καθ' ἃ τὰ ἄλλα. Metaph. Z. γ. p. 106. Ed. Sylb.

Ch. III. AND thus all things whatſoever, being either (*f*) *Subſtances* or *Attributes*, it follows of courſe that all Words, *which are ſignificant as Principals*, muſt needs be ſignificant of either the one or the other. If they are *ſignificant of Subſtances*, they are call'd *Subſtantives*; if *of Attributes*, they are call'd *Attributives*. So that ALL WORDS *whatever, ſignificant as Principals, are either* SUBSTANTIVES *or* ATTRIBUTIVES.

AGAIN, as to Words, which are only ſignificant as *Acceſſories*, they acquire a Signification either from being aſſociated *to one Word*, or elſe *to many*. If *to one Word alone*, then as they can do no more than in ſome manner *define* or *determine*, they may juſtly for that reaſon be called DE-

(*f*) This diviſion of things into *Subſtance* and *Attribute* ſeems to have been admitted by Philoſophers of all Sects and Ages. See *Categor.* c. 2. *Metaphyſ.* L. VII. c. 1. *De Cœlo*, L. III. c. 1.

DEFINITIVES. If *to many Words at once*, then as they ſerve to no other purpoſe than *to connect*, they are called for that reaſon by the name of CONNECTIVES. Ch. III.

AND thus it is that all WORDS whatever are either *Principals* or *Acceſſories*; or under other Names, either *ſignificant from themſelves*, or *ſignificant by relation*. —If *ſignificant from themſelves*, they are either *Subſtantives* or *Attributives*; if *ſignificant by relation*, they are either *Definitives* or *Connectives*. So that under one of theſe four Species, SUBSTANTIVES, ATTRIBUTIVES, DEFINITIVES, and CONNECTIVES, *are* ALL WORDS, *however different, in a manner included.*

IF any of theſe Names ſeem new and unuſual, we may introduce others more uſual, by calling the *Subſtantives*, NOUNS; the *Attributives*, VERBS; the *Definitives*, ARTI-

Ch. III. ARTICLES; and the *Connectives*, CONJUNCTIONS.

SHOU'D it be aſk'd, what then becomes of *Pronouns*, *Adverbs*, *Prepoſitions*, and *Interjections*; the anſwer is, either they muſt be found included within the Species above-mentioned, or elſe muſt be admitted for ſo many Species by themſelves.

§ THERE were various opinions in ancient days, as to the *number* of theſe Parts, or Elements of Speech.

Plato in his * Sophiſt mentions only two, the *Noun* and the *Verb*. *Ariſtotle* mentions no more, where he treats of † Propoſitions. Not that thoſe acute Philoſophers were ignorant of the other Parts, but they ſpoke with reference to *Logic* or *Dia-*

* Tom. I. p. 261. Edit. Ser.

† De Interpr. c. 2 & 3.

Dialectic (*g*), conſidering the Eſſence of Speech as contained in theſe two, becauſe *theſe alone* combined make a perfect *aſſertive* Sentence, which none of the reſt without them are able to effect. Hence therefore *Ariſtotle* in his * *treatiſe of Poetry* (where he was to lay down the elements Ch. III.

(*g*) *Partes igitur orationis ſunt ſecundum Dialecticos duæ*, NOMEN & VERBUM; *quia hæ ſolæ etiam per ſe conjunctæ plenam faciunt orationem*; *alias autem partes* συνκαταηγορήματα, *hoc eſt, conſignificantia appellabant.* Priſcian. l. 2. p. 574. Edit. Putſchii. *Exiſtit hic quædam quæſtio, cur duo tantum,* NOMEN & VERBUM, *ſe (Ariſtoteles ſc.) determinare promittat, cum plures partes orationis eſſe videantur. Quibus hoc dicendum eſt, tantum Ariſtotelem hoc libro diffiniſſe, quantum illi ad id, quod inſtituerat tractare, ſuffecit. Tractat namque de ſimplici enuntiativa oratione, quæ ſcilicet hujuſmodi eſt, ut junctis tantum Verbis et Nominibus componatur.—Quare ſuperfluum eſt quærere, cur alias quoque, quæ videntur orationis partes, non propoſuerit, qui non totius ſimpliciter orationis, ſed tantum ſimplicis orationis inſtituit elementa partiri.* Boetius in Libr. de Interpretat. p. 295. *Apollonius* from the above principles elegantly calls the NOUN and VERB, τὰ ἐμψυχότατα μέρη τῦ λόγυ, *the moſt animated parts of Speech.* De Syntaxi, l. 1. c. 3. p. 24. See alſo *Plutarch. Quæſt. Platon. p.* 1009.

* Poet. Cap. 20.

Ch. III. ments of a more variegated ſpeech) adds the *Article* and *Conjunction* to the Noun and Verb, and ſo adopts the ſame Parts, with thoſe eſtabliſhed in this Treatiſe. To *Ariſtotle*'s authority (if indeed better can be required) may be added that alſo of the elder *Stoics* (*b*).

THE latter *Stoics* inſtead of four Parts made five, by dividing the Noun into the *Appellative* and *Proper*. Others increaſed the number, by detaching the *Pronoun* from the Noun; the *Participle* and *Adverb* from the Verb; and the *Prepoſition* from the Conjunction. The *Latin Grammarians* went farther, and detached *the Interjection* from the Adverb, within which by the *Greeks* it was always included, as a Species.

WE

(*b*) For this we have the authority of *Dionyſius* of *Halicarnaſſus*, *De Struct. Orat. Sect.* 2. whom *Quintilian* follows, *Inſt. l.* 1. *c.* 4. *Diogenes Laertius* and *Priſcian* make them always to have admitted five Parts. See *Priſcian*, as before, and *Laertius*, *Lib. VII. Segm.* 57.

WE are told indeed by (*i*) *Dionyſius* of *Halicarnaſſus* and *Quintilian*, that *Ariſtotle*, with *Theodectes*, and the more early writers, held but *three* Parts of ſpeech, the *Noun*, the *Verb*, and the *Conjunction*. This, it muſt be owned, accords with the oriental Tongues, whoſe Grammars (we are (*k*) told) admit no other. But as to *Ariſtotle*, we have his own authority to aſſert the contrary, who not only enumerates the *four* Species which we have adopted, but aſcertains them each by a proper Definition *. Ch. III.

(*i*) See the places quoted in the note immediately preceding.

(*k*) *Antiquiſſima eorum eſt opinio, qui tres claſſes faciunt. Eſtque hæc Arabum quoque ſententia—Hebræi quoque (qui, cum Arabes Grammaticam ſcribere deſinerent, artem eam demum ſcribere cœperunt, quod ante annos contigit circiter quadringentos) Hebræi, inquam, hac in re ſecuti ſunt magiſtros ſuos Arabes.—Immo vero trium claſſium numerum aliæ etiam Orientis linguæ retinent. Dubium, utrum eâ in re Orientales imitati ſunt antiquos Græcorum, an hi potius ſecuti ſunt Orientalium exemplum. Utut eſt, etiam veteres Græcos tres tantum partes agnoviſſe, non ſolum autor eſt Dionyſius*, &c. Voſſ. de Analog. l. 1. c. 1. See alſo *Sanctii Minerv. l.* 1. c. 2.

* Sup. p. 34.

Ch. III. To conclude—the Subject of the following Chapters will be a distinct and separate consideration of the NOUN, the VERB, the ARTICLE, and the CONJUNCTION; which four, the better (as we apprehend) to express their respective natures, we chuse to call SUBSTANTIVES, ATTRIBUTIVES, DEFINITIVES, and CONNECTIVES.

CHAP.

CHAP. IV.

Concerning Subſtantives, properly ſo called.

SUBSTANTIVES are *all thoſe principal Words, which are ſignificant of Subſtances, conſidered as Subſtances.* Ch. IV.

THE firſt ſort of *Subſtances* are the NATURAL, ſuch as Animal, Vegetable, Man, Oak.

THERE are other Subſtances *of our own making*. Thus by giving a Figure *not natural* to *natural* Materials, we create ſuch Subſtances, as Houſe, Ship, Watch, Teleſcope, *&c.*

AGAIN, by a *more refined operation of our Mind alone*, we *abſtract any Attribute* from its neceſſary ſubject, and conſider it *apart*, devoid of its dependence. For example, from Body we abſtract *to Fly*;

Ch. IV. from Surface, *the being White*; from Soul, *the being Temperate*.

AND thus it is *we convert even Attributes into Subſtances*, denoting them on this occaſion by proper *Subſtantives*, ſuch as *Flight*, *Whiteneſs*, *Temperance*; or elſe by others more general, ſuch as *Motion*, *Colour*, *Virtue*. Theſe we call ABSTRACT SUBSTANCES; the ſecond ſort we call ARTIFICIAL.

Now all thoſe ſeveral Subſtances have their Genus, their Species, and their Individuals. For example, in *natural* Subſtances, *Animal* is a Genus; *Man*, a Species; *Alexander*, an Individual. In *artificial* Subſtances, *Edifice* is a Genus; *Palace*, a Species; *the Vatican*, an Individual. In *abſtract* Subſtances, *Motion* is a Genus; *Flight*, a Species; *this Flight or that Flight* are Individuals.

Ch. IV.

As therefore every (*a*) GENUS may be found *whole and intire in each one of its Species*; (for thus Man, Horſe, and Dog, are each of them diſtinctly a complete and intire Animal) and as every SPECIES may be found *whole and intire in each one of its Individuals*; (for thus *Socrates*, *Plato*, and *Xenophon*, are each of them completely and diſtinctly *a Man*) hence it is, that every *Genus*, tho' ONE, is multiplied into MANY; and every *Species*, tho' ONE, is alſo multiplied into MANY, by *reference to thoſe beings, which are their proper ſubordinates*. Since then *no individual has any ſuch ſubordinates*, it can never in ſtrictneſs be conſidered as MANY, and ſo is truly an INDIVIDUAL as well in *Nature* as in *Name*.

(*a*) This is what *Plato* ſeems to have expreſſed in a manner ſomewhat myſterious, when he talks of μίαν ἰδέαν διὰ πολλῶν, ἑνὸς ἑκάστου κειμένου χωρὶς, πάντη διατεταμένην—καὶ πολλὰς, ἑτέρας ἀλλήλων, ὑπὸ μιᾶς ἔξωθεν περιεχομένας. *Sophiſt. p.* 253. *Edit. Serrani.* For the common definition of Genus and Species, ſee the Iſagoge or Introduction of *Porphyry* to *Ariſtotle*'s Logic.

Ch. IV. FROM theſe Principles it is, that *Words* following the nature and genius of *Things*, *ſuch Subſtantives* admit of NUMBER as denote *Genera* or *Species*, while thoſe, which denote (*b*) Individuals, in ſtrictneſs admit it not.

BESIDES

(*b*) Yet ſometimes *Individuals* have plurality or *Number*, from the cauſes following. In the firſt place the Individuals of the human race are ſo large a multitude, even in the ſmalleſt nation, that it would be difficult to invent a new Name for every new-born Individual. Hence then inſtead of *one* only being call'd *Marcus*, and *one* only *Antonius*, it happens that *many* are called *Marcus* and many called *Antonius*; and thus 'tis the *Romans* had their Plurals, *Marci* and *Antonii*, as we in later days have our *Marks* and our *Anthonies*. Now the Plurals of this ſort may be well called *accidental*, becauſe it is merely by chance that the Names coincide.

There ſeems more reaſon for ſuch Plurals, as the *Ptolemies*, *Scipios*, *Catos*, or (to inſtance in modern names) the *Howards*, *Pelhams*, and *Montagues*; becauſe a *Race* or Family is like a *ſmaller ſort of Species*; ſo that the *family Name* extends to the Kindred, as the ſpecific Name extends to the Individuals.

A third cauſe which contributed to make proper Names become Plural, was the *high Character* or *Eminence* of ſome one Individual, whoſe *Name* became afterwards a kind of *common Appellative*, to denote all

BESIDES *Number*, another character- Ch. IV.
iſtic, viſible in Subſtances, is that of SEX. Every Subſtance is either *Male* or *Female*; or *both Male and Female*; or *neither one nor the other*. So that with reſpect to *Sexes* and their *Negation*, *all Subſtances conceiveable* are comprehended under this *fourfold* conſideration.

Now the exiſtence of *Hermaphrodites* being rare, if not doubtful; hence Language, only regarding thoſe diſtinctions which

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thoſe, who had pretenſions to merit in the ſame way. Thus every great *Critic* was call'd an *Ariſtarchus*; every great *Warrior*, an *Alexander*; every great *Beauty*, a *Helen*, &c.

A DANIEL *come to Judgment! yea a* DANIEL, cries *Shylock* in the Play, when he would expreſs the wiſdom of the young Lawyer.

So *Martial* in that well known verſe,

Sint MÆCENATES, *non deerunt, Flacce,* MARONES.

So *Lucilius*,

ΑΙΓΙΛΙΠΟΙ *montes*, ÆTHNÆ *omnes*, *aſperi* ATHONES.

πόσοι ΦΑΕΘΟΝΤΕΣ, ἢ ΔΕΥΚΑΛΙΩΝΕΣ. Lucian in Timon. T. I. p. 108.

Ch. IV. which are more obvious, conſiders *Words denoting Subſtances* to be either MASCULINE, FEMININE, or NEUTER *.

As to our own Species, and all thoſe animal Species, *which have reference to common Life*, or of which the Male and the Female, by their ſize, form, colour, *&c.* are *eminently diſtinguiſhed*, moſt Languages have different Subſtantives, to denote the Male and the Female. But as to thoſe animal Species, which either *leſs frequently occur*, or of which one Sex is *leſs apparently diſtinguiſhed* from the other, in theſe a ſingle Subſtantive commonly ſerves for both Sexes.

IN

* After this manner they are diſtinguiſhed by *Ariſtotle*. Τῶν ὀνομάτων τὰ μὲν ἄῤῥενα, τὰ δὲ θήλεα, τὰ δὲ μεταξύ. Poet. cap. 21. *Protagoras* before him had eſtabliſhed the ſame Diſtinction, calling them ἄῤῥενα, θήλεα, καὶ σκεύη. Ariſtot. Rhet. L. III. c. 5. Where mark what were afterwards called ἀδέτερα, or Neuters, were by theſe called τὰ μεταξὺ καὶ σκεύη.

† IN the *Engliſh* Tongue it ſeems a general rule (except only when infringed by a figure of Speech) that no Subſtantive is *Maſculine*, but what denotes a *Male animal Subſtance*; none *Feminine*, but what denotes a *Female animal Subſtance*; and that where the Subſtance *has no Sex*, the Subſtantive is always *Neuter*. Ch. IV.

BUT 'tis not ſo in *Greek*, *Latin*, and many of the *modern* Tongues. Theſe all of them have Words, ſome maſculine, ſome feminine (and thoſe too in great multitudes) which have reference to Subſtances, where Sex never had exiſtence. To give one inſtance for many. MIND is ſurely neither male, nor female; yet is ΝΟΥΣ, in *Greek*, maſculine, and MENS, in *Latin*, feminine.

IN

† *Nam quicquid per Naturam Sexui non adſignatur, neutrum haberi oporteret, ſed id Ars*, &c. Conſent. apud Putſch. p. 2023, 2024.

The whole Paſſage from *Genera Hominum, quæ naturalia ſunt*, &c. is worth peruſing.

Ch. IV. In ſome Words theſe diſtinctions ſeem owing to nothing elſe, than to the mere caſual ſtructure of the Word itſelf: It is of ſuch a Gender, from having ſuch a Termination; or from belonging perhaps to ſuch a Declenſion. In others we may imagine a more ſubtle kind of reaſoning, a reaſoning which diſcerns, even *in things without Sex*, a diſtant analogy to that great NATURAL DISTINCTION, *which* (according to *Milton*) *animates the World* ‡.

In this view we may conceive ſuch SUBSTANTIVES to have been conſidered as MASCULINE, which were "conſpicuous for the Attributes of imparting or "communicating; or which were by nature active, ſtrong, and efficacious, and "that indiſcriminately whether to good "or to ill; or which had claim to Eminence, either laudable or otherwiſe."

THE

‡ Mr. *Linnæus*, the celebrated Botaniſt, has traced the *Diſtinction of Sexes* throughout the whole *Vegetable World*, and made it the Baſis of his Botanic Method.

THE FEMININE on the contrary were Ch. IV.
" ſuch, as were conſpicuous for the At-
" tributes either of receiving, of con-
" taining, or of producing and bringing
" forth; or which had more of the paſ-
" ſive in their nature, than of the active;
" or which were peculiarly beautiful
" and amiable; or which had reſpect to
" ſuch Exceſſes, as were rather Femi-
" nine, than Maſculine."

UPON theſe Principles the two greater Luminaries were conſidered, one as Maſculine, the other as Feminine; the SUN (Ἥλιος, *Sol*) as *Maſculine*, from communicating Light, which was native and original, as well as from the vigorous warmth and efficacy of his Rays; the MOON (Σελήνη, *Luna*) as *Feminine*, from being the Receptacle only of another's Light, and from ſhining with rays more delicate and ſoft.

THUS

Ch. IV. THUS *Milton*,

Firſt in HIS *Eaſt the glorious Lamp was ſeen,*
Regent of Day, and all th' Horizon round
Inveſted with bright rays; jocund to run
HIS *longitude thro' Heav'n's high road: the gray*
Dawn, and the Pleiades before HIM *danc'd,*
Shedding ſweet influence. Leſs bright the Moon
But oppoſite, in levell'd Weſt was ſet,
HIS *mirrour, with full face borrowing* HER *Light*
From HIM; *for other light* SHE *needed none.*
P. L. VII. 370.

BY *Virgil* they were conſidered as *Brother* and *Siſter*, which ſtill preſerves the ſame diſtinction.

Nec FRATRIS *radiis obnoxia ſurgere* LUNA.
G. I. 396.

THE SKY or ETHER is in *Greek* and *Latin Maſculine*, as being the ſource of thoſe ſhowers, which impregnate the Earth.

The

* The EARTH on the contrary is univer- Ch. IV.
ſally *Feminine*, from being the grand *Receiver*, the grand *Container*, but above all from being the *Mother* (either mediately or immediately) of every ſublunary Subſtance, whether animal or vegetable.

THUS *Virgil*,

Tum PATER OMNIPOTENS *fœcundis imbribus* ÆTHER
CONJUGIS *in gremium* LÆTÆ *deſcendit, & omnes*
Magnus alit magno commixtus corpore fœtus.
G. II. 325.

THUS *Shakeſpear*,

——‡ COMMON MOTHER, *Thou*
Whoſe Womb unmeaſurable, and infinite Breaſt
Teems and feeds all—Tim. of Athens.

So *Milton*,

Whatever Earth, ALL-BEARING MOTHER, *yields.* P. L. V.

So

* Senecæ Nat. *Quæſt. III.* 14.

‡ Παμμῆτορ γῆ χαῖρε—Græc. Anth. p. 281.

Ch. IV.

So *Virgil*,

Non jam MATER *alit* TELLUS, *viresque miniſtrat* (*c*). Æn. XI. 71.

AMONG *artificial* Subſtances the SHIP (Ναῦς, *Navis*) is *feminine*, as being ſo eminently a *Receiver* and *Container* of various things, of Men, Arms, Proviſions, Goods, *&c.* Hence Sailors, ſpeaking of their Veſſel, ſay always, "SHE *rides at* "*anchor*," "SHE *is under ſail.*"

A CITY (Πόλις, *Civitas*) and a COUNTRY (Πατρὶς, *Patria*) are *feminine* alſo, by being (like the Ship) *Containers* and *Receivers*, and farther by being as it were the *Mothers* and *Nurſes* of their reſpective Inhabitants.

THUS

(*c*) —διὸ καὶ ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ τὴν ΓΗΣ φύσιν, ὡς ΘΗΛΥ καὶ ΜΗΤΕΡΑ νομίζεσιν· ΟΥΡΑΝΟΝ δὲ καὶ ΗΛΙΟΝ, καὶ εἴ τι τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων, ὡς ΓΕΝΩΝΤΑΣ καὶ ΠΑΤΕΡΑΣ προσαγορεύουσι. Ariſt. de Gener. Anim. l. c. 2.

Ch. IV.

THUS *Virgil*,

Salve, MAGNA PARENS FRUGUM, *Saturnia Tellus*,
MAGNA VIRUM—— Geor. II. 173.

So, in that Heroic Epigram on thoſe brave *Greeks*, who fell at *Chæronea*,

Γαῖα δὲ Πάτρις ἔχει κόλποις τῶν πλεῖσα καμόντων
Σώματα—
Their PARENT COUNTRY *in* HER *boſom holds*
Their wearied bodies.—*

So *Milton*,

The City, which Thou ſeeſt, no other deem
Than great and glorious Rome, QUEEN *of the Earth.* Par. Reg. L. IV.

As to the OCEAN, tho' from its being the *Receiver* of all Rivers, as well as the *Container*

* Demoſt. in Orat. de Coronâ.

Ch. IV. *Container* and *Productreſs* of ſo many Vegetables and Animals, it might juſtly have been made (like the Earth) *Feminine*; yet its *deep Voice* and *boiſterous Nature* have, in ſpight of theſe reaſons, prevailed to make it *Male*. Indeed the very ſound of *Homer*'s

——μέγα σθένος Ὠκεανοῖο,

would ſuggeſt to a hearer, even ignorant of its meaning, that the Subject was incompatible with *female* delicacy and ſoftneſs.

TIME (Χρόνος) *from his mighty Efficacy upon every thing around us*, is by the *Greeks* and *Engliſh* juſtly conſidered as *Maſculine*. Thus in that elegant diſtich, ſpoken by a decrepit old Man,

* Ὁ γὰρ Χρόνος μ' ἔκαμψε, τέκτων ὁ σοφὸς,
Ἅπαντα δ' ἐργαζόμενος ἀσθενέστερα †.
Me TIME *hath bent, that ſorry Artiſt,* HE
That ſurely makes, whate'er he handles,
worſe.

So

* Ω Χρόνε, παντοίων ζητῶν πανεπίσκοπε Δαῖμον. Græc. Anth. p. 290.

† Stob. Ecl. p. 591.

So too *Shakeſpear*, ſpeaking likewiſe of TIME, Ch. IV.

Orl. *Whom doth* HE *gallop withal?*
Roſ. *With a thief to the gallows.*—
As you like it.

THE *Greek* Θάνατος or Ἅιδης, and the *Engliſh* DEATH, ſeem from the ſame irreſiſtible Power to have been conſidered as *Maſculine*. Even the Vulgar with us are ſo accuſtomed to this notion, that a FEMALE DEATH they would treat as ridiculous (*d*).

TAKE a few examples of the maſculine Death.

(*d*) Well therefore did *Milton* in his Paradiſe Loſt not only adopt DEATH as a *Perſon*, but conſider him as *Maſculine*: in which he was ſo far from introducing a Phantom of his own, or from giving it a *Gender not ſupported by Cuſtom*, that perhaps he had as much *the Sanction of national Opinion* for his *Maſculine Death*, as the ancient Poets had for many of their Deities.

Ch. IV. *Callimachus* upon the Elegies of his Friend *Heraclitus*—

Αἱ δὲ τεαὶ ζώουσιν ἀηδονες, ἧσιν ὁ πάντων
Ἁρπάκτηρ Ἀΐδης οὐκ ἐπὶ χεῖρα βαλεῖ.

——*yet thy ſweet warbling ſtrains*
Still live immortal, nor on them ſhall DEATH
HIS *hand e'er lay, tho' Ravager of all.*

IN the *Alceſtis* of *Euripides*, Θάνατος or DEATH is one of the Perſons of the drama; the beginning of the play is made up of dialogue between *Him* and *Apollo*; and towards its end, there is a fight between *Him* and *Hercules*, in which *Hercules* is conqueror, and reſcues *Alceſtis* from his hands.

IT is well known too, that SLEEP and DEATH are made *Brothers* by *Homer*. It was to this old *Gorgias* elegantly alluded, when at the extremity of a long life he lay ſlumbering on his Death-bed. A Friend aſked him, "*How he did?*"——

"SLEEP

" SLEEP (replied the old Man) *is juſt* Ch. IV.
" *upon delivering me over to the care of*
" *his* BROTHER (*e*)."

THUS *Shakeſpear*, ſpeaking of Life,

——*merely Thou art Death's Fool;*
For HIM *Thou labour'ſt by thy flight to*
ſhun,
And yet run'ſt towards HIM *ſtill.*
Meaſ. for Meaſ.

So *Milton*,

Dire was the toſſing, deep the groans;
Deſpair
Tended the ſick, buſieſt from couch to couch:
And over them triumphant DEATH HIS
dart
Shook; but delay'd to ſtrike——
P. L. XI. 489 (*f*).

THE

(*e*) Ἤδη με Ο ΤΠΝΟΣ ἄρχεται παραλαμβάνεσθαι Τ' ΑΔΕΛΦΩΙ. Stob. Ecl. p. 600.

(*f*) Suppoſe in any one of theſe examples we introduce *a female Death*; ſuppoſe we read,

Ch. IV. THE ſupreme Being (GOD, Θεὸς, *Deus*, *Dieu*, &c.) is in all languages *Maſculine*, in as much as the maſculine Sex is the ſuperior and more excellent; and as He is the Creator of all, the Father of Gods and Men. Sometimes indeed we meet with ſuch words as Τὸ Πρῶτον, Τὸ Θεῖον, *Numen*, DEITY (which laſt we *Engliſh* join to a neuter, ſaying *Deity itſelf*) ſometimes I ſay we meet with theſe *Neuters*. The reaſon in theſe inſtances ſeems to be, that as GOD is prior to all things, both in dignity and in time, this Priority is better characterized and expreſt by a *Negation*, than by any of thoſe Diſtinctions which are *co-ordinate with ſome Oppoſite*, as Male for example is

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And over them triumphant Death HER *dart*
Shook, &c.

What a falling off! How are the nerves and ſtrength of the whole Sentiment weakened!

is co-ordinate with Female, Right with Left, *&c. &c.* (*g*). Ch.IV.

VIRTUE (Ἀρετὴ, *Virtus*) as well as moſt of its Species, are all *Feminine*, perhaps from their Beauty and amiable Appearance, which are not without effect even upon the moſt reprobate and corrupt.

(*g*) Thus *Ammonius*, ſpeaking on the ſame Subject —ΤΟ ΠΡΩΤΟΝ λέγομεν, ἐφ' ᾧ μὴ δὲ τῶν διὰ μυθολογίας παραδόντων ἡμῖν τὰς θεολογίας ἐτόλμησέ τις ἢ ἀῤῥενωπὸν, ἢ θυληπρεπῆ (lege θηλυπρεπῆ) διαμόρφωσιν φέρειν· καὶ τοῦτο εἰκότως· τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἄῤῥενι τὸ θῆλυ σύζυγον· τὸ (lege τῷ) δὲ ΠΑΝΤΗΙ ΑΠΛΩΣ ΑΙΤΙΩΙ σύζυγον ἀδέν. ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅταν ἀρσενικῶς ΤΟΝ ΘΕΟΝ ὀνομάζομεν, [παρὸς] τὸ σεμνότερον τῶν γενῶν τοῦ ὑφειμένου προτιμῶντες, οὕτως αὐτὸν προσαγορέυομεν. PRIMUM *dicimus, quod nemo etiam eorum, qui theologiam nobis fabularum integumentis obvolutam tradiderunt, vel maris vel fœminæ ſpecie fingere auſus eſt: idque merito:* conjugatum enim mari *fœmininum eſt.* CAUSÆ *autem omnino* ABSOLUTÆ AC SIMPLICI *nihil eſt conjugatum. Immo vero cum* DEUM *maſculino genere appellamus, ita ipſum nominamus, genus præſtantius ſubmiſſo atque humili præferentes.* Ammon. in Lib. de Interpr. p. 30. b.—ἀ γὰρ ἐναντίον τῷ Πρώτῳ ἀδέν. Ariſtot. Metaph. A. p. 210. Sylb.

Ch. IV. ——*abaſh'd the Devil ſtood,*
And felt how awful Goodneſs is, and ſaw
VIRTUE *in* her *ſhape how lovely; ſaw,*
and pin'd
His loſs——

P. L. IV. 846.

THIS being allowed, VICE (Κακία) becomes *Feminine* of courſe, as being, in the συζυγία, or Co-ordination of things, Virtue's natural Oppoſite (*b*).

THE Fancies, Caprices, and fickle Changes of FORTUNE would appear but awkwardly under a Character that was Male: but taken together they make a very

(*b*) They are both repreſented as *Females* by *Xenophon*, in the celebrated Story of *Hercules*, taken from *Prodicus*. See *Memorab.* L. II. c. 1. As to the συζυγία here mentioned, thus *Varro*——*Pythagoras Samius ait omnium rerum initia eſſa bina: ut finitum & infinitum, bonum & malum, vitam & mortem, diem & noctem.* De Ling. Lat. L. IV. See alſo *Ariſt. Metaph.* L. I. c. 5. and *Eccleſiaſticus*, Chap. lxii. ver. 24.

very natural *Female*, which has no ſmall Ch. IV.
reſemblance to the Coquette of a modern Comedy, beſtowing, withdrawing, and ſhifting her favours, as different Beaus ſucceed to her good graces.

Tranſmutat incertos honores,
Nunc mihi, nunc alii benigna. Hor.

WHY the FURIES were made *Female*, is not ſo eaſy to explain, unleſs it be that female Paſſions of all kinds were conſidered as ſuſceptible of greater exceſs, than male Paſſions; and that the *Furies* were to be repreſented, as Things ſuperlatively outrageous.

Talibus Alecto dictis exarſit in iras.
At Juveni oranti ſubitus tremor occupat artus:
Diriguere oculi: tot Erinnys ſibilat Hydris,
Tantaque ſe facies aperit: tum flammea torquens

Lumina

Ch. IV.

Lumina cunctantem & quærentem dicere plura
Repulit, & geminos erexit crinibus angues,
Verberaque inſonuit, rabidoque hæc addidit ore:
En! Ego victa ſitu, &c.

Æn. VII. 455 (*i*).

He

(*i*) The Words above mentioned, *Time*, *Death*, *Fortune*, *Virtue*, &c. in *Greek*, *Latin*, *French*, and moſt modern Languages, though they are diverſified with Genders in the manner deſcribed, yet never vary the Gender which they have once acquired, except in a few inſtances, where the Gender is doubtful. We cannot ſay ἡ ἀρετὴ or ὁ ἀρετὴ, *hæc Virtus* or *hic Virtus*, *la Vertu* or *le Vertu*, and ſo of the reſt. But it is otherwiſe in *Engliſh*. We in our own language ſay, Virtue is *its* own Reward, or Virtue is *her* own Reward; Time maintains *its* wonted Pace, or Time maintains *his* wonted Pace.

There is a ſingular advantage in this liberty, as it enables us to mark, with a peculiar force, the Diſtinction between the ſevere or *Logical* Stile, and the ornamental or *Rhetorical*. For thus when we ſpeak of the above Words, and of all others naturally devoid of Sex,

HE, that would ſee more on this Subject, may conſult *Ammonius* the Peripatetic, Ch. IV.

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as *Neuters*, we ſpeak of them *as they are*, and as becomes a *logical* Inquiry. When we give them *Sex*, by making them Maſculine or Feminine, they are from thenceforth *perſonified*; are a kind of *intelligent Beings*, and become, as ſuch, the proper ornaments either of *Rhetoric* or of *Poetry*.

Thus *Milton*,

——*The Thunder*,
Wing'd with red light'ning and impetuous rage,
Perhaps hath ſpent HIS *ſhafts*—— P. Loſt. I. 174.

The Poet, having juſt before called the *Hail*, and *Thunder*, God's *Miniſters of Vengeance*, and ſo perſonified them, had he afterwards ſaid *its* Shafts for *his* Shafts, would have deſtroyed his own Image, and approached withal ſo much nearer to Proſe.

The following Paſſage is from the ſame Poem.

Should intermitted Vengeance arm again
HIS *red right hand*—— P. L. II. 174.

In this Place *His* Hand is clearly preferable either to *Her's* or *Its*, by immediately referring us to *God himſelf*, the Avenger.

I ſhall

Ch. IV. tic, in his Commentary on the Treatiſe *de Interpretatione*, where the Subject is treated at large with reſpect to the *Greek* Tongue. We ſhall only obſerve, that as all ſuch Speculations are at beſt but Conjectures, they ſhould therefore be received

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I ſhall only give one inſtance more, and quit this Subject.

At his command th' up-rooted Hills retir'd
Each to HIS *place: they heard his voice and went*
Obſequious: Heav'n HIS *wonted face renew'd,*
And with freſh flourets Hill and Valley ſmil'd.
P. L. VI.

See alſo ver. 54, 55, of the ſame Book.

Here all things are perſonified; the Hills *hear*, the Valleys *ſmile*, and the *Face* of Heaven is renewed. Suppoſe then the Poet had been neceſſitated by the laws of his Language to have ſaid—*Each Hill retir'd to* ITS *Place—Heaven renewed* ITS *wonted face*—how proſaic and lifeleſs would theſe Neuters have appeared; how detrimental to the *Proſopopeia*, which he was aiming to eſtabliſh! In this therefore he was happy, that the Language, in which he wrote, impoſed no ſuch neceſſity; and he was too wiſe a Writer, to impoſe it on himſelf. It were to be wiſhed, his Correctors had been as wiſe on their parts.

ed with candour, rather than ſcrutinized with rigour. *Varro*'s words on a Subject near akin are for their aptneſs and elegance well worth attending. *Non mediocres enim tenebræ in ſilvâ, ubi hæc captanda; neque eò, quò pervenire volumus, ſemitæ tritæ; neque non in tramitibus quædam objecta, quæ euntem retinere poſſunt* *. Ch. IV.

To conclude this Chapter. We may collect from what has been ſaid, that both NUMBER and GENDER appertain to WORDS, becauſe in the firſt place they appertain to THINGS; that is to ſay, *becauſe Subſtances are Many, and have either Sex, or no Sex; therefore Subſtantives have Number, and are Maſculine, Feminine, or Neuter.* There is however this difference between the two Attributes: NUMBER in ſtrictneſs deſcends no lower, than to

* De Ling. Lat. L. IV.

Ch. IV. to *the laſt Rank of Species* (*k*): GENDER on the contrary ſtops not here, but deſcends to *every Individual*, however diverſified. And ſo much for SUBSTANTIVES, PROPERLY SO CALLED.

(*k*) The reaſon why *Number* goes no lower, is that it does not naturally appertain to *Individuals*; the cauſe of which ſee before, p. 39.

CHAP.

CHAP. V.

Concerning Subſtantives of the Secondary Order.

Ch. V.

WE are now to proceed to a SECONDARY RACE of SUBSTANTIVES, a Race quite different from any already mentioned, and whoſe Nature may be explained in the following manner.

EVERY Object which preſents itſelf to the Senſes or the Intellect, is either then perceived for the *firſt time*, or elſe is recognized as having been perceived *before*. In the former caſe it is called an Object τῆς πρώτης γνώσεως, *of the firſt knowledge* or *acquaintance* (*a*); in the latter

(*a*) See *Apoll. de Syntaxi*, l. 1. c. 16. p. 49. l. 2. c. 3. p. 103. Thus *Priſcian*—*Intereſt autem inter demonſtrationem & relationem hoc*; *quod demonſtratio, interrogationi reddita*, Primam Cognitionem *oſtendit*; Quis

Ch. V.

ter it is called an Object τῆς δευτέρας γνώσεως, *of the ſecond knowledge* or *acquaintance*.

Now as all Converſation paſſes between *Particulars* or *Individuals*, theſe will often happen to be reciprocally Objects τῆς πρώτης γνώσεως, that is to ſay, *till that inſtant unacquainted with each other*. What then is to be done? How ſhall the Speaker addreſs the other, when he knows not his Name? or how explain himſelf by his own Name, of which the other is wholly ignorant? Nouns, as they have been deſcribed, cannot anſwer the purpoſe. The firſt expedient upon this occaſion ſeems to have been Δεῖξις; that is, *Pointing*, or *Indication by the Finger or Hand*, ſome traces of which are ſtill to be obſerved, as a part of that Action, which naturally attends our ſpeaking. But the Authors of Language

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Quis fecit? Ego: *relatio vero* Secundam Cognitionem *ſignificat, ut*, Is, de quo jam dixi. *Lib. XII. p.* 936. *Edit. Putſchii.*

Language were not content with this. They invented a race of *Words to ſupply this Pointing*; which Words, *as they always ſtood for Subſtantives or Nouns*, were characterized by the Name of Ἀντωνυμίαι, or PRONOUNS (*b*). Theſe alſo they diſtinguiſhed into three ſeveral ſorts, calling them *Pronouns* of the *Firſt*, the *Second*, and the *Third Perſon*, with a view to certain diſtinctions, which may be explained as follows. Ch. V.

SUPPOSE the Parties converſing to be wholly unacquainted, neither Name nor Countenance on either ſide known, and the

(*b*) Ἐκεῖνο ἂν Ἀντωνυμία, τὸ μετὰ ΔΕΙΞΕΩΣ ἢ ἀναφορᾶς ANTONOMAZOMENON. Apoll. de Synt. L. II. c. 5. p. 106. *Priſcian* ſeems to conſider them ſo peculiarly deſtined to the expreſſion of *Individuals*, that he does not ſay they ſupply the place of *any* Noun, but that of the *proper* Name only. And this undoubtedly was their original, and ſtill is their true and natural uſe. PRONOMEN *eſt pars orationis, quæ pro* nomine proprio uniuſcujuſque *accipitur*. Priſc. L. XII. See alſo *Apoll.* L. II. c. 9. p. 117, 118.

Ch. V. the Subject of the Converſation to be *the Speaker himſelf*. Here, to ſupply the place of Pointing by a Word of *equal* Power, they furniſhed the Speaker with the *Pronoun*, I. *I write, I ſay, I deſire*, &c. and as the Speaker is always principal with reſpect to his own diſcourſe, this they called for that reaſon *the Pronoun of the Firſt Perſon*.

AGAIN, ſuppoſe the Subject of the Converſation to be *the Party addreſt*. Here for ſimilar reaſons they invented the *Pronoun*, THOU. *Thou writeſt, Thou walkeſt*, &c. and as the Party addreſt is next in dignity to the Speaker, or at leaſt comes next with reference to the diſcourſe; this Pronoun they therefore called *the Pronoun of the Second Perſon*.

LASTLY, ſuppoſe the Subject of Converſation neither the Speaker, nor the Party addreſt, but *ſome Third Object, different from both*. Here they provided another *Pronoun*, HE, SHE, or IT, which in

in diſtinction to the two former was called *the Pronoun of the Third Perſon.* Ch. V.

AND thus it was that *Pronouns* came to be diſtinguiſhed by their reſpective PERSONS (*c*).

As

(*c*) The Deſcription of the different PERSONS here given is taken from *Priſcian*, who took it from *Apollonius*. *Perſonæ Pronominum ſunt tres; prima, ſecunda, tertia.* Prima *eſt, cum ipſa, quæ loquitur*, de ſe pronuntiat; Secunda, *cum de eâ pronunciat*, ad quam directo ſermone loquitur; Tertia, *cum de eâ*, quæ nec loquitur, nec ad ſe directum accipit Sermonem. L. XII. p. 940. *Theodore Gaza* gives the ſame Diſtinctions. Πρῶτον (πρόσωπον ſc.) ᾧ περὶ ἑαυτῆς φράζει ὁ λέγων· δεύτερον, ᾧ περὶ τοῦ, πρὸς ὃν ὁ λόγος· τρίτον, ᾧ περὶ ἑτέρου. Gaz. Gram. L. IV. p. 152.

This account of *Perſons* is far preferable to the common one, which makes the Firſt the *Speaker*; the Second, the Party *addreſt*; and the Third, the *Subject*. For tho' the Firſt and Second be as commonly deſcribed, one the Speaker, the other the Party addreſt; yet till they become *ſubjects of the diſcourſe*, they have no exiſtence. Again as to the Third Perſon's being the *ſubject*, this is a character, which it *ſhares in common*

Ch. V. As to NUMBER, the Pronoun of each Perſon has it: (I) has the plural (WE), becauſe

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with both the other Perſons, and which can never therefore be called a peculiarity of its own. To explain by an inſtance or two. When *Eneas* begins the narrative of his adventures, *the ſecond Perſon* immediately appears, becauſe he makes *Dido*, whom he *addreſſes*, the immediate ſubject of his Diſcourſe.

Infandum, Regina, jubes, *renovare dolorem.*

From hence forward for 1500 Verſes (tho' ſhe be all that time the party addreſt) we hear nothing farther of this *Second Perſon*, a variety of other Subjects filling up the Narrative.

In the mean time the *Firſt Perſon* may be ſeen every where, becauſe the *Speaker* every where is himſelf the *Subject*. They were indeed Events, as he ſays himſelf,

—quæque ipſe miſerrima vidi,
Et quorum pars magna fui——

Not that the Second Perſon does not often occur in the courſe of this Narrative; but then it is always by a Figure of Speech, when thoſe, who by their abſence are in fact ſo many Third Perſons, are converted into Second

becauſe there may be many Speakers at once of the ſame Sentiment; as well as one, who, including himſelf, ſpeaks the Sentiment of many. (THOU) has the plural (YOU), becauſe a Speech may be ſpoken to many, as well as to one. (HE) has the plural (THEY), becauſe the Subject of diſcourſe is often many at once. Ch. V.

BUT tho' all theſe Pronouns have *Number*, it does not appear either in *Greek*, or *Latin*, or any modern Language, that thoſe of the firſt and ſecond Perſon carry the diſtinctions of SEX. The reaſon ſeems

cond Perſons by being introduced as *preſent*. The *real* Second Perſon (*Dido*) is never once hinted.

Thus far as to *Virgil*. But when we read *Euclid*, we find neither *Firſt* Perſon, nor *Second*, in any Part of the whole Work. The reaſon is, that neither Speaker nor Party addreſt (in which light we may always view the Writer and his Reader) can poſſibly become the Subject of pure Mathematics, nor indeed can any thing elſe, except abſtract Quantity, which neither ſpeaks itſelf, nor is ſpoken to by another.

Ch. V.

to be, that the Speaker and Hearer being generally preſent to each other, it would have been ſuperfluous to have marked a diſtinction by Art, which from Nature and even Dreſs was commonly (*d*) apparent on both ſides. But this does not hold with reſpect to the third Perſon, of whoſe Character and Diſtinctions, (including Sex among the reſt) we often know no more, than what we learn from the diſcourſe. And hence it is that in moſt Languages *the third Perſon* has its *Genders*, and that even *Engliſh* (which allows its Adjectives no Genders at all) has in this Pronoun the triple (*e*) diſtinction of *He*, *She*, and *It*.

HENCE

(*d*) *Demonſtratio ipſa ſecum genus oſtendit.* Priſcian. L. XII. p. 942. See *Apoll. de Syntax.* L. II. c. 7. p. 109.

(*e*) The Utility of this Diſtinction may be better found in ſuppoſing it away. Suppoſe for example we ſhould read in hiſtory theſe words—*He cauſed him to*

HENCE too we ſee the reaſon why *a* Ch. V.
ſingle Pronoun (*f*) to each Perſon, an *I*

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to deſtroy him—and that we were to be informed the [He], which is here thrice repeated, ſtood each time for ſomething different, that is to ſay, for a Man, for a Woman, and for a City, whoſe Names were *Alexander*, *Thais*, and *Perſepolis*. Taking the Pronoun in this manner, diveſted of its Genders, how would it appear, which was deſtroyed; which was the deſtroyer; and which the cauſe, that moved to the deſtruction? But there are not ſuch doubts, when we hear the Genders diſtinguiſhed; when inſtead of the ambiguous Sentence, *He* cauſed *him* to deſtroy *him*, we are told with the proper diſtinctions, that SHE *cauſed* HIM *to deſtroy* IT. Then we know with certainty, what before we could not: that the Promoter was the Woman; that her Inſtrument was the Hero; and that the Subject of their Cruelty was the unfortunate City.

(*f*) *Quæritur tamen cur prima quidem Perſona & ſecunda* ſingula *Pronomina habeant, tertiam vero* ſex diverſæ *indicent voces? Ad quod reſpondendum eſt, quod prima quidem & ſecunda Perſona ideo non egent diverſis vocibus, quod* ſemper præſentes inter ſe ſunt, & *demonſtrativæ; tertia vero Perſona modo demonſtrativa eſt, ut*, Hic, Iſte; *modo relativa, ut Is, Ipſe*, &c. Priſcian. L. XII. p. 933.

Ch. V. to the *Firſt*, and a *Thou* to the *Second*, are abundantly ſufficient to all the purpoſes of Speech. But it is not ſo with reſpect to the *Third* Perſon. The various relations of the various Objects exhibited by this (I mean relations of near and diſtant, preſent and abſent, ſame and different, definite and indefinite, *&c.*) made it neceſſary that here there ſhould not be one, but *many* Pronouns, ſuch as *He*, *This*, *That*, *Other*, *Any*, *Some*, &c.

It muſt be confeſſed indeed, that all theſe Words do not always appear as *Pronouns*. When they ſtand by themſelves, and repreſent ſome Noun, (as when we ſay, THIS *is Virtue*, or δειικτικῶς, *Give me* THAT) then are they *Pronouns*. But when they are aſſociated to ſome Noun (as when we ſay, THIS *Habit* is Virtue; or δειικτικῶς, THAT *Man* defrauded me) then as they ſupply not the place of a Noun, but only ſerve to aſcertain one, they fall rather into the Species of *Definitives* or *Articles*. That there is indeed

indeed a near relation between *Pronouns* and *Articles*, the old Grammarians have all acknowledged, and ſome words it has been doubtful to which Claſs to refer. The beſt rule to diſtinguiſh them is this —The genuine PRONOUN *always ſtands* by *itſelf*, aſſuming the *Power* of a Noun, and ſupplying its *place*—The genuine ARTICLE *never ſtands* by itſelf, but appears at all times aſſociated to ſomething elſe, requiring a Noun for its ſupport, as much as Attributives or (g) Adjectives. Ch. V.

As

(g) Τὸ Ἄρθρον μεῖὰ ὀνόμαῖ©, ϰ᾽ ἡ Ἀνῖωνυμία ἀνῖ ὀνόμαῖ©. THE ARTICLE *ſtands* WITH *a Noun*; *but* THE PRONOUN *ſtands* FOR *a Noun*. Apoll. L. I. c. 3. p. 22. Ἀυῖὰ ἂν τὰ ἄρθρα, τῆς πρὸς τὰ ὀνόμαῖα συναρτήσεως ἀποϛάντα, εἰς τὴν ὑποτεταγμένην ἀντωνυμίαν μεταπίπῖει. *Now Articles themſelves, when they quit their Connection with Nouns, paſs into ſuch Pronoun, as is proper upon the occaſion.* Ibid. Again—Ὅταν τὸ Ἄρθρον μὴ μετ᾽ ὀνόματ© παραλαμβάνηται, ποιήσῆαι δὲ σύνταξιν ὀνόματ©

Ch. V. As to the *Coaleſcence* of theſe Pronouns, it is, as follows. The Firſt or Second

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ματος ἣν προεκλεθείμεθα, ἐκ πάσης ἀνάγκης εἰς ἀνωνυμίαν μεταληφθήσεται, εἴγε ἐκ ἐγκινόμενον μετ' ὀνόματος δυνάμει ἀντὶ ὀνόματος παρελήφθη. *When the Article is aſſumed without the Noun, and has (as we explained before) the ſame Syntax, which the Noun has; it muſt of abſolute neceſſity be admitted for a Pronoun, becauſe it appears without a Noun, and yet is in power aſſumed for one.* Ejuſd. L. II. c. 8. p. 113. L. I. c. 45. p. 96. *Inter Pronomina & Articulos hoc intereſt, quod Pronomina ea putantur, quæ, cum ſola ſint, vicem nominis complent, ut* QUIS, ILLE, ISTE: *Articuli vero cum Pronominibus, aut Nominibus, aut Participiis adjunguntur.* Donat. Gram. p. 1753.

Priſcian, ſpeaking of the *Stoics*, ſays as follows: ARTICULIS *autem* PRONOMINA *connumerantes*, FINITOS *ea* ARTICULOS *appellabant; ipſos autem Articulos, quibus nos caremus*, INFINITOS ARTICULOS *dicebant. Vel, ut alii dicunt, Articulos connumerabant Pronominibus, &* ARTICULARIA *eos* PRONOMINA *vocabant*, &c. Priſc. L. I. p. 574. *Varro*, ſpeaking of *Quiſque* and *Hic*, calls them both ARTICLES, the firſt *indefinite*, the ſecond *definite*. *De Ling. Lat. L. VII.* See alſo L. IX. p. 132. *Voſſius* indeed in his Analogia *(L. I. c. 1.)* oppoſes this Doctrine, becauſe *Hic* has not the ſame power with the *Greek* Article,

Second will, either of them, by themſelves coaleſce with the Third, but not with each other. For example, it is good ſenſe, as well as good Grammar, to ſay in any Language—I AM HE—THOU ART HE—but we cannot ſay—I AM THOU—nor THOU ART I. The reaſon is, there is no abſurdity for the *Speaker* to be the *Subject* alſo of the Diſcourſe, as when we ſay, *I am He*; or for the *Perſon addreſt*; as when we ſay, *Thou art He*. But for the ſame Perſon, in the ſame circumſtances, to be at once the Speaker, and the Party addreſt, this is impoſſible; and ſo therefore is the Coaleſcence of the Firſt and Second Perſon. Ch. V.

AND now perhaps we have ſeen enough of *Pronouns*, to perceive how they differ from

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ticle, &c. But he did not enough attend to the antient Writers on this Subject, who conſidered all Words, as ARTICLES, which *being aſſociated to Nouns (and not ſtanding in their place) ſerved in any manner to aſcertain, and determine their Signification.*

Ch. V. from other Subſtantives. The others are *Primary*, theſe are their *Subſtitutes*; a kind of ſecondary Race, which were taken in aid, when for reaſons already (*b*) mentioned the others could not be uſed. It is moreover by means of theſe, and of *Articles*, which are nearly allied to them, that

(*b*) See theſe reaſons at the beginning of this chapter, of which reaſons the principal one is, that "no "Noun, properly ſo called, implies its own Preſence. "It is therefore *to aſcertain ſuch Preſence*, that the Pro- "noun is taken in aid; and hence it is it becomes "equivalent to δεῖξις, that is, to *Pointing or Indication* "*by the Finger.*" It is worth remarking in that Verſe of *Perſius*,

Sed pulchrum eſt DIGITO MONSTRARI, *& dicier*,
HIC EST.

how *the* δεῖξις, and *the Pronoun* are introduced togegether, and made to co-operate to the ſame end.

Sometimes by virtue of δεῖξις the Pronoun of the *third* Perſon ſtands for the *firſt*.

Quod ſi militibus parces, erit HIC *quoque Miles.*
That is, *I alſo will be a Soldier.*
Tibul. L. II. El. 6. v. 7. See *Vulpius.*

It

that "LANGUAGE, tho' in itſelf only "ſignificant of *general Ideas*, is brought "down to denote *that infinitude of Par-* "*ticulars*, which are for ever ariſing, and "ceaſing to be." But more of this hereafter in a proper place. Ch. V.

As to the three orders of Pronouns already mentioned, they may be called *Prepoſitive*, as may indeed all Subſtantives, becauſe they are capable of introducing or leading a Sentence, without having reference to any thing previous. But beſides thoſe there is ANOTHER PRONOUN (in

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It may be obſerved too, that even in Epiſtolary Correſpondence, and indeed in all kinds of Writing, where the Pronouns I and YOU make their appearance, there is a ſort of *implied Preſence*, which they are ſuppoſed to indicate, though the parties are in fact at ever ſo great a diſtance. And hence the riſe of that diſtinction in *Apollonius*, τὰς μὲν τῆν ὄψεων εἶναι δείξεις, τὰς δὲ τῦ νῦ, *that ſome Indications are ocular, and ſome are mental.* De Syntaxi, L. II. c. 3. p. 104.

Ch. V. (in *Greek* ὃς, ὅστις (*i*); in *Latin*, *Qui*; in *Engliſh*, *Who*, *Which*, *That*) a Pronoun having a character peculiar to itſelf, the nature of which may be explained as follows.

SUPPOSE I was to ſay—LIGHT *is a Body*, LIGHT *moves with great celerity*.—Theſe

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(*i*) The *Greeks*, it muſt be confeſt, call this Pronoun ὑποταχτικὸν ἄρθρον, *the ſubjunctive Article*. Yet, as it ſhould ſeem, this is but an improper Appellation. *Apollonius*, when he compares it to the προτακτικὸν or true *prepoſitive Article*, not only confeſſes it to differ, as being expreſt by a different Word, and having a different place in every Sentence; but in Syntax he adds, *it is wholly different*. De Syntax. L. I. c. 43. p. 91. *Theodore Gaza* acknowledges the ſame, and therefore adds——ὅθεν δὴ κ᾽ ἐ κυρίως ἂν εἴη ἄρθρον ταυτί——*for theſe reaſons this (meaning the Subjunctive) cannot properly be an Article*. And juſt before he ſays, κυρίως γε μὴν ἄρθρον τὸ προτακτικόν——*however properly ſpeaking it is the Prepoſitive is the Article*. Gram. Introd. L. IV. The Latins therefore have undoubtedly done better in ranging it with the Pronouns.

Theſe would apparently be two diſtinct Sentences. Suppoſe, inſtead of the Second, LIGHT, I were to place the prepoſitive Pronoun, IT, and ſay—LIGHT *is a Body*; IT *moves with great celerity*—the Sentences would ſtill be diſtinct and two. But if I add *a Connective* (as for Example an AND) ſaying—LIGHT *is a Body*, AND *it moves with great celerity*—I then by Connection make the two into one, as by cementing many Stones I make one Wall. Ch. V.

Now it is *in the united Powers of a Connective, and another Pronoun*, that we may ſee the force, and character of the Pronoun here treated. Thus therefore, if in the place of AND IT, we ſubſtitute THAT, or WHICH, ſaying LIGHT *is a Body*, WHICH *moves with great celerity* —the Sentence ſtill retains its *Unity* and *Perfection*, and becomes if poſſible more compact than before. We may with juſt reaſon therefore call this Pronoun the SUBJUNCTIVE, becauſe it cannot (like the

Ch. V. the Prepoſitive) introduce an original Sentence, but only *ſerves to ſubjoin one to ſome other, which is previous* (*k*).

THE

(*k*) Hence we ſee why the Pronoun here mentioned is always *neceſſarily* the Part of ſome *complex* Sentence, which Sentence contains, either expreſt or underſtood, *two* Verbs, and *two* Nominatives.

Thus in that Verſe of *Horace*,

QUI *metuens vivit, liber mihi non erit unquam.*

Ille non erit liber—is one Sentence; *qui metuens vivit*—is another. *Ille* and *Qui* are the *two Nominatives*; *Erit* and *Vivit*, the *two Verbs*; and ſo in all other inſtances.

The following paſſage from *Apollonius* (though ſomewhat corrupt in more places than one) will ſerve to ſhew, whence the above Speculations are taken. Τὸ ὑποτακτικὸν ἄρθρον ἐπὶ ῥῆμα ἴδιον φέρεται, συνδεδεμένον διὰ τῆς ἀναφορᾶς τῷ προκειμένῳ ὀνόματι· καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἁπλῶν λόγον ἀ παρισάνει καλὰ τὴν τῶν δύο ῥημάτων σύνταξιν (λέγω τὴν ἐν τῷ ὀνόματι, καὶ τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ ἄρθρῳ) ὅπερ πάλιν παρείπετο τῷ ΚΑΙ συνδέσμῳ. Κοινὸν μὲν (lege ΤΟ ΚΑΙ γὰρ κοινὸν μὲν) παρε-

THE Application of this SUBJUNCTIVE, like the other Pronouns, is univerſal. It may Ch. V.

παρελάμβανε τὸ ὄνομα τὸ προκείμενον, σύμπλεκον δὲ ἕτερον λόγον πάντως ἢ ἕτερον ῥῆμα παρελάμβανε, ἢ ἕτω τὸ, ΠΑΡΕΓΕΝΕΤΟ Ο ΓΡΑΜΜΑΤΙΚΟΣ, ΟΣ ΔΙΕΛΕΞΑΤΟ, δυνάμει τὸν αὐτὸν ἀποτελεῖ τῷ (forſ. τῷ) Ο ΓΡΑΜΜΑΤΙΚΟΣ ΠΑΡΕΓΕΝΕΤΟ, ΚΑΙ ΔΙΕΛΕΞΑΤΟ. *The ſubjunctive Article, (that is, the Pronoun here mentioned) is applied to a Verb of its own, and yet is connected withal to the antecedent Noun. Hence it can never ſerve to conſtitute a ſimple Sentence, by reaſon of the Syntax of the two Verbs, I mean that which reſpects the Noun or Antecedent, and that which reſpects the Article or Relative. The ſame too follows us to the Conjunction,* AND. *This Copulative aſſumes the Antecedent Noun, which is capable of being applied to many Subjects, and by connecting to it a new Sentence, of neceſſity aſſumes a new Verb alſo. And hence it is that the Words*—the Grammarian came, WHO diſcourſed—*form in power nearly the ſame ſentence, as if we were to ſay*—the Grammarian came, AND diſcourſed. *Apoll. de Syntaxi, L. I. c.* 43. *p.* 92. See alſo an ingenious *French* Treatiſe, called *Grammaire generale & raiſonnée*, Chap. IX.

The *Latins*, in their Structure of this Subjunctive, ſeem to have well repreſented its *compound* Nature of part *Pronoun*, and part *Connective*, in forming their

Ch. V. may be the Subſtitute of all kinds of Subſtantives, natural, artificial, or abſtract; as well as general, ſpecial, or particular. We may ſay, the *Animal, Which*, &c. the *Man, Whom*, &c. the *Ship, Which*, &c. *Alexander, Who*, &c. *Bucephalus, That*, &c. *Virtue, Which*, &c. &c.

NAY, it may even be the Subſtitute of all the other Pronouns, and is of courſe therefore expreſſive of all three Perſons. Thus we ſay, I, WHO *now read, have near finiſhed this Chapter*; THOU, WHO *now readeſt*: HE, WHO *now readeth*, &c. &c.

AND thus is THIS SUBJUNCTIVE truly a *Pronoun* from its *Subſtitution*, there being

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QUI and QUIS from QUE and IS, or (if we go with *Scaliger* to the *Greek*) from KAI and Ὅ∑, KAI and Ὅ. *Scal. de Cauſ. Ling. Lat. c.* 127.

HOMER alſo expreſſes the Force of this *Subjunctive, Pronoun* or *Article*, by help of the *Prepoſitive* and a *Connective*, exactly conſonant to the Theory here eſtabliſhed. See *Iliad*, Λ. ver. 270, 553. N. 571. Π. 54, 157, 158.

ing no Subſtantive exiſting, in whoſe place it may not ſtand. At the ſame time, it is *eſſentially diſtinguiſhed* from the other Pronouns, by this peculiar, that it is not only *a Subſtitute*, but withal *a Connective* (*l*). Ch. V.

AND

(*l*) Before we quit this Subject, it may not be improper to remark, that in the *Greek* and *Latin* Tongues the two principal Pronouns, that is to ſay, the Firſt and Second Perſon, the *Ego* and the *Tu*, are *implied* in the very Form of the Verb itſelf (γράφω, γράφεις, *ſcribo*, *ſcribis*) and are for that reaſon never *expreſſt*, unleſs it be to mark a Contradiſtinction; ſuch as in *Virgil*,

Nos *patriam fugimus*; TU, *Tityre*, *lentus in umbrâ*
Formoſam reſonare doces, &c.

This however is true with reſpect only to the *Caſus rectus*, or *Nominative* of theſe Pronouns, but not with reſpect to their *oblique Caſes*, which muſt always be added, becauſe tho' we ſee the EGO in *Amo*, and the TU in *Amas*, we ſee not the TE or ME in *Amat*, or *Amant*.

Yet even theſe *oblique Caſes* appear in a different manner, according as they mark Contradiſtinction, or not. If they contradiſtinguiſh, then are they *commonly* placed at the beginning of the Sentence, or at leaſt before the Verb, or leading Subſtantive.

Ch. V. AND now to conclude what we have ſaid concerning Subſtantives. All SUBSTANTIVES

Thus *Virgil*,

——*Quid Theſea, magnum*
Quid memorem Alciden? Et MI *genus ab Jove ſumme?*

Thus *Homer*,

Τ̓ΜΙΝ μὲν θεοὶ δοῖεν——
Παῖδα δὲ ΜΟΙ λύσατε φίλην—— Ιλ. Α.

where the Τ̓μῖν and the Μοὶ ſtand, as contradiſtinguiſhed, and both have precedence of their reſpective Verbs, the Τ̓μῖν even leading the whole Sentence. In other inſtances, theſe Pronouns commonly take their place behind the Verb, as may be ſeen in examples every where obvious. The *Greek* Language went farther ſtill. When the oblique Caſe of theſe Pronouns happened to contradiſtinguiſh, they aſſumed a peculiar Accent of their own, which gave them the name of ὀρθοτονούμεναι, or *Pronouns uprightly accented.* When they marked no ſuch oppoſition, they not only took their place behind the Verb, but even *gave it their Accent*, and (as it were) *inclined themſelves upon it.* And hence they acquired the name of Εγκλιτικαὶ, that is, *Leaning* or *Inclining* Pronouns. The *Greeks* too had in the firſt perſon Ἐμοῦ, Ἐμοί, Ἐμέ for *Contradiſtinctives*, and Μοῦ, Μοὶ, Μὲ for *Enclitics*. And hence it was that *Apollonius* contended, that in the paſſage above quoted from the firſt Iliad, we ſhould read παῖδα δ' ΕΜΟΙ, for

STANTIVES are either *Primary*, or *Secondary*, that is to ſay, according to a Language more familiar and known, are either NOUNS or PRONOUNS. The NOUNS denote *Subſtances*, and thoſe either *Natural*, *Artificial*, or *Abſtract* *. They moreover denote Things either *General*, or *Special*, or *Particular*. The PRONOUNS, their Subſtitutes, are either *Prepoſitive*, or *Subjunctive*. THE PREPOSITIVE is diſtinguiſhed into *three* Orders called the *Firſt*, the *Second*, and the *Third* Perſon. THE SUBJUNCTIVE includes Ch. V.

for παῖδα δὲ MOI, on account of the Contradiſtinction, which there occurs between the *Grecians* and *Chryſes*. See *Apoll. de Syntaxi*, *L. I. c.* 3. *p.* 20. *L. II. c.* 2. *p.* 102, 103.

This Diverſity between the Contradiſtinctive Pronouns, and the Enclitic, is not unknown even to the *Engliſh* Tongue. When we ſay, *Give me Content*, the *(Me)* in this caſe is a perfect Enclitic. But when we ſay, *Give Mi Content*, *Give Him his thouſands*, the *(Me)* and *(Him)* are no Enclitics, but as they ſtand in oppoſition, aſſume an Accent of their own, and ſo become the true ὀρθοτονεμένα.

* See before, p. 37, 38.

Ch. V. the powers of all thoſe three, having *ſuperadded*, as of its own, the peculiar force of a *Connective*.

HAVING done with SUBSTANTIVES, we now proceed to ATTRIBUTIVES.

CHAP.

CHAP. VI.

Concerning Attributives.

ATTRIBUTIVES are *all thoſe principal Words, that denote Attributes, conſidered as Attributes.* Such for example are the Words, *Black*, *White*, *Great*, *Little*, *Wiſe*, *Eloquent*, *Writeth*, *Wrote*, *Writing*, &c. (*a*). Ch. VI.

How-

(*a*) In the above liſt of Words are included what Grammarians called *Adjectives*, *Verbs*, and *Participles*, in as much as *all of them equally* denote the *Attributes of Subſtance*. Hence it is, that as they are all from their very nature the Predicates in a Propoſition (being all predicated of ſome Subject or Subſtance, *Snow is white*, Cicero *writeth*, &c.) hence I ſay the Appellation PHMA or VERB is employed by Logicians in an extended Senſe *to denote them all*. Thus *Ammonius* explaining the reaſon, why *Ariſtotle* in his Tract *de Interpretatione* calls λευκὸς *a Verb*, tells us πᾶσαν φωνὴν, κατηγορέμενον ὅρου ἐν προτάσει ποιεῖσαν, ῥΗΜΑ καλεῖσθαι, *that every Sound articulate, that forms the*

Ch. VI. HOWEVER, previouſly to theſe, and to every other poſſible Attribute, whatever a thing may be, whether black or white, ſquare or round, wiſe or eloquent, writing or thinking, it muſt *firſt* of neceſſity EXIST, before it can poſſibly be any thing elſe. For EXISTENCE may be conſidered as *an univerſal Genus*, to which all things of all kinds are at all times to be referred. The Verbs therefore, which denote it, claim precedence of all others, as being eſſential to the very being of every Propoſition, in which they may ſtill be found, either *expreſt*, or by *implication*; expreſt, as when we ſay, *The Sun* IS *bright*; by im-

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Predicate in a Propoſition, is called a VERB, p. 24. Edit. Ven. *Priſcian*'s obſervation, though made on another occaſion, is very pertinent to the preſent. *Non Declinatio, ſed proprietas excutienda eſt ſignificationis.* L. II. p. 576. And in another place he ſays——*non ſimilitudo declinationis omnimodo conjungit vel diſcernit partes orationis inter ſe, ſed vis ipſius ſignificationis.* L. XIII. p. 970.

implication, as when we ſay, *The Sun riſes*, which means, when reſolved, *The Sun* IS *riſing* (*b*). Ch. VI.

THE Verbs, *Is*, *Groweth*, *Becometh*, *Eſt*, *Fit*, ὑπάρχει ἐςὶ, πέλει, γίγνεται, are all of them uſed to expreſs this *general Genus*. The *Latins* have called them *Verba Subſtantiva*, *Verbs Subſtantive*, but the *Greeks* Ῥήματα Ὑπαρκτικὰ, *Verbs of Exiſtence*, a Name more apt, as being of greater latitude, and comprehending equally as well Attribute, as Subſtance. The principal of thoſe Verbs, and which we ſhall particularly here conſider, is the Verb, Ἐςὶ, *Eſt*, *Is*.

NOW all EXISTENCE is either abſolute or qualified—*abſolute*, as when we ſay, B IS; *qualified*, as when we ſay, B IS AN ANIMAL; B IS BLACK, IS ROUND, *&c.*

WITH

(*b*) See *Metaphyſ. Ariſtot.* L. V. c. 7. Edit. *Du-Vall.*

Ch. VI. WITH reſpect to this difference, the Verb (IS) can by itſelf expreſs *abſolute Exiſtence*, but never the *qualified*, without ſubjoining the particular Form, becauſe the Forms of Exiſtence being in number infinite, if the particular Form be not expreſt, we cannot know which is intended. And hence it follows, that when (IS) only ſerves to ſubjoin ſome ſuch Form, it has little more force, than that of *a mere Aſſertion*. It is under the ſame character, that it becomes a latent part in every other Verb, by expreſſing that Aſſertion, which is one of their Eſſentials. Thus, as was obſerved juſt before, *Riſeth* means, IS *riſing*; *Writeth*, IS *writing*.

AGAIN—AS to EXISTENCE in general, it is either *mutable*, or *immutable*; *mutable*, as in the *Objects of Senſation*; *immutable*, as in the *Objects of Intellection and Science*. Now *mutable* Objects exiſt all in *Time*, and admit the ſeveral Diſtinctions

ſtinctions of preſent, paſt, and future. Ch. VI.
But *immutable Objects know no ſuch Diſtinctions*, but rather ſtand oppoſed to all things temporary.

AND hence two different Significations of the ſubſtantive Verb (IS) according as it denotes *mutable*, or *immutable* Being.

FOR example, if we ſay, *This Orange is ripe*, (IS) meaneth, *that it exiſteth ſo now at this preſent*, in oppoſition to *paſt* time, when it was green, and to *future* time, when it will be rotten.

BUT if we ſay, *The Diameter of the Square is incommenſurable with its ſide*, we do not intend by (IS) that it is incommenſurable *now*, having been *formerly* commenſurable, or being to become ſo *hereafter*; on the contrary we intend that *Perfection of Exiſtence*, to which *Time* and *its Diſtinctions* are utterly unknown. It is under the ſame meaning we employ this

Ch. VI. this Verb, when we ſay, TRUTH IS, or, GOD IS. The oppoſition is not of *Time preſent* to *other Times*, but of *neceſſary Exiſtence* to *all temporary Exiſtence whatever* (*c*). And ſo much for *Verbs of Exiſtence*, commonly called *Verbs Subſtantive*.

WE are now to deſcend to the common Herd of Attributives, ſuch as *black* and *white*, *to write*, *to ſpeak*, *to walk*, &c. among which, when compared and oppoſed to each other, one of the moſt eminent diſtinctions appears to be this. Some, by being joined to a proper Subſtantive

(*c*) *Cum enim dicimus*, DEUS EST, *non eum dicimus* NUNC ESSE, *ſed tantum* IN SUBSTANTIA ESSE, *ut hoc ad immutabilitatem potius ſubſtantiæ, quam ad tempus aliquod referatur. Si autem dicimus*, DIES EST, *ad nullam diei ſubſtantiam pertinet, niſi tantum ad temporis conſtitutionem; hoc enim, quod ſignificat, tale eſt, tanquam ſi dicamus*, NUNC EST. *Quare cum dicimus* ESSE, *ut ſubſtantiam deſignemus, ſimpliciter* EST *addimus; cum vero ita ut aliquid præſens ſignificetur, ſecundum Tempus.* Boeth. in Lib. de Interpr. p. 307. See alſo *Plat. Tim.* p. 37, 38. *Edit. Serrani.*

ſtantive *make* without farther help *a per-* Ch. VI.
fect aſſertive Sentence; while the reſt, tho' otherwiſe perfect, are *in this reſpect* deficient.

To explain by an example. When we ſay, *Cicero eloquent, Cicero wiſe*, theſe are imperfect Sentences, though they denote a Subſtance and an Attribute. The reaſon is, that they want an *Aſſertion*, to ſhew that ſuch Attribute appertains to ſuch Subſtance. We muſt therefore call in the help of an Aſſertion elſewhere, an (IS) or a (WAS) to complete the Sentence, ſaying *Cicero* IS *wiſe, Cicero* WAS *eloquent*. On the contrary, when we ſay, *Cicero writeth, Cicero walketh*, in inſtances like theſe there is no ſuch occaſion, becauſe the Words *(writeth)* and *(walketh)* imply in their own Form not an Attribute only, but an Aſſertion likewiſe. Hence it is they may be reſolved, the one into *Is* and *Writing*, the other into *Is* and *Walking*.

Now

Ch. VI. Inſtant, that is to ſay, *during an Extenſion between two Inſtants*, and *this* of courſe gives us the Idea of TIME. As therefore *Motions* and their *Privation* imply *Time* as their concomitant, ſo VERBS, which denote them, come to denote TIME alſo (*d*). And hence the origin and uſe of TENSES, "which are ſo many different forms, aſ-"ſigned to each Verb, to ſhew, without "altering its principal meaning, the va-"rious TIMES in which ſuch meaning "may exiſt." Thus *Scribit*, *Scripſit*, *Scripſerat*, and *Scribet*, denote all equally the Attribute, *To Write*, while the difference between them, is, that they denote *Writing in different Times*.

SHOULD

(*d*) The antient Authors of Dialectic or Logic have well deſcribed this Property. The following is part of their Definition of a Verb——ῥῆμα δέ ἐϛι τὸ προσσημαῖνον χρόνον, *a Verb is ſomething, which ſignifies Time* OVER AND ABOVE (for ſuch is the force of the Prepoſition, Πρὸς.) If it ſhould be aſked, *over and above what?* It may be anſwered, over and above its *principal* Signification, which is to denote ſome *moving* and *energizing* Attribute. See *Ariſt. de Interpret.* c. 3. together with his Commentators *Ammonius* and *Boethius*.

SHOULD it be aſked, whether *Time* itſelf may not become upon occaſion the Verb's *principal* Signification; it is anſwered, No. And this appears, becauſe *the ſame Time* may be denoted by different verbs (as in the words, *writeth* and *ſpeaketh*) and *different Times* by the ſame Verb (as in the words, *writeth* and *wrote*) neither of which could happen, were *Time* any thing more, than a mere *Concomitant*. Add to this, that when words denote Time, not collaterally, but principally, they ceaſe to be verbs, and become either adjectives, or ſubſtantives. Of the adjective kind are *Timely*, *Yearly*, *Dayly*, *Hourly*, &c. of the ſubſtantive kind are *Time*, *Year*, *Day*, *Hour*, &c. Ch. VI.

THE moſt obvious diviſion of TIME is into Preſent, Paſt, and Future, nor is any language complete, whoſe verbs have not TENSES, to mark theſe diſtinctions. But we may go ſtill farther. Time paſt and future are both *infinitely* extended.

Ch. VI. Hence it is that in *univerſal Time paſt* we may aſſume *many particular Times paſt*, and in *univerſal Time future*, *many particular Times future*, ſome more, ſome leſs remote, and correſponding to each other under different relations. Even *preſent Time itſelf* is not exempt from theſe differences, and as neceſſarily implies *ſome degree of Extenſion*, as does every given line, however minute.

HERE then we are to ſeek for the reaſon, which firſt introduced into language that variety of Tenſes. It was not it ſeems enough to denote *indefinitely* (or by Aoriſts) mere Preſent, Paſt, or Future, but it was neceſſary on many occaſions to define with more preciſion, *what kind* of Paſt, Preſent, or Future. And hence the multiplicity of Futures, Præterits, and even Preſent Tenſes, with which all languages are found to abound, and without which it would be difficult to aſcertain our Ideas.

How-

HOWEVER as the knowledge of TENSES depends on the Theory of TIME, and this is a ſubject of no mean ſpeculation, we ſhall reſerve it by itſelf for the following chapter. Ch. VI.

CHAP. VII.

Concerning Time, and Tenſes.

C. VII. TIME and SPACE have this in common, that they are both of them by nature things *continuous*, and as ſuch they both of them imply *Extenſion*. Thus between *London* and *Saliſbury* there is the Extenſion of *Space*, and between *Yeſterday* and *To-morrow*, the Extenſion of *Time*. But in this they differ, that all the parts of Space exiſt *at once* and *together*, while thoſe of Time only exiſt *in Tranſition* or *Succeſſion* (*a*). Hence then we may gain ſome Idea of TIME, by conſidering it under the notion

(*a*) See Vol. I. p. 275. Note XIII. To which we may add, what is ſaid by *Ammonius*—οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁ χρόνος ὅλος ἅμα ὑφίσταται, ἀλλ' ἢ κατὰ μόνον τὸ ΝΥΝ· ἐν γὰρ τῷ γίνεσθαι καὶ φθείρεσθαι τὸ εἶναι ἔχει. TIME *doth not ſubſiſt the whole at once, but only in a ſingle* NOW *or* INSTANT; *for it hath its Exiſtence in becoming and in ceaſing to be.* Amm. in Predicam. p. 82. b.

notion of *a tranſient Continuity*. Hence alſo, as far as the affections and properties of *Tranſition* go, Time is *different* from Space; but as to thoſe of *Extenſion* and *Continuity*, they perfectly *coincide*. C. VII.

LET us take, for example, ſuch a part of Space, as a Line. In every given LINE we may aſſume any where *a Point*, and therefore in every given *Line* there may be aſſumed infinite *Points*. So in every given TIME we may aſſume any where *a Now* or *Inſtant*, and therefore in every given *Time* there may be aſſumed infinite *Nows* or *Inſtants*.

FARTHER ſtill—A POINT is the *Bound* of every finite *Line*; and A NOW or INSTANT, of every finite *Time*. But altho' they are *Bounds*, they are neither of them *Parts*, neither the *Point* of any *Line*, nor the *Now* or *Inſtant* of any *Time*. If this appear ſtrange, we may remember, that the *parts* of any thing *extended* are *neceſ-*

C.VII. *ſarily extended* alſo, it being eſſential to their character, *that they ſhould meaſure their Whole*. But if a *Point* or *Now* were *extended*, each of them would contain within itſelf *infinite other Points*, and *infinite other Nows* (for theſe may be aſſumed infinitely within the minuteſt Extenſion) and this, it is evident, would be abſurd and impoſſible.

THESE aſſertions therefore being admitted, and both *Points* and *Nows* being taken as *Bounds*, but not as *Parts* (*b*), it will follow,

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(*b*) —φανερὸν ὁτὶ ἐδὲ μόριον τὸ ΝΥΝ τᾶ χρόνᾳ, ὥσπερ ἐδ' αἱ στιγμαὶ τῆς γραμμῆς· αἱ δὲ γραμμαὶ δύο τῆς μίας μόρια. *It is evident that* A NOW *or Inſtant is no more a part of Time, than* POINTS *are of a Line. The parts indeed of one Line are two other Lines.* Natur. Auſc. L. IV. c. 17. And not long before—Τὸ δὲ ΝΥΝ ἐ μέρος· μετρεῖ, τε γὰρ τὸ μέρος, καὶ σύγκεισθαι δεῖ τὸ ὅλον ἐκ τῶν μερῶν· ὁ δὲ ΧΡΟΝΟΣ ἐ δοκεῖ σύγκεισθαι ἐκ τῶν ΝΥΝ. *A* NOW *is no Part of Time; for a Part is able to meaſure its Whole, and the Whole is neceſſarily made up of its Parts; but* TIME *doth not appear to be made up of* NOWS. Ibid. c. 14.

follow, that in the ſame manner as *the ſame* C. VII.
Point may be the *End* of one Line, and the *Beginning* of another, ſo the *ſame Now* or *Inſtant* may be the *End* of one Time, and the *Beginning* of another. Let us ſuppoſe for example, the Lines, A B, B C.



I ſay that the Point B is the End of the Line A B, and the Beginning of the Line, B C. In the ſame manner let us ſuppoſe A B, B C to repreſent certain Times, and let B be a *Now* or *Inſtant*. In ſuch caſe I ſay that the *Inſtant* B is the End of the Time A B, and the Beginning of the Time B C. I ſay likewiſe of theſe two Times, that with reſpect to the *Now* or *Inſtant*, which they include, the firſt of them is neceſſarily PAST TIME, as being *previous* to it; the other is neceſſarily FUTURE, as being *ſubſequent*. As therefore

C. VII. every Now or INSTANT always exiſts in Time, and without being Time, is *Time's Bound*; the Bound of *Completion* to the *Paſt*, and the Bound of *Commencement* to the *Future*: from hence we may conceive its nature or end, which is *to be the Medium of Continuity between the Paſt and the Future, ſo as to render Time, thro' all its Parts, one Intire and Perfect Whole* (c).

FROM the above ſpeculations, there follow ſome concluſions, which may be perhaps called paradoxes, till they have been attentively conſidered. In the firſt place *there cannot* (ſtrictly ſpeaking) *be any ſuch*

(c) Τὸ δὲ ΝΥΝ ἐϛι συνέχεια χρόνϖ, ὥϛπερ ἐλέχθη. συνέχει γὰρ τὸν χρόνον, τὸν ϖαρελθόντα καὶ ἐσόμενον, καὶ ὅλως ϖέρας χρόνϖ ἐϛίν· ἔϛι γὰρ τῷ μὲν ἀρχὴ, τῷ δὲ τελευτή. A Now *or Inſtant is (as was ſaid before) the Continuity or holding together of Time; for it makes Time continuous, the paſt and the future, and is in general its boundary, as being the beginning of one Time and the ending of another.* Natur. Auſcult. L. IV. c. 19. Συνέχεια in this place means not *Continuity*, as ſtanding for *Extenſion*, but rather that *Junction* or *Holding together*, by which Extenſion is imparted to other things.

ſuch thing as Time preſent. For if all Time be *tranſient* as well as *continuous*, it cannot like a Line be preſent all together, but part will neceſſarily be gone, and part be coming. If therefore any portion of its continuity were to be preſent *at once*, it would ſo far quit its *tranſient* nature, and be *Time* no longer. But if no portion of its continuity can be thus preſent, how can *Time* poſſibly be *preſent*, to which ſuch Continuity is eſſential? C. VII.

FARTHER than this—If there be no ſuch thing as *Time Preſent*, there can be *no Senſation of Time* by any one of the ſenſes. For ALL SENSATION *is of the* † *Preſent only*, the Paſt being preſerved not by *Senſe* but by *Memory*, and the Future being anticipated by *Prudence* only and wiſe *Foreſight*.

BUT if *no Portion* of Time be the object of *any Senſation*; farther, if the Preſent

† Ταυτῇ γὰρ (αισθήσει ſc.) ὔυτε τὸ μέλλον, ὔυτε τὸ γιγνόμενον γνωρίζομεν, ἀλλὰ τὸ παρὸν μόνον. Αρις. περὶ Μνημ. A. α.

C. VII. ſent *never* exiſt; if the Paſt be *no more*; if the Future be not *as yet*; and if theſe are all the parts, out of which TIME is compounded: how ſtrange and ſhadowy a Being do we find it? How nearly approaching to a perfect Non-entity (*d*)? Let us try however, ſince the ſenſes fail us, if we have not faculties of higher power, to ſeize this fleeting Being.

THE World has been likened to a variety of Things, but it appears to reſemble no one more, than ſome moving ſpectacle

(*d*) Ὅτι μὲν ἓν ὅλως ἐκ ἔϛιν, ἢ μόγις καὶ ἀμυδρῶς, ἐκ τῶν δέ τις ἂν ὑποπτεύσειε· τὸ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶ γέγονε, καὶ ἐκ ἔϛι· τὸ δὲ μέλλει, καὶ ἔπω ἐϛίν· ἐκ δὲ τούτων καὶ ὁ ἄπειρος καὶ ὁ ἀεὶ λαμβανόμενος χρόνος ϛύγκειται· τὸ δ' ἐκ μὴ ὄντων ϛυγκείμενον, ἀδύνατον ἂν δόξειε κατέχειν ποτὲ οὐσίας. *That therefore* TIME *exiſts not at all, or at leaſt has but a faint and obſcure exiſtence, one may ſuſpect from hence. A part of it has been, and is no more; a part of it is coming, and is not as yet; and out of theſe is made that infinite Time, which is ever to be aſſumed ſtill farther and farther. Now that which is made up of nothing but Non-entities, it ſhould ſeem was impoſſible ever to participate of Entity.* Natural. Auſc. L. IV. c. 14. See alſo Philop. M. S. Com. in Nicomach. p. 10.

tacle (ſuch as a proceſſion or a triumph) C.VII.
that abounds in every part with ſplendid objects, ſome of which are ſtill departing, as faſt as others make their appearance. The Senſes look on, while the ſight paſſes, perceiving as much as is *immediately preſent*, which they report *with tolerable accuracy* to the Soul's ſuperior powers. Having done this, they have done their duty, being concerned with nothing, ſave what is preſent and inſtantaneous. But to the *Memory*, to the *Imagination*, and above all to the *Intellect*, the ſeveral *Nows* or *Inſtants* are not loſt, as to the *Senſes*, but are preſerved and made objects of *ſteady* comprehenſion, however in their own nature they may be *tranſitory* and *paſſing*. "Now it is from contemplating "two or more of theſe Inſtants under one "view, together with that Interval of "Continuity, which ſubſiſts between "them, that we acquire inſenſibly the "Idea of TIME (*e*)." For example: *The Sun*

(*e*) Τότε φαμὲν γεγονέναι χρόνον, ὅταν τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον ἐν τῇ κινήσει αἰσθησιν λάβωμεν. Ὁρίζομεν δὲ

C.VII. *Sun riſes*; this I remember: *it riſes again*; this too I remember. Theſe Events are not together; there is an *Extenſion* between

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δὲ τῷ ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο ὑπολαβεῖν αὐτὰ, καὶ μεταξύ τι αὐτῶν ἕτερον· ὅταν γὰρ τὰ ἄκρα ἕτερα τοῦ μέσου νοήσωμεν, καὶ δύο εἴπῃ ἡ ψυχὴ τὰ ΝΥΝ, τὸ μὲν πρότερον, τὸ δὲ ὕστερον, τότε καὶ τοῦτο φαμὲν εἶναι ΧΡΟΝΟΝ. *It is then we ſay there has been* TIME, *when we can acquire a Senſation of prior and ſubſequent in Motion. But we diſtinguiſh and ſettle theſe two, by conſidering one firſt, then the other, together with an interval between them different from both. For as often as we conceive the Extremes to be different from the Mean, and the Soul talks of two* NOWS, *one prior and the other ſubſequent, then it is we ſay there is* TIME, *and this it is we call* TIME. Natural. Auſcult. L. IV. c. 16. *Themiſtius*'s Comment upon this paſſage is to the ſame purpoſe. Ὅταν γὰρ ὁ νοῦς ἀναμνησθεὶς τοῦ ΝΥΝ, ὃ χθὲς εἶπεν, ἕτερον πάλιν εἴπῃ τὸ σήμερον, τότε καὶ χρόνον εὐθὺς ἐνενόησεν, ὑπὸ τῶν δύο ΝΥΝ ὁριζόμενον, οἷον ὑπὸ περάτων δυοῖν· καὶ ὅτω λέγειν ἔχει, ὅτι τοσόν ἐστι πεντεκαίδεκα ὡρῶν, ἢ ἑκκαίδεκα, οἷον ἐξ ἀπείρου γραμμῆς πηχυαίαν δύο σημείοις ἀποτεμνόμενος. *For when the Mind, remembering the* NOW, *which it talked of yeſterday, talks again of another* NOW *to-day, then it is it immediately has an idea of* TIME, *terminated by theſe two Nows, as by two Boundaries; and thus is it enabled to ſay, that the Quantity is of fifteen, or of ſixteen hours, as if it were to ſever a Cubit's length from an infinite Line by two Points.* Themiſt. Op. edit. Aldi. p. 45. b.

tween them—not however of *Space*, for we may ſuppoſe the place of riſing the ſame, or at leaſt to exhibit no ſenſible difference. Yet ſtill we recognize *ſome* Extenſion between them. Now what is this Extenſion, *but a natural Day?* And what is that, but pure *Time?* It is after the ſame manner, by recognizing two new Moons, and the Extenſion between theſe: two vernal Equinoxes, and the Extenſion between theſe; that we gain Ideas of other Times, ſuch as *Months* and *Years*, which are all ſo many Intervals, deſcribed as above; that is to ſay, *paſſing Intervals of Continuity between two Inſtants viewed together.* C. VII.

AND thus it is THE MIND acquires the Idea of TIME. But this Time it muſt be remembered is PAST TIME ONLY, which is always the *firſt* Species, that occurs to the human intellect. How then do we acquire the Idea of TIME FUTURE? The anſwer is, we acquire it by *Anticipation.* Should it be demanded ſtill farther, *And what is Anticipation?* We anſwer, that in this

C. VII. this caſe it is a kind of reaſoning by analogy from ſimilar to ſimilar; from ſucceſſions of events, that are paſt already, to ſimilar ſucceſſions, that are preſumed hereafter. For example: I obſerve as far back as my memory can carry me, how every day has been ſucceeded by a night; that night, by another day; that day, by another night; and ſo downwards in order to the Day that is now. Hence then I *anticipate a ſimilar ſucceſſion* from the preſent Day, and thus gain the Idea of days and nights *in futurity*. After the ſame manner, by attending to the periodical returns of New and Full Moons; of Springs, Summers, Autumns and Winters, all of which in Time paſt I find never to have failed, I *anticipate a like orderly and diverſified ſucceſſion*, which makes Months, and Seaſons, and Years, *in Time future*.

WE go farther than this, and not only thus anticipate in theſe *natural* Periods, but even in matters of *human* and *civil* concern. For example: Having obſerved in many

paſt inſtances how health had ſucceeded to exerciſe, and ſickneſs to ſloth; we anticipate *future* health to thoſe, who, being *now* ſickly, uſe exerciſe; and *future* ſickneſs to thoſe, who, being *now* healthy, are ſlothful. It is a variety of ſuch obſervations, all reſpecting one ſubject, which when ſyſtematized by juſt reaſoning, and made habitual by due practice, form the character of a Maſter-Artiſt, or Man of *practical* Wiſdom. If they reſpect the human body (as above) they form the Phyſician; if matters military, the General; if matters national, the Stateſman; if matters of private life, the Moraliſt; and the ſame in other ſubjects. All theſe ſeveral characters in their reſpective ways may be ſaid to poſſeſs a kind of prophetic diſcernment, which not only preſents them *the barren proſpect* of futurity (a proſpect not hid from the meaneſt of men) but ſhews withal thoſe events, which are likely to attend it, and thus enables them to act with ſuperior certainty and rectitude. And hence it is, that (if we except thoſe, who have had diviner aſſiſtances) C. VII.

C. VII. ances) we may juſtly ſay, as was ſaid of old, *He's the beſt Prophet, who conjectures well* (*f*).

FROM

(*f*) Μάντις δ' ἄριστος, ὅστις εἰκάζει καλῶς. So *Milton*.

Till old Experience do attain
To ſomething like Prophetic Strain.

Et facile exiſtimari poteſt, Prudentiam eſſe quodammodo Divinationem.

Corn. Nep. in Vit. Attici.

There is nothing appears ſo clearly an object of the MIND or INTELLECT ONLY, as *the Future* does, ſince we can find no place for its exiſtence any where elſe. Not but the ſame, if we conſider, is equally true of *the Paſt*. For tho' it may have once had another kind of being, when (according to common Phraſe) *it actually was*, yet was it then ſomething *Preſent*, and not ſomething *Paſt*. *As Paſt*, it has no exiſtence but in THE MIND or MEMORY, ſince had it in fact any other, it could not properly be called Paſt. It was this intimate connection between TIME, and the SOUL, that made ſome Philoſophers doubt, *whether if there was no Soul, there could be any Time*, ſince Time appears to have its Being in no other region. Πότερον δὲ μὴ ὄσης ψυχῆς ὄντος ἂν ὁ χρόνος, ἀπορήσειεν ἄν τις, κ. τ. λ. Natur. Auſcult. L. IV. c. 20. *Themiſtius*, who comments the above paſſage, expreſſes himſelf more poſitively. Εἰ τοίνυν διχῶς λέγεται τότε ἀριθμητὸν καὶ τὸ ἀριθμέμενον, τὸ μὲν τὸ ἀριθμητὸν δηλαδὴ δυνάμει, τὸ δὲ ἐνεργείᾳ, ταῦτα δὲ οὐκ ἂν ὑποσάιη, μὴ ὄντος τοῦ ἀριθμήσοντος

FROM what has been reaſoned it appears, that knowledge of *the Future* comes from knowledge of *the Paſt*; as does knowledge of *the Paſt* from knowledge of *the Preſent*, ſo that their *Order to us* is that of PRESENT, PAST, and FUTURE. C. VII.

OF theſe Species of knowledge, that of the *Preſent* is the loweſt, not only as *firſt in perception*, but as far the more extenſive, being neceſſarily common to all *animal* Beings, and reaching even to Zoophytes, as far as they poſſeſs *Senſation*. Knowledge of *the Paſt* comes next, which is ſuperior to the *former*, as being confined to thoſe animals, that have *Memory* as well as *Senſes*. Knowledge of *the Future*

σοντος μήτε δυνάμει μήτε ἐνεργείᾳ, φανερὸν ὡς οὐκ ἂν ὁ χρόνος εἴη, μὴ ὄσης ψυχῆς. Them. p. 48. Edit. Aldi. Vid. etiam ejuſd. Comm. in Lib. de An. p. 94.

C. VII. Arist. de An. II. 3. p. 28.

Future comes last, as being derived from the other two, and which is for that reason *the most excellent* as well as *the most rare*, since Nature in her superadditions rises from worse always to better, and is never found to sink from better down to worse *.

And now having seen, how we acquire the knowledge of *Time past*, and *Time future*; which is first in perception, which first in dignity; which more common, which more rare; let us compare them both to the *present Now* or *Instant*, and examine what relations they maintain towards it.

In the first place there may be *Times* both *past* and *future*, in which the *present Now* has no existence, as for example in *Yesterday*, and *To-morrow*.

Again,

* See below, Note (*r*) of this Chapter.

AGAIN, the *preſent Now* may ſo far be- C.VII.
long to *Time* of either ſort, as to be *the End* of the paſt, and *the Beginning* of the future; but it cannot be included *within* the limits of either. For if it were poſſible, let us ſuppoſe C the *preſent Now* included



within the limits of the *paſt Time* A D. In ſuch caſe C D, part of the paſt Time A D, will be ſubſequent to C the *preſent Now*, and ſo of courſe be *future*. But by the Hypotheſis it is *paſt*, and ſo will be both Paſt and Future at once, which is abſurd. In the ſame manner we prove that C cannot be included within the limits of a *future Time*, ſuch as BE.

WHAT then ſhall we ſay of ſuch *Times*, as *this* Day, *this* Month, *this* Year, *this*

C.VII. Century, all which include within them *the preſent Now?* They cannot be *paſt Times* or *future*, from what has been proved; and *preſent Time has no exiſtence*, as has been proved likewiſe *. Or ſhall we allow them to be preſent, *from the preſent Now, which exiſts within them*; ſo that from the preſence of *that* we call *theſe* alſo preſent, tho' the ſhorteſt among them has infinite parts always abſent? If ſo, and in conformity to cuſtom we allow ſuch *Times preſent*, as preſent Days, Months, Years, and Centuries, each muſt of neceſſity be *a compound of the Paſt and the Future*, divided from each other by ſome preſent Now or Inſtant, and *jointly* called PRESENT, *while that Now remains within them*. Let us ſuppoſe for example the Time XY, which

f ... X A B C D E Y ... *g*

let

* Sup. p. 104.

let us call a Day, or a Century; and let the preſent *Now* or *Inſtant* exiſt at A. I ſay, in as much as A exiſts within XY, that therefore XA is Time paſt, and AY Time future, and the whole XA, AY, *Time preſent*. The ſame holds, if we ſuppoſe the preſent Now to exiſt at B, or C, or D, or E, or any where before Y. When the preſent Now exiſts at Y, then is the whole XY *Time paſt*, and ſtill more ſo, when the Now gets to *g*, or onwards. In like manner before the Preſent Now entered X, as for example when it was at *f*, then was the whole XY *Time future*; it was the ſame, when the preſent Now was at X. When it had paſt that, then XY became *Time preſent*. And thus it is that TIME is PRESENT, while paſſing, in its PRESENT NOW or INSTANT. It is the ſame indeed here, as it is in *Space*. A Sphere paſſing over a Plane, and being for that reaſon preſent to it, is only preſent to that Plane *in a ſingle Point at once*, C. VII.

C.VII. while during the whole progreſſion its parts abſent are *infinite* (*g*).

FROM what has been ſaid, we may perceive that ALL TIME, *of every denomination*,

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(*g*) PLACE, according to the antients, was either mediate, or immediate. I am (for example) in *Europe*, becauſe I am in *England*; in *England*, becauſe in *Wiltſhire*; in *Wiltſhire*, becauſe in *Saliſbury*; in *Saliſbury*, becauſe in *my own houſe*; in *my own houſe*, becauſe in *my ſtudy*. Thus far MEDIATE PLACE. And what is my IMMEDIATE PLACE? *It is the internal Bound of that containing Body (whatever it be) which co-incides with the external Bound of my own Body.* Τῦ περιέχοντος πέρας, καθ' ὃ περιέχει τὸ περιεχόμενον. Now as this *immediate* Place is included within the limits of all the former Places, it is from this relation that thoſe *mediate* Places alſo are called each of them *my Place*, tho' the leaſt among them ſo far exceed my magnitude. To apply this to TIME. The *preſent Century* is preſent in *the preſent Year*; that, in *the preſent Month*; that, in *the preſent Day*; that, in *the preſent Hour*; that, in *the preſent Minute*. It is thus by circumſcription within circumſcription that we arrive at THAT REAL AND INDIVISIBLE INSTANT, which by being itſelf the *very Eſſence of the Preſent* diffuſes PRESENCE throughout

mination, is divisible and extended. But if so, then whenever we suppose *a definite Time*, even though it be a *Time present*, it must needs have a *Beginning*, a *Middle*, and *an End*. And so much for TIME. C. VII.

Now from the above doctrine of TIME, we propose by way of Hypothesis the following Theorie of TENSES.

THE TENSES are used to mark Present, Past, and Future Time, either *indefinitely* with-

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all even the largest of Times, which are found *to include it within their respective limits. Nicephorus Blemmides* speaks much to the same purpose. Ἐνεργώς ἐν χρόνος ἐστὶν ὁ ἐφ' ἑκάτερα παρακείμενος τῷ κυρίως ΝΥΝ· χρόνος μερικὸς, ἐκ παρελληλυθότος καὶ μέλλοντος συνεχῶς, καὶ διὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸ κυρίως ΝΥΝ γειτνίασιν, ΝΥΝ λεγόμενος καὶ αὐτός. PRESENT TIME *therefore is that which adjoins to the* REAL NOW *or* INSTANT *on either side, being a limited Time made up of Past and Future, and from its vicinity to that* REAL NOW *said to be* NOW *also itself.* Ἐπιτ. φυσικῆς Κεφ. θ'. See also *Arist. Physic.* L. VI. c. 2, 3, &c.

C.VII. without reference to any Beginning, Middle, or End; or elſe *definitely*, in reference to ſuch diſtinctions.

IF *indefinitely*, then have we THREE TENSES, an Aoriſt of the Preſent, an Aoriſt of the Paſt, and an Aoriſt of the Future. If *definitely*, then have we three Tenſes to mark the *Beginnings* of theſe three Times; three, to denote their *Middles*; and three to denote their *Ends*; in all NINE.

THE three firſt of theſe Tenſes we call the Inceptive Preſent, the Inceptive Paſt, and the Inceptive Future. The three next, the Middle Preſent, the Middle Paſt, and the Middle Future. And the three laſt, the Completive Preſent, the Completive Paſt, and the Completive Future.

AND thus it is, that the TENSES in their natural number appear to be TWELVE; *three*

three to denote *Time abſolute*, and *nine* to denote it *under its reſpective diſtinctions*. C.VII.

Aoriſt of the Preſent.

Γράφω. *Scribo.* I write.

Aoriſt of the Paſt.

Ἔγραψα. *Scripſi.* I wrote.

Aoriſt of the Future.

Γράψω. *Scribam.* I ſhall write.

Inceptive Preſent.

Μέλλω γράφειν. *Scripturus ſum.* I am going to write.

Middle or extended Preſent.

Τυγχάνω γράφων. *Scribo* or *Scribens ſum.* I am writing.

Completive Preſent.

Γέγραφα. *Scripſi.* I have written.

Inceptive Paſt.

Ἔμελλον γράφειν. *Scripturus eram.* I was beginning to write.

Middle

C.VII. Middle or extended Paſt.

Ἔγραφον or ἐτύγχανον γράφων. *Scribebam.* I was writing.

Completive Paſt.

Ἐγεγράφειν. *Scripſeram.* I had done writing.

Inceptive Future.

Μελλήσω γράφειν. *Scripturus ero.* I ſhall be beginning to write.

Middle or extended Future.

Ἔσομαι γράφων. *Scribens ero.* I ſhall be writing.

Completive Future.

Ἔσομαι γεγραφώς. *Scripſero.* I ſhall have done writing.

It is not to be expected that the above Hypotheſis ſhould be juſtified through all inſtances in every language. It fares with Tenſes,

Tenſes, as with other affections of ſpeech; C. VII.
be the Language upon the whole ever ſo perfect, much muſt be left, in defiance of all analogy, to the harſh laws of mere authority and chance.

IT may not however be improper to inquire, what traces may be diſcovered in favour of this ſyſtem, either in languages themſelves, or in thoſe authors who have written upon this part of Grammar, or laſtly in the nature and reaſon of things.

IN the firſt place, as to AORISTS. *Aoriſts* are uſually by Grammarians referred *to the Paſt*; ſuch are ἦλθον, *I went*; ἔπεσον, *I fell*, &c. We ſeldom hear of them in *the Future*, and more rarely ſtill in *the Preſent*. Yet it ſeems agreeable to reaſon, that *wherever Time is ſignified without any farther circumſcription, than that of Simple preſent, paſt, or future, the Tenſe is* AN AORIST.

THUS

C. VII. THUS *Milton*,

Millions of ſpiritual creatures WALK *the earth*
Unſeen, both when we wake, and when we ſleep. P. L. IV. 277.

Here the verb (WALK) means not that they were walking *at that inſtant only, when Adam ſpoke, but* ἀορίςως *indefinitely*, take any inſtant whatever. So when the ſame author calls *Hypocriſy*,

——*the only Evil, that* WALKS
Inviſible, except to God alone,

the Verb (WALKS) hath the like *aoriſtical* or *indefinite application*. The ſame may be ſaid in general of all Sentences of the *Gnomologic* kind, ſuch as

Ad pœnitendum PROPERAT, *cito qui judicat.*
Avarus, niſi cum moritur, nil rectè FACIT, &c.

ALL

ALL theſe Tenſes are ſo many AORISTS OF THE PRESENT. C.VII.

Gnomologic Sentences after the ſame manner make likewiſe AORISTS OF THE FUTURE.

Tu nihil ADMITTES *in te, formidine pœnæ.* Hor.

So too *Legiſlative* Sentences, *Thou* SHALT *not kill, Thou* SHALT *not ſteal,* &c. for this means no one *particular* future Time, but is a prohibition extended *indefinitely* to every part of Time future (*b*).

WE

(*b*) The *Latin* Tongue appears to be more than ordinarily deficient, as to the article of *Aoriſts*. It has no peculiar Form even for *an Aoriſt of the Paſt*, and therefore (as *Priſcian* tells us) the *Præteritum* is forced to do the double duty both of *that Aoriſt*, and of the *perfect Preſent*, its application in particular inſtances being to be

C. VII. WE paſs from *Aoriſts*, to THE INCEPTIVE TENSES.

THESE may be found in part ſupplied (like many other Tenſes) by verbs auxiliar. ΜΕΛΛΩ γράφειν. *Scripturus* SUM. I AM GOING *to write*. But the *Latins* go farther, and have a ſpecies of Verbs, derived from others, which do the duty of theſe Tenſes, and are themſelves for that reaſon called *Inchoatives* or *Inceptives*. Thus from *Caleo, I am warm*, comes *Caleſco, I begin to grow warm*; from *Tumeo, I ſwell*, comes *Tumeſco, I begin to ſwell*. Theſe *Inchoative* Verbs are ſo peculiarly appropriated to the *Beginnings* of Time, that they are defective as to all Tenſes, which denote it in its *Completion*, and there-

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be gathered from the Context. Thus it is that FECI means (as the ſame author informs us) both πεποίηκα and ἐποίησα, *I have done it*, and *I did it*; VIDI both ἑώρακα and εἶδον, *I have juſt ſeen it*, and *I ſaw it once*. *Priſc. Gram.* L. VIII. p. 814, 838. *Edit. Putſch.*

therefore have neither *Perfectum*, *Plus quam-perfectum*, or *Perfect Future*. There is likewiſe a ſpecies of Verbs called in *Greek* Ἐφετικὰ, in *Latin Deſiderativa*, the *Deſideratives* or *Meditatives*, which if they are not ſtrictly *Inceptives*, yet both in *Greek* and *Latin* have a near affinity with them. Such are πολεμησείω, *Bellaturio*, *I have a deſire to make war*; βρωσείω, *Eſurio*, *I long to eat*. (*i*). And ſo much for THE INCEPTIVE TENSES. C.VII.

THE two laſt orders of Tenſes which remain, are thoſe we called (*k*) THE MIDDLE TENSES (which expreſs Time as *extended* and

(*i*) As all *Beginnings* have reference to what is *future*, hence we ſee how properly theſe Verbs are formed, the *Greek* ones from a future Verb, the *Latin* from a future Participle. From πολεμήσω and βρώσω come πολεμησείω and βρωσείω; from *Bellaturus* and *Eſurus* come *Bellaturio* and *Eſurio*. See *Macrobius*, p. 691. Ed. Var. ἐ πάνυ γέ με νῦν δὴ ΓΕΛΑΣΕΙΟΝΤΑ ἐποίησας γελάσαι. Plato in Phædone.

(*k*) Care muſt be taken not to confound theſe *middle* Tenſes, with the Tenſes of thoſe Verbs, which bear the ſame name among Grammarians.

C.VII. and *paſſing*) and the PERFECT or COMPLETIVE, which expreſs its *Completion* or *End*.

Now for theſe the authorities are many. They have been acknowledged already in the ingenious Accidence of Mr. *Hoadly*, and explained and confirmed by Dr. *Samuel Clarke*, in his rational edition of *Homer*'s *Iliad*. Nay, long before either of theſe, we find the ſame ſcheme in *Scaliger*, and by him (*l*) aſcribed to † *Grocinus*, as its author. The learned *Gaza* (who

(*l*) *Ex his percipimus Grocinum acutè admodum Tempora diviſiſſe, ſed minus commodè. Tria enim conſtituit, ut nos, ſed quæ bifariam ſecat, Perfectum & Imperfectum: ſic, Præteritum imperfectum*, Amabam: *Præteritum perfectum*, Amaveram. *Rectè ſanè. Et Præſens imperfectum*, Amo. *Recte hactenus; continuat enim amorem, neque abſolvit. At Præſens perfectum*, Amavi: *quis hoc dicat?—De Futuro autem ut non malè ſentit, ita controverſum eſt. Futurum, inquit, imperfectum*, Amabo: *Perfectum*, Amavero. *Non malè, inquam: ſignificat enim* Amavero, *amorem futurum & abſolutum iri:* Amabo *perfectionem nullam indicat.* De Cauſ. Ling. Lat. c. 113.

† His Name was *William Grocin*, an *Engliſhman*, contemporary with *Eraſmus*, and celebrated for his learning. He went to *Florence* to ſtudy under *Landin*, and was Profeſſor at *Oxford*. *Spec. Lit. Flor. p.* 205.

(who was himſelf a *Greek*, and one of the ableſt reſtorers of that language in the weſtern world) characterizes the Tenſes in nearly the ſame manner (*m*). What *Apollonius* hints, is exactly conſonant (*n*). *Priſcian* C.VII.

(*m*) The PRESENT TENSE (as this Author informs us in his excellent Grammar) denotes τὸ ἐνεςάμενον καὶ ἀτελὲς, *that which is now Inſtant and incomplete*; THE PERFECTUM, τὸ παρεληλυθὸς ἄρτι, καὶ ἐντελὲς τῷ ἐνεςῶτος, *that which is now immediately paſt, and is the Completion of the Preſent*; THE IMPERFECTUM, τὸ παραλειλαμένον καὶ ἀτελὲς τῷ παρῳχημένῳ, *the extended and incomplete part of the Paſt*; and THE PLUSQUAMPERFECTUM, τὸ παρεληλυθὸς πάλαι, καὶ ἐντελὲς τῷ παρακειμένῳ, *that which is paſt long ago, and is the completion of the præteritum.* Gram. L. IV.

(*n*) Ἐντεῦθεν δὲ πειθόμεθα, ὅτι ὁ παρῳχημένος συντέλειαν σημαίνει ὁ παρακείμενος, τὴν γε μὴν ἐνεςῶσαν —*Hence we are perſuaded that the Perfectum doth not ſignify the completion of the Paſt, but* PRESENT COMPLETION. *Apollon.* L. III. c. 6. The Reaſon, which perſuaded him to this opinion, was the application and uſe of the Particle ἄν, of which he was then treating, and which, as it denoted *Potentiality* or *Contingence*, would aſſort (he ſays) with any of the paſſing, extended, and incomplete Tenſes, but never with this PERFECTUM, becauſe this implied ſuch a *complete* and *indefeaſible exiſtence*, as never to be qualified into the nature of a *Contingent*.

C. VII. *Priſcian* too advances the ſame doctrine from the *Stoics*, whoſe authority we eſteem greater than all the reſt, not only from the more early age when they lived, but from their ſuperior ſkill in Philoſophy, and their peculiar attachment to *Dialectic*, which naturally led them to great accuracy in theſe *Grammatical* Speculations (*o*).

BEFORE

(*o*) By theſe Philoſophers the *vulgar preſent Tenſe* was called THE IMPERFECT PRESENT, and the *vulgar Præteritum*, THE PERFECT PRESENT, than which nothing can be more conſonant to the ſyſtem that we favour. But let us hear *Priſcian*, from whom we learn theſe facts. PRÆSENS TEMPUS *proprie dicitur, cujus pars jam præteriit, pars futura eſt. Cum enim Tempus, fluvii more, inſtabili volvatur curſu, vix punctum habere poteſt in præſenti, hoc eſt, in inſtanti. Maxima igitur pars ejus (ſicut dictum eſt) vel præteriit vel futura eſt.—Unde* STOICI *jure* HOC TEMPUS PRESENS *etiam* IMPERFECTUM *vocabant (ut dictum eſt) eo quod prior ejus pars, quæ præteriit, tranſacta eſt, deeſt autem ſequens, id eſt, futura. Ut ſi in medio verſu dicam*, ſcribo verſum, *priore ejus parte ſcriptâ; cui adhuc deeſt extrema pars, præſenti utor verbo, dicendo*, ſcribo verſum: *ſed* IMPERFECTUM *eſt, quod deeſt adhuc verſui, quod ſcribatur——Ex eodem igitur Præſenti naſcitur etiam Perfectum. Si enim ad finem perveniat inceptum, ſtatim utimur* PRÆTERITO PERFECTO; *continuo enim, ſcripto ad finem verſu, dico*, ſcripſi verſum.—And ſoon after ſpeaking of the *Latin Per-*

BEFORE we conclude, we ſhall add a few miſcellaneous obſervations, which will be more eaſily intelligible from the hypotheſis here advanced, and ſerve withal to confirm its truth. C. VII.

AND firſt, the *Latins* uſed their *Præteritum Perfectum* in ſome inſtances after a very peculiar manner, ſo as to imply the very reverſe of the verb in its natural ſignification. Thus, VIXIT, ſignified, IS DEAD; FUIT, ſignified, NOW IS NOT, IS NO MORE. It was in this ſenſe that *Cicero* addreſſed the People of *Rome*, when he had put to death the leaders in the *Catalinarian* Conſpiracy. He appeared in the

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Perfectum, he ſays——*ſciendum tamen, quod Romani* PRÆTERITO PERFECTO *non ſolum in re modo completa utuntur, (in quo vim habet ejus, qui apud Græcos* παρακείμενος *vocatur, quem* STOICI ΤΕΛΕΙΟΝ ΕΝΕΣΤΩΤΑ *nominaverunt) ſed etiam pro* Ἀορίστῳ *accipitur*, &c. Lib. VIII. p. 812, 813, 814.

C. VII. Forum, and cried out with a loud voice, * VIXERUNT. So *Virgil*,

——‖ FUIMUS *Troes*, FUIT *Ilium & ingens*
Gloria Dardanidum—— Æn. II.

And

* So among the *Romans*, when in a Cauſe all the Pleaders had ſpoken, the Cryer uſed to proclaim DIXERUNT, i. e. *they have done ſpeaking*. Aſcon. Pæd. in Verr. II.

‖ So *Tribullus* ſpeaking of certain Prodigies and evil Omens.

Hæc fuerint *olim*. *Sed tu, jam mitis, Apollo,*
Prodigia indomitis merge ſub æquoribus.
Eleg. II. 5. ver. 19.

Let theſe Events HAVE BEEN *in days of old*;—by Implication therefore—*But* HENCEFORTH *let them be no more.*

So *Eneas* in *Virgil* prays to *Phœbus*.

Hac Trojana tenus fuerit *fortuna ſecuta.*

Let Trojan *Fortune* (that is, adverſe, like that of *Troy*, and its inhabitants,) HAVE *ſo far* FOLLOWED *us*. By implication therefore, *but let it follow us no farther, Here let it end, Hic ſit Finis*, as *Servius* well obſerves in the place.

In which inſtances, by the way, mark not only the force of the *Tenſe*, but of the *Mood*, the PRECATIVE or IMPERATIVE, not in the *Future* but in the PAST. See p. 154, 155, 156.

And again, C.VII.

——*Locus Ardea quondam*
Dictus avis, & nunc magnum manet
Ardea nomen,
* *Sed fortuna* FUIT— Æn. VII.

THE reaſon of theſe ſignifications is derived from THE COMPLETIVE POWER of the Tenſe here mentioned. We ſee that the periods of Nature, and of human affairs, are maintained by the reciprocal ſucceſſion of *Contraries*. It is thus with Calm and Tempeſt; with Day and Night; with Proſperity and Adverſity; with Glory and Ignominy; with Life and Death. Hence then, in the inſtances above, the *completion* of one contrary is put for the *commencement* of the other, and to ſay, HATH LIVED, or, HATH BEEN, has the ſame meaning with, IS DEAD, or, IS NO MORE.

* *Certus in hoſpitibus non eſt amor; errat, ut ipſi:*
Cumque nihil ſperes firmius eſſe, FUIT.
Epiſt. Ovid. Helen. Paridi. ver. 190.
Sive erimus, ſeu nos Fata FUISSE *volent.*
Tibull. III. 5. 32.

C. VII. IT is remarkable in * *Virgil*, that he frequently joins in the ſame ſentence this *complete* and *perfect Preſent* with the *extended* and *paſſing Preſent*; which proves that he conſidered the two, as belonging to the ſame ſpecies of *Time*, and therefore naturally formed to co-incide with each other.

——*Tibi jam brachia* contrahit *ardens*
Scorpios, & cœli juſtâ plus parte reliquit.
G. I.

Terra tremit; fugere *feræ*— G. I.

Præſertim ſi tempeſtas a vertice ſylvis.
Incubuit, glomeratque *ferens incendia*
ventus. G. II.

——*illa nota citius, volucrique ſagittâ,*
Ad terram fugit, & *portu ſe* condidit
alto. Æn. V.

IN

* See alſo *Spencer's Fairy Queen*, B. I. C. 3. St. 19. C. 3. St. 39. C. 8. St. 9.

He hath *his Shield* redeem'd, *and forth his Sword he*
draws.

IN the ſame manner he joins the ſame two modifications of *Time in the Paſt*, that is to ſay, the *complete* and *perfect* Paſt with the *extended* and *paſſing*. C. VII.

——Inruerant *Danai*, & *tectum omne* tenebant. Æn. II.

Tris imbris torti radios, tris nubis aquoſæ
Addiderant, *rutuli tris ignis*, & *alitis auſtri.*
Fulgores nunc terrificos, ſonitumque metumque
Miſcebant *operi*, *flammiſque ſequacibus iras* (*p*). Æn. VIII.

As

(*p*) The Intention of *Virgil* may be better ſeen, in rendering one or two of the above paſſages into *Engliſh*.

——*Tibi jam brachia* contrahit *ardens*
Scorpios, & *cæli juſtâ plus parte* reliquit.

For thee the ſcorpion IS NOW CONTRACTING *his claws, and* HATH ALREADY LEFT *thee more than a juſt portion of Heaven.* The Poet, from a high ſtrain of poetic adulation, ſuppoſes the ſcorpion ſo deſirous of admitting *Auguſtus* among the heavenly ſigns, that though he *has already made* him more than room enough, yet he *ſtill* con-

C.VII. As to the IMPERFECTUM, it is ſometimes employed to denote what is *uſual* and *cuſtomary*. Thus *ſurgebat* and *ſcribebat* ſignify not only, *he* WAS *riſing*, *he* WAS *writing*, but upon occaſion they ſignify, *he* USED *to riſe*, *he* USED *to write*. The reaſon of this is, that whatever is *cuſtomary*, muſt be ſomething which has been *frequently repeated*. But what has been *frequently repeated*, muſt needs require *an Extenſion of Time paſt*, and thus we fall inſenſibly into the TENSE here mentioned.

AGAIN,

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continues to be making him more. Here then we have two acts, one *perfect*, the other *pending*, and hence the uſe of the two different Tenſes. Some editions read *relinquit*; but *reliquit* has the authority of the celebrated *Medicean* manuſcript.

——*Illa noto citius, volucrique ſagittâ,*
Ad terram fugit, *& portu ſe* condidit *alto.*

The ſhip, quicker than the wind, or a ſwift arrow, CONTINUES FLYING *to land, and* IS HID *within the lofty harbour.* We may ſuppoſe this Harbour, (like many others) to have been ſurrounded with high Land. Hence the Veſſel, immediately on entering it, was *completely hid* from thoſe ſpectators, who had gone out to

ſee

AGAIN, we are told by *Pliny* (whoſe authority likewiſe is confirmed by many gems and marbles ſtill extant) that the ancient painters and ſculptors, when they fixed their names to their works, did it *pendenti titulo, in a ſuſpenſive kind of Inſcription*, and employed for that purpoſe the Tenſe here mentioned. It was Ἀπελλῆς ἐποίει, *Apelles faciebat*, Πολύκλειτος ἐποίει, *Polycletus faciebat*, and never ἐποίησε or *fecit*. By this they imagined that they avoided the ſhew of arrogance, and had in caſe of cenſure an apology (as it were) prepared, ſince it appeared from the work itſelf, that *it was once indeed in hand*, but no pretenſion that *it was ever finiſhed* (*q*). C. VII.

IT

ſee the Ship-race, but yet might *ſtill continue ſailing* towards the ſhore within.

——Inruerant *Danai*, & *tectum omne* tenebant.

The Greeks HAD ENTERED *and* WERE THEN POSSESSING *the whole Houſe*; as much as to ſay, *they had entered, and that was over*, but their Poſſeſſion *continued ſtill*.

(*q*) *Plin. Nat. Hiſt. L. I.* The firſt Printers (who were moſt of them Scholars and Critics) in imitation of the

C. VII. It is remarkable that the very manner, in which the *Latins* derive theſe tenſes from one another, ſhews a plain reference to the ſyſtem here advanced. From *the paſſing Preſent* come the paſſing Paſt, and Future. *Scribo, Scribebam, Scribam.* From *the perfect Preſent* come the perfect Paſt, and Future. *Scripſi, Scripſeram, Scripſero.* And ſo in all inſtances, even where the verbs are irregular, as from *Fero* come *Ferebam* and *Feram*; from *Tuli* come *Tuleram* and *Tulero.*

We ſhall conclude by obſerving, that the Order of the Tenſes, as they ſtand ranged by the old Grammarians, is not a fortuitous Order, but is conſonant to our perceptions, in the recognition of Time, according to what we have explained already

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the antient Artiſts uſed the ſame Tenſe. *Excudebat H. Stephanus. Excudebat Guil. Morelius. Abſolvebat Joan. Benenatus*, which has been followed by Dr, *Taylor* in his late valuable edition of *Demoſthenes.*

ready (*r*). Hence it is, that the *Preſent Tenſe* ſtands firſt; then *the Paſt Tenſes*; and laſtly *the Future*. C. VII.

AND now, having ſeen what authorities there are for Aoriſts, or thoſe Tenſes, which denote Time *indefinitely*; and what for thoſe Tenſes, oppoſed to Aoriſts, which mark it *definitely*, (ſuch as the Inceptive, the Middle, and the Completive) we here finiſh the ſubject of TIME and TENSES, and proceed to conſider THE VERB IN OTHER ATTRIBUTES, which it will be neceſſary to deduce from other principles.

(*r*) See before p. 109, 110, 111, 112, 113. *Scaliger*'s obſervation upon this occaſion is elegant.—*Ordo autem (Temporum ſcil.) aliter eſt, quam natura eorum. Quod enim præteriit, prius eſt, quam quod eſt, itaque primo loco debere poni videbatur. Verùm, quod primo quoque tempore offertur nobis, id creat primas ſpecies in animo: quamobrem Præſens Tempus primum locum occupavit; eſt enim commune omnibus animalibus. Præteritum autem iis tantum, quæ memoriâ prædita ſunt. Futurum verò etiam paucioribus, quippe quibus datum eſt prudentiæ officium.* De Cauſ. Ling. Lat. c. 113. See alſo *Senecæ Epiſt.* 124. *Mutum animal ſenſu comprehendit præſentia; præteritorum*, &c.

CHAP.

CHAP. VIII.

Concerning Modes.

C. VIII. WE have obſerved already (*a*) that the Soul's leading powers are thoſe of *Perception* and thoſe of *Volition*, which words we have taken in their moſt comprehenſive acceptation. We have obſerved alſo, that *all Speech or Diſcourſe* is a *publiſhing* or exhibiting ſome part of our ſoul, either a certain *Perception*, or a certain *Volition*. Hence then, according as we exhibit it either in *a different part*; or after *a different manner*, hence I ſay the variety of MODES or MOODS (*b*).

IF

(*a*) See Chapter II.

(*b*) *Gaza* defines a Mode exactly conſonant to this doctrine. He ſays it is—βάλημα, εἴτ' ἂν πάθημα ψυχῆς, διὰ φωνῆς σημαινόμενον—*a Volition or Affection of the Soul, ſignified through ſome Voice, or Sound articulate.* Gram. L. IV. As therefore this is the nature of Modes, and Modes belong to Verbs, hence it is *Apollonius*

IF we ſimply *declare*, or *indicate* ſome- C. VIII.
thing to be, or not to be, (whether a Per-
ception or Volition, it is equally the ſame)
this conſtitutes that Mode called the DE-
CLARATIVE or INDICATIVE.

A Perception.

—Nosco *crinis, incanaque menta*
Regis Romani—— Virg. Æn. VI.

A Volition.

In nova FERT ANIMUS *mutatas dicere*
formas
Corpora—— Ovid. Metam. I.

IF we do not ſtrictly aſſert, as of ſome-
thing abſolute and certain, but as of ſome-
thing *poſſible* only, and in the number of
Con-

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nius obſerves—τοῖς ῥήμασιν ἐξαιρέτως παράκειται ἡ ψυχικὴ διάθεσις—*the Soul's diſpoſition is in an eminent degree attached to Verbs.* De Synt. L. III. c. 13. Thus too *Priſcian: Modi ſunt diverſæ* INCLINATIONES ANIMI, *quas varia conſequitur* DECLINATIO VERBI. L. VIII. p. 821.

C.VIII. *Contingents*, this makes that Mode, which Grammarians call the POTENTIAL; and which becomes on ſuch occaſions the leading Mode of the ſentence.

Sed tacitus paſci ſi poſſet Corvus, HABERET
Plus dapis, &c. Hor.

YET ſometimes it is not the leading Mode, but only *ſubjoined* to the Indicative. In ſuch caſe, it is moſtly uſed to denote the *End*, or *final Cauſe*; which End, as in human Life it is always a Contingent, and may never perhaps happen in deſpite of all our foreſight, is therefore expreſt moſt naturally by the Mode here mentioned. For example,

Ut JUGULENT *homines, ſurgunt de nocte latrones.* HOR.

Thieves riſe by night, that they may cut mens throats.

HERE

HERE that they *riſe*, is *poſitively aſſerted* in the *Declarative* or *Indicative* Mode; but as to their *cutting mens throats*, this is only delivered *potentially*, becauſe how truly ſoever it may be the *End* of their riſing, it is ſtill but a *Contingent*, that may never perhaps happen. This Mode, as often as it is in this manner ſubjoined, is called by Grammarians not the Potential, but THE SUBJUNCTIVE. C. VIII.

BUT it ſo happens, in the conſtitution of human affairs, that it is not always ſufficient merely *to declare* ourſelves to others. We find it often expedient, from a conſciouſneſs of our inability, to addreſs them after a manner more intereſting to ourſelves, whether to have *ſome Perception informed*, or *ſome Volition gratified*. Hence then new Modes of ſpeaking; if we *interrogate*, it is the INTERROGATIVE MODE; if we *require*, it is the REQUISITIVE. Even the Requiſitive itſelf hath its *ſubordinate Species:* With reſpect to inferiors, it is an IMPERATIVE MODE; with reſpect to

C. VIII. equals and ſuperiors, it is a PRECATIVE or OPTATIVE *.

AND thus have we eſtabliſhed a variety of Modes; the INDICATIVE or DECLARATIVE, *to aſſert what we think certain*; the POTENTIAL, *for the Purpoſes of whatever we think Contingent*; THE INTERROGATIVE, *when we are doubtful, to procure us Information*; and THE REQUISITIVE, to *aſſiſt us in the gratification of our Volitions*. The Requiſitive too appears under two diſtinct Species, either as it is IMPERATIVE to inferiors, or PRECATIVE to ſuperiors (*c*).

As

* It was the confounding of this Diſtinction, that gave riſe to a Sophiſm of *Protagoras*. *Homer* (ſays he) in beginning his Iliad with—*Sing, Muſe, the Wrath*,—when he thinks to *pray*, in reality *commands*. ἔυχεσθαι οἰόμενος, ἐπιτάττει. Ariſtot. Poet. c. 19. The Solution is evident from the Diviſion here eſtabliſhed, the Grammatical Form being in both caſes the ſame.

(*c*) The Species of *Modes* in great meaſure depend on the Species of *Sentences*. The *Stoics* increaſed the number of Sentences far beyond the *Peripatetics*. Beſides thoſe mentioned in Chapter II. Note (*b*) they had many

As therefore all theſe ſeveral Modes have their foundation in nature, ſo have certain C. VIII.

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many more, as may be ſeen in *Ammonius de Interpret.* p. 4. and *Diogenes Laertius*, L. VII. 66. The Peripatetics (and it ſeems too with reaſon) conſidered all theſe additional Sentences as included within thoſe, which they themſelves acknowledged, and which they made to be five in number, the Vocative, the Imperative, the Interrogative, the Precative, and the Aſſertive. There is no mention of a *Potential* Sentence, which may be ſuppoſed to co-incide with the Aſſertive, or Indicative. The Vocative (which the Peripatetics called the εἶδος κλητικὸν, but the Stoics more properly προσαγορευτικὸν) was nothing more than the Form of addreſs in point of names, titles, and epithets, with which we apply ourſelves one to another. As therefore it ſeldom included any Verb within it, it could hardly contribute to form a verbal Mode. *Ammonius* and *Boethius*, the one a *Greek* Peripatetic, the other a *Latin*, have illuſtrated the Species of Sentences from *Homer* and *Virgil*, after the following manner.

Ἀλλὰ τῇ λόγῳ πείθῃ εἰδῶν, τῇ τε ΚΛΗΤΙΚΟΥ, ὡς τὸ, Ὦ μάκαρ Ἀτρείδη——
καὶ τῇ ΠΡΟΣΤΑΚΤΙΚΟΥ, ὡς τὸ,
Βάσκ' ἴθι, Ἶρι ταχεῖα——

C. VIII. certain marks or signs of them been introduced into languages, that we may be enabled

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ἢ τῦ ΕΡΩΤΗΜΑΤΙΚΟΥ, ὡς τὸ,

Τίς, πόθεν εἶς ἀνδρῶν ;——

ἢ τῦ ΕΥΚΤΙΚΟΥ, ὡς τὸ,

Αἰ γὰρ Ζεῦ τε πάτερ——

ἢ ἐπὶ τούτοις, τῦ ΑΠΟΦΑΝΤΙΚΟΥ, καθ' ὃν ἀπὸ φαινόμεθα περὶ ὁτουῦν τῶν πραγμάτων, οἷον

——Θεοὶ δέ τε πάντα ἴσασιν——

ἢ περὶ παντὸς, &c. Εἰς τὸ περὶ Ἑρμ. p. 4.

Boethius's Account is as follows. *Perfectarum vero Orationum partes quinque sunt:* DEPRECATIVA, *ut,*

Jupiter omnipotens, precibus si flecteris ullis,
Da dicende auxilium, Pater, atque hæc omina firma.

IMPERATIVA, *ut,*

Vade age, Nate, voca Zephyros, & labere pennis.

INTERROGATIVA, *ut,*

Dic mihi, Damœta, cujum pecus?——

VOCATIVA, *ut,*

O! Pater, O! hominum rerumque æterna potestas.

ENUNTIATIVA, *in quâ Veritas vel Falsitas invenitur, ut,*

Principio arboribus varia est natura creandis.

Boeth. in Lib. de Interp. p. 291.

In

enabled by our diſcourſe to ſignify them, C.VIII.
one to another. And hence thoſe various MODES or MOODS, of which we find in common Grammars ſo prolix a detail, and which are in fact no more than "ſo many "*literal* Forms, intended to expreſs theſe "*natural* Diſtinctions" (*d*).

ALL

In *Milton* the ſame Sentences may be found, as follows. THE PRECATIVE,

—Univerſal Lord! be bounteous ſtill
To give us only Good——

THE IMPERATIVE,

Go then, Thou mightieſt, in thy Father's might.

THE INTERROGATIVE,

Whence, and what art thou, execrable Shape?

THE VOCATIVE,

——Adam, *earth's hallow'd Mold,*
Of God inſpir'd——

THE ASSERTIVE or ENUNCIATIVE,

The conquer'd alſo and enſlav'd by war
Shall, with their freedom loſt, all virtue loſe.

(*d*) The *Greek* Language, which is of all the moſt elegant and complete, expreſſes theſe ſeveral Modes,

C. VIII. ALL theſe MODES have this in common, that they exhibit ſome way or other the

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and all diſtinctions of Time likewiſe, by an adequate number of Variations in each particular Verb. Theſe Variations may be found, ſome at the beginning of the Verb, others at its ending, and conſiſt for the moſt part either in *multiplying* or *diminiſhing* the number of Syllables, or elſe in *lengthening* or *ſhortening* their reſpective Quantities, which two methods are called by Grammarians the *Syllabic* and the *Temporal*. The *Latin*, which is but a Species of *Greek* ſomewhat debaſed, admits in like manner a large portion of thoſe Variations, which are chiefly to be found at the Ending of its Verbs, and but rarely at their Beginning. Yet in its Deponents and Paſſives it is ſo far defective, as to be forced to have recourſe to the *Auxiliar*, *ſum*. The modern Languages, which have ſtill fewer of thoſe Variations, have been neceſſitated all of them to aſſume two Auxiliars at leaſt, that is to ſay, thoſe which expreſs in each Language the Verbs, *Have*, and *Am*. As to the *Engliſh* Tongue, it is ſo poor in this reſpect, as to admit no Variation for Modes, and only one for Time, which we apply to expreſs an Aoriſt of the Paſt. Thus from *Write* cometh *Wrote*; from *Give*, *Gave*; from *Speak*, *Spake*, &c. Hence to expreſs Time, and Modes, we are compelled to employ no leſs than ſeven Auxiliars, viz. *Do*, *Am*, *Have*, *Shall*, *Will*, *May*, and *Can*; which we uſe ſometimes ſingly, as when we ſay, I *am* writing,

the SOUL and its AFFECTIONS. Their Peculiarities and Diſtinctions are in part, as follows. C.VIII.

THE REQUISITIVE and INTERROGATIVE MODES are diſtinguiſhed from *the Indicative* and *Potential*, that whereas theſe *laſt ſeldom call for a Return*, to the two *former* it is *always neceſſary*.

IF we compare THE REQUISITIVE MODE with THE INTERROGATIVE, we ſhall find theſe alſo diſtinguiſhed, and that not only in the *Return*, but in other Peculiarities.

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ing, I *have* written; ſometimes two together, as, I *have been* writing, I *ſhould have* written; ſometimes no leſs than three, as I *might have been* loſt, he *could have been* preſerved. But for theſe, and all other ſpeculations, relative to the *Genius* of the *Engliſh* Language, we refer the reader, who wiſhes for the moſt authentic information, to that excellent Treatiſe of the learned Dr. *Lowth*, intitled, *A ſhort Introduction to Engliſh Grammar*.

C. VIII. *The Return to the Requiſitive* is *ſometimes* made in *Words, ſometimes in Deeds.* To the requeſt of *Dido* to *Eneas*—

——*a primâ dic, hoſpes, origine nobis*
Inſidias Danâum——

the *proper* Return was in *Words*, that is, in an hiſtorical Narrative. To the Requeſt of the unfortunate Chief——*date obolum Beliſario*—the *proper* Return was in a Deed, that is, in a charitable Relief. But with reſpect to *the Interrogative, the Return is neceſſarily made in Words alone*, in Words, which are called a *Reſponſe* or *Anſwer*, and which are always actually or by implication ſome *definitive aſſertive Sentence*. Take Examples. *Whoſe Verſes are theſe?*—the Return is a Sentence—*Theſe are Verſes of Homer. Was Brutus a worthy Man?*—the Return is a Sentence—*Brutus was a worthy Man.*

AND hence (if we may be permitted to digreſs) we may perceive the

the near affinity of this *Interrogative* Mode with the *Indicative*, in which laſt its Reſponſe or Return is moſtly made. So near indeed is this Affinity, that in theſe two Modes alone the Verb retains the ſame Form (*e*), nor are they otherwiſe diſtinguiſhed, than either by the Addition or Abſence of ſome ſmall particle, or by ſome minute change in the collocation of the words, or ſometimes only by a change in the Tone, or Accent (*f*). C. VIII.

BUT

(*e*) Ἤγε ἓν προκειμένη ὁριστικὴ ἔγκλισις, τὴν ἐγκειμένην κατάφασιν ἀποβάλλουσα, μεθίσταται τὸ καλεῖσθαι ὁριστική—ἀναπληρωθεῖσα δὲ τῆς καταφάσεως, ὑποστρέφει εἰς τὸ εἶναι ὁριστική. *The Indicative Mode, of which we ſpeak, by laying aſide that Aſſertion, which by its nature it implies, quits the name of Indicative—when it reaſſumes the Aſſertion, it returns again to its proper Character.* Apoll. de Synt. L. III. c. 21. *Theodore Gaza* ſays the ſame, *Introd. Gram.* L. IV.

(*f*) It may be obſerved of the INTERROGATIVE, that as often as the *Interrogation* is *ſimple* and *definite*, the Reſponſe may be made in almoſt the *ſame* Words,

C. VIII. But to return to our compariſon between the *Interrogative* Mode and the *Requiſitive*.

THE

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by converting them into a ſentence affirmative or negative, according as the Truth is either one or the other. For example—*Are theſe Verſes of* Homer?—Reſponſe—*Theſe Verſes are of* Homer. *Are thoſe Verſes of* Virgil?—Reſponſe—*Thoſe are not Verſes of* Virgil. And here the Artiſts of Language, for the ſake of brevity and diſpatch, have provided two Particles, to repreſent all ſuch Reſponſes; YES, for all the affirmative; NO, for all the negative.

But when the *Interrogation* is *complex*, as when we ſay—*Are theſe Verſes of* Homer, *or of* Virgil?—much more, when it is *indefinite*, as when we ſay in general—*Whoſe are theſe Verſes?*—we cannot then reſpond after the manner above mentioned. The Reaſon is, that no Interrogation can be anſwered by a ſimple *Yes*, or a ſimple *No*, except only thoſe, which are themſelves ſo ſimple, as of two poſſible anſwers to admit only one. Now the leaſt complex Interrogation will admit of four Anſwers, two affirmative, two negative, if not perhaps of more. The reaſon is, a complex Interrogation cannot conſiſt of leſs than two ſimple ones; each of which may be ſeparately affirmed and ſeparately denied. For inſtance

THE INTERROGATIVE (in the language of Grammarians) has all *Perſons* of C.VIII.

inſtance—*Are theſe Verſes* Homer's, *or* Virgil's? (1.) *They are Homer's*—(2.) *They are not Homer's*—(3.) *They are Virgil's*—(4.) *They are not Virgil's*—we may add, (5.) *They are of neither.* The indefinite Interrogations go ſtill farther; for theſe may be anſwered by infinite affirmatives, and infinite negatives. For inſtance—*Whoſe are theſe Verſes?* We may anſwer affirmatively—*They are* Virgil's, *They are* Horace's, *They are* Ovid's, *&c.*—or negatively—*They are not* Virgil's, *They are not* Horace's, *They are not* Ovid's, and ſo on, either way, to infinity. How then ſhould we learn from a ſingle *Yes*, or a ſingle *No*, which particular is meant among infinite Poſſibles? Theſe therefore are Interrogations which muſt be always anſwered by a *Sentence.* Yet even here Cuſtom has conſulted for Brevity, by returning for Anſwer only the *ſingle eſſential characteriſtic Word*, and retrenching by an Ellipſis all the reſt, which reſt the Interrogator is left to ſupply from himſelf. Thus when we are aſked—*How many right angles equal the angles of a triangle?*—we anſwer in the ſhort monoſyllable, Two; whereas, without the Ellipſis, the anſwer would have been—*Two right angles equal the angles of a triangle*,

The

C.VIII. of both *Numbers*. The REQUISITIVE or IMPERATIVE has no *firſt Perſon* of the *ſingular*, and that from this plain reaſon, that it is equally abſurd in *Modes* for a perſon to *requeſt* or *give commands to himſelf*, as it is in *Pronouns*, for the ſpeaker to become *the ſubject of his own addreſs* *.

AGAIN, we may *interrogate* as *to all Times*, both Preſent, Paſt, and Future. *Who* WAS *Founder of* Rome? *Who* IS *King of* China? *Who* WILL DISCOVER *the Longitude?*—But *Intreating* and *Commanding* (which are the eſſence of the *Re-*

The Antients diſtinguiſhed theſe two Species of Interrogation by different names. The ſimple they called Ἐρώτημα, *Interrogatio*; the complex, πύσμα, *Percontatio*. *Ammonius* calls the firſt of theſe Ἐρώτησις διαλεκτική; the other, Ἐρώτησις πυσματική. See *Am. Lib. de Interpr.* p. 160. *Diog. Laert.* VII. 66. *Quintil. Inſt.* IX. 2.

* Sup. p. 74, 75.

Requiſitive Mode) have a neceſſary re- C.VIII.
ſpect to the *Future* (*g*) only. For indeed what

(*g*) *Apollonius*'s Account of the Future, implied in all Imperatives, is worth obſerving. Ἐπὶ γὰρ μὴ γινομένοις ἢ μὴ γεγονόσιν ἡ ΠΡΟΣΤΑΞΙΣ· τὰ δὲ μὴ γινόμενα ἢ μὴ γεγονότα, ἐπιτηδειότητα δὲ ἔχοντα εἰς τὸ ἔσεσθαι, ΜΕΛΛΟΝΤΟΣ ἐϛι. A COMMAND *has reſpect to thoſe things which either are not doing, or have not yet been done. But thoſe things, which being not now doing, or having not yet been done, have a natural aptitude to exiſt hereafter, may be properly ſaid to appertain to* THE FUTURE. De Syntaxi, L. I. c. 36. Soon before this he ſays—Ἅπαντα τὰ προσακτικὰ εἰσκειμένην ἔχει τὴν τοῦ μέλλοντος διάθεσιν—χρηδὸν γὰρ ἐν ἴσῳ ἐϛὶ τὸ, Ὁ ΤΥΡΑΝΝΟΚΤΟΝΗΣΑΣ ΤΙΜΑΣΘΩ, τῷ, ΤΙΜΗΘΗΣΕΤΑΙ, κατὰ τὴν χρόνου ἔννοιαν· τῇ ἐκκλίσει διηλλαχὸς, καθὸ τὸ μὲν προσακτικὸν, τὸ δὲ ὁριϛικόν. *All* IMPERATIVES *have a diſpoſition within them, which reſpects* THE FUTURE—*with regard therefore to* TIME, *it is the ſame thing to ſay,* LET HIM, THAT KILLS A TYRANT, BE HONOURED, *or,* HE, THAT KILLS ONE, SHALL BE HONOURED; *the diſference being only in the Mode, in as much as one is* IMPERATIVE, *the other* INDICATIVE *or Declarative.* Apoll. de Syntaxi, L. I. c. 35. *Priſcian* ſeems to allow Imperatives a ſhare of *Preſent* Time, as well as *Future*. But if we attend, we ſhall find his *Preſent* to be

C. VIII. what have they to do with the preſent or the paſt, the natures of which are immutable and neceſſary?

It

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be nothing elſe than *an immediate Future*, as oppoſed to a more diſtant one. *Imperativus vero Præſens & Futurum [Tempus] naturali quâdam neceſſitate videtur poſſe accipere. Ea etenim imperamus, quæ vel in præſenti ſtatim volumus fieri ſine aliquâ dilatione, vel in futuro.* Lib. VIII. p. 806.

It is true the *Greeks* in their Imperatives admit certain Tenſes of the Paſt, ſuch as thoſe of the *Perfectum*, and of the two *Aoriſts*. But then theſe Tenſes, when ſo applied, either totally loſe their *temporary* Character, or elſe are uſed to inſinuate ſuch *a Speed of execution*, that the deed ſhould be (as it were) *done*, in the very inſtant when *commanded*. The ſame difference ſeems to ſubſiſt between our *Engliſh* Imperative, BE GONE, and thoſe others of, GO, or BE GOING. The firſt (if we pleaſe) may be ſtiled *the Imperative of the Perfectum*, as calling in the very inſtant for the completion of our Commands: the others may be ſtiled *Imperatives of the Future*, as allowing a reaſonable time to begin firſt, and finiſh afterward.

It is thus *Apollonius*, in the Chapter firſt cited, diſtinguiſhes between σκαπτέτω τὰς ἀμπέλους, *Go to digging the Vines*, and σκαψάτω τὰς ἀμπέλους, *Get the Vines dug*.

IT is from this connection of *Futurity* with *Commands*, that the *Future Indicative* is ſometimes uſed for the *Imperative*, and that to ſay to any one, YOU SHALL DO THIS, has often the ſame force with the Imperative, DO THIS. So in the Decalogue—THOU SHALT NOT KILL —THOU SHALT NOT BEAR FALSE WITNESS C.VIII.

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dug. The firſt is ſpoken (as he calls it) εἰς παράτασιν, *by way of Extenſion, or allowance of Time for the work*; the ſecond, εἰς συντελείωσιν, *with a view to immediate Completion.* And in another place, explaining the difference between the ſame Tenſes, Σκάπτε and Σκάψον, he ſays of the laſt, ἃ μόνον τὸ μὴ γενόμενον προτάσσει, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ γινόμενον ἐν παρατάσει ἀπαγορεύει, *that it not only commands ſomething, which has not been yet done, but forbids alſo that, which is now doing in an Extenſion, that is to ſay, in a ſlow and lengthened progreſs.* Hence, if a man has been a long while writing, and we are willing to haſten him, it would be wrong to ſay in *Greek*, ΓΡΑΦΕ, WRITE (for that he is *now*, and has been *long* doing) but ΓΡΑΨΟΝ, GET YOUR WRITING DONE; MAKE NO DELAYS. See *Apoll.* L. III. c. 24. See alſo *Macrobius de Diff. Verb. Græc. & Lat.* p. 680. *Edit. Varior. Latini non æſtimaverunt*, &c.

C. VIII. WITNESS—which denote (we know) the ſtricteſt and moſt authoritative Commands.

As to the POTENTIAL MODE, it is diſtinguiſhed from all the reſt, by its *ſubordinate* or *ſubjunctive* Nature. It is alſo farther diſtinguiſhed from the *Requiſitive* and *Interrogative*, by implying a kind of feeble and weak *Aſſertion*, and ſo becoming in ſome degree ſuſceptible of Truth and Falſhood. Thus, if it be ſaid potentially, *This may be*, or, *This might have been*, we may remark without abſurdity, *It is true*, or *It is falſe*. But if it be ſaid, *Do this*, meaning, *Fly to Heaven*, or, *Can this be done?* meaning, *to ſquare the Circle*, we cannot ſay in either caſe, *it is true* or *it is falſe*, though the Command and the Queſtion are about things impoſſible. Yet ſtill the *Potential* does not aſpire to the Indicative, becauſe it implies but a *dubious* and *conjectural*

Assertion, whereas that of the Indicative is absolute, and without reserve. C. VIII.

THIS therefore (the INDICATIVE I mean) is the Mode, which, as in all Grammars it is the first in order, so is truly first both in dignity and use. It is this, which publishes our sublimest perceptions; which exhibits the Soul in her purest Energies, superior to the Imperfection of desires and wants; which includes the whole of *Time*, and its minutest distinctions; which, in its various *Past* Tenses, is employed by History, to preserve to us the Remembrance of former Events; in its *Futures* is used by Prophecy, or (in default of this) by wise Foresight, to instruct and forewarn us, as to that which is coming; but above all in its *Present* Tense serves Philosophy and the Sciences, by just Demonstrations to establish *necessary Truth*; THAT TRUTH, which from its nature *only exists*

C. VIII. *iſts in the Preſent*; which knows no diſtinctions either of Paſt or of Future, but is every where and always invariably one (*b*).

THROUGH

(*b*) See the quotation, Note (*c*) Chapter the Sixth. *Cum enim dicimus*, DEUS EST, *non eum dicimus nunc eſſe, ſed*, &c.

Boethius, author of the ſentiment there quoted, was by birth a *Roman* of the firſt quality; by religion, a Chriſtian; and by philoſophy, a Platonic and Peripatetic; which two Sects, as they ſprang from the ſame Source, were in the latter ages of antiquity commonly adopted by the ſame Perſons, ſuch as *Themiſtius*, *Porphyry*, *Iamblichus*, *Ammonius*, and others. There were no Sects of Philoſophy, that lay greater Streſs on the diſtinction between things exiſting *in Time* and *not in Time*, than the two above-mentioned. The Doctrine of the Peripatetics on this Subject (ſince it is theſe that *Boethius* here follows) may be partly underſtood from the following Sketch.

"THE THINGS, THAT EXIST IN TIME, are "*thoſe whoſe Exiſtence Time can meaſure.* But if their "Exiſtence may be meaſured by Time, then there "may be aſſumed a Time greater than the Exiſtence "of any one of them, as there may be aſſumed a "number greater than the greateſt multitude, that is

"capable

THROUGH all the above Modes, with their reſpective Tenſes, the Verb being con- C. VIII.

" capable of being numbered. And hence it is that " *things temporary* have their Exiſtence, as it were *li-* " *mited* by Time; that they are confined within it, as " within ſome bound; and that in ſome degree or other " they *all ſubmit to its power*, according to thoſe com- " mon Phraſes, that *Time is a deſtroyer*; that *things* " *decay through Time*; that *men forget in Time, and loſe* " *their abilities*, and ſeldom that they improve, or grow " young, or beautiful. The truth indeed is, *Time al-* " *ways attends Motion*. Now the natural effect of Mo- " tion is *to put ſomething, which now is, out of that ſtate,* " *in which it now is*, and ſo far therefore to deſtroy that " ſtate.

" The reverſe of all this holds with THINGS THAT " EXIST ETERNALLY. Theſe exiſt *not in Time*, be- " cauſe Time is ſo far from being able to meaſure their " Exiſtence, that *no Time can be aſſumed, which their* " *Exiſtence doth not ſurpaſs*. To which we may add, " that they *feel none of its effects*, being no way obnoxious " either to damage or diſſolution.

" To inſtance in examples of either kind of Being. " There are ſuch things at this inſtant, as *Stonehenge* " and the *Pyramids*. It is likewiſe true at this inſtant, " that the *Diameter of the ſquare is incommenſurable* " *with its ſide*. What then ſhall we ſay? Was there

C. VIII. conſidered as denoting an ATTRIBUTE, has always reference to ſome Perſon, or SUBSTANCE. Thus if we ſay, *Went*, or, *Go*, or *Whither goeth*, or, *Might have gone*, we muſt add a Perſon or Subſtance, to make the Sentence complete. Cicero *went*; Cæſar *might have gone*; *whither goeth the Wind? Go! Thou Traitor!* But there is a Mode or Form, under which Verbs ſometimes appear, where they have no reference at all to Perſons or Subſtances. For example—*To eat is pleaſant*; *but*

"ever a Time, when it was *not incommenſurable*, as "it is certain there was a Time, when there was no "Stonehenge, or Pyramids? or is it *daily* growing *leſs* "*incommenſurable*, as we are aſſured of Decays in both "thoſe maſſy Structures?" From theſe unchangeable Truths, we may paſs to their Place, or Region; to the unceaſing Intellection of the univerſal Mind, ever perfect, ever full, knowing no remiſſions, languors, &c. See *Nat. Auſc.* L. IV. c. 19. Metaph. L. XIV. c. 6, 7, 8, 9, 10. Edit. Du Val. and Vol. I. p. 262. Note VII. The following Paſſage may deſerve Attention.

Τῶ γὰρ Νῶ ὁ μὲν νοῶν σύφυτον, ᾗ μὴ νοῶν· ὁ δὲ ᾗ σύφυτος, ᾗ νοῦς. ἀλλὰ ᾗ ὅντος ὄντως τέλεος; ἂν μὴ σχοσθῆς ἀυτῷ τὸ ᾗ νοῦν εἶναι, ᾗ σύφυτον νοῦν, ᾗ μὴ ἄλλοτε ἄλλα. ἔφη εἷς ἀν ἐκτελίσσαντες ὁ νοῶν ἀεὶ ᾗ πάντα, ᾗ ἅμα. Max. Tyr. Diſſ. XVII. p. 201. Ed. Lond.

but to faſt is wholeſome. Here the Verbs, *To eat*, and, *To faſt*, ſtand alone by themſelves, nor is it requiſite or even practicable to prefix a Perſon or Subſtance. Hence the *Latin* and modern Grammarians have called Verbs under this Mode, from this their indefinite nature, INFINITIVES. *Sanctius* has given them the name of *Imperſonals*; and the *Greeks* that of Ἀπαρέμφατα, from the ſame reaſon of their *not diſcovering* either Perſon or Number. C. VIII.

THESE INFINITIVES go farther. They not only lay aſide the character of *Attributives*, but they alſo aſſume that of *Subſtantives*, and as ſuch themſelves become diſtinguiſhed with their ſeveral *Attributes*. Thus in the inſtance above, *Pleaſant* is the Attribute, attending the Infinitive, *To Eat*; *Wholeſome* the attribute attending the Infinitive, *To Faſt*. Examples in *Greek* and *Latin* of like kind are innumerable.

Dulce & decorum eſt pro patria MORI.
SCIRE *tuum nihil eſt*—

C.VIII. Οὐ καθανεῖν γὰρ δεινὸν, ἀλλ' ἀισχρῶς θανεῖν (*i*).

THE *Stoics* in their grammatical inquiries had this Infinitive in ſuch eſteem, that they

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(*i*) It is from the INFINITIVE thus participating the nature of a Noun or Subſtantive, that the beſt Grammarians have called it ſometimes Ὄνομα ῥηματικὸν, A VERBAL NOUN; ſometimes Ὄνομα ῥήματος, THE VERB's NOUN. The Reaſon of this Appellation is in *Greek* more evident, from its taking the prepoſitive Article before it in all caſes; τὸ γράφειν, τοῦ γράφειν, τῷ γράφειν. The ſame conſtruction is not unknown in *Engliſh*.

Thus *Spencer*,

For not to have been dipt in Lethe *lake,*
Could ſave the Son of Thetis FROM TO DIE—

ἀπὸ τοῦ θανεῖν. In like manner we ſay, *He did it, to be rich*, where we muſt ſupply by an Ellipſis the Prepoſition, FOR. *He did it, for to be rich*, the ſame as if we had ſaid, *He did it for gain*——ἕνεκα τοῦ πλουτεῖν, ἕνεκα τοῦ κέρδους——in *French*, *pour s'enricher*. Even when we ſpeak ſuch Sentences, as the following, *I chooſe* TO PHILOSOPHIZE, *rather than* TO BE RICH, τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν βούλομαι, ἤπερ τὸ πλουτεῖν, the Infinitives are in nature as much Accuſatives, as if we were to ſay, *I chooſe* PHILOSOPHY *rather than* RICHES, τὴν φιλο-

they held this alone to be the genuine PHMA or VERB, a name, which they denied to all the other Modes. Their reaſoning was, they conſidered the true verbal character to be contained *ſimple* and *unmixed* in the *Infinitive only*. Thus the Infinitives, Περιπατεῖν, *Ambulare*, *To walk*, mean *ſimply* that energy, and *nothing more*. The other Modes, beſides expreſſing this energy, *ſuperadd certain Affections*, which reſpect perſons and circumſtances. Thus *Ambulo* and *Ambula* mean not ſimply *To walk*, but mean, *I walk*, and, *Walk Thou*. C. VIII.

φιλοσοφίαν βάλομαι, ἤπερ τὸν πλεῖστον. Thus too *Priſcian*, ſpeaking of *Infinitives*—CURRERE *enim eſt* CURSUS; & SCRIBERE, SCRIPTURA; & LEGERE, LECTIO. *Itaque frequenter & Nominibus adjunguntur, & aliis caſualibus, more Nominum; ut Perſius,*

Sed pulcrum eſt digito monſtrari, & dicier, hic eſt.

And ſoon after—*Cum enim dico,* BONUM EST LEGERE, *nihil aliud ſignifico, niſi,* BONA EST LECTIO. L. XVIII. p. 1130. See alſo *Apoll.* L. I. c. 8. *Gaza* Gram. L. IV. Τὸ δὲ ἀπαρέμφατον, ὄνομά ἐϛι ῥήματος κ. τ. λ.

C. VIII. And hence they are all of them reſolvable into *the Infinitive, as their Prototype*, together with *ſome ſentence or word, expreſſive of their proper Character. Ambulo, I walk*; this is, *Indico me ambulare, I declare myſelf to walk. Ambula, Walk Thou*; that is, *Impero te ambulare, I command thee to walk*; and ſo with the Modes of every other ſpecies. Take away therefore the *Aſſertion*, the *Command*, or whatever elſe gives *a Character* to any one of theſe Modes, and there remains nothing more than THE MERE INFINITIVE, which (as *Priſcian* ſays) *ſignificat ipſam rem, quam continet Verbum* (*k*).

THE

(*k*) See *Apollon.* L. III. 13. Καθόλε πᾶν παρηγμένον ἀπό τινος κ. τ. λ. See alſo *Gaza*, in the note before. *Igitur a Conſtructione quoque* Vim rei Verborum *(id eſt, Nominis, quod ſignificat ipſam rem) habere* INFINITIVUM *poſſumus dignoſcere*; res autem in Perſonas diſtributa *facit* alios verbi motus.—*Itaque* omnes modi *in hunc, id eſt*, Infinitivum, *tranſumuntur ſive* reſolvuntur. *Priſc.* L. XVIII. p. 1131. From theſe Principles *Apollonius* calls the Infinitive Ῥῆμα γενικώτατον, and *Priſcian*, *Verbum generale.*

C.VIII.

THE application of this Infinitive is ſomewhat ſingular. It *naturally coaleſces* with all thoſe Verbs, that denote any *Tendence, Deſire*, or *Volition of the Soul*, but not readily with others. Thus it is ſenſe as well as ſyntax, to ſay βούλομαι ζῆν, *Cupio vivere, I deſire to live*; but not to ſay Ἐσθίω ζῆν, *Edo vivere*, or even in *Engliſh, I eat to live*, unleſs by an Ellipſis, inſtead of *I eat for to live*; as we ſay ἕνεκα τοῦ ζῆν, or *pour vivre*. The reaſon is, that though *different Actions* may unite in the *ſame Subject*, and therefore be coupled together (as when we ſay, *He walked and diſcourſed*) yet the Actions notwithſtanding remain ſeparate and diſtinct. But it is not ſo with reſpect to *Volitions*, and *Actions*. Here the coaleſcence is often ſo intimate, that *the Volition* is unintelligible, till *the Action* be expreſt. *Cupio, Volo, Deſidero—I deſire, I am willing, I want*—What?—The ſentences, we ſee, are defective and imperfect.

C. VIII. We muſt help them then by *Infinitives*, which expreſs the proper Actions to which they tend. *Cupio legere, Volo diſcere, Deſidero vidère, I deſire to read, I am willing to live, I want to ſee.* Thus is the whole rendered complete, as well in ſentiment, as in ſyntax (*l*).

And ſo much for Modes, and their ſeveral Species. We are to attempt to denominate them according to their moſt eminent characters, it may be done in the following manner. As every neceſſary truth, and every demonſtrative ſyllogiſm (which laſt is no more than a combination of ſuch truths) muſt always be expreſt under poſitive aſſertions, and as poſitive

(*l*) *Priſcian* calls theſe Verbs, which naturally precede Infinitives, *Verba Voluntativa*; they are called in *Greek* Προαιρετικά. See L. XVIII. 1129. but more particularly ſee *Apollonius*, L. III. c. 13. where this whole doctrine is explained with great Accuracy. See alſo *Macrobius de Diff. Verb. Gr. & Lat. p.* 685. *Ed. Vqr.*

—*Nec omne* ἀπαρέμφατον *cuicunque Verbo*, &c.

fitive aſſertions only belong to the *Indicative*, we may denominate it for that reaſon the MODE OF SCIENCE (*m*). Again, as the *Potential* is only converſant about *Contingents*, of which we cannot ſay with certainty that they will happen or not, we may call this Mode, THE MODE OF CONJECTURE. Again, as thoſe that are ignorant and would be informed, muſt aſk of thoſe that already know, this being the natural way of becoming *Proficients*; hence we may call the *Interrogative*, THE MODE OF PROFICIENCY. C. VIII.

Inter cuncta leges, & PERCONTABERE doctos,
Quâ ratione queas traducere leniter ævum,
Quid purè tranquillet, &c. Hor.

Farther ſtill, as the higheſt and moſt excellent uſe of the *Requiſitive* Mode is legiſlative

(*m*) *Ob nobilitatem præivit* INDICATIVUS, *ſolus Modus aptus Scientiis, ſolus Pater Veritatis.* Scal. de Cauſ. L. Lat. c. 116.

C. VIII. giſlative command, we may ſtile it for this reaſon THE MODE OF LEGISLATURE. *Ad Divos adeunto caſtè*, ſays *Cicero* in the character of a *Roman* law-giver; *Be it therefore enacted*, ſay the laws of *England*; and in the ſame *Mode* ſpeak the *laws* of every other nation. It is alſo in this *Mode* that the geometrician, with the authority of a legiſlator, orders lines to be biſected, and circles deſcribed, as preparatives to that ſcience, which he is about to eſtabliſh.

THERE are other *ſuppoſed* affections of Verbs, ſuch as *Number* and *Perſon*. But theſe ſurely cannot be called a part of their eſſence, nor indeed are they the eſſence of any other Attribute, being in fact the properties, not of Attributes, but of Subſtances. The moſt that can be ſaid, is, that Verbs in the more elegant languages are provided with certain terminations, which reſpect the *Number* and *Perſon* of every *Subſtantive*, that we may know

know with more preciſion, in a complex ſentence, each particular ſubſtance, with its attendant verbal Attributes. The ſame may be ſaid of *Sex*, with reſpect to Adjectives. They have terminations which vary, as they reſpect Beings male or female, tho' *Subſtances* paſt diſpute are alone ſuſceptible of ſex (*n*). We therefore paſs over theſe matters, and all of like kind, as C. VIII.

(*n*) It is ſomewhat extraordinary, that ſo acute and rational a Grammarian as *Sanctius*, ſhould juſtly deny *Genders*, or the diſtinction of Sex to *Adjectives*, and yet make *Perſons* appertain, not to *Subſtantives*, but to *Verbs*. His commentator *Perizonius* is much more conſiſtent, who ſays—*At vero ſi rem rectè conſideres, ipſis Nominibus & Pronominibus vel maximè, imò unicè ineſt ipſa Perſona; & Verba ſe habent in Perſonarum ratione ad Nomina planè ſicuti Adjectiva in ratione Generum ad Subſtantiva, quibus ſolis autor* (Sanctius ſcil. L. I. c. 7.) *& rectè Genus adſcribit, excluſis Adjectivis.* Sanct. Minerv. L. I. c. 12. There is indeed an exact Analogy between the Accidents of *Sex* and *Perſon*. There are but two *Sexes*, that is to ſay, the Male and the Female; and but two *Perſons* (or Characters eſſential to diſcourſe) that is to ſay, the Speaker, and the Party addreſſed. The third Sex and third Perſon are improperly ſo called, being in fact but Negations of the other two.

C. VIII. as being rather among the elegancies, than the eſſentials (*o*) of language, which eſſentials are the ſubject of our preſent inquiry. The principal of theſe now remaining is THE DIFFERENCE OF VERBS, AS TO THEIR SEVERAL SPECIES, which we endeavour to explain in the following manner.

(*o*) Whoever would ſee more upon a ſubject of importance, referred to in many parts of this treatiſe, and particularly in note (*b*) of this chapter, may conſult *Letters concerning Mind*, an Octavo Volume publiſhed 1750, the Author Mr. *John Petvin*, *Vicar of Ilſington in Devon*, a perſon who, though from his retired ſituation little known, was deeply ſkilled in the Philoſophy both of the Antients and Moderns, and, more than this, was valued by all that knew him for his virtue and worth.

CHAP.

CHAP. IX.

Concerning the Species of Verbs, and their other remaining Properties.

ALL Verbs, that are ſtrictly ſo called, denote (*a*) Energies. Now as all *Energies* are *Attributes*, they have reference of courſe to certain *energizing Subſtances*. Thus it is impoſſible there ſhould be ſuch Energies, as *To love*, *to fly*, *to wound*, &c. if there were not ſuch beings as *Men*, *Birds*, *Swords*, &c. Farther, every Energy doth not only require an Energizer, but is neceſſarily converſant about ſome *Subject*. For example, if we ſay, *Brutus loves*—we muſt needs ſupply—loves *Cato*, *Caſſius*, Ch. IX.

(*a*) We uſe this word ENERGY, rather than *Motion*, from its more comprehenſive meaning; it being a ſort of Genus, which includes within it both *Motion* and its *Privation*. See before, p. 94, 95.

Ch. IX. *Caſſius, Portia,* or ſome one. *The Sword wounds*—i. e. wounds *Hector, Sarpedon, Priam,* or ſome one. And thus is it, that every Energy is neceſſarily ſituate between two Subſtantives, an Energizer which is *active,* and a Subject which is *paſſive.* Hence then, if the Energizer lead the ſentence, the Energy follows its character, and becomes what we call A VERB ACTIVE.—Thus we ſay *Brutus amat, Brutus loves.* On the contrary, if the paſſive Subject be principal, it follows the character of this too, and then becomes what we call A VERB PASSIVE.—Thus we ſay, *Portia amatur, Portia is loved.* It is in like manner that the *ſame Road* between the ſummit and foot of the ſame mountain, with reſpect to the ſummit is *Aſcent,* with reſpect to the foot is *Deſcent.* Since then every Energy reſpects an Energizer or a paſſive Subject; hence the Reaſon why every Verb, whether active or paſſive, has in language a neceſſary reference

ference to ſome *Noun* for its *Nominative Caſe* (*b*). Ch. IX.

BUT to proceed ſtill farther from what has been already obſerved. *Brutus loved Portia.*—Here *Brutus* is the Energizer; *loved*, the *Energy*; and *Portia*, the *Subject*. But it might have been, *Brutus* loved *Cato*, or *Caſſius*, or the *Roman Republic*; for the Energy is referable to Subjects infinite. Now among theſe infinite Subjects, when that happens to occur, which is the Energizer alſo, as when we ſay *Brutus* loved *himſelf*, ſlew *himſelf*, &c. in ſuch Caſe *the Energy* hath to the *ſame* being *a double Relation*, both active and paſſive. And this it is which gave riſe among

(*b*) The doctrine of Impersonal Verbs has been juſtly rejected by the beſt Grammarians, both antient and modern. See *Sanct. Min.* L. I. c. 12. L. III. c. 1. L. IV. c. 3. *Priſcian.* L. XVIII. p. 1134. *Apoll.* L. III. ſub fin. In which places the reader will ſee a proper Nominative ſupplied to all Verbs of this ſuppoſed Character.

Ch. IX. among the *Greeks* to that ſpecies of Verbs, called VERBS MIDDLE (*c*), and ſuch was their true and original uſe, however in many inſtances they may have ſince happened to deviate. In other languages the Verb ſtill retains its active Form, and the paſſive Subject *(ſe* or *himſelf)* is expreſſed like other accuſatives.

AGAIN, in ſome Verbs it happens that the Energy *always keeps within* the Energizer, and *never paſſes out* to any foreign extraneous Subject. Thus when we ſay, *Cæſar walketh, Cæſar ſitteth,* it is impoſſible

(*c*) Τὰ γὰρ καλούμενα μεσότητος χήματα συνέμπλωσιν ἀνεδέξατο ἐνεργετικῆς καὶ παθητικῆς διαθέσεως. *The Verbs, called Verbs middle, admit a Coincidence of the active and paſſive Character.* Apollon. L. III. c. 7. He that would ſee this whole Doctrine concerning the power of THE MIDDLE VERB explained and confirmed with great Ingenuity and Learning, may conſult a ſmall Treatiſe of that able Critic *Kuſter*, entitled, *De vero Uſu Verborum Mediorum.* A neat edition of this ſcarce piece has been lately publiſhed.

ble *the Energy ſhould paſs out* (as in the caſe of thoſe Verbs called by the Grammarians VERBS TRANSITIVE) becauſe both the *Energizer* and the *Paſſive Subject* are united in *the ſame Perſon*. For what is the cauſe of this walking or ſitting?—It is the *Will* and *Vital Powers* belonging to *Cæſar*. And what is the Subject, made ſo to move or to ſit?—It is the *Body* and *Limbs* belonging alſo to the ſame *Cæſar*. It is this then forms that ſpecies of Verbs, which grammarians have thought fit to call VERBS NEUTER, as if indeed they were void both of *Action* and *Paſſion*, when perhaps (like Verbs middle) they may be rather ſaid *to imply both*. Not however to diſpute about names, as theſe Neuters *in their Energizer* always diſcover *their paſſive Subject* (*c*), which other Verbs Ch. IX.

(*c*) This Character of Neuters the *Greeks* very happily expreſs by the Terms, Αυτοπάθεια and Ἰδιοπάθεια, which *Priſcian* renders, *quæ ex ſe in ſeipſâ fit intrinſecus Paſſio*. L. VIII. 790. *Conſentii Ars apud Putſch.* p. 2051.

Ch. IX. Verbs cannot, their paſſive Subjects being infinite; hence the reaſon why it is as ſuperfluous in theſe Neuters to have the Subject expreſſed, as in other Verbs it is neceſſary, and cannot be omitted. And thus it is that we are taught in common grammars

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It may be here obſerved, that even thoſe Verbs, called *Actives*, can upon occaſion lay aſide their tranſitive character; that is to ſay, can drop their ſubſequent Accuſative, and *aſſume the Form of Neuters*, ſo as to ſtand by themſelves. This happens, when the Diſcourſe reſpects the mere *Energy* or *Affection* only, and has no regard to the Subject, be it this thing or that. Thus we ſay, οὐκ οἶδεν ἀναγινωσκειν ἅτος, *This Man knows not how to read*; ſpeaking only of the Energy, in which we ſuppoſe him deficient. Had the Diſcourſe been upon the Subjects of reading, we muſt have added them, οὐκ οἶδεν ἀναγινώσκειν τὰ Ὁμήρυ, *He knows not how to read Homer*, or *Virgil*, or *Cicero*, &c.

Thus *Horace*,

Qui CUPIT *aut* METUIT, *juvat illum ſic domus aut res,*
Ut lippum pictæ tabulæ ——

He that DESIRES *or* FEARS (not this thing in particular nor that, but in general he within whoſe breaſt

theſe

mars that *Verbs Active require an Accu-* Ch. IX.
ſative, while *Neuters require none*.

OF the above ſpecies of Verbs, the *Middle* cannot be called neceſſary, becauſe moſt languages have done without it. THE SPECIES OF VERBS therefore remaining are the ACTIVE, the PASSIVE and the NEUTER, and thoſe ſeem eſſential to all languages whatever (*d*).

theſe affections prevail) *has the ſame joy in a Houſe or Eſtate, as the Man with bad Eyes has in fine Pictures.* So *Cæſar* in his celebrated *Laconic* Epiſtle of, VENI, VIDI, VICI, where two Actives we ſee follow one Neuter in the ſame detached Form, as that Neuter itſelf. The Glory it ſeems was *in the rapid Sequel of the Events.* Conqueſt came as quick, as he could come himſelf, and look about him. *Whom* he ſaw, and *whom* he conquered, was not the thing, of which he boaſted. See *Apoll.* L. III. c. 31. p. 279.

(*d*) The STOICS, in their logical view of Verbs, as making part in Propoſitions, conſidered them under the four following Sorts.

Ch. IX. THERE remains a remark or two farther, and then we quit the Subject of Verbs. It is true in general that the greater part of them denote Attributes of *Energy*

When a *Verb*, co-inciding with the *Nominative of ſome Noun*, made *without farther help* a perfect aſſertive Sentence, as Σωκράτης περιπατεῖ, *Socrates walketh*; then as the Verb in ſuch caſe implied the Power of a perfect Predicate, they called it for that reaſon Κατηγόρημα, *a Predicable*; or elſe, from its readineſs συμβάινειν, *to co-incide with its Noun in completing the Sentence*, they called it Σύμβαμα, *a Co-incider*.

When a *Verb* was able with a *Noun* to form a perfect aſſertive Sentence, yet could not aſſociate with ſuch Noun, but under ſome *oblique Caſe*, as Σωκράτει μεταμέλει, *Socratem pœnitet*: Such a Verb, from its *near approach to juſt Co-incidence, and Predication*, they called Παρασύμβαμα or Παρακατηγόρημα.

When a Verb, though regularly co-inciding with a Noun in its Nominative, *ſtill required*, to complete the Sentiment, *ſome other Noun under an oblique Caſe*, as Πλάτων φιλεῖ Δίωνα, *Plato loveth Dio*, (where without *Dio* or ſome other, the Verb *loveth* would reſt indefinite:)

Energy and *Motion*. But there are ſome which appear to denote nothing more, than a *mere ſimple Adjective*, joined to an Aſſertion. Thus ἰσάζει in *Greek*, and *Equalleth* in *Engliſh*, mean nothing more than Ch. IX.

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nite:) Such Verb, from this Defect, they called ἧττον ἢ σύμβαμα, or ἢ κατηγόρημα, *ſomething leſs than a Co-incider, or leſs than a Predicable.*

Laſtly, when a Verb required *two Nouns in oblique Caſes*, to render the Sentiment complete; as when we ſay Σωκράτει Ἀλκιβιάδης μέλει, *Tædet me Vitæ*, or the like: Such Verb they called ἧττον, or ἔλαττον ἢ παρασύμβαμα, or ἢ παρακατηγόρημα, *ſomething leſs than an imperfect Co-incider, or an imperfect Predicable.*

Theſe were the *Appellations* which they gave to Verbs, when employed along with Nouns to the forming of Propoſitions. As to the Name of ΡΗΜΑ, or VERB, they denied it to them all, giving it only to the *Infinitive*, as we have ſhewn already. See page 164. See alſo *Ammon. in Lib. de Interpret.* p. 37. *Apollon. de Syntaxi*, L. I. c. 8. L. III. c. 31. p. 279. c. 32. p. 295. *Theod. Gaz. Gram.* L. IV.

From the above Doctrine it appears, that all *Verbs Neuter* are Συμβάματα; *Verbs Active*, ἧττονα ἢ συμβάματα.

Ch. IX. than ἴσός ἐςι, *is equal*. So *Albeo* in *Latin* is no more than *albus ſum*.

—*Campique ingentes oſſibus albent.* Virg.

THE ſame may be ſaid of *Tumeo*. *Mons tumet*, i. e. *tumidus eſt, is tumid*. To expreſs the Energy in theſe inſtances, we muſt have recourſe to the Inceptives.

Fluctus uti primo cæpit cum ALBESCERE *Vento.* Virg.

—— —— *Freta ponti*
Incipiunt agitata TUMESCERE. Virg.

THERE are Verbs alſo to be found, which are formed out of Nouns. So that as in *Abſtract Nouns* (ſuch as *Whiteneſs* from *White*, *Goodneſs* from *Good*) as alſo in the *Infinitive Modes* of Verbs, *the Attributive is converted into a Subſtantive*; here *the Subſtantive on the contrary is converted into an Attributive*. Such are Κυνίζειν from κύων, *to act the part of a Dog*, or *be a Cynic*;

nic; Φιλιππίζειν from Φίλιππος, *to Philippize*, or *favour Philip*; *Syllaturire* from *Sylla*, to *meditate acting the ſame part as Sylla did*. Thus too the wiſe and virtuous Emperour, by way of counſel to himſelf —ὅρα μὴ ἀποκαισαρωθῇς, *beware thou beeſt not* BECÆSAR'D; as though he ſaid, *Beware, that by being Emperor, thou doſt not dwindle into* A MERE CÆSAR (*e*). In like manner one of our own witty Poets, Ch. IX.

STERNHOLD *himſelf he* OUT-STERNHOLDED.

And long before him the facetious *Fuller*, ſpeaking of one *Morgan*, a ſanguinary Biſhop in the Reign of Queen *Mary*, ſays of him, *that he* OUT-BONNER'D *even* BONNER *himſelf* *.

AND ſo much for that Species of ATTRIBUTES, called VERBS IN THE STRICTEST SENSE.

(*e*) *Marc. Antonin.* L. VI. § 30.
* Church Hiſt. B. VIII. p. 21.

CHAP. X.

Concerning thoſe other Attributives, Participles and Adjectives.

Ch. X. THE nature of Verbs being underſtood, that of PARTICIPLES is no way difficult. Every complete Verb is expreſſive of an *Attribute*; *of Time*; and of *an Aſſertion*. Now if we take away *the Aſſertion*, and thus deſtroy the *Verb*, there will remain the *Attribute* and the *Time*, which make the eſſence of a PARTICIPLE. Thus take away the Aſſertion from the Verb, Γράφει, *Writeth*, and there remains the Participle, Γράφων, *Writing*, which (without the *Aſſertion*) denotes *the ſame Attribute*, and *the ſame Time*. After the ſame manner, *by withdrawing the Aſſertion*, we diſcover Γράψας in Ἔγραψε, Γράψων in Γράψει, for we chuſe to refer to the *Greek*, as being of all languages

the moſt complete, as well in this reſpect, as in others. Ch. X.

AND ſo much for PARTICIPLES (*a*).

THE

(*a*) The *Latins* are defective in this Article of Participles. Their Active Verbs, ending in *or*, (commonly called Deponents) have Active Participles of all Times (ſuch as *Loquens*, *Locutus*, *Locuturus*) but none of the Paſſive. Their Actives ending in *O*, have Participles of the Preſent and Future (ſuch as *Scribens*, and *Scripturus*) but none of the Paſt. On the contrary, their Paſſives have Participles of the Paſt (ſuch as *Scriptus*) but none of the Preſent or Future, unleſs we admit ſuch as *Scribendus* and *Docendus* for Futures, which Grammarians controvert. The want of theſe Participles they ſupply by a Periphraſis—for γραψας they ſay, *cum ſcripſiſſet*—for γραφόμενος, *dum ſcribitur*, &c. In *Engliſh* we have ſometimes recourſe to the ſame Periphraſis; and ſometimes we avail ourſelves of the ſame Auxiliars, which form our Modes and Tenſes.

The *Engliſh* Grammar lays down a good rule with reſpect to its Participles of the Paſt, that they all terminate in D, T, or N. This Analogy is perhaps liable to as few Exceptions, as any. Conſidering therefore how little Analogy of any kind we have in our Lan-

Ch. X. *Energy*, but whoſe *mind is enriched with a larger portion of thoſe powers*. It is indeed no wonder, as all Attributives are homogeneous, that at times the ſeveral ſpecies ſhould appear to interfere, and the difference between them be ſcarcely perceptible. Even in *natural* ſpecies, which are congenial and of kin, the ſpecific difference is not always to be diſcerned, and in appearance at leaſt they ſeem to run into each other.

We have ſhewn already (*b*) in the Inſtances of Φιλιππίζειν, *Syllaturire*, Ἀποναισαρωθῆναι, and others, how *Subſtantives* may be transformed into *Verbal Attributives*. We ſhall now ſhew, how they may be converted into *Adjectives*. When we ſay the party of *Pompey*, the ſtile of *Cicero*, the philoſophy of *Socrates*, in

(*b*) Sup. p. 182, 183.

in theſe caſes the party, the ſtile, and the philoſophy ſpoken of, receive a ſtamp and character from the perſons, whom they reſpect. Thoſe perſons therefore perform the part of Attributes, that is, ſtamp and characterize their reſpective Subjects. Hence then *they actually paſs into Attributes*, and aſſume, as ſuch, the form of *Adjectives*. And thus it is we ſay, the *Pompeian* party, the *Ciceronian* ſtile, and the *Socratic* philoſophy. It is in like manner for a trumpet *of Braſs*, we ſay, a *brazen* Trumpet; for a Crown *of Gold*, a *golden* Crown, &c. Even *Pronominal* Subſtantives admit the like mutation. Thus inſtead of ſaying, the Book *of Me*, *of Thee*, and *of Him*, we ſay, *My* Book, *Thy* Book, and *His* Book; inſtead of ſaying the Country *of Us*, *of You*, and *of Them*, we ſay, *Our* Country, *Your* Country, and *Their* Country, which Words may be called ſo many *Pronominal Adjectives*. Ch. X.

Ch. X. It has been obſerved already, and muſt needs be obvious to all, that Adjectives, as marking Attributes, can have no ſex (*c*). And yet their having terminations conformable to the ſex, number, and caſe of their Subſtantive, ſeems to have led grammarians into that ſtrange abſurdity of ranging them with Nouns, and ſeparating them from Verbs, tho' with reſpect to theſe they are perfectly homogeneous; with reſpect to the others, quite contrary. They are homogeneous with reſpect to Verbs, as both ſorts denote *Attributes*; they are heterogeneous with reſpect to Nouns, as *never properly denoting Subſtances*. But of this we have ſpoken before (*d*).

THE

(*c*) Sup. p. 171.

(*d*) Sup. C. VI. Note (*a*). See alſo C. III. p. 28, &c.

THE Attributives hitherto treated, that is to ſay, VERBS, PARTICIPLES, and ADJECTIVES, may be called ATTRIBUTIVES OF THE FIRST ORDER. The reaſon of this name will be better underſtood, when we have more fully diſcuſſed ATTRIBUTIVES OF THE SECOND ORDER, to which we now proceed in the following chapter. Ch. X.

CHAP.

CHAP. XI.

Concerning Attributives of the ſecond Order.

Ch. XI. AS the Attributives hitherto mentioned denote *the Attributes of Subſtances*, ſo there is an inferior claſs of them, which denote *the Attributes only of Attributes*.

To explain by examples in either kind —when we ſay, *Cicero and Pliny were both of them eloquent*; *Statius and Virgil both of them wrote*; in theſe inſtances the Attributives, *eloquent*, and *wrote*, are immediately referable to the ſubſtantives, *Cicero*, *Virgil*, &c. As therefore denoting THE ATTRIBUTES OF SUBSTANCES, we call them ATTRIBUTIVES OF THE FIRST ORDER. But when we ſay, *Pliny was moderately eloquent, but Cicero exceedingly eloquent*; *Statius wrote indifferently, but Virgil wrote admirably*; in

in theſe inſtances, the Attributives, *Moderately*, *Exceedingly*, *Indifferently*, *Admirably*, are not referable to *Subſtantives*, but to *other Attributives*, that is, to the words, *Eloquent*, and *Wrote*. As therefore denoting *Attributes of Attributes*, we call them ATTRIBUTIVES OF THE SECOND ORDER. Ch. XI.

GRAMMARIANS have given them the Name of Ἐπιῤῥήματα, ADVERBIA, ADVERBS. And indeed if we take the word Ῥῆμα, or, *Verb*, in its moſt *comprehenſive Signification*, as including not only *Verbs properly ſo called*, but alſo *Participles* and *Adjectives* [an uſage, which may be juſtified by the beſt authorities (*a*)] we ſhall find

(*a*) Thus *Ariſtotle* in his Treatiſe *de Interpretatione*, inſtances Ἄνθρωπος as *a Noun*, and Λεύκος as *a Verb*. So *Ammonius*—κατὰ τοῦτο τὸ σημαινόμενον, τὸ μὲν ΚΑΛΟΣ καὶ ΔΙΚΑΙΟΣ καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα—ΡΗΜΑΤΑ λέγεσθαι καὶ οὐκ ΟΝΟΜΑΤΑ. *According to this Signification* (that is of denoting the Attributes of Subſtance

Ch. XI. find the name, Επίῤῥημα, or ADVERB, to be a very juſt appellation, as denoting a PART OF SPEECH, THE NATURAL APPENDAGE OF VERBS. So great is this dependence in Grammatical Syntax, that an *Adverb* can no more ſubſiſt without its *Verb*, than a *Verb* can ſubſiſt without its *Subſtantive*. It is the ſame here, as in certain natural Subjects. Every Colour for its exiſtence as much requires a Superficies, as the Superficies for its exiſtence requires a ſolid Body (*b*).

AMONG

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and the Predicate in Propoſitions) *the words*, FAIR, JUST, *and the like, are called* VERBS, *and not* NOUNS. *Am. in libr. de Interp.* p. 37. b. *Ariſt. de Interp.* L. I. c. 1. See alſo of this Treatiſe, c. 6. Note (*a*) p. 87.

In the ſame manner the *Stoics* talked of the Participle. *Nam* PARTICIPIUM *connumerantes Verbis*, PARTICIPIALE VERBUM *vocabant vel* CASUALE. *Priſcian*, L. I. p. 574.

(*b*) This notion *of ranging the Adverb under the ſame Genus with the Verb* (by calling them both Attributives) and *of explaining it to be the Verb's Epithet or Adjective* (by

AMONG the Attributes of Subſtance are reckoned Quantities, and Qualities. Thus we ſay, *a white Garment*, *a high Mountain*. Now ſome of theſe Quantities and Qualities are capable of Intenſion, and Remiſſion. Thus we ſay, *a Garment* EXCEEDINGLY *white*; *a Mountain* TOLERABLY *high*, Ch. XI.

(by calling it the Attributive of an Attributive) is conformable to the beſt authorities. *Theodore Gaza* defines an ADVERB, as follows—μέρος λόγυ ἄπτωτον, κατὰ ῥήματος λεγόμενον, ἢ ἐπιλεγόμενον ῥήματι, ᾗ οἷον ἐπίθετον ῥήματος. *A Part of Speech devoid of Caſes, predicated of a Verb, or ſubjoined to it, and being as it were the Verb's Adjective.* L. IV. (where by the way we may obſerve, how properly the Adverb is made an *Aptote*, ſince its principal ſometimes *has* caſes, as in *Valdè Sapiens*; ſometimes *has none*, as in *Valdè amat.*) *Priſcian*'s definition of an Adverb is as follows—ADVERBIUM *eſt pars orationis indeclinabilis, cujus ſignificatio Verbis adjicitur. Hoc enim perficit Adverbium Verbis additum, quod adjectiva nomina appellativis nominibus adjuncta*; *ut* prudens *homo*; prudenter *egit*; felix *Vir*; feliciter *vivit*. L. XV. p. 1003. And before, ſpeaking of the *Stoics*, he ſays—*Etiam* ADVERBIA *Nominibus vel* VERBIS CONNUMERABANT, *& quaſi* ADJECTIVA VERBORUM *nominabant*. L. I. p. 574. See alſo *Apoll. de Synt.* L. I. c. 3. *ſub fin.*

Ch. XI. *high*, or MODERATELY *high*. It is plain therefore that Intenſion and Remiſſion are among the Attributes of ſuch Attributes. Hence then one copious Source of ſecondary Attributives, or Adverbs, to denote theſe two, that is, *Intenſion*, and *Remiſſion*. The *Greeks* have their θαυμαςῶς, μάλιςα, σφόδρα, ἥκιςα; the *Latins* their *valdè*, *vehementer*, *maximè*, *ſatis*, *mediocriter*; the *Engliſh* their *greatly*, *vaſtly*, *extremely*, *ſufficiently*, *moderately*, *tolerably*, *indifferently*, &c.

FARTHER than this, where there are different Intenſions of the ſame Attribute, they may be *compared* together. Thus if the Garment A be EXCEEDINGLY *White*, and the Garment B be MODERATELY *White*, we may ſay, *the Garment A is* MORE *white than the Garment B*.

IN theſe inſtances the Adverb MORE not only denotes Intenſion, but *relative Intenſion*. Nay we ſtop not here. We not

not only denote Intenſion *merely relative* Ch.XI.
but relative Intenſion, than which there is none greater. Thus we not only ſay *the Mountain A is* MORE *high than the Mountain B*, but that *it is the* MOST *high of all Mountains.* Even *Verbs, properly ſo called*, as they admit *ſimple* Intenſions, ſo they admit alſo theſe *comparative* ones. Thus in the following Example——*Fame he* LOVETH MORE *than Riches, but Virtue of all things he* LOVETH MOST—the Words MORE and MOST denote the different *comparative Intenſions* of the Verbal Attributive, *Loveth.*

AND hence the riſe of COMPARISON, and of its different *Degrees*; which cannot well be more, than the two Species above mentioned, one to denote *Simple Exceſs*, and one to *denote Superlative.* Were we indeed to introduce *more* degrees than theſe, we ought perhaps to introduce *infinite*, which is abſurd. For why ſtop at a limited Number, when in all ſubjects,

Ch. XI. ſuſceptible of Intenſion, the intermediate Exceſſes are in a manner infinite? There are infinite Degrees of *more* White, between the *firſt Simple White*, and the *Superlative*, *Whiteſt*; the ſame may be ſaid of *more* Great, *more* Strong, *more* Minute, *&c.* The Doctrine of Grammarians about *three* ſuch Degrees, which they call the Poſitive, the Comparative, and the Superlative, muſt needs be abſurd; both becauſe in their Poſitive there is† no Compariſon at all, and becauſe their *Superlative* is a Comparative, as much as their *Comparative* itſelf. Examples to evince this may be found every where. *Socrates was the* MOST WISE *of all the Athenians*— *Homer was the* MOST SUBLIME *of all Poets.*—

—*Cadit et Ripheus,* JUSTISSIMUS UNUS
Qui fuit in Teucris— Virg.

IT

† *Qui (ſcil. Gradus Poſitivis) quoniam perfectus eſt, a quibuſdam in numero Graduum non computatur.* Conſentii Ars apud Putſch. p. 2022.

IT muſt be confeſſed theſe Compara- Ch. XI.
tives, as well the *ſimple*, as the *ſuperlative*, ſeem ſometimes to part with their *relative* Nature, and only retain their *intenſive*. Thus in the Degree, denoting *ſimple* Exceſs,

Triſtior, *et lacrymis oculos ſuffuſa nitentes.* Virg.

Ruſticior *paulo eſt*— Hor.

IN the *Superlative* this is more uſual. *Vir doctiſſimus, Vir fortiſſimus, a moſt learned Man, a moſt brave Man,*—that is to ſay, not the *braveſt* and *moſt learned* Man, that ever exiſted, but a Man poſſeſſing thoſe Qualities *in an eminent Degree.*

THE Authors of Language have contrived a method to retrench theſe Comparative Adverbs, by expreſſing their force in the Primary Attributive. Thus inſtead of *More fair*, they ſay FAIRER; inſtead of *Moſt fair*, FAIREST, and the ſame

Ch. XI. holds true both in the *Greek* and *Latin*. This Practice however has reached no farther than to *Adjectives*, or at leaſt to *Participles, ſharing the nature of Adjectives*. Verbs perhaps were thought too much diverſified already, to admit more Variations without perplexity.

As there are ſome Attributives, which admit of Compariſon, ſo there are others, which admit of none. Such for example are thoſe, which denote *that Quality of Bodies ariſing from their Figure*; as when we ſay, a *Circular* Table, a *Quadrangular* Court, a *Conical* Piece of Metal, *&c.* The reaſon is, that a million of things, participating the ſame Figure, participate it *equally*, if they participate it at all. To ſay therefore that while A and B are both quadrangular, A is *more* or *leſs* quadrangular than B, is abſurd. The ſame holds true in all Attributives, denoting *definite Quantities*, whether *continuous* or *diſcrete*, whether *abſolute* or *relative*. Thus the *two-foot* Rule

A

A cannot be *more a two-foot* Rule, than any other of the ſame length. *Twenty* Lions cannot be *more twenty* than *twenty* Flies. If A and B be both *triple*, or *quadruple* to C, they cannot be *more triple*, or *more quadruple*, one than the other. The reaſon of all this is, there can be *no Compariſon* without *Intenſion and Remiſſion*; there can be no Intenſion and Remiſſion in things *always definite*; and ſuch are the Attributives, which we have laſt mentioned. Ch. XI.

IN the ſame reaſoning we ſee the cauſe, why *no Subſtantive is ſuſceptible of theſe Comparative Degrees*. *A Mountain* cannot be ſaid MORE TO BE, or TO EXIST, than *a Mole-hill*, but the *More* and *Leſs* muſt be ſought for in their Quantities. In like manner when we refer many Individuals to one Species, the Lion A cannot be called *more a Lion*, than the Lion B, but if more any thing, he is *more fierce*, *more ſpeedy*, or exceeding in ſome ſuch Attribute. So again, in referring many Species

Ch. XI. Species to one Genus, a Crocodile is not more an Animal, than a Lizard; nor a Tiger, more than a Cat, but if any thing, they are *more bulky*, *more ſtrong*, &c. the Exceſs, as before, being derived from their Attributes. So true is that ſaying of the acute *Stagirite—that* SUBSTANCE *is not ſuſceptible of* MORE *and* LESS (*c*). But this by way of digreſſion; to return to the ſubject of Adverbs.

OF the Adverbs, or ſecondary Attributives already mentioned, theſe denoting Intenſion or Remiſſion may be called Adverbs of *Quantity continuous*; *Once*, *Twice*, *Thrice*, are Adverbs of *Quantity diſcrete*; *More* and *Moſt*, *Leſs* and *Leaſt*, to which may be added *Equally*, *Proportionally*, &c. are

(*c*) ἐκ ἂν ἐπιδέχοιτο ἡ οὐσία τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον, *Categor.* c. 5. See alſo *Sanctius*, L. I. c. 11. L. II. c. 10, 11. where the ſubject of Comparatives is treated in a very maſterly and philoſophical manner. See alſo *Priſcian*, p. 598. *Derivantur igitur Comparativa a Nominibus Adjectivis*, &c.

5

are Adverbs of *Relation*. There are others of *Quality*, as when we ſay, HONESTLY *induſtrious*, PRUDENTLY *brave*, *they fought* BRAVELY, *he painted* FINELY, a *Portico formed* CIRCULARLY, *a Plain cut* TRIANGULARLY, *&c.* Ch. XI.

AND here it is worth while to obſerve, how the ſame thing, participating the ſame Eſſence, aſſumes different grammatical Forms from its different relations. For example, ſuppoſe it ſhould be aſked, how differ *Honeſt*, *Honeſtly*, and *Honeſty*. The Anſwer is, they are *in Eſſence* the ſame, but they differ, in as much as *Honeſt* is the *Attributive of a Subſtantive*; *Honeſtly*, *of a Verb*; and *Honeſty*, being diveſted of theſe its attributive Relations, aſſumes *the Power of a Subſtantive*, ſo as to ſtand by itſelf.

THE Adverbs, hitherto mentioned, are common to *Verbs of every Species*; but there

Ch. XI. there are ſome which are peculiar to *Verbs properly ſo called*, that is to ſay, to ſuch as denote *Motion* or *Energy*, with their *Privations*. All MOTION and REST imply TIME and PLACE, as a kind of neceſſary *Coincidents*. Hence then, if we would expreſs the *Place* or *Time* of either, we muſt needs have recourſe to the proper Adverbs; *of Place*, as when we ſay, *he ſtood* THERE; *he went* HENCE; *he travelled* FAR, *&c.*: of *Time*, as when we ſay, *he ſtood* THEN; *he went* AFTERWARD; *he travelled* FORMERLY, *&c.* Should it be aſked——why *Adverbs of Time*, when Verbs have *Tenſes?* The Anſwer is, tho' Tenſes may be ſufficient to denote the greater Diſtinctions of Time, yet to denote them all by Tenſes would be a perplexity without end. What a variety of Forms, to denote *Yeſterday*, *To-day*, *To-morrow*, *Formerly*, *Lately*, *Juſt now*, *Now*, *Immediately*, *Preſently*, *Soon*, *Hereafter*, &c.? It was this then that made the

the *Temporal* Adverbs neceſſary, over and above the *Tenſes*. Ch. XI.

To the Adverbs juſt mentioned may be added thoſe, which denote the *Intenſions and Remiſſions peculiar to Motion*, ſuch as *ſpeedily, haſtily, ſwiftly, ſlowly*, &c. as alſo *Adverbs of Place, made out of Prepoſitions*, ſuch as ἄνω and κάτω from ἀνὰ and κατὰ, in *Engliſh upward* and *downward*, from *up* and *down*. In ſome inſtances the Prepoſition ſuffers no change, but becomes an Adverb by nothing more than its Application, as when we ſay, CIRCA *equitat, he rides* ABOUT; PROPE *cecidit, he was* NEAR *falling*; *Verum ne* POST *conferas culpam in me, But do not* AFTER *lay the blame on me* (*d*).

THERE

(*d*) *Soſip. Chariſii Inſt. Gram.* p. 170. *Terent. Eun.* Act. II. Sc. 3.

Ch. XI. THERE are likewiſe *Adverbs of Interrogation*, ſuch as *Where*, *Whence*, *Whither*, *How*; of which there is this remarkable, that when they loſe their *Interrogative* power, they aſſume that of a *Relative*, ſo as even to repreſent the *Relative* or *Subjunctive Pronoun*. Thus *Ovid*,

Et Seges eſt, UBI *Troja fuit*—

tranſlated in our old *Engliſh* Ballad,

And Corn doth grow, WHERE *Troy town ſtood.*

That is to ſay, *Seges eſt in eo loco*, IN QUO, *&c. Corn groweth in that place*, IN WHICH, *&c.* the power of the *Relative*, being implied in the *Adverb*. Thus *Terence*,

Hujuſmodi mihi res ſemper comminiſcere,
UBI *me excarnufices*— Heaut. IV. 6.

where UBI relates to *res*, and ſtands for *quibus rebus*.

IT

IT is in like manner that the *Relative* Ch. XI.
Pronoun upon occaſion becomes an *Interrogative*, at leaſt in *Latin* and *Engliſh*. Thus *Horace*,

QUEM *Virum aut Heroa lyrâ, vel acri*
Tibiâ ſumes celebrare, Clio?

So *Milton*,

WHO *firſt ſeduc'd them to that foul revolt?*

THE reaſon of all this is as follows. *The Pronoun* and *Adverbs* here mentioned are all alike, in their original character, RELATIVES. Even when they become Interrogatives, they loſe not this character, but are ſtill Relatives, as much as ever. The difference is, that *without* an Interrogation, they have reference to a Subject, which is *antecedent*, *definite*, and *known*; *with* an *Interrogation*, to a Subject which is *ſubſequent*, *indefinite*, and *unknown*,

Ch.XI. *known*, and which it is expected that *the Answer* should express and ascertain,

WHO *first seduc'd them?*——

The very Question itself supposes a Seducer, to which, tho' *unknown*, the Pronoun, WHO, has a *reference*.

Th' infernal Serpent——

Here in the *Answer* we have *the Subject, which was indefinite, ascertained*; so that the WHO in the *Interrogation* is (we see) as much a *Relative*, as if it had been said originally, without any Interrogation at all, *It was the Infernal* SERPENT, WHO *first seduced them*.

AND thus is it that *Interrogatives* and *Relatives* mutually pass into each other.

AND so much for ADVERBS, peculiar to Verbs properly so called. We have already spoken of those, which are common to all Attributives. We have likewise at-

tempted to explain *their general Nature*, which we have found to conſiſt in being *the Attributes of Attributes*. There remains only to add, that ADVERBS *may be derived from almoſt every Part of Speech*: from PREPOSITIONS, as when from *After* we derive *Afterwards*—from PARTICIPLES, and through theſe from *Verbs*, as when from *Know* we derive *Knowing*, and thence *Knowingly*; from *Scio*, *Sciens*, and thence *Scienter*—from ADJECTIVES, as when from Virtuous and Vicious, we derive *Virtuouſly* and *Viciouſly*—from SUBSTANTIVES, as when from Πίθηκος, *an Ape*, we derive Πιθήκειον βλέπειν, *to look* APISHLY; from Λέων, *a Lion*, Λεοντωδῶς, *Leoninely* — nay even from PROPER NAMES, as when from *Socrates* and *Demoſthenes*, we derive *Socratically* and *Demoſthenically*. *It was Socratically reaſoned*, we ſay; *it was Demoſthenically ſpoken* *. Ch. XI.

* *Ariſtotle* has Κυκλοπικῶς *Cyclopically*, from Κύκλωψ *a Cyclops*. Eth. Nic. X. 9.

Ch. XI. Of the ſame ſort are many others, cited by the old Grammarians, ſuch as *Catiliniter* from *Catilina*, *Siſenniter* from *Siſenna*, *Tullianè* from *Tullius*, &c. (*e*).

NOR are they thus extenſive only in *Derivation*, but in *Signification* alſo. *Theodore Gaza* in his Grammar informs us (*f*), that ADVERBS may be found in every one of the Predicaments, and that the readieſt way to reduce their Infinitude, was to refer them by claſſes to thoſe ten univerſal Genera. The *Stoics* too called the ADVERB by the name of Παυδέκτης, and that from a view to the ſame *multiform Nature*. *Omnia in ſe capit quaſi collata per ſatiram, conceſſâ ſibi rerum variâ poteſtate.* It is thus that *Soſipater* explains the

(*e*) See *Priſc.* L. XV. p. 1022. *Soſ. Chariſ.* 161. Edit. *Putſchii.*

(*f*) —διὸ δὴ κ᾽ ἄμεινον ἴσως δέκα κ᾽ τῶν ἐπιῤῥημάτων γίνη θέσθαι ἐκεῖνα, οὐσίαν, ποιὸν, ποσὸν, πρός τι, κ. τ. λ. Gram. Introd. L. II.

the Word (*g*), from whoſe authority we know it to be *Stoical*. But of this enough. Ch. XI.

AND now having finiſhed theſe PRINCIPAL PARTS of Speech, the SUBSTANTIVE and the ATTRIBUTIVE, which are SIGNIFICANT WHEN ALONE, we proceed to thoſe AUXILIARY PARTS, which are ONLY SIGNIFICANT, WHEN ASSOCIATED. But as theſe make the Subject of a Book by themſelves, we here conclude the firſt Book of this Treatiſe.

(*g*) *Soſip. Char.* p. 175. Edit. *Putſchii.*

HERMES

OR A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY CONCERNING UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR.

BOOK II.

CHAP I.

Concerning Definitives.

Ch. I.

WHAT remains of our Work, is a matter of leſs difficulty, it being the ſame here, as in ſome Hiſtorical Picture; when the principal Figures are once formed, it is an eaſy labour to deſign the reſt.

Ch. I. DEFINITIVES, the Subject of the preſent Chapter, are commonly called by Grammarians, ARTICLES, ARTICULI, Ἄρθρα. They are of two kinds, either thoſe *properly and ſtrictly ſo called*, or elſe the *Pronominal Articles*, ſuch as *This*, *That*, *Any*, &c.

WE ſhall firſt treat of thoſe *Articles more ſtrictly ſo denominated*, the reaſon and uſe of which may be explained, as follows.

THE viſible and individual Subſtances of Nature are infinitely more numerous, than for each to admit of a particular Name. To ſupply this defect, when any Individual occurs, which either wants a proper Name, or whoſe proper Name is not known, we aſcertain it, as well as we can, by referring it to its Species; or, if the Species be unknown, then at leaſt

leaſt to ſome Genus. For example—a certain Object occurs, with a head and limbs, and appearing to poſſeſs the powers of Self-motion and Senſation. If we know it not as an Individual, we refer it to its proper Species, and call it *Dog*, or *Horſe*, or *Lion*, or the like. If none of theſe Names fit, we go to the Genus, and call it, *Animal*. Ch. I.

BUT this is not enough. The Thing, at which we are looking, is neither a Species, nor a Genus. What is it then? An Individual.—Of what kind? *Known*, or *unknown?* Seen now *for the firſt time*, or *ſeen before*, and now remembered?—It is here we ſhall diſcover the uſe of the two Articles (A) and (THE). (A) reſpects our *primary* Perception, and denotes Individuals as *unknown*; (THE) reſpects our *ſecondary* Perception, and denotes Individuals as *known*. To explain by an example—I ſee an object paſs

Ch. I. by, which I never ſaw till now. What do I ſay?—*There goes* A *Beggar with* A *long Beard.* The Man departs, and returns a Week after. What do I ſay then?—*There goes* THE *Beggar with* THE *long Beard.* The Article only is changed, the reſt remains unaltered.

YET mark the force of this apparently minute Change. The Individual, *once vague*, is now recognized *as ſomething known*, and that merely by the efficacy of this latter Article, which tacitly inſinuates a kind of *previous* acquaintance, by referring the preſent Perception to a like Perception already paſt (*a*).

THE Truth is, the Articles (A) and (THE) are both of them *definitives*, as they circumſcribe the latitude of Genera and Species, by reducing them for the moſt

(*a*) See B. I. c. 5. p. 63, 64.

moſt part to denote Individuals. The difference however between them is this; the Article (A) leaves the Individual itſelf *unaſcertained*, whereas the Article (THE) *aſcertains the Individual alſo*, and is for that reaſon the more accurate Definitive of the two. Ch. I.

IT is perhaps owing to the imperfect manner, in which the Article (A) defines, that the *Greeks* have no Article correſpondent to it, but ſupply its place, by a negation of their Article, Ὁ. Ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἔπεσεν, THE *man fell* — ἄνθρωπος ἔπεσεν, A *Man fell*, without any thing prefixed, but only the Article withdrawn (*b*). Even in *Engliſh*, where the Article

(*b*) Τὰ γὰρ ἀοριςωδῶς ποτε νοέμενα, ἢ τῇ ἄρθρῳ παράθεσις ὑπὸ ὁρισμὸν τῇ προσώπῳ ἄγει. *Thoſe things, which are at times underſtood indefinitely, the addition of the Article makes to be definite as to their Perſon.* Apoll. L. IV. c. 1. See of the ſame author, L. I. c. 6, 36.

ποιεῖ

Ch. I. Article (A) cannot be uſed, as in plurals, its force is expreſt by the ſame Negation. *Thoſe are* THE *Men*, means thoſe are Individuals, of which we poſſeſs ſome *previous* Knowledge. *Thoſe are Men*, the Article apart, means no more than that they are ſo many *vague* and *uncertain* Individuals, juſt as the Phraſe, *A Man*, in the ſingular, implies one of the ſame number.

BUT

ποιεῖ (τὸ Ἄρθρον ſc.) ὁ ἀναπόλησιν προεγνωσμένης τῇ ἐν τῇ συντάξει· οἷον εἰ μὲν λέγοι τις, ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΣ ΗΚΕ, ἄδηλον τίνα ἄνθρωπον λέγει. εἰ δὲ Ο ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΣ, δῆλον, προεγνωσμένον γὰρ τινα ἄνθρωπον λέγει. Τοῦτο δὲ αὐτὸ βέλονται ϗ οἱ φάσκοντες τ' ἄρθρον σημαντικὸν πρώτης γνώσεως ϗ δευτέρας. *The Article cauſes a Review within the Mind of ſomething known before the texture of the Diſcourſe. Thus if any one ſays* Ἄνθρωπος ἦκε, MAN CAME *(which is the ſame, as when we ſay in* Engliſh A *man came) it is not evident, of whom he ſpeaks. But if he ſays* ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἦκε, THE MAN CAME, *then it is evident; for he ſpeaks of ſome Perſon known before. And this is what thoſe mean, who ſay that the Article is expreſſive of the Firſt and Second Knowledge together.* Theod. Gazæ, L. IV.

BUT tho' the *Greeks* have no Article correſpondent to the Article (A,) yet nothing can be more nearly related, than their Ὁ, to the Article, THE. Ὁ βασιλεῦς, THE *King*; ΤΟ δῶρον, THE *Gift*, *&c.* Nor is this only to be proved by parallel examples, but by the Attributes of the *Greek* Article, as they are deſcribed by *Apollonius*, one of the earlieſt and moſt acute of the old Grammarians, now remaining. CH. I.

Ἔϛιν ἴδιον καθὸ ϗ ἐν ἄλλοις ἀπεφηνάμεθα, ἴδιον ἄρθρων ἡ ἀναφορὰ, ἥ ἐϛι ϖροκατειλεγμένυ ϖροσώπυ ϖαραϛατική.—*Now the peculiar Attribute of the Article, as we have ſhewn elſewhere, is that Reference, which implies ſome certain Perſon already mentioned.* Again—Οὐ γὰρ δήγε τὰ ὀνόματα ἐξ ἑαυτῶν ἀναφορὰν ϖαρίϛησιν, εἰ μὴ συμπαραλάβοιεν τὸ ἄρθρον, ἅ ἐξαίρετός ἐϛιν ἡ ἀναφορά. *For Nouns of themſelves imply not Re-*

Ch. I. *Reference, unleſs they take to them the Article, whoſe peculiar Character is Reference.* Again—Τὸ ἄρθρον προϋφεστῶσαν γνῶσιν δηλοῖ —*The Article indicates a pre-eſtabliſhed acquaintance* (*c*).

His reaſoning upon *Proper Names* is worth remarking. Proper Names (he tells us) often fall into *Homonymie*, that is, different Perſons often go by the ſame Name. To ſolve this ambiguity, we have recourſe to *Adjectives* or *Epithets*. For example—there were two *Grecian* chiefs, who bore the name of *Ajax*. It was not therefore without reaſon, that *Mneſtheus* uſes Epithets, when this intent was to diſtinguiſh the one of them from the other.

Ἀλλὰ

(*c*) *Apoll.* de Synt. L. I. c. 6, 7. His account of REFERENCE is as follows—Ἰδίωμα ἀναφορᾶς προκατειλεγμένου προσώπου δευτέρα γνῶσις. *The peculiar character of Reference is the ſecond or repeated Knowledge of ſome Perſon already mentioned.* L. II. c. 3.

Ἀλλὰ περ οἵω ἴτω Τελαμώνιος ἄλκιμος Αἴας. Hom. Ch. I.

If both Ajaxes (ſays he) *cannot be ſpared,*
——at leaſt alone
Let mighty Telamonian Ajax come.

Apollonius proceeds——Even Epithets themſelves are diffuſed thro' various Subjects, in as much as the ſame Adjective may be referred to many Subſtantives.

IN order therefore to render both Parts of Speech equally definite, that is to ſay the Adjective as well as the Subſtantive, the Adjective itſelf aſſumes *an Article* before it, that it may indicate *a Reference to ſome ſingle Perſon only*, μοναδικὴ ἀναφορὰ, according to the Author's own Phraſe. And thus it is we ſay, Τρύφων ὁ Γραμματικὸς, *Trypho* THE *Grammarian*; Ἀπολλόδωρος ὁ Κυρηναῖος, *Apollodorus* THE *Cyrenean*, &c. The Author's Concluſion of this

Ch. I. this Section is worth remarking. Δεόντως ἄρα καὶ κατὰ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἡ προσθεσίς ἐστι τοῦ ἄρθρου, συνιδιάζουσα τὸ ἐπιθετικὸν τῷ κυρίῳ ὀνόματι—*It is with reaſon therefore that the Article is here alſo added, as it brings the Adjective to an Individuality, as preciſe, as the proper Name* (*d*).

We may carry this reaſoning farther, and ſhew, how by help of the *Article* even *common Appellatives* come to have the force of *proper Names*, and that unaſſiſted by epithets of any kinds. Among the *Athenians* Πλοῖον meant *Ship*; Ἕνδεκα, *Eleven*; and Ἄνθρωπος, *Man*. Yet add but the Article, and Τὸ Πλοῖον, THE SHIP, meant *that particular Ship, which they ſent annually to Deles*; Οἱ Ἕνδεκα, THE ELEVEN, meant *certain Officers of Juſtice*; and Ὁ Ἄνθρωπος, THE MAN, meant *their public Executioner*. So in *Engliſh*, *City*, is a Name

(*d*) See *Apoll.* L. I. c. 12. where by miſtake *Menelaus* is put for *Mneſtheus*.

Name common to many places; and *Speaker*, a Name common to many Men. Yet if we prefix the Article, THE CITY means our Metropolis; and THE SPEAKER, *a high Officer* in the *Britiſh* Parliament. Ch. I.

AND thus it is by an eaſy tranſition, that the Article, from denoting *Reference*, comes to denote *Eminence* alſo; that is to ſay, from implying an *ordinary* pre-acquaintance, to preſume a kind of *general and univerſal Notoriety*. Thus among the *Greeks* Ὁ Ποιητὴς, THE POET, meant *Homer* (*e*); and Ὁ Σταγειρίτης, THE STAGIRITE, meant *Ariſtotle*; not that there were

(*e*) There are ſo few exceptions to this Obſervation, that we may fairly admit it to be generally true. Yet *Ariſtotle* twice denotes *Euripides* by the Phraſe ὁ ποιητὴς, once at the end of the ſeventh Book of his *Nicomachian Ethics*, and again in his *Phyſics*, L. II. 2. *Plato* alſo in his tenth Book of Laws (p. 901. *Edit. Serr.*) denotes *Heſiod* after the ſame manner.

Ch. I. were not many Poets, beſide *Homer*; and many Stagirites, beſide *Ariſtotle*; but none equally illuſtrious for their Poetry and Philoſophy.

IT is on a like principle that *Ariſtotle* tells us, it is by no means the ſame thing to aſſert—εἶναι τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθὸν, or, ΤΟ ἀγαθόν — that, *Pleaſure is* A GOOD, or, THE GOOD. The firſt only makes it a *common Object of Deſire*, upon a level with many others, which daily raiſe our wiſhes; the laſt ſuppoſes it *that ſupreme and ſovereign Good*, the ultimate Scope of all our Actions and Endeavours (*f*).

BUT to purſue our Subject. It has been ſaid already that the Article has no meaning, but when aſſociated to ſome other word.—To what words then may it be aſſociated?—To ſuch as require *defining*, for

(*f*) Analyt. Prior. L. I. c. 40.

for it is by nature a *Definitive*.—And *what Words* are theſe?—Not thoſe which already are *as definite, as may be*. Nor yet thoſe, which, *being indefinite, cannot properly be made otherwiſe*. It remains then they muſt be *thoſe, which though indefinite, are yet capable, through the Article, of becoming definite*. Ch. I.

UPON theſe Principles we ſee the reaſon, why it is abſurd to ſay, Ο ΕΓΩ, THE I, or Ο ΣΥ, THE THOU, becauſe nothing can make thoſe Pronouns more *definite*, than they are (*g*). The ſame may be aſſerted of

(*g*) *Apollonius* makes it part of the Pronoun's Definition, to refuſe co-aleſcence with the Article. Ἐκεῖνο ἂν Ἀντωνυμία, τὸ μετὰ δείξεως ἢ ἀναφορᾶς ἀντονομαζόμενον, ᾧ ἃ σύνεσι τὸ ἄρθρον. *That therefore is a Pronoun, which with Indication or Reference is put for a Noun, and* WITH WHICH THE ARTICLE DOTH NOT ASSOCIATE. L. II. c. 5. So *Gaza*, ſpeaking of Pronouns—Πάλη δὲ—ἃ ἐπιδέχονται ἄρθρον. L. IV. *Priſcian* ſays the ſame. *Jure igitur apud Græcos prima*

Ch. I. of Proper Names, and though the *Greeks* ſay ὁ Σωκράτης, ἡ Ξάνθιππη, and the like, yet the Article is a mere Pleonaſm, unleſs perhaps it ſerve to diſtinguiſh Sexes. By the ſame rule we cannot ſay in *Greek* ΟΙ ΑΜΦΟΤΕΡΟΙ, or in *Engliſh*, THE BOTH, becauſe theſe Words *in their own nature* are each of them perfectly *defined*, ſo that to define them farther would be quite ſuperfluous. Thus, if it be ſaid, *I have read* BOTH *Poets*, this plainly indicates *a definite pair*, of whom ſome mention has been made already; Δυὰς ἐγνωσμένη, a *known Duad*, as *Apollonius* expreſſes himſelf, (*b*) when he ſpeaks of this Subject. On the contrary, if it be ſaid, *I have read* Two *Poets*, this may mean *any Pair* out of

et ſecunda perſona pronominum, quæ ſine dubio demonſtrativæ ſunt, articulis adjungi non poſſunt; nec tertia, quando demonſtrativa eſt. L. XII. p. 938.—In the beginning of the ſame Book, he gives the true reaſon of this. *Supra omnes alias partes orationis* FINIT PERSONAS PRONOMEN.

(*b*) *Apollon.* L. I. c. 16.

of all that ever exiſted. And hence this Numeral, being in this Senſe *indefinite* (as indeed are all others, as well as itſelf) is forced *to aſſume the Article*, whenever it would become *definite* *. And thus it is, THE TWO in *Engliſh*, and OI ΔΥΟ in *Greek*, mean nearly the ſame thing, as BOTH or ΑΜΦΟΤΕΡΟΙ. Hence alſo it is, that as TWO, when taken alone, has reference to ſome *primary* and *indefinite* Perception, while the Article, THE, has reference to ſome *ſecondary* and *definite* †; hence I ſay the Reaſon, why it is bad *Greek* to ſay ΔΥΟ ΟΙ ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΙ, and bad *Engliſh*, to ſay TWO THE MEN. Such Syntax is in fact a *Blending of Incom-* Ch. I.

* This explains *Servius* on the XIIth Æneid. v. 511. where he tells us that *Duorum* is put for *Amborum*. In *Engliſh* or *Greek* the Article would have done the buſineſs, for *the Two*, or τοῖν δυοῖν are equivalent to *Both* or ἀμφοῖἑων, but not ſo *Duorum*, becauſe the *Latins* have no Articles to prefix.

† Sup. p. 215, 216.

Ch. I. *patibles*, that is to ſay of a *defined Subſtantive* with an *undefined Attributive*. On the contrary to ſay in *Greek* ΑΜΦΟΤΕΡΟΙ ΟΙ ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΙ, or in *Engliſh*, BOTH THE MEN, is good and allowable, becauſe the Subſtantive cannot poſſibly be leſs apt, by being defined, to coaleſce with an Attributive, which is defined as well as itſelf. So likewiſe, it is correct to ſay, ΟΙ ΔΥΟ ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΙ, THE TWO MEN, becauſe here the Article, being placed in the beginning, *extends its Power* as well through Subſtantive as Attributive, and equally contributes to *define* them both.

As ſome of the words above admit of no Article, *becauſe they are by Nature as definite as may be*, ſo there are others, which admit it not, *becauſe they are not to be defined at all*. Of this ſort are all INTERROGATIVES. If we queſtion about *Subſtances*, we cannot ſay Ο ΤΙΣ ΟΥΤΟΣ, THE WHO IS THIS; but ΤΙΣ ΟΥΤΟΣ,

ΟΥΤΟΣ, WHO IS THIS? (*i*). The ſame as to *Qualities* and both kinds of *Quantity*. We ſay without an Article ΠΟΙΟΣ, ΠΟΣΟΙ, ΠΗΛΙΚΟΣ, in *Engliſh*, WHAT SORT OF, HOW MANY, HOW GREAT. The Reaſon is, that the Articles Ὁ, and THE, reſpect Beings, *already known*; Interrogatives reſpect Beings, *about which we are ignorant*; for as to what we know, Interrogation is ſuperfluous. Ch. I.

IN a word *the natural Aſſociators with Articles* are all thoſe *common Appellatives*, which denote the ſeveral Genera and Species of Beings. It is theſe, which, by aſſuming a different *Article*, ſerve either to explain an Individual upon its firſt being perceived, or elſe to indicate, upon its return, a Recognition, or repeated Knowledge (*k*).

(*i*) *Apollonius* calls ΤΙΣ, ἐναντιώτατον τῶν ἄρθρων, a Part of Speech, *moſt contrary, moſt averſe to Articles*, L. IV. c. 1.

(*k*) What is here ſaid reſpects *the two* Articles which we have in *Engliſh*. In *Greek*, the Article does no more than imply *a Recognition*. See before p. 215, 216.

Ch. I. We ſhall here ſubjoin a few Inſtances of the Peculiar Power of ARTICLES.

EVERY Propoſition conſiſts of a *Subject*, and a *Predicate*. In *Engliſh* theſe are diſtinguiſhed by their Poſition, the Subject ſtanding *firſt*, the Predicate *laſt*. *Happineſs is Pleaſure*—Here, *Happineſs* is the *Subject*; *Pleaſure*, the *Predicate*. If we change their order, and ſay, *Pleaſure is Happineſs*; then *Pleaſure* becomes *the Subject*, and *Happineſs* the *Predicate*. In *Greek* theſe are diſtinguiſhed not by any Order or Poſition, but by help of the *Article*, which the Subject always aſſumes, and the Predicate in moſt inſtances (ſome few excepted) rejects. *Happineſs is Pleaſure*—ἡδονὴ ἡ εὐδαιμονία—*Pleaſure is Happineſs*—ἡ ἡδονὴ εὐδαιμονία—*Fine things are difficult*—χαλεπὰ τὰ καλά—*Difficult things are fine*—τὰ χαλεπὰ καλά.

IN

IN *Greek* it is worth attending, how in the ſame Sentence, the ſame *Article*, by being prefixed to a different Word, quite changes the whole meaning. For example—Ὁ Πτολεμαῖος γυμνασιαρχήσας ἐτιμήθη —*Ptolemy, having preſided over the Games, was publickly honoured.* The Participle γυμνασιαρχήσας has here no other force, than to denote to us *the Time, when* Ptolemy was honoured, *viz.* after having preſided over the Games. But if, inſtead of the Subſtantive, we join the Participle to the *Article*, and ſay, Ὁ γυμνασιαρχήσας Πτολεμαῖος ἐτιμήθη, our meaning is then—*The Ptolemy, who preſided over the Games, was honoured.* The Participle in this caſe, *being joined to the Article*, tends tacitly to indicate not one *Ptolemy* but many, of which number a particular one participated of honour (*l*). Ch. I.

(*l*) *Apollon.* L. I. c. 33, 34.

Ch. I. In *Engliſh* likewiſe it deſerves remarking, how the Senſe is changed by changing of the *Articles*, tho' we leave every other Word of the Sentence untouched.—*And Nathan ſaid unto David*, THOU ART THE MAN *. In that ſingle THE, that diminutive Particle, all the force and efficacy of the Reaſon is contained. By that alone are the Premiſes applied, and ſo firmly fixed, as never to be ſhaken. It is poſſible this Aſſertion may appear at firſt ſomewhat ſtrange; but let him, who doubts it, only change the *Article*, and then ſee what will become of the Prophet and his reaſoning.—*And Nathan ſaid unto David*, THOU ART A MAN. Might not the King well have demanded upon ſo impertinent a poſition,

Non dices hodie, quorſum hæc tam putida tendant?

BUT

* ΣΥ ΕΙ Ὁ ΑΝΗΡ. Βασιλ. Β'. κεφ, ιϛ'.

BUT enough of ſuch Speculations. The only remark, which we ſhall make on them, is this; that "minute Change in "PRINCIPLES leads to mighty Change in "EFFECTS; ſo that well are PRINCIPLES "intitled to our regard, however *in ap-* "*pearance* they may be trivial and low." Ch. I.

THE ARTICLES already mentioned are thoſe *ſtrictly* ſo called; but beſides theſe there are the PRONOMINAL ARTICLES, ſuch as, *This*, *That*, *Any*, *Other*, *Some*, *All*, *No*, or *None*, &c. Of theſe we have ſpoken already in our Chapter of Pronouns (*m*), where

(*m*) See B. I. c. 5. p. 72, 73. It ſeems to have been ſome view of words, like that here given, which induced *Quintilian* to ſay of the *Latin* Tongue—*Noſter ſermo Articulos non deſiderat; ideoque in alias partes orationis ſparguntur.* Inſt. Orat. L. I. c. 4. So *Scaliger*. *His declaratis, ſatis conſtat Græcorum Articulos non neglectos a nobis, ſed eorum uſum ſuperfluum. Nam ubi aliquid præſcribendum eſt, quod Græci per articulum efficiunt* (ἔλειξεν ὁ δοῦλος) *expletur a Latinis per* Is *aut* ILLE; Is, aut,

Ch. I. where we have ſhewn, when they may be taken as Pronouns, and when as Articles. Yet in truth it muſt be confeſſed, if the Eſſence of an Article be *to define* and *aſcertain*, they are much more properly Articles, than any thing elſe, and as ſuch ſhould be conſidered in Univerſal Grammar. Thus when we ſay, THIS *Picture I approve, but* THAT *I diſlike*, what do we perform by the help of theſe Definitives, but bring down the common Appellative to denote two Individuals, the one as *the more near*, the other as *the more diſtant?* So when we ſay, SOME *men* are *virtuous, but* ALL *men are mortal*, what is the natural Effect of this ALL and SOME, but to define that *Univerſality*, and *Particularity*, which would remain indefinite, were we to take them

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aut, Ille ſervus dixit, *de quo ſervo antea facta mentio ſit, aut qui alio quo pacto notus ſit. Additur enim Articulus ad rei memoriam renovandam, cujus antea non neſcii ſumus, aut ad præſcribendam intellectionem, quæ latiùs patere queat; veluti cum dicimus*, C. Cæſar, Is qui poſtea dictator fuit. *Nam alii fuere C. Cæſares. Sic Græcè* Καῖσαρ ὁ αὐτοκράτωρ. De Cauſ. Ling. Lat. c. 131.

them away? The ſame is evident in ſuch Sentences, as — SOME *ſubſtances have ſenſation*; OTHERS *want it*—*Chuſe* ANY *way of acting, and* SOME *men will find fault*, &c. For here SOME, OTHER, and ANY, ſerve all of them to *define* different Parts of a given Whole; SOME, to denote a *definite Part*; ANY, to denote an *indefinite*; and OTHER, to denote the *remaining* Part, when a Part has been aſſumed already. Sometimes this laſt Word denotes *a large indefinite Portion*, ſet in oppoſition to ſome *ſingle, definite*, and *remaining Part*, which receives from ſuch Oppoſition no ſmall degree of heightening. Thus *Virgil*, Ch. I.

Excudent ALII *ſpirantia molliùs æra*;
(Credo equidem) vivos ducent de marmore vultus;
Orabunt cauſas meliùs, cælique meatus
Deſcribent radio, et ſurgentia ſidera dicent:
TU *regere imperio populos*, ROMANE, *memento*, &c. Æn. VI.

NOTHING

Ch. I. NOTHING can be ſtronger or more ſublime, than this Antitheſis; *one Act* ſet as equal to *many other Acts taken together*, and the Roman *ſingly* (for it is *Tu Romane*, not *Vos Romani*) to *all other* Men; and yet this performed by ſo trivial a cauſe, as the juſt oppoſition of ALII to TU.

BUT here we conclude, and proceed to treat of CONNECTIVES.

CHAP.

CHAP. II.

Concerning Connectives, and firſt thoſe called Conjunctions.

CONNECTIVES are the ſubject of what follows; which, according as they connect either *Sentences* or *Words*, are called by the different Names of CONJUNCTIONS, or PREPOSITIONS. Of theſe Names, that of the *Prepoſition* is taken from a *mere accident*, as it commonly ſtands in connection before the Part, which it connects. The name of the *Conjunction*, as is evident, has reference to its *eſſential character*. Ch. II.

OF theſe two we ſhall conſider the CONJUNCTION firſt, becauſe it connects, not Words, but *Sentences*. This is conformable to the Analyſis, with which we began this inquiry *, and which led us, by parity

* Sup. p. 11, 12.

Ch. II. parity of reaſon, to conſider *Sentences themſelves* before *Words*. Now the Definition of a CONJUNCTION is as follows —*a Part of Speech, void of Signification itſelf, but ſo formed as to help Signification, by making* TWO *or more ſignificant Sentences to be* ONE *ſignificant Sentence* (*a*).

THIS

(*a*) Grammarians have uſually conſidered the Conjunction as connecting rather *ſingle Parts of Speech*, than *whole Sentences*, and that too with the addition of like with like, Tenſe with Tenſe, Number with Number, Caſe with Caſe, *&c.* This *Sanctius* juſtly explodes. *Conjunctio neque caſus, neque alias partes orationis (ut imperiti docent) conjungit, ipſæ enim partes inter ſe conjunguntur—ſed conjunctio Orationes inter ſe conjungit.* Miner. L. III. c. 14. He then eſtabliſhes his doctrine by a variety of examples. He had already ſaid as much, L. I. c. 18. and in this he appears to have followed *Scaliger*, who had aſſerted the ſame before him. *Conjunctionis autem notionem veteres paullo inconſultiùs prodidere; neque enim, quod aiunt, partes alias conjungit (ipſæ enim partes per ſe inter ſe conjunguntur)—ſed Conjunctio eſt, quæ conjungit Orationes plures.* De Cauſ. Ling. Lat. c. 165.

This

THIS therefore being the general Idea of CONJUNCTIONS, we deduce their Species in Ch. II.

This Doctrine of theirs is confirmed by *Apollonius*, who in the ſeveral places, where he mentions the Conjunction, always conſiders it in Syntax as connecting *Sentences*, and *not* Words, though in his works now extant he has not given us its Definition. See L. I. c. 2. p. 14. L. II. c. 12. p. 124. L. III. c. 15. p. 234.

But we have ſtronger authority than this to ſupport *Scaliger* and *Sanctius*, and that is *Ariſtotle*'s Definition, as the Paſſage has been corrected by the beſt Critics and Manuſcripts. A Conjunction, according to him, is φωνὴ ἄσημος, ἐκ πλειόνων μὲν φωνῶν μιᾶς, σημαντικῶν δέ, ποιεῖν πεφυκυῖα μίαν φωνὴν σημαντικήν. *An articulate Sound, devoid of Signification, which is ſo formed as to make* ONE *ſignificant articulate Sound out of ſeveral articulate Sounds, which are each of them ſignificant.* Poet. c. 20. In this view of things, the *one ſignificant articulate Sound, formed by the Conjunction*, is not the Union of two or more Syllables in one ſimple Word, nor even of two or more Words in one ſimple Sentence, but of two or more *ſimple Sentences* in one *complex Sentence*, which is conſidered as ONE, from that Concatenation of Meaning effected by the *Conjunctions*. For example, let us take the Sentence, which follows. *If Men are by nature ſocial, it is their Intereſt to be juſt, though it*

Ch. II. in the following manner. CONJUNCTIONS, while they *connect ſentences*, either *connect alſo*

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were not ſo ordained by the Laws of their Country. Here are three Sentences. (1.) *Men are by nature ſocial.* (2.) *It is Man's Intereſt to be juſt.* (3.) *It is not ordained by the Laws of every Country that Man ſhould be juſt.* The firſt two of theſe Sentences are made *One* by the Conjunction, IF; theſe, *One* with the third Sentence, by the Conjunction, THO'; and the three, thus united, make that φωνὴ μία σημαντικὴ, *that one ſignificant articulate Sound*, of which *Ariſtotle* ſpeaks, and which is the reſult of the conjunctive Power.

This explains a paſſage in his Rhetoric, where he mentions the ſame Subject. Ὁ γὰρ σύνδεσμος ἓν ποιεῖ τὸ πολλά· ὥστε ἐὰν ἐξαιρεθῇ, δῆλον ὅτι τναντίον ἔσαι τὸ ἓν πολλά. *The Conjunction makes many,* ONE; *ſo that if it be taken away, it is then evident on the contrary that one will be* MANY. Rhet. III. c. 12. His inſtance of a Sentence, diveſted of its Conjunctions, and thus made *many* out of *one*, is, ἦλθον, ἀπήντησα, ἐδεόμην, *veni, occurri, rogavi*, where by the way the three Sentences, reſulting from this Diſſolution, (for ἦλθον, ἀπήντησα, and ἐδεόμην, are each of them, when unconnected, ſo many perfect Sentences) prove that theſe are the proper Subjects of the *Conjunction*'s connective faculty.

Ammonius's

alſo their meanings, or not. For example: let us take theſe two Sentences—*Rome was enſlaved—Cæſar was ambitious*—and connect them together by the Conjunction, BECAUSE. *Rome was enſlaved,* BECAUSE *Cæſar was ambitious.* Here the *Meanings,* as well as the *Sentences,* appear to be connected. But if I ſay,—*Manners muſt be reformed,* OR *Liberty will be loſt*—here the Conjunction, OR, though *it join the* Ch. II.

Ammonius's account of the uſe of this Part of Speech is elegant. Διὸ καὶ τῶν λόγων ὁ μὲν ὕπαρξιν μίαν σημαίνων, ὁ κυρίως εἷς, ἀνάλογον ἂν εἴη τῷ μηδέπω τετμημένῳ ξύλῳ, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἑνὶ λεγομένῳ· ὁ δὲ πλείονας ὑπάρξεις δηλῶν, ἕνα (lege διὰ) τινὰ δὲ σύνδεσμον ἡνῶσθαί πως δοκῶν, ἀναλογεῖ τῇ νηὶ τῇ ἐκ πολλῶν συγκειμένῃ ξύλων, ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν γόμφων φαινομένην ἐχούσῃ τὴν ἕνωσιν. *Of Sentences that, which denotes one Exiſtence ſimply, and which is ſtrictly* ONE, *may be conſidered as analogous to a piece of Timber not yet ſevered, and called on this account One. That, which denotes ſeveral Exiſtences, and which appears to be made* ONE *by ſome Conjunctive Particle, is analogous to a Ship made up of many pieces of Timber, and which by means of the nails has an apparent Unity.* Am. in Lib. de Interpret. p. 54, 6.

Ch. II. *the Sentences*, yet as to their reſpective *Meanings*, is a perfect *Disjunctive*. And thus it appears, that though all Conjunctions *conjoin Sentences*, yet with reſpect to the *Senſe*, ſome are CONJUNCTIVE, and ſome DISJUNCTIVE; and hence (*b*) it is that we derive their different Species.

THE *Conjunctions, which conjoin both Sentences and their Meanings*, are either COPULATIVES, or CONTINUATIVES. The principal Copulative in *Engliſh* is, AND. The Continuatives are, IF, BECAUSE, THEREFORE, THAT, *&c.* The Difference between theſe is this — *The Copulative* does no more than barely *couple* Sentences, and is therefore applicable to all Subjects, whoſe Natures *are not incompatible*. *Continuatives*, on the contrary, by a more intimate connection, conſolidate Sen-

(*b*) Thus *Scaliger*. *Aut ergo Senſum conjungunt, ac Verba; aut Verba tantum conjungunt, Senſum vero diſjungunt.* De C. L. Lat. c. 167.

Sentences into *one continuous Whole*, and are therefore applicable only to Subjects, which have an *eſſential Co-incidence*. Ch. II.

To explain by examples—It is no way improper to ſay, *Lyſippus was a Statuary*, AND *Priſcian was a Grammarian* — *The Sun ſhineth*, AND *the Sky is clear*—becauſe theſe are things that may co-exiſt, and yet imply no abſurdity. But it would be abſurd to ſay, *Lyſippus was a Statuary*, BECAUSE *Priſcian was a Grammarian*; tho' not to ſay, *the Sun ſhineth*, BECAUSE *the Sky is clear*. The Reaſon is, with reſpect to the firſt, *the Co-incidence* is merely *accidental*; with reſpect to the laſt, it is *eſſential*, and founded in nature. And ſo much for the Diſtinction between *Copulatives* and *Continuatives* (*c*).

As

(*c*) *Copulativa eſt, quæ copulat tam Verba, quam Senſum.* Thus *Priſcian*, p. 1026. But *Scaliger* is more explicit—*ſi Senſum conjungunt (conjunctiones ſc.) aut neceſſario*

Ch. II. As to *Continuatives*, they are either SUPPOSITIVE, ſuch as, IF; or POSITIVE, ſuch as, BECAUSE, THEREFORE, AS, *&c.* Take Examples of each—*you will live happily*, IF *you live honeſtly*—*you live happily*, BECAUSE *you live honeſtly*. The Difference between theſe Continuatives is this—The *Suppoſitives* denote *Connection*, but aſſert not actual *Exiſtence*; the *Poſitives* imply *both the one and the other* (*d*).

FARTHER

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ceſſariò, aut non neceſſariò: & ſi non neceſſario, tum ſiunt Copulativæ, &c. De C. Ling. Lat. c. 167. *Priſcian*'s own account of Continuatives is as follows. *Continuativæ ſunt, quæ continuationem & conſequentiam rerum ſignificant*—ibid. *Scaliger*'s account is—*cauſſam aut præſtituunt, aut ſubdunt*. Ibid. c. 168. The *Greek* name for the Copulative was Σύνδεσμος συμπλεκτικός; for the Continuative, συναπτικός; the Etymologies of which words juſtly diſtinguiſh their reſpective characters.

(*d*) The old *Greek* Grammarians confined the name Συνακτικοὶ, and the *Latins* that of *Continuativæ*, to thoſe Con-

FARTHER than this, the Poſitives above mentioned are either CAUSAL, ſuch as, BECAUSE, SINCE, AS, &c. or COLLECTIVE, ſuch as, THEREFORE, WHEREFORE, THEN, &c. The Difference between theſe is this—the *Cauſals* ſubjoin *Cauſes to Effects—The Sun is in Eclipſe*, BE- Ch. II.

Conjunctions, which we have called *Suppoſitive* or *Conditional*, while the Poſitive they called παρασυναπτικοὶ, or *Subcontinuativæ*. They agree however in deſcribing their proper Characters. The firſt according to *Gaza* are, δὶ ὕπαρξιν μὲν ἁ, ἀκολουθίαν δέ τινα καὶ τάξιν δηλοῦντες—L. IV. *Priſcian* ſays, they ſignify to us, *qualis eſt ordinatio & natura rerum, cum dubitatione aliquâ eſſentiæ rerum*—p. 1027. And *Scaliger* ſays, they conjoin *ſine ſubſiſtentiâ neceſſariâ*; *poteſt enim ſubſiſtere & non ſubſiſtere*; *utrumque enim admittunt*. Ibid. c. 168. On the contrary of the Poſitive, or παρασυναπτικοὶ (to uſe his own name) *Gaza* tells us, ὅτι καὶ ὕπαρξιν μετὰ τάξεως σημαίνουσιν ἕτοιγε—And *Priſcian* ſays, *cauſam continuationis oſtendunt conſequentem cum eſſentia rerum*—And *Scaliger*, *non ex hypotheſi, ſed ex eo, quod ſubſiſtit, conjungunt*. Ibid.

Ch. II. BECAUSE *the Moon intervenes—The Collectives* ſubjoin *Effects to Cauſes—The Moon intervenes*, THEREFORE *the Sun is in Eclipſe*. Now we uſe *Cauſals* in thoſe inſtances, where, the Effect being conſpicuous, we ſeek its Cauſe; and *Collectives*, in *Demonſtrations*, and *Science properly ſo called*, where the Cauſe being known

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It may ſeem at firſt ſomewhat ſtrange, why the *Poſitive* Conjunctions ſhould have been conſidered as Subordinate to the *Suppoſitive*, which by their antient Names appears to have been the fact. Is it, that the Poſitive are confined to what *actually is*; the Suppoſitive extend to *Poſſibles*, nay even as far as to *Impoſſibles?* Thus it is falſe to affirm, *As it is Day, it is Light*, unleſs it actually *be* Day. But we may at midnight affirm, *If it be Day, it is Light*, becauſe the, IF, extends to Poſſibles alſo. Nay we may affirm, by its help (if we pleaſe) even Impoſſibles. We may ſay, *If the Sun be cubical, then is the Sun angular*; *If the Sky fall, then ſhall we catch Larks*. Thus too *Scaliger* upon the ſame occaſion—*amplitudinem Continuativæ percipi ex eo, quod etiam impoſſibile aliquando præſupponit*. De C. L. Lat. C. 168. In this ſenſe then the Continuative, Suppoſitive or Conditional Conjunction is (as it were) ſuperior to the Poſitive, as being of greater latitude in its application.

known firſt, by its help we diſcern conſequences (*e*). Ch. II.

ALL theſe *Continuatives* are reſolvable into *Copulatives*. Inſtead of, BECAUSE *it is Day, it is light*, we may ſay, *It is Day*, AND *it is Light*. Inſtead of, IF *it be Day, it is Light*, we may ſay, *It is at the ſame time neceſſary to be Day*, AND *to be Light*; and ſo in other Inſtances. The Reaſon is, that the Power of the *Copulative* extends to all Connections, as well to the *eſſential*, as to the *caſual* or *fortuitous*. Hence therefore the Continuative may be reſolved into *a Copulative and ſomething more*, that is to ſay, into a Copulative implying an *eſſential* Co-incidence (*f*) in the Subjects conjoined.

(*e*) The *Latins* called the Cauſals, *Cauſales* or *Cauſativæ*; the Collectives, *Collectivæ* or *Illativæ*: The *Greeks* called the former Αἰτιολογικοὶ, and the latter Συλλογιστικοί.

(*f*) *Reſolvuntur autem in Copulativas omnes hæ, propterea quod Cauſa cum Effectu Suâpte naturâ conjuncta eſt. Scal.* de C. L. Lat. c. 169.

Ch. II. As to *Cauſal* Conjunctions (of which we have ſpoken already) there is no one of the four Species of Cauſes, which they are not capable of denoting: for example, THE MATERIAL CAUSE—*The Trumpet ſounds,* BECAUSE *it is made of Metal*—THE FORMAL—*The Trumpet ſounds,* BECAUSE *it is long and hollow*—THE EFFICIENT—*The Trumpet ſounds,* BECAUSE *an Artiſt blows it*—THE FINAL—*The Trumpet ſounds,* THAT *it may raiſe our courage.* Where it is worth obſerving, that the three firſt Cauſes are expreſt by the ſtrong affirmation of the *Indicative Mode,* becauſe if the Effect actually be, theſe muſt of neceſſity be alſo. But the laſt Cauſe has a different Mode, namely, the *Contingent* or *Potential.* The Reaſon is, that the Final Cauſe, tho' it may be *firſt in Speculation,* is always *laſt in Event.* That is to ſay, however it may be the End, which ſet the Artiſt firſt to work, it may ſtill be an End beyond his Power to obtain, and which,

which, like other Contingents, may either happen, or not (*g*). Hence alſo it is connected by Conjunctions of a peculiar kind, ſuch as, THAT, ἵνα, UT, &c. Ch. II.

THE Sum is, that ALL CONJUNCTIONS, *which connect both Sentences and their Meanings*, are either COPULATIVE, or CONTINUATIVE; the Continuatives are either *Conditional*, or *Poſitive*; and the Poſitives are either *Cauſal* or *Collective*.

AND now we come to the DISJUNCTIVE CONJUNCTIONS, a Species of Words which bear this contradictory Name, becauſe, while they *disjoin the Senſe*, they *conjoin the Sentences* (*h*).

WITH

(*g*) See B. I. c. 8. p. 142. See alſo Vol. I. Note VIII. p. 271. For the four Cauſes, ſee Vol I. Note XVII. p. 280.

(*h*) Οἱ δὲ διαζευκτικοὶ τὰ διαζευγμένα συντιθέασι, κὴ ἢ πρᾶγμα ἀπὸ πράγματος, ἢ πρόσωπον ἀπὸ προσώπε διαζευγνῦντες, τὴν φράσιν ἐπισυνδέσιν. *Gazæ* Gram.

Ch. II. WITH reſpect to theſe we may obſerve, that as there is a Principle of UNION diffuſed throughout all things, by which THIS WHOLE is kept together, and preſerved from Diſſipation; ſo there is a Principle of DIVERSITY diffuſed in like manner, the Source of Diſtinction, of Number, and of Order (*i*).

Now

Gram. L. IV. *Disjunctivæ ſunt, quæ, quamvis dictiones conjungant, ſenſum tamen disjunctum habent.* Priſc. L. XVI. p. 1029. And hence it is, that a Sentence, connected by Disjunctives, has a near reſemblance to a *ſimple negative Truth.* For though this as to its Intellection be *disjunctive* (its end being to disjoin the Subject from the Predicate) yet as it combines Terms together into one Propoſition, it is as truly *ſynthetical*, as any Truth, that is *affirmative.* See Chap. I. Note (*b*). p. 3.

(*i*) The DIVERSITY, which adorns Nature, may be ſaid to heighten by degrees, and as it paſſes to different Subjects, to become more and more intenſe. Some things only differ, when conſidered as *Individuals*, but if we recur to their *Species*, immediately loſe all Diſtinction: ſuch for inſtance are *Socrates* and *Plato.* Others *differ* as to *Species*, but as to *Genus* are the ſame: ſuch

Now it is *to expreſs in ſome degree the Modifications of this Diverſity*, that DISJUNCTIVE CONJUNCTIONS ſeem firſt to have been invented. Ch. II.

OF theſe DISJUNCTIVES, ſome are SIMPLE, ſome ADVERSATIVE—*Simple*, as when we ſay, EITHER *it is Day*, OR *it is*

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are *Man* and *Lion*. There are others again, which *differ as to Genus*, and co-incide only in thoſe *tranſcendental Comprehenſions* of Ens, Being, Exiſtence, and the like: ſuch are *Quantities* and *Qualities*, as for example *an Ounce*, and the Colour, *White*. Laſtly ALL BEING whatever differs, as *Being*, from *Non-being*.

Farther, in all things different, however moderate their Diverſity, there is an appearance of OPPOSITION with reſpect to each other, in as much as each thing *is it ſelf*, and *not any* of the reſt. But yet in all Subjects this Oppoſition is not *the ſame*. In RELATIVES, ſuch as Greater and Leſs, Double and Half, Father and Son, Cauſe and Effect, in *theſe* it is *more ſtriking*, than in ordinary Subjects, becauſe *theſe* always ſhew it, *by neceſſarily inferring each other*. In CONTRARIES, ſuch as Black and White, Even and Odd, Good and Bad, Virtuous

Ch. II. *is Night—Adverſative*, as when we ſay, *It is not Day*, BUT *it is Night*. The Difference between theſe is, that the ſimple do no more, than *merely disjoin*; the *Adverſative* disjoin, with an *Oppoſition concomitant*. Add to this, that the Adverſative are *definite*; the Simple, *indefinite*. Thus when we ſay, *The Number of Three is not an*

Virtuous and Vitious, in theſe the Oppoſition goes ſtill farther, becauſe theſe not only *differ*, but are even *deſtructive of each other*. But *the moſt potent Oppoſition* is that of Ἀντίφασις, or CONTRADICTION, when we oppoſe *Propoſition* to *Propoſition*, *Truth* to *Falſhood*, aſſerting of any Subject, *either it is, or it is not*. This indeed is an *Oppoſition*, which extends itſelf to all things, for every thing conceiveable muſt needs have its *Negative*, though multitudes by nature have neither *Relatives*, nor *Contraries*.

Beſides theſe Modes of DIVERSITY, there are others that deſerve notice: ſuch for inſtance, as the Diverſity between the *Name* of a thing, and *its Definition*; between the *various Names*, which belong to the *ſame thing*, and the *various things*, which are denoted by the *ſame Name*; all which *Diverſitie* upon occaſion become a Part of our Diſcourſe. An ſo much, in ſhort, for the Subject of DIVERSITY.

an even Number, BUT *an odd*, we not only disjoin two oppoſite Attributes, but we definitely affirm one, and deny the other. But when we ſay, *The Number of the Stars is* EITHER *even* OR *odd*, though we aſſert one Attribute *to be*, and the other *not to be*, yet the Alternative notwithſtanding is left indefinite. And ſo much for *ſimple Disjunctives* (*k*). Ch. II.

As

(*k*) The ſimple Disjunctive ἤ, or *Vel*, is moſtly uſed *indefinitely*, ſo as to leave an Alternative. But when it is uſed *definitely*, ſo as to leave no Alternative, it is then a perfect Disjunctive of the Subſequent from the Previous, and has the ſame force with οὐ δέ, or, *Et non*, It is thus *Gaza* explains that Verſe of *Homer*.

Βέλομ' ἐγὼ λαὸν σόον ἔμμεναι, ἢ ἀπολίσθαι.
Il. A.

That is to ſay, *I deſire the people ſhould be ſaved*, AND NOT *be deſtroyed*, the Conjunction ἤ being ἀναιρετικὸς, or *ſublative*. It muſt however be confeſt, that this Verſe is otherwiſe explained by an Ellipſis, either of μᾶλλον, or ἀντίς, concerning which ſee the Commentators.

Ch. II. As to *Adverſative Disjunctives*, it has been ſaid already that they imply OPPOSITION. Now there can be no Oppoſition of the *ſame Attribute*, in the *ſame Subject*, as when we ſay, *Nireus was beautiful*; but the Oppoſition muſt be either of the *ſame Attribute* in *different Subjects*, as when we ſay, *Brutus was a Patriot*, BUT *Cæſar was not*—or of *different Attributes* in the *ſame Subject*, as when we ſay, *Gorgias was a Sophiſt*, BUT *not a Philoſopher*—or of *different Attributes* in *different Subjects*, as when we ſay, *Plato was a Philoſopher*, BUT *Hippias was a Sophiſt*.

THE *Conjunctions* uſed for all theſe purpoſes may be called ABSOLUTE ADVERSATIVES.

BUT there are *other Adverſatives*, beſides theſe; as when we ſay, *Nireus was more beautiful*, THAN *Achilles*—*Virgil was*

AS

AS *great a Poet*, AS *Cicero was an Orator*. The Character of theſe latter is, that they go farther than the former, by marking not only *Oppoſition*, but that *Equality* or *Exceſs*, which ariſes among Subjects from their being *compared*. And hence it is they may be called ADVERSATIVES OF COMPARISON. Ch. II.

BESIDES the Adverſatives here mentioned, there are two other Species, of which the moſt eminent are UNLESS and ALTHO'. For example—*Troy will be taken*, UNLESS *the Palladium be preſerved*—*Troy will be taken*, ALTHO' *Hector defend it*. The Nature of theſe *Adverſatives* may be thus explained. As every *Event* is naturally *allied* to its *Cauſe*, ſo by parity of reaſon it is *oppoſed* to its *Preventive*. And as every Cauſe is either *adequate* (*l*) or *in-adequate* (in-

(*l*) This Diſtinction has reference to *common Opinion*, and the *form of Language*, *conſonant thereto*. In ſtrict metaphyſical truth, *No Cauſe*, *that is not adequate*, *is any Cauſe at all*.

Ch. II. (in-adequate, when it endeavours, without being effectual) ſo in like manner is every *Preventive*. Now *adequate Preventives* are expreſt by ſuch Adverſatives, as UNLESS—*Troy will be taken*, UNLESS *the Palladium be preſerved*; that is, *This alone is ſufficient to prevent it*. The *In-adequate* are expreſt by ſuch Adverſatives, as ALTHO'—*Troy will be taken*, ALTHO' *Hector defend it*; that is, *Hector's Defence will prove in-effectual*.

THE Names given by the old Grammarians to denote theſe laſt Adverſatives, appear not ſufficiently to expreſs their Natures (*m*). They may be better perhaps called ADVERSATIVES ADEQUATE, and IN-ADEQUATE.

AND thus it is that all DISJUNCTIVES, that is CONJUNCTIONS, *which conjoin Sentences*,

(*m*) They called them for the moſt part, without ſufficient Diſtinction of their Species, *Adverſativæ*, or Ἐναντιωματικοί.

tences, but not their Meanings, are either SIMPLE or ADVERSATIVE; and that all ADVERSATIVES are either *Abſolute* or *Comparative*; or elſe *Adequate* or *In-adequate*. Ch. II.

WE ſhall finiſh this Chapter with a few miſcellany Obſervations.

IN the firſt place it may be obſerved, through all the Species of Disjunctives, that the *ſame* Disjunctive appears to have *greater* or *leſs* force, according as the Subjects, which it disjoins, are more or leſs disjoined by Nature. For example, if we ſay, *Every Number is even*, OR *odd*—*Every Propoſition is true*, OR *falſe*—nothing ſeems to disjoin *more ſtrongly* than the *Disjunctive*, becauſe no things are in Nature more *incompatible* than the Subjects. But if we ſay, *That Object is a Triangle*, OR *Figure contained under three right lines* —the (OR) in this caſe hardly ſeems to disjoin, or indeed to do more, than *diſtinctly* to expreſs the Thing, firſt by its

Ch. II. *Name*, and then by its *Definition*. So if we ſay, *That Figure is a Sphere*, OR *a Globe*, OR *a Ball*—the Disjunctive in this caſe, tends no farther to disjoin, than as it diſtinguiſhes the *ſeveral Names*, which belong to the *ſame Thing* (*n*).

AGAIN—the Words, *When* and *Where*, and all others of the ſame nature, ſuch as, *Whence*, *Whither*, *Whenever*, *Wherever*, &c. may be properly called ADVERBIAL CONJUNCTIONS, becauſe they participate the nature both of Adverbs and Conjunctions —*of Conjunctions*, as they *conjoin* Sentences;

(*n*) The *Latins* had a peculiar Particle for this occaſion, which they called *Subdisjunctiva*, a *Subdisjunctive*; and that was SIVE. *Alexander ſive Paris*; *Mars ſive Mavors*. The *Greek* Εἴτ' ἤν ſeems to anſwer the ſame end. Of theſe Particles, *Scaliger* thus ſpeaks—*Et ſane nomen Subdisjunctivarum rectè acceptum eſt, neque enim tam planè disjungit, quam Disjunctivæ. Nam Disjunctivæ ſunt in Contrariis—Subdisjunctivæ autem etiam in non Contrariis, ſed Diverſis tantum*; *ut, Alexander ſive Paris*. De C. L. Lat. c. 170.

ces; *of Adverbs*, as they denote the Attributes either of *Time*, or of *Place*. Ch. II.

AGAIN—theſe *Adverbial Conjunctions*, and perhaps *moſt of the Prepoſitions* (contrary to the Character of *acceſſory* Words, which have ſtrictly no Signification, but when aſſociated with other words) have a kind of *obſcure* Signification, when taken alone, by denoting thoſe Attributes of Time and Place. And hence it is, that they appear in Grammar, like *Zoophytes* in Nature; a *kind of* (*o*) *middle Beings*, of amphibious character, which, by ſharing the Attributes of the higher and the lower, conduce to link the Whole together (*p*).

AND

(*o*) Πολλαχοῦ γὰρ ἡ φύσις δήλη γίνεται κατὰ μικρὸν μεταβαίνουσα, ὥςε ἀμφισβητεῖσθαι ἐπὶ τίνων, πότερον ζῶον ἢ φυτόν. *Themiſt.* p. 74. Ed. Ald. See alſo *Ariſt.* de Animal. Part. p. 93. l. 10. Ed. Syll.

(*p*) It is ſomewhat ſurprizing that the politeſt and moſt elegant of the *Attic* Writers, and *Plato* above all

Ch. II. And ſo much for Conjunctions, their Genus, and their Species.

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the reſt, ſhould have their works filled with Particles of all kinds, and with Conjunctions in particular; while in the modern polite works, as well of ourſelves as of our neighbours, ſcarce ſuch a Word as a Particle, or Conjunction is to be found. Is it, that where there is *Connection in the Meaning*, there muſt be *Words had to connect*; but that where the Connection is little or none, ſuch Connectives are of little uſe? That Houſes of Cards, without cement, may well anſwer their end, but not thoſe Houſes, where one would chuſe to dwell? Is this the Cauſe? or have we attained an Elegance, to the Antients unknown?

Venimus ad ſummam fortunæ, &c.

CHAP.

CHAP. III.

Concerning thoſe Connectives, called Prepoſitions.

PREPOSITIONS by their name expreſs their *Place*, but not their *Character*. Their Definition will diſtinguiſh them from the former Connectives. A PREPOSITION *is a Part of Speech, devoid itſelf of Signification, but ſo formed as to unite two Words that are ſignificant, and that refuſe to co-aleſce or unite of themſelves* (*a*). This Ch. III.

(*a*) The Stoic Name for a Prepoſition was Προθετικὸς Σύνδεσμος, *Præpoſitiva Conjunctio, a Prepoſitive Conjunction.* Ὡς μὲν ἔν γε κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας παραθέσεις αἱ προθέσεις συνδεσμικῆς συνλάξεως γίνονται παρεμφατικαί, λέλεκται ἡμῖν· ἐξ ὧν γε ἀφορμὴ ἔυρηται παρὰ τοῖς Στωικοῖς τὸ καλεῖσθαι αὐτὰς Προθετικὰς Συνδέσμους. *Now in what manner even in other applications* (beſides the preſent) *Prepoſitions give proof of their Conjunctive Syntax, we have mentioned already; whence too*

Ch. III. This connective Power, (which relates to *Words* only, and not *Sentences*) will be better understood from the following Speculations.

SOME things co-alesce and unite *of themselves*; others refuse to do so *without help*, and as it were compulsion. Thus in Works of Art, the Morter and the Stone co-alesce of themselves; but the Wainscot and the Wall not without Nails and Pins. In nature this is more conspicuous. For example; all Quantities, and Qualities co-alesce immediately with their Subsances. Thus it is we say, *a fierce Lion, a vast Mountain*; and from *this Natural Concord of Subject and Accident*, arises *the Grammatical Concord of Substantive and Adjective*. In like

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the Stoics took occasion to call them PREPOSITIVE CONJUNCTIONS. *Apollon.* L. IV. c. 5. p. 313. Yet is this in fact rather a descriptive *Sketch*, than a complete *Definition*, since there are other Conjunctions, which are Prepositive as well as these. See *Gaz.* L. IV. de Præpositt. *Prisc.* L. XIV. p. 983.

like manner Actions co-aleſce with their Agents, and Paſſions with their Patients. Thus it is we ſay, *Alexander conquers; Darius is conquered.* Nay, as every Energy is a kind of Medium between its Agent and Patient, the whole three, *Agent, Energy,* and *Patient,* co-aleſce with the ſame facility; as when we ſay, *Alexander conquers Darius.* And hence, that is from *theſe Modes of natural Co-aleſcence,* ariſes *the Grammatical Regimen of the Verb by its Nominative, and of the Accuſative by its Verb.* Farther than this, Attributives themſelves may be moſt of them characterized; as when we ſay of ſuch Attributives as *ran, beautiful, learned,* he *ran ſwiftly,* ſhe was *very beautiful,* he was *moderately learned,* &c. And hence the *Co-aleſcence of the Adverb* with *Verbs, Participles,* and *Adjectives.* Ch. III.

THE general Concluſion appears to be this. "THOSE PARTS OF SPEECH UNITE "OF THEMSELVES IN GRAMMAR, WHOSE "ORIGINAL ARCHETYPES UNITE OF

Ch. III. "THEMSELVES IN NATURE." To which we may add, as following from what has been ſaid, that *the great Objects of Natural Union are* SUBSTANCE *and* ATTRIBUTE. Now tho' *Subſtances* naturally co-incide with their *Attributes*, yet they abſolutely refuſe doing ſo, *one with another* (*b*). And hence thoſe known Maxims in Phyſics, that *Body is impenetrable*; that *two Bodies cannot poſſeſs the ſame place*; that *the ſame Attribute cannot belong to different Subſtances*, &c.

FROM theſe Principles it follows, that when we form a Sentence, the *Subſtantive* without difficulty co-incides with the *Verb*, from the natural Co-incidence of *Subſtance* and *Energy*—THE SUN WARMETH. So likewiſe the *Energy* with the *Subject*, *on which*

(*b*) *Cauſa, propter quam duo Subſtantiva non ponuntur ſine copulâ, e Philoſophiâ petenda eſt: neque enim duo ſubſtantialiter unum eſſe poteſt, ſicut Subſtantia et Accidens; itaque non dicas*, CÆSAR, CATO PUGNAT. *Scal.* de Cauſ. Ling. Lat. c. 177.

which it operates——WARMETH THE EARTH. So likewiſe both *Subſtance* and *Energy* with their proper *Attributes*.—THE SPLENDID SUN,—GENIALLY WARMETH—THE FERTILE EARTH. But ſuppoſe we were deſirous to add other Subſtantives, as for inſtance, AIR, or BEAMS. How would theſe co-incide, or under what Character could they be introduced? Not as *Nominatives* or *Accuſatives*, for both thoſe places are already filled; the Nominative by the Subſtance, SUN; the Accuſative by the Subſtance, EARTH. Not as Attributes to theſe laſt, or to any other thing; for *Attributes by nature they neither are, nor can be made*. Here then we perceive the Riſe and Uſe of PREPOSITIONS. By theſe we connect thoſe Subſtantives to Sentences, which at the time are unable to co-aleſce *of themſelves*. Let us aſſume for inſtance a pair of theſe Connectives, THRO', and WITH, and mark their Effect upon the Subſtances here mentioned. *The ſplendid Sun* WITH *his Beams genially* Ch. III.

Ch. III. *genially warmeth* THRO' *the Air the fertile Earth.* The Sentence, as before, remains *intire and one*; the *Subſtantives* required are both *introduced*; and not a Word, which was there before, is detruded from its proper place.

IT muſt here be obſerved that moſt, if not all Prepoſitions ſeem originally formed to denote the *Relations of* PLACE (*c*). The reaſon is, this is that grand *Relation*, which *Bodies* or *natural Subſtances* maintain at all times one to another, whether they are contiguous or remote, whether in motion or at reſt.

IT may be ſaid indeed that *in the Continuity of Place* they form this UNIVERSE, or

(*c*) *Omne corpus aut movetur aut quieſcit: quare opus fuit aliquâ notâ, quæ* TO ΠΟΥ *ſignificaret, ſive eſſet inter duo extrema, inter quæ motus ſit, ſive eſſet in altero extremorum, in quibus ſit quies. Hinc elicimus Præpoſitionis eſſentialem definitionem.* Scal. de Cauſ. Ling. Lat. c. 152.

or VISIBLE WHOLE, and are made as much ONE by that general Comprehenſion, as is conſiſtent with their ſeveral Natures, and ſpecific Diſtinctions. Thus it is we have Prepoſitions to denote the *contiguous Relation* of Body, as when we ſay, *Caius walketh* WITH *a Staff*; *the Statue ſtood* UPON *a Pedeſtal*; *the River ran* OVER *a Sand*; others for *the detached* Relation, as when we ſay, *He is going* TO *Italy*; *the Sun is riſen* ABOVE *the Hills*; *theſe Figs came* FROM *Turky*. So as to *Motion* and *Reſt*, only with this difference, that *here* the Prepoſition varies its character with the Verb. Thus if we ſay, *that Lamp hangs* FROM *the Ceiling*, the Prepoſition, FROM, aſſumes a Character of *Quieſcence*. But if we ſay, *that Lamp is falling* FROM *the Ceiling*, the Prepoſition in ſuch caſe aſſumes a Character of *Motion*. So in *Milton*, Ch. III.

—To ſupport uneaſie Steps
OVER *the burning Marle*—Par. L. I.

Here OVER denotes *Motion*.

Again

Ch. III. Again—

—He—with looks of cordial Love
Hung OVER *her enamour'd*—Par. L. IV.

Here OVER denotes *Reſt.*

BUT though the original uſe of Prepoſitions was to denote *the Relations of Place*, they could not be confined to this Office only. They by degrees extended themſelves to Subjects *incorporeal*, and came to denote Relations, as well *intellectual* as *local*. Thus, becauſe in Place he, who is *above*, has commonly the advantage over him, who is *below*, hence we transfer OVER and UNDER to *Dominion* and *Obedience*; of a King we ſay, *he ruled* OVER *his People*; of a common Soldier, *he ſerved* UNDER *ſuch a General*. So too we ſay, *with* Thought; *without* Attention; thinking *over* a Subject; *under* Anxiety; *from* Fear; *out of* Love; *through* Jealouſy, *&c.* All which inſtances, with many others of like kind,

kind, ſhew that the *firſt Words* of Men, Ch. III.
like their *firſt Ideas*, had an immediate reference to *ſenſible Objects*, and that in afterdays, when they began to diſcern with their *Intellect*, they took thoſe Words, which they found *already* made, and transferred them by metaphor to *intellectual* Conceptions. There is indeed no Method to expreſs new Ideas, but either this of *Metaphor*, or that of *Coining new Words*, both which have been practiſed by Philoſophers and wiſe Men, according to the nature, and exigence of the occaſion (*d*).

IN

(*d*) Among the Words new coined we may aſcribe to *Anaxagoras*, Ὁμοιομέρεια; to *Plato*, Ποιότης; to *Cicero*, *Qualitas*; to *Ariſtotle*, Ἐνέλεχεια; to the *Stoics*, Ὄυτις, κεράτις, and many others.—Among the Words transferred by Metaphor from *common* to *ſpecial* Meanings, to the *Platonics* we may aſcribe Ἰδέα; to the *Pythagoreans* and *Peripatetics*, Κατηγορία, and Κατηγορεῖν; to the *Stoics*, Κατάληψις, ὑπόληψις, καθήκον; to the *Pyrrhoniſts*, Ἕξις, ἐνδέχεται, ἐπέχω, &c.

And

Ch. III. In the foregoing uſe of Prepoſitions, we have ſeen how they are applied *κατὰ παράθεσιν, by way of Juxta-poſition*, that is to ſay, where they are prefixt to a Word, with-

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And here I cannot but obſerve, that he who pretends to diſcuſs the Sentiments of any one of theſe Philoſophers, or even to cite and tranſlate him (except in trite and obvious Sentences) without accurately knowing the *Greek* Tongue in general; the nice differences of many Words apparently ſynonymous; the peculiar Stile of the Author whom he preſumes to handle; the new coined Words, and new Significations given to old Words, uſed by ſuch Author, and his Sect; the whole Philoſophy of ſuch Sect, together with the Connections and Dependencies of its ſeveral Parts, whether Logical, Ethical, or Phyſical;—He I ſay, that, without this previous preparation, attempts what I have ſaid, will ſhoot in the dark; will be liable to perpetual blunders; will explain, and praiſe, and cenſure merely by chance; and though he may poſſibly to Fools appear as a wiſe Man, will certainly among the wiſe ever paſs for a Fool. Such a Man's Intellect comprehends antient Philoſophy, as his Eye comprehends a diſtant Proſpect. He may ſee perhaps enough, to know Mountains from Plains, and Seas from Woods; but for an accurate diſcernment of particulars, and their character, this without farther helps, it is impoſſible he ſhould attain.

without becoming a Part of it. But they may be uſed alſo κατὰ σύνθεσιν, *by way of Compoſition*, that is, they may be prefixt to a Word, ſo as to become a real Part of it (*e*). Thus in *Greek* we have Ἐπίσασθαι, in *Latin*, *Intelligere*, in *Engliſh*, to *Underſtand*. So alſo, to *foretel*, to *overact*, to *undervalue*, to *outgo*, &c. and in *Greek* and *Latin*, other Inſtances innumerable. In this caſe the Prepoſitions commonly transfuſe ſomething of their own Meaning into the Word, with which they are compounded; and this imparted Meaning in moſt inſtances will be found ultimately reſolvable into ſome of the Relations of PLACE, (*f*) as uſed either in its *proper* or *metaphorical* acceptation. Ch. III.

LASTLY,

(*e*) See *Gaz.* Gram. L. IV. Cap. de Præpoſitione.

(*f*) For example, let us ſuppoſe ſome given Space. E & Ex ſignify *out of* that Space; PER, *through it*, from beginning to end; IN, *within it*; SUB, *under it*.

Ch. III. LASTLY, there are times, when Prepoſitions totally loſe their connective Nature, being

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Hence then E and PER in compoſition *augment*; *Enormis*, ſomething not ſimply big, but big in exceſs; ſomething got *out of the rule*, and *beyond the meaſure*; *Dico*, to *ſpeak*; *Edico*, to *ſpeak out*; whence *Edictum*, *an Edict*, ſomething ſo effectually ſpoken, as all are ſuppoſed to hear, and all to obey. So *Terence*,

Dico, Edico vobis—Eun. V. 5. 20.

which (as *Donatus* tells us in his Comment) is an Αὔξησις. *Fari*, *to ſpeak*; *Effari*, *to ſpeak out*—hence *Effatum*, *an Axiom*, or ſelf-evident Propoſition, ſomething addreſſed as it were to all men, and calling for univerſal Aſſent. *Cic.* Acad. II. 29. *Permagnus*, *Perutilis*, great *throughout*, uſeful *through every part*.

On the contrary, IN and SUB diminiſh and leſſen. *Injuſtus*, *Iniquus*, *unjuſt*, *inequitable*, that lies *within* Juſtice and Equity, that reaches not ſo far, that falls *ſhort of them*; *Subniger*, *blackiſh*; *Subrubicundus*, *reddiſh*; tending to black, and tending to red, but yet *under* the ſtandard, and *below* perfection.

Emo originally ſignified *to take away*; hence it came to ſignify *to buy*, becauſe he, who buys, *takes away* his purchaſe. INTER, *Between*, implies *Diſcontinuance*,

being converted into Adverbs, and uſed in Syntax accordingly. Thus *Homer*, Ch. III.

—Γέλασσε δὲ πᾶσα περὶ χθών.
—*And Earth ſmil'd all around.*

Ια. Τ. 362.

But of this we have ſpoken in a preceding Chapter. (*g*). One thing we muſt however obſerve, before we finiſh this Chapter, which is, that whatever we may be told of CASES in modern Languages, there are in fact no ſuch things; but their force and power is expreſt by two Methods,

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ance, for in things continuous there can nothing lie between. From theſe two comes, *Interimo*, *to kill*, that is to ſay, *to take a Man away in the midſt of Life, by making a Diſcontinuance of his vital Energy.* So alſo *Perimo*, *to kill* a Man, that is to ſay, *to take him away thoroughly*; for indeed what more thorough taking away can well be ſuppoſed? The *Greek* Verb, Ἀναιρεῖν, and the *Engliſh* Verb, *To take off*, ſeem both to carry the ſame alluſion. And thus it is that Prepoſitions become Parts of other Words.

(*g*) See before, p. 205.

Ch. III. thods, either by *Situation*, or by *Prepoſitions*; *the Nominative and Accuſative Caſes* by Situation; *the reſt*, by Prepoſitions. But this we ſhall make the Subject of a Chapter by itſelf, concluding here our Inquiry concerning Prepoſitions.

CHAP.

CHAP IV.

Concerning Caſes.

AS CASES, or at leaſt their various Powers, depend on the knowledge partly of *Nouns*, partly of *Verbs*, and partly of *Prepoſitions*; they have been reſerved, till thoſe Parts of Speech had been examined and diſcuſſed, and are for that reaſon made the Subject of ſo late a Chapter, as the preſent. Ch. IV.

THERE are no CASES in the modern Languages, except a few among the *primitive Pronouns*, ſuch as I, and ME; JE, and MOY; and the *Engliſh Genitive*, formed by the addition of s, as when from *Lion*, we form *Lion's*; from *Ship*, *Ship's*. From this defect however we may be enabled to diſcover in ſome inſtances *what a Caſe is*, the *Periphraſis*, which ſup-

Ch. IV. plies its place, being *the Caſe* (as it were) *unfolded.* Thus *Equi* is analized into *Du Cheval, Of the Horſe, Equo* into *Au Cheval, To the Horſe.* And hence we ſee that the GENITIVE and DATIVE CASES imply the joint Power of a *Noun* and a *Prepoſition,* the Genitive's Prepoſition being *A, De,* or *Ex,* the Dative's Prepoſition being *Ad,* or *Verſus.*

WE have not this aſſiſtance as to the ACCUSATIVE, which in modern Languages (a few inſtances excepted) is only known from its poſition, that is to ſay, by being ſubſequent to its Verb, in the collocation of the words.

THE VOCATIVE we paſs over from its little uſe, being not only unknown to the modern Languages, but often in the antient being ſupplied by the *Nominative.*

THE ABLATIVE likewiſe was uſed by the *Romans* only; a Caſe they ſeem to have adopted

adopted *to aſſociate with their Prepoſitions*, as they had deprived their *Genitive* and *Dative* of that privilege; a Caſe certainly not neceſſary, becauſe the *Greeks* do as well without it, and becauſe with the *Romans* themſelves it is frequently undiſtinguiſhed. Ch. IV.

THERE remains the NOMINATIVE, which whether it were a Caſe or no, was much diſputed by the Antients. The *Peripatetics* held it to be no *Caſe*, and likened the Noun, in this its *primary* and *original Form*, to a perpendicular Line, ſuch for example, as the line AB.



The Variations from the Nominative, they conſidered as if A B were to fall from its perpendicular, as for example, to A C, or A D. Hence then they only called theſe

Ch. IV. Variations, ΠΤΩΣΕΙΣ, CASUS, CASES, or FALLINGS. The *Stoics* on the contrary, and the Grammarians with them, made the *Nominative* a CASE alſo. Words they conſidered (as it were) *to fall from the Mind*, or *diſcurſive Faculty*. Now when a Noun fell thence *in its primary Form*, they then called it ΠΤΩΣΙΣ ΟΡΘΗ, CASUS RECTUS, AN ERECT, or UPRIGHT CASE or FALLING, ſuch as AB, and by this name they diſtinguiſhed the *Nominative*. When *it fell from the Mind under any of its variations*, as for example in the form of a *Genitive*, a *Dative*, or the like, ſuch variations they called ΠΤΩΣΕΙΣ ΠΛΑΓΙΑΙ, CASUS OBLIQUI, OBLIQUE CASES, or SIDELONG FALLINGS (ſuch as AC, or AD) in oppoſition to the other (that is AB) which was erect and perpendicular (*a*). Hence too Grammarians called the Method of enumerating the various Caſes of a Noun, ΚΛΙΣΙΣ, DECLINATIO, a DECLENSION, it

(*a*) See *Ammon.* in Libr. de Interpr. p. 35.

it being a ſort of *progreſſive Deſcent from the Noun's upright Form thro' its various declining Forms*, that is, a Deſcent from A B, to A C, A D, *&c.* Ch. IV.

OF theſe CASES we ſhall treat but of four, that is to ſay, the NOMINATIVE, the ACCUSATIVE, the GENITIVE, and the DATIVE.

IT has been ſaid already in the preceding Chapter, that the great Objects of natural Union are SUBSTANCE and ATTRIBUTE. Now from this *Natural Concord* ariſes the *Logical Concord* of SUBJECT and PREDICATE, and the *Grammatical Concord of* SUBSTANTIVE and ATTRIBUTIVE (*b*). Theſe CONCORDS in SPEECH produce PROPOSITIONS and SENTENCES, as that previous CONCORD in NATURE produces NATURAL BEINGS. This being

(*b*) See before, p. 264.

Ch. IV. admitted, we proceed by obſerving, that when a Sentence is regular and orderly, *Nature's Subſtance*, the *Logician's Subject*, and the *Grammarian's Subſtantive* are all denoted by that Caſe, which we call the NOMINATIVE. For example, CÆSAR *pugnat*, ÆS *fingitur*, DOMUS *ædificatur*. We may remark too by the way, that *the Character of this Nominative* may be learnt from its *Attributive*. The Action implied in *pugnat*, ſhews its Nominative CÆSAR to be an Active efficient Cauſe; the Paſſion implied in *fingitur*, ſhews its Nominative ÆS to be a Paſſive Subject, as does the Paſſion in *ædificatur* prove DOMUS to be an Effect.

As therefore every Attributive would as far as poſſible conform itſelf to its Subſtantive, ſo for this reaſon, when it has Caſes, it imitates its Subſtantive, and appears as a *Nominative* alſo. So we find it in ſuch inſtances as—CICERO *eſt* ELOQUENS; VITIUM *eſt* TURPE; HOMO *eſt* ANIMAL,

ANIMAL, &c. When it has no Caſes, (as happens with Verbs) it is forced to content itſelf with ſuch aſſimilations as it has, thoſe of Number and Perſon *; as when we ſay, CICERO LOQUITUR; NOS LOQUIMUR; HOMINES LOQUUNTUR. Ch. IV.

FROM what has been ſaid, we may make the following obſervations—that as there can be *no Sentence without a Subſtantive*, ſo that Subſtantive, if the Sentence be *regular*, is always denoted by a *Nominative*—that on this occaſion *all the Attributives, that have Caſes*, appear as *Nominatives* alſo—that there may be a regular and perfect Sentence *without any of the other Caſes*, but that *without one Nominative at leaſt*, this is utterly impoſſible. Hence therefore we form its Character and Deſcription—THE NOMINATIVE *is that Caſe, without which there can be no regular*

* What ſort of Number and Perſon Verbs have, ſee before, p. 170, 171.

Ch. IV. *lar* (*c*) *and perfect Sentence.* We are now to ſearch after another Caſe.

WHEN the *Attributive* in any Sentence is ſome *Verb denoting Action*, we may be aſſured *the principal Subſtantive* is ſome *active efficient* Cauſe. So we may call *Achilles* and *Lyſippus* in ſuch Sentences as *Achilles vulneravit*, *Lyſippus fecit*. But though this be evident and clearly underſtood, the Mind is ſtill *in ſuſpence*, and finds its conception *incomplete*. ACTION, it well knows, not only requires ſome *Agent*, but it muſt have a *Subject* alſo to work on, and it muſt produce ſome *Effect*. It is then to denote one of theſe (that is, the *Subject* or the *Effect*) that the Authors of Language

(*c*) We have added *regular* as well as *perfect*, becauſe there may be *irregular* Sentences, which may be *perfect without a Nominative*. Of this kind are all Sentences, made out of thoſe Verbs, called by the *Stoics* Παρασύμβαματα or Παραχατηγορήματα, ſuch as Σωκράτει μετάμελει, *Socratem pœnitet*, &c. See before, p. 180.

guage have deſtined THE ACCUSATIVE. Ch. IV.
Achilles vulneravit HECTOREM—here the Accuſative denotes the Subject. *Lyſippus fecit* STATUAS——here the Accuſative denotes the Effect. By theſe additional Explanations the Mind becomes ſatisfied, and the Sentences acquire a Perfection, which before they wanted. In whatever other manner, whether figuratively, or with Prepoſitions, this Caſe may have been uſed, its firſt deſtination ſeems to have been that here mentioned, and hence therefore we ſhall form its Character and Deſcription—THE ACCUSATIVE *is that Caſe, which to an efficient Nominative and a Verb of Action ſubjoins either the Effect or the paſſive Subject.* We have ſtill left the Genitive and the Dative, which we inveſtigate, as follows.

IT has been ſaid in the preceding Chapter (*d*), that when the Places of the *Nominative*

(*d*) See before, p. 265.

Ch. IV.

minative and the *Accuſative* are filled by proper Subſtantives, other Subſtantives are annexed by the help of *Prepoſitions*. Now, though this be ſo far true in the modern Languages, that (a very few inſtances excepted) they know no other method; yet is not the rule of equal latitude with reſpect to the *Latin* or *Greek*, and that from reaſons which we are about to offer.

AMONG the various Relations of Subſtantives denoted by Prepoſitions, there appear to be two principal ones; and theſe are, the *Term* or *Point*, which ſomething commences FROM, and the *Term* or *Point*, which ſomething tends TO. Theſe Relations the *Greeks* and *Latins* thought of ſo great importance, as to diſtinguiſh them, when they occurred, *by peculiar Terminations of their own*, which expreſt their force, *without the help of a Prepoſition*. Now it is here we behold the Riſe of the antient Genitive, and Dative, the GENITIVE *being formed to expreſs all Relations com-*

commencing FROM *itſelf*; THE DATIVE, *all Relations tending* TO *itſelf*. Of this there can be no ſtronger proof, than the Analyſis of theſe Caſes in the modern Languages, which we have mentioned already (*e*). Ch. IV.

It is on theſe Principles that they ſay in *Greek* — Δεομαί ΣΟΙ, δίδωμί ΣΟΙ, Of *thee I aſk*, To *thee I give*. The reaſon is, in requeſts the perſon requeſted is one whom ſomething is expected *from*; in donations, the perſon preſented, is one whom ſomething paſſes *to*. So again— (*f*) Πεποίηται λίθε, *it is made of Stone*. Stone was the paſſive Subject, and thus it appears in the *Genitive*, as being the *Term from*, or *out of which*. Even in *Latin*, where the Syntax is more formal and ſtrict, we read—

Implentur

(*e*) See before, p. 275, 276.

(*f*) Χρυσοῦ πεποιημένος, καὶ ἐλέφανλος, *made of Gold and Ivory*. So ſays *Pauſanias* of the *Olympian Jupiter*, L. V. p. 400. See alſo *Hom. Iliad.* Σ. 574.

Ch. IV. *Implentur veteris Bacchi, pinguiſque ferinæ.* Virg.

The old Wine and Veniſon were the funds or ſtores, *of* or *from* which they were filled. Upon the ſame principles, Πίνω τοῦ ὕδατος, is a Phraſe in *Greek*; and *Je bois de l'eau*, a Phraſe in *French*, as much as to ſay, *I take ſome or a certain part*, FROM or OUT OF *a certain whole*.

WHEN we meet in Language ſuch Genitives as *the Son of a Father*; *the Father of a Son*; *the Picture of a Painter*; *the Painter of a Picture*, &c. theſe are all RELATIVES, and therefore each of them reciprocally a *Term or Point* to the other, FROM or OUT OF which it derives its *Eſſence*, or at leaſt its *Intellection* (*g*).

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(*g*) All Relatives are ſaid to reciprocate, or mutually infer each other, and therefore they are often expreſt by this Caſe, that is to ſay, the Genitive. Thus *Ariſtotle*, Πάντα δὲ τὰ πρός τι πρός ἀντιστρέφοντα λέγεται, οἷον

THE *Dative*, as it implies *Tendency to*, Ch. IV.
is employed among its other uſes to denote the FINAL CAUSE, that being the Cauſe *to which* all Events, not fortuitous, may be ſaid to tend. It is thus uſed in the following inſtances, among innumerable others.

——TIBI *ſuaveis dædala tellus*
Submittit flores— Lucret.

——TIBI *brachia contrahit ardens*
Scorpios— Virg. G. I.

——TIBI *ſerviat ultima Thule.*
Ibid.

AND ſo much for CASES, their Origin and Uſe; a Sort of Forms, or Terminations,

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οἷον ὁ δοῦλος δεσπότου δοῦλος, καὶ ὁ δεσπότης δοῦλου δεσπότης λέγεται εἶναι, καὶ τὸ διπλάσιον ἡμίσεος διπλάσιον, καὶ τὸ ἥμισυ διπλασίου ἥμισυ. *Omnia vero, quæ ſunt ad aliquid, referuntur ad ea, quæ reciprocantur. Ut ſervus dicitur domini ſervus; et dominus, ſervi dominus; necnon duplum, dimidii duplum; et dimidium, dupli dimidium.* *Categor.* C. VII.

Ch. IV. tions, which we could not well pass over, from their great importance (*h*) both in the *Greek* and *Latin* Tongues; but which however, not being among the Essentials of Language, and therefore not to be found in many particular Languages, can be hardly said to fall within the limits of our Inquiry.

(*h*) *Annon et illud observatione dignum (licet nobis modernis spiritûs nonnihil redundat)* antiquas Linguas *plenas declinationum, casuum, conjugationum, et similium fuisse*; modernas, *his ferè destitutas, plurima per præpositiones et verba auxiliaria segniter expedire? Sanè facilè quis conjiciat (utcunque nobis ipsi placeamus)* ingenia priorum seculorum nostris fuisse multo acutiora et subtiliora. *Bacon. de Augm. Scient.* VI. 1.

CHAP.

CHAP. V.

Concerning Interjections—Recapitulation—Concluſion.

BESIDES the Parts of Speech before mentioned, there remains THE INTERJECTION. Of this Kind among the *Greeks* are Ὦ, Φεῦ, Αἰ, &c. among the *Latins*, *Ah! Heu! Hei!* &c. among the *Engliſh*, *Ah! Alas! Fie!* &c. Theſe the *Greeks* have ranged among their *Adverbs*; improperly, if we conſider the Adverbial Nature, which always co-incides with ſome Verb, as its Principal, and to which it always ſerves in the character of an Attributive. Now INTERJECTIONS *co-incide with no Part of Speech, but are either uttered alone, or elſe thrown into a Sentence, without altering its Form, either in Syntax or Signification.* The *Latins* ſeem therefore to have done better in † ſeparating Ch. V.

† *Vid. Servium in Æneid* XII. v. 486.

Ch. V. parating them by themſelves, and giving them a name by way of diſtinction from the reſt.

SHOULD it be aſk'd, if not Adverbs, what then are they? It may be anſwered, not ſo properly Parts of Speech, as adventitious Sounds; certain VOICES OF NATURE, rather than Voices of *Art*, expreſſing thoſe Paſſions and natural Emotions, which ſpontaneouſly ariſe in the human Soul, upon the View or Narrative of intereſting Events (*a*).

"AND

(*a*) INTERJECTIONES *a Græcis ad Adverbia referuntur, atque eos ſequitur etiam Boethius. Et recte quidem de iis, quando caſum regunt. Sed quando orationi ſolum inſeruntur, ut nota affectûs, velut ſuſpirii aut metûs, vix videntur ad claſſem aliquam pertinere, ut quæ* NATURALES *ſint* NOTÆ; *non, aliarum vocum inſtar, ex inſtituto ſignificant.* Voſſ. de Anal. L. I. c. 1. INTERJECTIO *eſt Vox affectum mentis ſignificans, ac citra verbi opem ſententiam complens.* Ibid. c. 3. *Reſtat claſſium extrema,* INTERJECTIO. *Hujus appellatio non ſimi-*

"AND thus we have found that ALL "WORDS ARE EITHER SIGNIFICANT BY "THEMSELVES, OR ONLY SIGNIFICANT, "WHEN Ch. V.

ſimiliter ſe habet ac Conjunctionis. Nam cum hæc dicatur Conjunctio, quia conjungat; Interjectio tamen, non quia interjacet, ſed quia interjicitur, *nomen accepit. Nec tamen de ἀσίᾳ ejus eſt, ut interjiciatur; cum per ſe compleat ſententiam, nec raro ab eâ incipiat oratio.* Ibid. L. IV. c. 28. INTERJECTIONEM *non eſſe partem Orationis ſic oſtendo: Quod naturale eſt, idem eſt apud omnes: Sed gemitus & ſigna lætitiæ idem ſunt apud omnes: Sunt igitur naturales. Si vero naturales, non ſunt partes Orationis. Nam eæ partes, ſecundum Ariſtotelem, ex inſtituto, non naturâ, debent conſtare. Interjectionem Græci Adverbiis adnumerant; ſed falſo. Nam neque,* &c. Sanct. Miner. L. I. c. 2. INTERJECTIONEM *Græci inter Adverbia ponunt, quoniam hæc quoque vel adjungitur verbis, vel verba ei ſubaudiuntur. Ut ſi dicam*—Papæ! quid video?—*vel per ſe*—Papæ!—*etiamſi non addatur,* Miror; *habet in ſe ipſius verbi ſignificationem. Quæ res maxime fecit Romanarum artium Scriptores ſeparatim hanc partem ab Adverbiis accipere; quia videtur affectum habere in ſeſe Verbi, et plenam motûs animi ſignificationem, etiamſi non addatur Verbum, demonſtrare. Interjectio tamen non ſolum illa, quæ dicunt Græci* σχετλιασμὸν, *ſignificat; ſed etiam voces, quæ cujuſcunque paſſionis animi pulſu per exclamationem* interjiciuntur. Priſc. L. XV.

Ch. V. "WHEN ASSOCIATED—*that thoſe ſigni-*
"*ficant by themſelves, denote either* SUB-
"STANCES *or* ATTRIBUTES, *and are call-*
"*ed for that reaſon* SUBSTANTIVES *and*
"ATTRIBUTIVES—*that the Subſtantives*
"*are either* NOUNS *or* PRONOUNS—*that*
"*the* ATTRIBUTIVES *are either* PRIMARY
"*or* SECONDARY—*that the Primary At-*
"*tributives are either* VERBS, PARTICI-
"PLES, *or* ADJECTIVES; *the Secondary,*
"ADVERBS—*Again, that the Parts of*
"*Speech, only ſignificant when aſſociated, are*
"*either* DEFINITIVES *or* CONNECTIVES
"—*that the Definitives are either* ARTI-
"CULAR *or* PRONOMINAL—*and that the*
"*Connectives are either* PREPOSITIONS *or*
"CONJUNCTIONS."

AND thus have we reſolved LANGUAGE, AS A WHOLE INTO ITS CONSTITUENT PARTS, which was the firſt thing, that we propoſed, in the courſe of this Inquiry(*b*).

BUT

(*b*) See before, p. 7.

BUT now as we conclude, methinks I hear ſome Objector, demanding with an air of pleaſantry, and ridicule—" *Is there* " *no ſpeaking then without all this trouble?* " *Do we not talk every one of us, as well* " *unlearned, as learned; as well poor Pea-* " *ſants, as profound Philoſophers?*" We may anſwer by interrogating on our part —Do not thoſe ſame poor Peaſants uſe the Levar and the Wedge, and many other Inſtruments, with much habitual readineſs? And yet have they any conception of thoſe Geometrical Principles, from which thoſe Machines derive their Efficacy and Force? And is the Ignorance of theſe Peaſants, a reaſon for others to remain ignorant; or to render the Subject a leſs becoming Inquiry? Think of Animals, and Vegetables, that occur every day—of Time, of Place, and of Motion —of Light, of Colours, and of Gravitation—of our very Senſes and Intellect, by which we perceive every thing elſe— Ch. V.

Ch. V. THAT they are, we all know, and are perfectly ſatisfied—WHAT they are, is a Subject of much obſcurity and doubt. Were we to reject this laſt Queſtion, becauſe we are certain of the firſt, we ſhould baniſh all Philoſophy at once out of the world (*c*).

BUT a graver Objector now accoſts us. "*What* (ſays he) *is the* UTILITY? "*Whence the Profit, where the Gain?*" Every Science whatever (we may anſwer) has its Uſe. Arithmetic is excellent

(*c*) Ἀλλ' ἔστι πολλὰ τῶν ὄντων, ἃ τὴν μὲν ὕπαρξιν ἔχει γνωριμωτάτην, ἀγνωστοτάτην δὲ τὴν οὐσίαν· ὥσπερ ἥτε κίνησις, καὶ ὁ τόπος, ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον ὁ χρόνος. Ἐκάστῳ γὰρ τούτων τὸ μὲν εἶναι γνώριμον καὶ ἀναμφίλεκτον· τίς δὲ ποτέ ἐστιν αὐτῶν ἡ οὐσία, τῶν χαλεπωτάτων ὁραθῆναι. Ἔστι δὲ δὴ τί τῶν τοιούτων καὶ ἡ ψυχή· τὸ μὲν γὰρ εἶναί τι τὴν ψυχὴν, γνωριμώτατον καὶ φανερώτατον· τί δὲ ποτέ ἐστιν, ὃ ῥᾴδιον καταμαθεῖν, Ἀλεξανδ. Ἀφροδ. Περὶ ψυχῆς, B. p. 142.

lent for the gauging of Liquors; Geometry, for the meaſuring of Eſtates; Aſtronomy, for the making of Almanacks; and Grammar perhaps, for the drawing of Bonds and Conveyances. Ch. V.

THUS much to the *Sordid* — If the *Liberal* aſk for ſomething better than this, we may anſwer and aſſure them from the beſt authorities, that every Exerciſe of the Mind upon Theorems of Science, like generous and manly Exerciſe of the Body, tends to call forth and ſtrengthen Nature's original Vigour. Be the Subject itſelf immediately lucrative or not, the Nerves of Reaſon are braced by the mere Employ, and we become abler Actors in the Drama of Life, whether our Part be of the buſier, or of the ſedater kind.

Ch. V. PERHAPS too *there is a Pleaſure even in Science itſelf*, diſtinct from any End, to which it may be farther conducive. Are not Health and Strength of *Body* deſirable for their own ſakes, tho' we happen not to be fated either for Porters or Draymen; And have not Health and Strength of *Mind* their intrinſic Worth alſo, tho' not condemned to the low drudgery of ſordid Emolument? Why ſhould there not be *a Good* (could we have the Grace to recognize it) *in the mere Energy of our Intellect*, as much as in Energies of lower degree? The Sportſman believes there is Good in his Chace; the Man of Gaiety, in his Intrigue; even the Glutton, in his Meal. We may juſtly aſk of theſe, *why they purſue ſuch things*; but if they anſwer, *they purſue them, becauſe they are* GOOD, it would be folly to aſk them farther, WHY *they* PURSUE *what is* GOOD. It might well in ſuch caſe be replied on their

their behalf (how ſtrange ſoever it may at firſt appear) *that if there was not ſomething* GOOD, *which was in no reſpect* USEFUL, *even things uſeful themſelves could not poſſibly have exiſtence.* For this is in fact no more than to aſſert, that ſome things are ENDS, ſome things are MEANS, and that if there were NO ENDS, there could be of courſe NO MEANS. Ch. V.

IT ſhould ſeem then the Grand Queſtion was, WHAT IS GOOD—that is to ſay, *what is that which is deſirable, not for ſomething elſe, but for itſelf*; for whether it be the Chace, or the Intrigue, or the Meal, may be fairly queſtioned, ſince Men in each inſtance are far from being agreed.

IN the mean time it is plain from daily experience, there are infinite Pleaſures, Amuſements, and Diverſions, ſome for Summer, others for Winter; ſome for Country,

Ch. V. Country, others for Town; ſome, eaſy, indolent, and ſoft; others, boiſterous, active, and rough; a multitude diverſified to every taſte, and which for the time are enjoyed as PERFECT GOOD, *without a thought of any End, that may be farther obtained.* Some Objects of this kind are at times ſought by all men, excepting alone that contemptible Tribe, who, from a love to the Means of life wholly forgetting its End, are truly for that reaſon called *Miſers*, or Miſerable.

IF there be ſuppoſed then a Pleaſure, a Satisfaction, a Good, a Something valuable for its ſelf without view to any thing farther, in ſo many Objects of the *ſubordinate* kind; ſhall we not allow the ſame praiſe to the *ſublimeſt* of all Objects? Shall THE INTELLECT alone feel no pleaſures *in its Energy*, when we allow them to the groſſeſt Energies of Appetite, and Senſe? Or if the Reality of all Pleaſures and Goods were

were to be controverted, may not the *Intellectual* Sort be defended, as rationally as any of them? Whatever may be urged in behalf of the reſt (for we are not now arraigning them) we may ſafely affirm of INTELLECTUAL GOOD, that it is "the "Good of that Part, which is moſt ex- "cellent within us; that it is a Good ac- "commodated to all Places and Times; "which neither depends on the will of "others, nor on the affluence of external "Fortune; that it is a Good, which de- "cays not with decaying Appetites, but "often riſes in vigour, when thoſe are no "more (*d*)." Ch. V.

THERE is a Difference, we muſt own, between this *Intellectual* Virtue, and *Moral* Virtue. MORAL VIRTUE, from its Employment, may be called more HU-

MAN,

(*d*) See Vol. I. p. 119, 120, &c.

Ch. V.

MAN, as it tempers our Appetites to the purpoſes of human Life. But INTELLECTUAL VIRTUE may be ſurely called more DIVINE, if we conſider the Nature and Sublimity of its End.

INDEED for *Moral Virtue*, as it is almoſt wholly converſant about Appetites, and Affections, either to reduce the natural ones to a proper Mean, or totally to expel the unnatural and vitious, it would be impious to ſuppoſe THE DEITY to have occaſion for ſuch an Habit, or that any work of this kind ſhould call for his attention. Yet GOD Is, and LIVES. So we are aſſured from Scripture it ſelf. What then may we ſuppoſe the DIVINE LIFE to be? Not a Life of Sleep, as Fables tell us of *Endymion*. If we may be allowed then to conjecture with a becoming reverence, what more likely, than A PERPETUAL ENERGY OF THE PUREST INTELLECT ABOUT THE FIRST, ALL-COMPREHENSIVE

COMPREHENSIVE OBJECTS OF INTELLECTION, WHICH OBJECTS ARE NO OTHER THAN THAT INTELLECT ITSELF? For in pure INTELLECTION it holds the reverſe of all Senſation, that THE PERCEIVER AND THING PERCEIVED are ALWAYS ONE AND THE SAME (e). Ch. V.

IT

(e) Εἰ ἔν ἔτως εὖ ἔχει, ὡς ἡμεῖς ποτὲ, ὁ Θεὸς ἀεὶ, θαυμαζόν· εἰ δὲ μᾶλλον, ἔτι θαυμασιώτερον· ἔχει δὲ ὧδε, καὶ ζωὴ δὲ γε ὑπάρχει· ἡ γὰρ Νοῦ ἐνέργεια, ζωή· Ἐκεῖνος δε, ἡ ἐνέργεια· ἐνέργεια δὲ ἡ καθ' αὐτὴν, ἐκείνου ζωὴ ἀρίστη καὶ ἀίδιος. Φαμὲν δὲ τὸν Θεὸν εἶναι ζῶον ἀίδιον, ἄριστον· ὥστε ζωὴ καὶ αἰὼν συνεχὴς καὶ ἀίδιος ὑπάρχει τῷ Θεῷ ΤΟΥΤΟ γὰρ Ο ΘΕΟΣ. Τῶν μετὰ τὰ φυσ· Λ'. ζ'. It is remarkable in Scripture that GOD is peculiarly characterized as A LIVING GOD, in oppoſition to all falſe and imaginary Deities, of whom ſome had no pretenſions to Life at all; others to none higher than that of Vegetables or Brutes; and the beſt were nothing better than illuſtrious Men, whoſe exiſtence was circumſcribed by the ſhort period of Humanity.

TO

Ch. V. IT was Speculation of this kind concerning THE DIVINE NATURE, which induced one of the wiſeſt among the Antients to believe—" That the Man, " who could live in the pure enjoyment " of his *Mind*, and who properly culti- " vated that *divine* Principle, was *happieſt* " *in himſelf*, and *moſt beloved by the Gods*. " For if the Gods had any regard to " what paſt among Men (as it appeared " they had) it was probable they ſhould " rejoice in *that which was moſt excellent*, " and by nature *the moſt nearly allied to* " *themſelves*; and, as this was MIND, " that they ſhould requite the Man, who " moſt loved and honoured *This*, both " from his regard to that which was " *dear*

To the paſſage above quoted, may be added another, which immediately precedes it. Αὐτὸν δὲ νοεῖ ὁ νοῦς κατὰ μετάληψιν τοῦ νοητοῦ· νοητὸς γὰρ γίγεται, θιγγάνων καὶ νοῶν· ὥςε TAYTON NOYΣ KAI NOHTON.

" *dear* to themſelves, and from his act- Ch. V.
" ing a Part, which was laudable and
" right *(f)*."

AND thus in all SCIENCE there is ſomething *valuable for itſelf*, becauſe it contains within it ſomething which is *divine*.

(f) Ἠθικ. Νικομαχ. τὸ Κ'. κεφ. ή.

End of the SECOND BOOK.

HER-

HERMES

OR A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY CONCERNING UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR.

BOOK III.

CHAP. I.

Introduction—Diviſion of the Subject into ite principal Parts.

SOME things the MIND performs thro' the BODY; as for example, the various Works and Energies of Art. Others it performs *without ſuch Medium*; as for example, when it thinks, and reaſons, and concludes. Now tho' the Mind, in either caſe, may be called the Principle or Source, yet are theſe laſt Ch. I.

Ch. I. more properly *its own* peculiar Acts, as being immediately referable to its own innate Powers. And thus is MIND *ultimately the Cauſe of all*; of every thing at leaſt that is *Fair* and *Good*.

Among thoſe Acts of Mind more immediately its own, that of *mental Separation* may be well reckoned one. *Corporeal* Separations, however accurate otherwiſe, are in one reſpect incomplete, as they may be repeated without end. The ſmalleſt Limb, ſevered from the ſmalleſt Animalcule (if we could ſuppoſe any inſtrument equal to ſuch diſſection) has ſtill a triple Extenſion of length, breadth, and thickneſs; has a figure, a colour, with perhaps many other qualities; and ſo will continue to have, tho' thus divided to infinity. But (*a*) the *Mind* ſurmounts all power of *Concretion*,

(*a*) *Itaque Naturæ facienda eſt prorſus Solutio & Separatio; non per Ignem certe, ſed per Mentem, tanquam ignem divinum.* Bacon. Organ. Lib. II. 16.

cretion, and can place in the ſimpleſt manner every Attribute by itſelf; convex without concave; colour without ſuperficies; ſuperficies without Body; and Body without its Accidents; as diſtinctly each one, as tho' they had never been united. Ch. I.

AND thus it is that it penetrates into the receſſes of all things, not only dividing them, as *Wholes*, into their *more conſpicuous Parts*, but perſiſting, till it even ſeparate thoſe *Elementary Principles*, which, being blended together after a more myſterious manner, are united in the *minuteſt Part*, as much as in the *mightieſt Whole* (*b*).

Now if MATTER and FORM are among theſe Elements, and deſerve perhaps to be eſteemed as *the principal* among them, it may not be foreign to the Deſign of this Treatiſe, to ſeek whether *theſe*, or *any things analogous to them*, may be found in

(*b*) See below, p. 312.

Ch. I. SPEECH or LANGUAGE (*c*). This therefore we ſhall attempt after the following method.

EVERY

(*c*) See before, p. 2. 7. MATTER and FORM (in *Greek* ΥΛΗ and ΕΙΔΟΣ) were Terms of great import in the days of antient Philoſophy, when things were ſcrutinized rather at their beginning than at their End. They have been but little regarded by modern Philoſophy, which almoſt wholly employs itſelf about the laſt order of Subſtance, that is to ſay, the *tangible, corporeal* or *concrete*, and which acknowledges no ſeparations even in this, but thoſe made by mathematical Inſtruments or Chemical Proceſs.

The original meaning of the Word ΥΛΗ, was SYLVA, a WOOD. Thus *Homer*,

——Τρέμε δ' ἔρεα μακρὰ ϗ ΥΛΗ,
Ποσσὶν ὑπ' ἀθανάτοισι Ποσειδάωνος ἰόντος.
As Neptune paſt, the Mountains and the WOOD
Trembled beneath the God's immortal Feet.

Hence as WOOD was perhaps the firſt and moſt uſeful kind of Materials, the Word Ὕλη, which denoted it, came to be by degrees extended, and at length to denote MATTER or MATERIALS in general. In this ſenſe Braſs was called the Ὕλη or *Matter* of a Statue; Stone, the Ὕλη or *Matter* of a Pillar; and ſo in other inſtances. The *Platonic Chalcidius*, and other Authors

EVERY thing in a manner, whether natural or artificial, is in its conſtitution com- Ch. I.

Authors of the latter Latinity uſe SYLVA under the ſame extended and comprehenſive Signification.

Now as the Species of *Matter* here mentioned, (Stone, Metal, Wood, &c.) occur moſt frequently in common life, and are all nothing more than natural Subſtances or Bodies, hence by the Vulgar, MATTER and BODY have been taken to denote the ſame thing; *Material* to mean *Corporeal*; *Immaterial*, *Incorporeal*, &c. But this was not the Sentiment of Philoſophers of old, by whom the Term *Matter* was ſeldom uſed under ſo narrow an acceptation. By theſe, every thing was called ΥΛΗ, or MATTER, whether corporeal or incorporeal, which was *capable of becoming ſomething elſe*, or *of being moulded into ſomething elſe*, whether from the operation of Art, of Nature, or a higher Cauſe.

In this ſenſe they not only called *Braſs* the Ὕλη of a Statue, and Timber of a Boat, but Letters and Syllables they called the Ὕλαι of Words; Words or ſimple Terms, the Ὕλαι of Propoſitions; and Propoſitions themſelves the Ὕλαι of Syllogiſms. The *Stoics* held all things out of our own power (τὰ ἐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν) ſuch as Wealth and Poverty, Honour and Diſhonour,

Ch. I. compounded of ſomething COMMON, and ſomething PECULIAR; of ſomething *Common*,

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Health and Sickneſs, Life and Death, to be the Ὕλαι, or *Materials of Virtue or Moral Goodneſs*, which had its eſſence in a proper conduct with reſpect to all theſe, (Vid. *Arr.* Epict. L. I. c. 29. Alſo Vol. the firſt of theſe miſcellaneous Treatiſes, p. 187, 309. M. Ant. XII. 29. VII. 29. X. 18, 19. where the Ὑλικὸν and Αἰτιῶδες are oppoſed to each other). The *Peripatetics*, tho' they expreſsly held the Soul to be ἀσώματος, or *Incorporeal*, yet ſtill talked of a Νοῦς Ὑλικὸς, *a material Mind* or *Intellect*. This to modern Ears may poſſibly ſound ſomewhat harſhly. Yet if we tranſlate the Words, *Natural Capacity*, and conſider them as only denoting that *original* and *native Power* of Intellection, which being previous to all *human* Knowledge, is yet neceſſary to its *reception*; there ſeems nothing then to remain, that can give us offence. And ſo much for the Idea of ΥΛΗ, or MATTER. See *Alex. Aphrod. de Anim.* p. 144, b. 145. *Ariſt. Metaph.* p. 121, 122, 141. *Edit. Sylb. Procl. in Euclid.* p. 22, 23.

As to ΕΙΔΟΣ, its original meaning was that of FORM or FIGURE, conſidered as denoting *viſible* Symmetry, and Proportion; and hence it had its name from Εἶδω *to ſee*, Beauty of perſon being one of the nobleſt, and moſt excellent Objects of *Sight*. Thus *Euripides*,

Πρῶτον μὲν Εἶδος ἄξιον τυραννίδος.
Fair FORM *to Empire gave the firſt pretence.*

Now

mon, and belonging to many other things; and of ſomething *Peculiar*, by which it is Ch. I.

Now as the *Form* or *Figure* of viſible Beings tended principally to *diſtinguiſh* them, and to give to each its Name and Eſſence; hence in a more general ſenſe, *whatever of any kind (whether corporeal or incorporeal)* was peculiar, eſſential, and diſtinctive, ſo as by its acceſſion to any Beings, as to its Ὕλη or *Matter*, to mark them with a Character, which they had not before, was called by the Antients ΕΙΔΟΣ or FORM. Thus not only *the Shape* given to the Braſs was called the Εἶδος or *Form* of the Statue; but the *Proportion* aſſigned to the Drugs was the Εἶδος or *Form* of the Medicine; *the orderly Motion* of the human Body was the Εἶδος or *Form* of the Dance; *the juſt Arrangement* of the Propoſitions, the Εἶδος or *Form* of the Syllogiſm. In like manner *the rational and accurate Conduct of a wiſe and good man*, in all the various Relations and Occurrences of life, made that Εἶδος or *Form*, deſcribed by *Cicero* to his Son,—FORMAM *quidam ipſam, Marce fili, et tanquam faciem* HONESTI *vides: quæ, ſi oculis cerneretur, mirabiles amores (ut ait Plato) excitaret ſapientiæ*, &c. De Offic. I.

We may go farther ſtill—THE SUPREME INTELLIGENCE, which paſſes thro' all things, and which is the ſame to our Capacities, as Light is to our Eyes,

Ch. I. is distinguished, and made to be its true and proper self.

HENCE

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this supreme Intelligence has been called ΕΙΔΟΣ ΕΙΔΩΝ, THE FORM OF FORMS, as being the Fountain of all Symmetry, of all Good, and of all Truth; and as imparting to every Being those *essential* and *distinctive* Attributes, which make it to be *itself*, and *not any thing* else.

And so much concerning FORM, as before concerning MATTER. We shall only add, that it is in the *uniting* of these, that every thing generable begins to exist; in their *separating*, *to perish*, and *be at an end*—that while the two co-exist, they co-exist not by *juxta-position*, like the stones in a wall, but by a more *intimate Co-incidence*, complete in the minutest part—that hence, if we were to persist in dividing any substance (for example Marble) to infinity, there would still remain after every section both *Matter* and *Form*, and these as perfectly united, as before the Division began—lastly, that they are both *pre-existent* to the Beings, which they constitute; the *Matter* being to be found in the world at large; the *Form*, if artificial, pre-existing within the *Artificer*, or if natural, within the *supreme Cause*, the Sovereign Artist of the Universe,

—Pulchrum pulcherrimus ipse
Mundum mente gerens, similique in imagine formans.

Even

Ch. I.

HENCE LANGUAGE, if compared according to this notion to the murmurs of a Foun-

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Even without ſpeculating ſo high as this, we may ſee among all animal and vegetable Subſtances, the Form pre-exiſting in their *immediate generating* Cauſe; Oak being the parent of Oak, Lion of Lion, Man of Man, *&c.*

Cicero's account of theſe Principles is as follows.

MATTER.

Sed ſubjectam putant omnibus ſine ulla ſpecie, atque carentem omni illa qualitate *(faciamus enim tractando uſitatius hoc verbum et tritius)* MATERIAM *quandam, ex quâ omnia expreſſa atque efficta ſint: (quæ tota omnia accipere poſſit, omnibuſque modis mutari atque ex omni parte) eóque etiam interire, non in nihilum,* &c. Acad. I. 8.

FORM.

Sed ego ſic ſtatuo, nihil eſſe in ullo genere tam pulchrum, quo non pulchrius id ſit, unde illud, ut ex ore aliquo, quaſi imago, exprimatur, quod neque oculis, neque auribus, neque ullo ſenſu percipi poteſt: cogitatione tantùm et mente complectimur.——HAS RERUM FORMAS *appellat Ideas ille non intelligendi ſolum, ſed etiam dicendi græviſſimus auctor et magiſter, Plato: caſque gigni negat, et ait ſemper eſſe, ac ratione et intelligentiâ contineri: cætera naſci, occidere, fluere, labi; nec diutiùs eſſe uno et eodem ſtatu. Quidquid eſt*

Ch. I. a Fountain, or the daſhings of a Cataract, has *in common* this, that like them, *it is a* SOUND. But then on the contrary it has *in peculiar* this, that whereas thoſe Sounds have *no Meaning or Signification*, to Language *a* MEANING *or* SIGNIFICATION *is eſſential*. Again, *Language*, if compared to the Voice of irrational Animals, has *in common* this, that like them, *it has a Meaning*. But then it has this *in peculiar* to diſtinguiſh it from them, that whereas the *Meaning* of thoſe Animal Sounds is derived *from* NATURE, that of Language is derived, not from Nature, but *from* COMPACT (*d*).

FROM

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eſt igitur, de quo ratione et viâ diſputetur, id eſt ad ultimam ſui generis Formam ſpeciemque redigendum. Cic. ad M. Brut. Orat.

(*d*) The *Peripatetics* (and with juſt reaſon) in all their definitions as well of Words as of Sentences, made it a part of their character to be ſignificant κατὰ συνθήκην, *by Compact*. See *Ariſtot. de Interp.* c. 2. 4. *Boethius* tranſlates the Words κατὰ συνθήκην, *ad placitum*,

FROM hence it becomes evident, that LANGUAGE, taken in the moſt comprehenſive view, *implies certain Sounds, having certain Meanings*; and that of theſe two Principles, the SOUND is as the MATTER, common (like other Matter) to many different things; the MEANING as that peculiar and characteriſtic FORM, by which the Nature or Eſſence of Language becomes complete. Ch. I.

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tum, or *ſecundum placitum*, and thus explains them in his comment—SECUNDUM PLACITUM *vero eſt, quod ſecundum quandam poſitionem, placitumque ponentis aptatur; nullum enim nomen naturaliter conſtitutum eſt, neque unquam, ſicut ſubjecta res à naturâ eſt, ita quoque a naturâ veniente vocabulo nuncupatur. Sed hominum genus, quod et ratione, et oratione vigeret, nomina poſuit, eaque quibus libuit, literis ſyllabiſque conjungens, ſingulis ſubjectarum rerum ſubſtantiis dedit.* *Boeth.* in Lib. de Interpret. p. 308.

CHAP.

CHAP. II.

Upon the Matter, or common Subject of Language.

Ch. II. THE ΥΛΗ or MATTER OF LANGUAGE comes firſt to be conſidered, a Subject, which Order will not ſuffer us to omit, but in which we ſhall endeavour to be as conciſe as we can. Now this ΥΛΗ or Matter is SOUND, and SOUND is *that Senſation peculiar to the Senſe of Hearing, when the Air hath felt a Percuſſion, adequate to the producing ſuch Effect* (*a*).

As

(*a*) This appears to be *Priſcian*'s Meaning when he ſays of a VOICE, what is more properly true of SOUND in general, that it is—*ſuum ſenſibile aurium, id eſt, quod propriè auribus accidit.* Lib. I. p. 537.

The following account of the *Stoics*, which refers the cauſe of SOUND to an *Undulation in the Air propagated circularly*, as when we drop a ſtone into a Ciſtern of water, ſeems to accord with the modern Hypotheſis, and

As the Cauſes of this Percuſſion are various, ſo from hence *Sound* derives the Variety of its Species. Ch. II.

FARTHER, as all theſe Cauſes are either Animate or Inanimate, ſo the two grand *Species* of Sounds are likewiſe *Animate* or *Inanimate*.

THERE is no peculiar Name for *Sound Inanimate*; nor even for that of Animals, when made by the trampling of their Feet, the fluttering of their Wings, or any other Cauſe, which is merely *accidental*. But that,

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and to be as plauſible as any—Ἀκούειν δὲ, τοῦ μεταξὺ τοῦ τε φωνοῦντος καὶ τοῦ ἀκούοντος ἀέρος πληττομένου σφαιροειδῶς, εἶτα κυματουμένου, καὶ ταῖς ἀκοαῖς προσπίπτοντος, ὡς κυματοῦται τὸ ἐν τῇ δεξαμενῇ ὕδωρ κατὰ κύκλους ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐμβληθέντος λίθου—*Porrò audire, cum is, qui medius inter loquentem, et audientem eſt, aer verberatur orbiculariter, deinde agitatus auribus influit, quemadmodum et ciſternæ aqua per orbes injecto agitatur lapide.* Diog. Laert. VII.

Ch. II. that, *which they make by proper Organs, in conſequence of ſome Senſation or inward Impulſe, ſuch Animal Sound is called a* VOICE.

As Language therefore implies that Sound called HUMAN VOICE; we may perceive that *to know the Nature and Powers of the Human Voice*, is in fact *to know* THE MATTER *or common Subject of Language.*

Now the Voice of Man, and it ſhould ſeem of all other Animals, is formed by certain Organs between the Mouth and the Lungs, and which Organs maintain the intercourſe between theſe two. The Lungs furniſh Air, out of which the Voice is formed; and the Mouth, when the Voice is formed, ſerves to publiſh it abroad.

WHAT theſe Vocal Organs preciſely are, is not in all reſpects agreed by Philo-

ſophers and Anatomiſts. Be this as it will, it is certain that the *mere primary and ſimple Voice is completely formed, before ever it reach the Mouth*, and can therefore (as well as Breathing) find a Paſſage thro' the Noſe, when the Mouth is ſo far ſtopt, as to prevent the leaſt utterance. Ch. II.

Now *pure* and *ſimple* VOICE, being thus produced, is (as before was obſerved) *tranſmitted to the Mouth*. HERE then, by means of certain *different* Organs, which do not change its primary Qualities, but only ſuperadd others, it receives *the Form or Character of* ARTICULATION. For ARTICULATION is in fact nothing elſe, than *that Form or Character, acquired to ſimple Voice, by means of the Mouth and its ſeveral Organs, the Teeth, the Tongue, the Lips*, &c. The Voice is not by Articulation made more grave or acute, more loud or ſoft (which are its *primary* Qualities) but it acquires to theſe Characters certain

Ch. II. certain *others additional*, which are perfectly adapted *to exiſt along with them* (*b*):

THE

(*b*) The ſeveral Organs above mentioned not only ſerve the purpoſes of *Speech*, but thoſe very different ones likewiſe of *Maſtication* and *Reſpiration*; ſo frugal is Nature in thus aſſigning them double duty, and ſo careful to maintain her character of *doing nothing in vain*.

He, that would be informed, how much better the Parts here mentioned are framed for *Diſcourſe* in *Man, who is a Diſcurſive Animal*, than they are in other Animals, who are not ſo, may conſult *Ariſtotle* in his Treatiſe *de Animal. Part.* Lib. II. c. 17. Lib. III. c. 1. 3. *De Animâ.* L. II. c. 8. § 23, &c.

And here by the way, if ſuch Inquirer be of a Genius truly modern, he may poſſibly wonder how the Philoſopher, conſidering (as it is modeſtly phraſed) the Age in which he lived, ſhould know ſo much, and reaſon ſo well. But if he have any taſte or value for antient literature, he may with much juſter cauſe wonder at the Vanity of his Contemporaries, who dream all Philoſophy to be the Invention of their own Age, knowing nothing of thoſe Antients ſtill remaining for their peruſal, tho' they are ſo ready on every occaſion to give the preference to *themſelves*.

The following account from *Ammonius* will ſhew whence the Notions in this chapter are taken, and what

THE *ſimpleſt* of theſe new Characters are thoſe acquired thro' the *mere Openings* Ch. II. *of*

what authority we have to diſtinguiſh VOICE from mere SOUND; and ARTICULATE VOICE from SIMPLE VOICE.

Καὶ ΨΟΦΟΣ μὲν ἐϛι πλημὴ ἀέρος αἰσθητὴ ἀκοῇ· ΦΩΝΗ δὲ, ψόφος ἐξ ἐμψυχε γινόμενος, ὅταν διὰ τῆς συϛολῆς τε θώρακος ἐκθλιβόμενος ἀπὸ τε πνεύμονος ὁ εἰσπνευθεὶς ἀὴρ προσπίπτῃ ἀθρόως τῇ καλεμένῃ τραχείᾳ ἀρτηρίᾳ, καὶ τῇ ὑπερώᾳ, ἤτοι τῷ γαργαρεῶνι, καὶ διὰ τῆς πλημῆς ἀποτελῇ τινα ἦχον αἰσθητὸν, κατὰ τινα ὁρμὴν τῆς ψυχῆς· ὅπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐμπνευϛῶν παρὰ τοῖς μουσικοῖς καλεμένων ὀργάνων συμβαίνει, οἷον αὐλῶν καὶ συρίγγων· τῆς γλώτ̃ης, καὶ τῶν ὀδόντων, καὶ χειλέων πρὸς μὲν ΤΗΝ ΔΙΑΛΕΚΤΟΝ ἀναγκαίων ὄντων, πρὸς δὲ ΤΗΝ ἈΠΛΩΣ ΦΩΝΗΝ ἁ πάντως συμβαλλομένων.—*Eſtque* SONUS, *ictus aeris qui auditu ſentitur:* VOX *autem eſt ſonus, quem animans edit, cum per thoracis compreſſionem aer attractus a pulmone, eliſus ſimul totus in arteriam, quam aſperam vocant, et palatum, aut gurgulionem impingit, et ex ictu ſonum quendam ſenſibilem pro animi quodam impetu perficit. Id quod in inſtrumentis quæ quia inflant, ideo ἐμπνευϛὰ a muſicis dicuntur, uſu venit, ut in tibiis, ac fiſtulis contingit, cum lingua, dentes, labiaque ad loquelam neceſſaria ſint, ad vocem vero ſimplicem non omnino conferant. Ammon.* in Lib. de Intepr. p. 25. b. Vid. etiam *Boerhaave* Inſtitut. Medic. Sect. 626. 630.

Ch. II. *of the Mouth*, as theſe Openings differ in giving the Voice a Paſſage. It is the Variety of Configurations in theſe Openings only, which gives birth and origin to the ſeveral VOWELS; and hence it is they derive their Name, by being thus *eminently Vocal* (*c*), and *eaſy to be ſounded of themſelves alone*.

THERE are *other articulate Forms*, which the Mouth makes not by mere Openings, but by *different Contacts of its different parts*; ſuch for inſtance, as it makes by the Junction of the two Lips, of the Tongue with

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It appears that the *Stoics* (contrary to the notion of the *Peripatetics*) uſed the word ΦΩΝΗ to denote SOUND in general. They defined it therefore to be—Τὸ ἴδιον αἰσθητὸν ἀκοῆς, which juſtifies the definition given by *Priſcian*, in the Note preceding. ANIMAL SOUND they defined to be—Ἀὴρ, ὑπὸ ὁρμῆς πεπληγμένος, *Air ſtruck* (and ſo made audible) *by ſome animal impulſe*; and HUMAN or RATIONAL SOUND they defined—Ἔναρθρος καὶ ἀπὸ διανόιας ἐκπεμπομένη, *Sound articulate and derived from the diſcurſive faculty*. *Diog. Laert.* VII. 55.

(*c*) ΦΩΝΗΕΝΤΑ.

with the Teeth, of the Tongue with the Palate, and the like. Ch. II.

Now as all theſe ſeveral Contacts, unleſs ſome Opening of the Mouth either immediately precede, or immediately follow, would rather occaſion Silence, than to produce a Voice; hence it is, that with ſome ſuch Opening, either previous or ſubſequent, they are always connected. Hence alſo it is, that the *Articulations ſo produced* are called CONSONANT, becauſe they ſound not of themſelves, and from their own powers, but *at all times in company with ſome auxiliary Vowel* (*d*).

THERE are other ſubordinate Diſtinctions of theſe primary Articulations, which to enumerate would be foreign to the deſign of this Treatiſe.

IT is enough to obſerve, that they are all denoted by the common Name of ELE-

(*d*) ΣΥΜΦΩΝΑ.

Ch. II. MENT (*e*), in as much as every Articulation of every other kind is from them derived, and into them reſolved. Under their *ſmalleſt* Combination they produce a *Syllable*; Syllables properly combined produce a *Word*; Words properly combined produce a *Sentence*; and Sentences properly combined produce an *Oration* or *Diſcourſe*.

AND thus it is that to Principles *apparently* ſo trivial (*f*), as about twenty plain ele-

(*e*) The *Stoic* Definition of an ELEMENT is as follows—Ἔστι δὲ στοιχεῖον, ἐξ οὗ πρώτου γίνεται τὰ γινόμενα, καὶ εἰς ὃ ἔσχατον ἀναλύεται. *An* ELEMENT *is that, out of which, as their firſt Principle, things generated are made, and into which, as their laſt remains, they are reſolved.* *Diog. Laert.* VII. 176. What *Ariſtotle* ſays upon ELEMENTS with reſpect to the Subject here treated, is worth attending to—Φωνῆς στοιχεῖα, ἐξ ὧν σύγκειται ἡ φωνὴ, καὶ εἰς ἃ διαιρεῖται ἔσχατα· ἐκεῖνα δὲ μηκέτ' εἰς ἄλλας φωνὰς ἑτέρας τῷ εἴδει αὐτῶν. *The* ELEMENTS OF ARTICULATE VOICE *are thoſe things, out of which the* VOICE *is compounded, and into which, as its laſt remains, it is divided: the Elements themſelves being no farther diviſible into other articulate Voices, differing in Species from them.* Metaph. V. c. 3.

(*f*) The *Egyptians* paid divine Honours to the *Inventor of Letters*, and *Regulator of Language*, whom they

elementary Sounds, we owe that variety of articulate Voices, which have been ſufficient to explain the Sentiments of ſo innumerable a Multitude, as all the preſent and paſt Generations of Men. Ch. II.

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they called THEUTH. By the GREEKS he was worſhipped under the Name of HERMES, and repreſented commonly by a *Head alone without other Limbs*, ſtanding upon *a quadrilateral Baſis*. The Head itſelf was *that of a beautiful Youth*, having on it a *Petaſus*, or *Bonnet*, adorned with two Wings.

There was a peculiar reference in this Figure to the ΕΡΜΗΣ ΛΟΓΙΟΣ, THE HERMES OF LANGUAGE OR DISCOURSE. He poſſeſſed no other part of the human figure but the HEAD, becauſe *no other* was deemed *requiſite to rational Communication*. *Words* at the ſame time, the medium of this Communication, being (as *Homer* well deſcribes them) Επεα πτεροέντα, *Winged Words*, were repreſented in their *Velocity* by the WINGS of his Bonnet.

Let us ſuppoſe ſuch a HERMES, having the *Front of his Baſis* (the uſual place for Inſcriptions) *adorned with ſome old Alphabet*, and having *a Veil flung acroſs*, by which that Alphabet is *partly* covered. Let A YOUTH be ſeen *drawing off this Veil*; and A NYMPH, near the Youth, *tranſcribing what She there diſcovers*.

Such a Deſign would eaſily indicate its Meaning. THE YOUTH we might imagine to be THE GENIUS

Ch. II. IT appears from what has been ſaid, that THE MATTER or COMMON SUBJECT OF LANGUAGE IS *that Species of Sounds called* VOICES ARTICULATE.

WHAT

OF MAN (*Naturæ Deus humanæ*, as *Horace* ſtiles him;) THE NYMPH to be ΜΝΗΜΟΣΥΝΗ, or MEMORY; as much as to inſinuate that "MAN, for the "Preſervation of his *Deeds* and *Inventions*, *was neceſ-* "*ſarily obliged to have recourſe to* LETTERS; and that "MEMORY, *being conſcious of her own Inſufficiency*, "was glad to avail herſelf of ſo valuable an Acquiſi- "tion."

MR. STUART, well known for his accurate and elegant Edition of *the Antiquities of* Athens, has adorned this Work with a Frontiſpiece agreeable to the above Ideas, and that in a taſte truly *Attic* and *Simple*, which no one poſſeſſes more eminently than himſelf.

As to HERMES, his Hiſtory, Genealogy, Mythology, Figure, *&c.* Vid. *Platon. Phileb.* T. II. p. 18. *Edit. Serran. Diod. Sic.* L. I. *Horat.* Od. X. L. I. *Heſiod. Theog.* V. 937. *cum Comment. Joan. Diaconi. Thycid.* VI. 27. *et Scholiaſt. in loc. Pighium apud Gronov. Theſaur.* T. IX. p. 1164.

For the *value* and *importance* of *Principles*, and the *difficulty* in attaining them, ſee *Ariſtot. de Sophiſt. Elench.* §. 34.

WHAT remains to be examined in the following Chapter, is Language under its characteriſtic and peculiar FORM, that is to ſay, Language conſidered, not with reſpect to *Sound*, but to *Meaning*. Ch. II.

The following Paſſage, taken from that able Mathematician *Tacquet*, will be found peculiarly pertinent to what has been ſaid in this chapter concerning *Elementary Sounds*, p. 324, 325.

Mille milliones ſcriptorum mille annorum millionibus non ſcribent omnes 24 *litterarum alphabeti permutationes, licet ſinguli quotidiè abſolverent* 40 *paginas, quarum unaquæque contineret diverſos ordines litterarum* 24. *Tacquet Arithmeticæ Theor.* p. 381. Edit. Antverp. 1663.

CHAP III.

Upon the Form, or peculiar Character of Language.

Ch. III. WHEN to any articulate Voice there accedes *by compact* a Meaning or Signification, ſuch Voice by ſuch acceſſion is then called A WORD; and many Words, poſſeſſing their Significations (as it were) *under the ſame Compact* (*a*), unite in conſtituting A PARTICULAR LANGUAGE.

IT

(*a*) See before Note (*c*) p. 314. See alſo Vol. I. Treatiſe II. c. 1. Notes (*a*) and (*c*).

The following Quotation from *Ammonius* is remarkable—Καθάπερ ἔν τὸ μὲν κατὰ τόπον κινεῖσθαι, φύσει, τὸ δὲ ὀρχεῖσθαι, θέσει καὶ κατὰ συνθήκην, καὶ τὸ μὲν ξύλον, φύσει, ἡ δὲ θύρα, θέσει· ἕτω καὶ τὸ μὲν φωνεῖν, φύσει, τὸ δὲ δι' ὀνομάτων ἢ ῥημάτων σημαίνειν, θέσει— καὶ ἔοικε τὴν μὲν φωνητικὴν δύναμιν, ὄργανον ἔσαν τῶν ψυχικῶν ἐν ἡμῖν δυνάμεων γνωσικῶν, ἢ ὀρεκτικῶν, κατὰ φύσιν ἔχειν ὁ ἄνθρωπος παραπλησίως τοῖς ἀλόγοις ζώοις·

IT appears from hence, that A WORD may be defined *a Voice articulate, and ſignificant by Compact* — and that LANGUAGE may be defined *a Syſtem of ſuch Voices, ſo ſignificant.* Ch. III.

IT is from notions like theſe concerning Language and Words, that one may be

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ζώοις· τὸ δὲ ὀνόμασιν, ἢ ῥήμασιν, ἢ τοῖς ἐκ τάτων συγκειμένοις λόγοις χρῆσθαι πρὸς τὴν σημασίαν (ἐκεῖτι φύσει ἔσιν, ἀλλὰ θέσει) ἐξαίρετον ἔχειν πρὸς τὰ ἄλογα ζῶα, διότι καὶ μόνῳ τῶν ζητῶν αὐτοκινήτε μετέχει ψυχῆς, καὶ τέχνικῶς ἐνεργεῖν δυναμένης, ἵνα καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ φωνεῖν ἡ τεχνικὴ αὐτῆς διακρίνηται δύναμις· δηλῶσι δὲ ταῦτα οἱ εἰς κάλλῳ συντιθέμενοι λόγοι μετὰ μέτρων, ἢ ἄνευ μέτρων. *In the ſame manner therefore, as local Motion is from Nature, but Dancing is ſomething poſitive; and as Timber exiſts in Nature, but a Door is ſomething poſitive; ſo is the power of producing a vocal Sound founded in Nature, but that of explaining ourſelves by Nouns, or Verbs, ſomething poſitive. And hence it is, that as to the ſimple power of producing vocal Sound (which is as it were the Organ or Inſtrument to the Soul's faculties of Knowledge or Volition) as to this vocal power I ſay, Man ſeems to poſſeſs it from Nature, in like manner as irra-*

Ch. III. be tempted to call LANGUAGE a kind of PICTURE OF THE UNIVERSE, where the Words are as the Figures or Images of all particulars.

AND yet it may be doubted, how far this is true. For if *Pictures* and *Images* are all of them *Imitations*, it will follow, that whoever has natural faculties to know the

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irrational animals: but as to the employing of Nouns, or Verbs, or Sentences compoſed out of them, in the explanation of our Sentiments (the thing thus employed being founded not in Nature, but in Poſition) this he ſeems to poſſeſs by way of peculiar eminence, becauſe he alone of all mortal Beings partakes of a Soul, which can move itſelf, and operate artificially; ſo that even in the Subject of Sound his artificial Power ſhews itſelf; as the various elegant Compoſitions both in Metre, and without Metre, abundantly prove. Ammon. de Interpr. p. 51. a.

It muſt be obſerved, that *the operating artificially*, (ἐνεργεῖν τεχνικῶς) of which *Ammonius* here ſpeaks, and which he conſiders as a diſtinctive Mark peculiar to the *Human* Soul, means ſomething very different from the *mere producing works of elegance and deſign*; elſe it could never be a mark of Diſtinction between Man, and many other Species of Animals, ſuch as the Bee, the Beaver, the Swallow, &c. See Vol. I. p. 8, 9, 10. 158, 159, &c.

the Original, will by help of the ſame ſaculties know alſo its Imitations. But it by no means follows, that he who knows any Being, ſhould know for that reaſon its *Greek* or *Latin* Name. Ch. III.

THE Truth is, that every Medium through which we exhibit any thing to another's Contemplation, is either derived from *Natural Attributes*, and then it is an IMITATION; or elſe from *Accidents quite arbitrary*, and then it is a SYMBOL (*b*).

Now,

(*b*) Διαφέρει δὲ τὸ ΟΜΟΙΩΜΑ τῷ ΣΥΜΒΟΛΟΥ, καθόσον τὸ μὲν ὁμοίωμα τὴν φύσιν αὐτὴν τοῦ πράγματος κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν ἀπεικονίζεσθαι βάλεται, ἢ ἐκ ἔξιν ἐφ' ἡμῖν αὐτὸ μεταπλάσαι· τὸ γὰρ ἐν τῇ εἰκόνι γεγραμμένε τοῦ Σωκράτες ὁμοίωμα, εἰ μὴ ἢ τὸ φαλακρὸν, ἢ τὸ σιμὸν, ἢ τὸ ἐξώφθαλμον ἔχει τοῦ Σωκράτες, ἐκέτ' ἂν αὐτοῦ λέγοιτο εἶναι ὁμοίωμα· τὸ δέ γε σύμβολον, ἤτοι σημεῖον, (ἀμφότερα γὰρ ὁ φιλόσοφος αὐτὸ ὀνομάζει) τὸ ὅλον ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἔχει, ἅτε ἢ ἐκ μόνης ὑφισάμενον τῆς ἡμετέρας ἐπινοίας· οἷον, τοῦ ποτε δεῖ συμβάλλειν ἀλλήλοις τὰς πολεμοῦντας, δύναται

Ch. III. Now, if it be allowed that in far the greater part of things, not any of their *natural* Attributes are to be found in articulate Voices, and that yet through ſuch Voices things of every kind are exhibited, it will follow that WORDS *muſt of neceſſity be* SYMBOLS, becauſe it appears that they cannot be *Imitations*.

BUT here occurs a Queſtion, which deſerves attention—"Why, in the common "intercourſe of men with men, have "Imitations been neglected, and Symbols "pre-

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ναται σύμβολοι εἶναι ἢ σάλπιγγος ἀπήχησις, ἢ λαμπάδος ῥίψις, καθάπερ φησὶν Εὐριπίδης,

Ἐπεὶ δ' ἀφείθη πυρσὸς, ὡς πυρσηνικῆς
Σάλπιγγος ἦχος, σῆμα φοινίου μάχης.

Δύναται δέ τις ὑποθέσθαι ἢ δόρατος ἀνάτασιν, ἢ βέλους ἄφεσιν, ἢ ἀλλὰ μυρία.—A REPRESENTATION *or* RESEMBLANCE *differs from a* SYMBOL, *in as much as the Reſemblance aims as far as poſſible to repreſent the very nature of the thing, nor is it in our power to ſhift or vary it. Thus a* REPRESENTATION *intended for* Socrates *in a Picture, if i have not thoſe circumſtances peculiar*

" preferred, although Symbols are only Ch. III.
" known by Habit or Inſtitution, while
" Imitations are recognized by a kind of
" natural Intuition?"—To this it may be anſwered, that if the Sentiments of the Mind, like the Features of the Face, were immediately viſible to every beholder, the Art of Speech or Diſcourſe would have been perfectly ſuperfluous. But now, while our Minds lie inveloped and hid, and the Body (like a Veil) conceals every thing but itſelf, we are neceſſarily compelled, when we communicate our Thoughts, to

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culiar to Socrates, *the bald, the flat-noſed, and the Eyes projecting, cannot properly be called a Repreſentation of him. But a* SYMBOL *or* SIGN *(for the Philoſopher* Ariſtotle *uſes both names) is wholly in our own power, as depending ſingly for its exiſtence on our imagination. Thus for example, as to the time when two armies ſhould engage, the Symbol or Sign may be the ſounding of a Trumpet, the throwing of a Torch, (according to what* Euripides *ſays,*

But when the flaming Torch was hurl'd, the ſign
Of purple fight, as when the Trumpet ſounds, &c.)

or elſe one may ſuppoſe the elevating of a Spear, the darting of a Weapon, and a thouſand ways beſides. Ammon. in Lib. de Interp. p. 17. b.

Ch. III. to convey them to each other *through a Medium which is corporeal* (*c*). And hence it is that all Signs, Marks, Imitations, and Symbols muſt needs be *ſenſible*, and addreſſed *as ſuch* to the *Senſes* (*d*). Now THE SENSES, we know, never exceed their natural Limits; the Eye perceives no Sounds; the Ear perceives no Figures nor Colours. If therefore we were to converſe, not by *Symbols* but by *Imitations*, as far as things are characterized by Figure

(*c*) Αἱ ψυχαὶ αἱ ἡμέτεραι, γυμναὶ μὲν ὖσαι τῶν σωμάτων, ἠδύναντο δι' αὐτῶν τῶν νοημάτων σημαίνειν ἀλλήλαις τὰ πράγματα· Ἐπειδὴ δὲ σώμασι συνδέδενται, δίκην νέφους περικαλύπτουσιν αὐτῶν τὸ νοερὸν, ἐδεήθησαν τῶν ὀνομάτων, δι' ὧν σημαίνουσιν ἀλλήλαις τὰ πράγματα. *Animi noſtri a corporis compage ſecreti res viciſſim animi conceptionibus ſignificare poſſent: cum autem corporibus involuti ſint, perinde ac nebulâ, ipſorum intelligendi vis obtegitur: quocirca opus eis fuit nominibus, quibus res inter ſe ſignificarent.* *Ammon.* in Prædicam. p. 18. a.

(*d*) *Quicquid ſcindi poſſit in differentias ſatis numeroſas, ad notionum varietatem explicandam (modo differentiæ illæ* ſenſui perceptibiles *ſint) fieri poteſt vehiculum cogitationum de homine in hominem.* *Bacon.* de Augm. Scient. VI, 1.

gure and Colour, our Imitation would be Ch. III.
neceſſarily thro' Figure and Colour alſo. Again, as far as they are characterized by Sounds, it would for the ſame reaſon be thro' the Medium of Sounds. The like may be ſaid of all the other Senſes, the Imitation ſtill ſhifting along with the Objects imitated. We ſee then how *complicated* ſuch Imitation would prove.

IF we ſet LANGUAGE therefore, as a *Symbol*, in oppoſition to *ſuch Imitation*; if we reflect on the Simplicity of the one, and the Multiplicity of the other; if we conſider the Eaſe and Speed, with which Words are formed (an Eaſe which knows no trouble or fatigue; and a * Speed, which equals the Progreſs of our very Thoughts) if we oppoſe to this the difficulty and length of Imitations; if we remember that ſome Objects are capable of no Imitations at all, but that all Objects univerſally may be typified by Symbols; we may plainly

* Ἐπεα πτερόεντα—See before, p. 325.

Ch. III. plainly perceive an Answer to the Question here proposed, "Why, in the common intercourse of men with men, "Imitations have been rejected, and "Symbols preferred."

HENCE too we may perceive a Reason, *why there never was a Language, nor indeed can possibly be framed one, to express the Properties and real Essences of things*, as a Mirrour exhibits their Figures and their Colours. For if Language of itself imply nothing more, than *certain Species of Sounds with certain Motions concomitant*; if to some Beings Sound and Motion are no Attributes at all; if to many others, where Attributes, they are no way essential (such as the Murmurs and Wavings of a Tree during a storm) if this be true—it is impossible the Nature of such Beings should be expressed, or the least essential Property be any way imitated, while between *the Medium* and *themselves* there is nothing CONNATURAL (*e*).

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(*e*) See Vol. I. Treatise II. c. 3. p. 70.

IT is true indeed, when *Primitives* were once eſtabliſhed, it was eaſy to follow the Connection and Subordination of Nature, in the juſt deduction of *Derivatives* and *Compounds*. Thus the Sounds, *Water*, and, *Fire*, being once annexed to thoſe two Elements, it was certainly more natural to call Beings participating of the firſt, *Watry*, of the laſt, *Fiery*, than to commute the Terms, and call them by the reverſe. But why, and from what *natural Connections* the Primitives themſelves might not be commuted, it will be found, I believe, difficult to aſſign a Reaſon, as well in the inſtances before us, as in moſt others. We may here alſo ſee the Reaſon, why ALL LANGUAGE IS FOUNDED IN COMPACT, and not in Nature; for ſo are all Symbols, of which Words are a certain Species. Ch. III.

THE Queſtion remains if WORDS are Symbols, then SYMBOLS OF WHAT?—

Ch. III. If it be anſwered, OF THINGS, the Queſtion returns, OF WHAT THINGS?—If it be anſwered, *of the ſeveral Individuals of Senſe, the various particular Beings, which exiſt around us*—to this, it is replied, may be raiſed certain Doubts. In the firſt place every Word will be in fact a *proper Name*. Now if all Words are proper Names, how came Lexicographers, whoſe expreſs buſineſs is to explain Words, either wholly to omit proper Names, or at leaſt to explain them, not from their own Art, but from Hiſtory?

AGAIN, if all *Words* are *proper Names*, then in ſtrictneſs no Word can belong to more than one Individual. But if ſo, then, as *Individuals* are *infinite*, to make a perfect Language, *Words muſt be infinite alſo*. But if infinite, then *incomprehenſible*, and never to be attained by the wiſeſt Men; whoſe labours in Language upon this Hypotheſis would be as idle as that ſtudy of infinite written Symbols, which Miſſion-

Miſſionaries (if they may be credited) attribute to the *Chineſe*. Ch. III.

AGAIN, *if all Words are proper Names*, or (which is the ſame) the Symbols of *Individuals*; it will follow, as Individuals are not only *infinite*, but ever *paſſing*, that the Language of thoſe, who lived ages ago, will be as unknown *now*, as the very Voices of the Speakers. Nay the Language of every Province, of every Town, of every Cottage, muſt be every where different, and every where changing, ſince ſuch is the Nature of *Individuals*, which it follows.

AGAIN, *if all Words are proper Names*, the Symbols of *Individuals*, it will follow that in Language there can be no *general Propoſition*, becauſe upon the Hypotheſis *all Terms are particular*; nor any *Affirmative Propoſition*, becauſe *no one Individual in nature is another*. It remains, there can be no Propoſitions, but *Particular Negatives*.

Ch.III. *tives.* But if ſo, then is Language incapable of communicating *General Affirmative Truths*—If ſo, then of communicating *Demonſtration*—If ſo, then of communicating *Sciences*, which are ſo many Syſtems of Demonſtrations—If ſo, then of communicating *Arts*, which are the Theorems of Science applied practically—If ſo, we ſhall be little better for it either in Speculation or in Practice (*e*). And ſo much for this Hypotheſis; let us now try another.

IF WORDS are not the Symbols of *external Particulars*, it follows of courſe, they muſt be THE SYMBOLS OF OUR IDEAS: For this is evident, if they are not Symbols

(*e*) The whole of *Euclid* (whoſe Elements may be called the baſis of Mathematical Science) is founded upon *general Terms*, and *general Propoſitions*, moſt of which are *affirmative*. So true are thoſe Verſes, however barbarous as to their ſtile,

Syllogizari non eſt ex Particulari,
Neve Negativis, rectè concludere ſi vis.

Symbols of things *without*, they can only be Symbols of ſomething *within*. Ch. III.

HERE then the Queſtion recurs, if SYMBOLS OF IDEAS, then of WHAT IDEAS?—OF SENSIBLE IDEAS.—Be it ſo, and what follows?—Every thing in fact, which has followed already from the ſuppoſition of their being the Symbols of *external Particulars*; and that from this plain and obvious reaſon, becauſe the ſeveral *Ideas*, which *Particulars* imprint, muſt needs be as *infinite* and *mutable*, as they are themſelves.

IF then Words are neither the Symbols of *external Particulars*, nor yet of *particular Ideas*, they can be SYMBOLS of nothing elſe, except of GENERAL IDEAS, becauſe nothing elſe, except theſe, remains.—And what do we mean by GENERAL IDEAS?—We mean SUCH AS ARE COMMON TO MANY INDIVIDUALS; not only to Individuals which exiſt now,

Ch. III. but which exiſted in ages paſt, and will exiſt in ages future; ſuch for example, as the Ideas belonging to the Words, *Man*, *Lion*, *Cedar*.—Admit it, and what follows?—It follows, that *if Words are the Symbols of ſuch general Ideas*, Lexicographers may find employ, though they meddle not with *proper Names*.

It follows that *one Word* may be, not *homonymouſly*, but *truly and eſſentially common to many Particulars*, paſt preſent and future; ſo that however theſe Particulars may be *infinite*, and *ever fleeting*, yet Language notwithſtanding may be *definite* and *ſteady*. But if ſo, then attainable even by ordinary Capacities, without danger of incurring the *Chineſe* Abſurdity *.

Again, it follows that the Language of thoſe, who lived ages ago, as far as it ſtands

* See p. 338, 339.

ſtands *for the ſame general Ideas*, may be as intelligible *now*, as it was *then*. The like may be ſaid of the ſame Language being accommodated to diſtant Regions, and even to diſtant Nations, amidſt all the variety of *ever new* and *ever changing* Objects. Ch. III.

AGAIN, it follows that Language may be expreſſive of *general Truths*; and if ſo, then of Demonſtration, and Sciences, and Arts; and if ſo, become ſubſervient to purpoſes of every kind *(f)*.

Now if it be true, "that none of theſe "things could be aſſerted of Language, "were not Words the Symbols of *general* "*Ideas*—and it be further true, that theſe "things may be all undeniably aſſerted "of Language"—it will follow (and that neceſſarily) that WORDS ARE THE SYMBOLS OF GENERAL IDEAS.

(f) See before Note *(e)*.

Ch. III. AND yet perhaps even here may be an Objection. It may be urged, if Words are the Symbols of *general Ideas*, Language may anſwer well enough the purpoſe of Philoſophers, who reaſon about *general*, and *abſtract* Subjects—but what becomes of the buſineſs of ordinary Life? Life we know is merged in a multitude of *Particulars*, where an Explanation by Language is as requiſite, as in the higheſt Theorems. The Vulgar indeed want it to *no other* End. How then can this End in any reſpect be anſwered, if Language be expreſſive of nothing farther than *general Ideas*?

To this it may be anſwered, that *Arts* ſurely reſpect the buſineſs of ordinary Life; yet ſo far are *general Terms* from being an Obſtacle here, that without them no Art can be *rationally* explained. How for inſtance ſhould the meaſuring Artiſt aſcertain to the Reapers the price of their labours, had not he firſt through *general Terms*

Terms learnt thoſe *general Theorems*, that reſpect the doctrine and practice of Menſuration? Ch. III.

BUT ſuppoſe this not to ſatisfy a perſevering Objector—ſuppoſe him to inſiſt, that, admitting this to be true, *there were ſtill a multitude of occaſions for minute particularizing, of which it was not poſſible for mere Generals to be ſuſceptible*—ſuppoſe, I ſay, ſuch an Objection, what ſhould we anſwer?——*That the Objection was juſt*; that it was neceſſary *to the Perfection and Completion of* LANGUAGE, *that it ſhould be expreſſive of* PARTICULARS, *as well as of* GENERALS. We muſt however add, that its *general* Terms are by far its moſt *excellent* and *eſſential* Part, ſince from theſe it derives "that com-"prehenſive *Univerſality*, that juſt pro-"portion of *Preciſion* and *Permanence*, "without which it could not poſſibly "be either learnt, or underſtood, or ap-"plied to the purpoſes of Reaſoning and

Ch. III. "Science;"—that *particular* Terms have their Utility and End, and that therefore care too has been taken for a ſupply of theſe.

ONE Method of expreſſing Particulars, is that of PROPER NAMES. This is the leaſt artificial, becauſe *proper Names* being in every diſtrict arbitrarily applied, may be unknown to thoſe, who know the Language perfectly well, and can hardly therefore with propriety be conſidered as parts of it. The other and more artificial Method is that of DEFINITIVES or ARTICLES (*g*), whether we aſſume the *pronominal*, or thoſe *more ſtrictly* ſo called. And here we cannot enough admire the exquiſite *Art* of Language, which, *without wandering into infinitude, contrives how to denote things infinite*; that is to ſay in other words, which, by the ſmall Tribe of *Definitives properly applied to general Terms*,

(*g*) See before, p. 72, &c. 233, &c.

Terms, knows how to employ theſe laſt, Ch. III.
tho' in number *finite*, to the accurate expreſſion of *infinite* Particulars.

To explain what has been ſaid by a ſingle example. Let the general Term be MAN. I have occaſion to apply this Term to the denoting of ſome Particular. Let it be required to expreſs this Particular, *as unknown*; I ſay, A *Man—known*; I ſay, THE *Man—indefinite*; ANY *Man—definite*; A CERTAIN *Man—preſent and near*; THIS *Man—preſent and diſtant*; THAT *Man—like to ſome other*; SUCH A *Man—an indefinite Multitude*; MANY *Men—a definite Multitude*; A THOUSAND *Men—the ones of a Multitude, taken throughout*; EVERY *Man—the ſame ones, taken with diſtinction*; EACH *Man—taken in order*; FIRST *Man*, SECOND *Man*, &c.—*the whole Multitude of Particulars taken collectively*; ALL *Men—the Negation of this Multitude*; NO *Man*. But of this we have ſpoken already, when we inquired concerning Definitives.

Ch. III. THE Sum of all is, that WORDS ARE THE SYMBOLS OF IDEAS BOTH GENERAL AND PARTICULAR; YET OF THE GENERAL, PRIMARILY, ESSENTIALLY, AND IMMEDIATELY; OF THE PARTICULAR, ONLY SECONDARILY, ACCIDENTALLY, AND MEDIATELY.

SHOULD it be aſked, "why has Lan-"guage this *double* Capacity?"—May we not aſk, by way of return, Is it not a kind of reciprocal Commerce, or *Intercourſe of our Ideas?* Should it not therefore be framed, ſo as to expreſs *the whole* of our Perception? Now can we call that Perception intire and whole, which implies either INTELLECTION without *Senſation*, or SENSATION without *Intellection?* If not, how ſhould Language explain *the whole* of our Perception, had it not Words to expreſs the Objects, proper to each of the two Faculties?

To

To conclude—As in the preceding Chapter we conſidered Language with a view to its MATTER, ſo here we have conſidered it with a view to its FORM. Its MATTER is recognized, when it is conſidered *as a Voice*; its FORM, as it is *ſignificant of our ſeveral Ideas*; ſo that upon the whole it may be defined—A SYSTEM OF ARTICULATE VOICES, THE SYMBOLS OF OUR IDEAS, BUT OF THOSE PRINCIPALLY, WHICH ARE GENERAL OR UNIVERSAL. Ch. III.

CHAP.

CHAP. IV.

Concerning general or univerſal Ideas.

Ch. IV. MUCH having been ſaid in the preceding Chapter about GENERAL OR UNIVERSAL IDEAS, it may not perhaps be amiſs to inquire, *by what proceſs we come to perceive them*, and *what kind of Beings they are*; ſince the generality of men think ſo meanly of their exiſtence, that they are commonly conſidered, as little better than Shadows. Theſe Sentiments are not unuſual even with the Philoſopher now a days, and that from cauſes much the ſame with thoſe, which influence the Vulgar.

THE VULGAR merged *in Senſe* from their earlieſt Infancy, and never once dreaming any thing to be worthy of purſuit, but what either pampers their Appetite, or fills their Purſe, imagine nothing to

to be *real*, but what may be *taſted*, or *touched*. THE PHILOSOPHER, as to theſe matters being of much the ſame Opinion, in Philoſophy looks no higher, than to *experimental Amuſements*, deeming nothing *Demonſtration*, if it be not made *ocular*. Thus inſtead of aſcending from *Senſe* to *Intellect* (the natural progreſs of all true Learning) he hurries on the contrary into the midſt of Senſe, where he wanders at random without any end, and is loſt in a Labyrinth of infinite Particulars. Hence then the reaſon why the ſublimer parts of *Science*, the Studies of MIND, INTELLECTION, and INTELLIGENT PRINCIPLES, are in a manner neglected; and, as if the Criterion of all Truth were an Alembic or an Air-pump, what cannot be proved by *Experiment*, is deemed no better than *mere Hypotheſis*. Ch. IV.

AND yet it is ſomewhat remarkable, amid the prevalence of ſuch Notions, that there ſhould ſtill remain two Sciences in faſhion,

Ch. IV. faſhion, and theſe having their Certainty of all the leaſt controverted, *which are not in the minuteſt article depending upon Experiment.* By theſe I mean ARITHMETIC, and GEOMETRY (*a*). But to come to our Subject concerning GENERAL IDEAS.

MAN'S

(*a*) The many noble Theorems (ſo uſeful in life, and ſo admirable in themſelves) with which theſe two SCIENCES ſo eminently abound, ariſe originally from PRINCIPLES, THE MOST OBVIOUS IMAGINABLE; Principles, ſo little wanting the pomp and apparatus of EXPERIMENT, that they are *ſelf-evident* to every one, poſſeſſed of common ſenſe. I would not be underſtood, in what I have here ſaid, or may have ſaid elſewhere, to undervalue EXPERIMENT; whoſe importance and utility I freely acknowledge, in the many curious Noſtrums and choice Receipts, with which it has enriched the neceſſary Arts of life. Nay, I go farther—I hold *all juſtifiable Practice in every kind of Subject* to be founded in EXPERIENCE, which is no more than *the reſult of many repeated* EXPERIMENTS. But I muſt add withal, that the man who acts *from Experience alone*, tho' he act ever ſo well, is but an *Empiric* or *Quack*, and that not only in Medicine, but in every other Subject. It is then only that we recognize ART, and that the EMPIRIC quits his name for the more honourable one of ARTIST, when to his EXPERIENCE he adds SCIENCE,

MAN'S FIRST PERCEPTIONS are thoſe of the SENSES, in as much as they commence from his earlieſt Infancy. Theſe Perceptions, if not infinite, are at leaſt *indefinite*, and more *fleeting* and *tranſient*, than the very Objects, which they exhibit, becauſe Ch. IV.

SCIENCE, and is thence enabled to tell us, not only, WHAT *is to be done*, but WHY *it is to be done*; for ART *is a compoſite of Experience and Science*, Experience providing it *Materials*, and Science giving them A FORM.

In the mean time, while EXPERIMENT is thus neceſſary to all PRACTICAL WISDOM, with reſpect to PURE and SPECULATIVE SCIENCE, as we have hinted already, it has not the leaſt to do. For who ever heard of *Logic*, or *Geometry*, or *Arithmetic* being proved *experimentally?* It is indeed by the application of *theſe* that *Experiments* are rendered uſeful; that they are aſſumed into Philoſophy, and in ſome degree made a part of it, being otherwiſe nothing better than puerile amuſements. But that theſe Sciences themſelves ſhould depend upon the Subjects, on which they work, is, as if the Marble were to faſhion the Chizzle, and not the Chizzle the Marble.

Ch. IV. becauſe they not only depend upon the *exiſtence* of thoſe Objects, but becauſe they cannot ſubſiſt, without their *immediate Preſence*. Hence therefore it is, that there can be *no Senſation of either Paſt or Future*, and conſequently had the Soul no other Faculties, than the *Senſes*, it never could acquire the leaſt Idea of TIME (*b*).

BUT happily for us we are not deſerted here. We have in the firſt place a Faculty, called IMAGINATION or FANCY, which however as to its *energies* it may be ſubſequent to Senſe, yet is truly prior to it both in *dignity* and *uſe*. THIS it is which *retains the fleeting Forms of things*, when Things themſelves are gone, and *all Senſation* at an end.

THAT this Faculty, however connected with Senſe, is ſtill perfectly different, may be

(*b*) See before, p. 105. See alſo, p. 112. Note (*f*).

be ſeen from hence. We have an *Imagination* of things, that are gone and extinct; but no ſuch things can be made objects of *Senſation*. We have an eaſy command over the Objects of our *Imagination*, and can call them forth in almoſt what manner we pleaſe; but our *Senſations* are neceſſary, when their Objects are preſent, nor can we controul them, but by removing either the Objects, or ourſelves (*c*). Ch. IV.

As

(*c*) Beſides the diſtinguiſhing of SENSATION from IMAGINATION, there are two other Faculties of the Soul, which from their nearer alliance ought carefully to be diſtinguiſhed from it, and theſe are MNHMH, and ANAMNHΣIΣ, MEMORY, and RECOLLECTION.

When we view ſome *relict* of ſenſation repoſed within us, *without thinking of its riſe, or referring it to any ſenſible Object*, this is PHANSY or IMAGINATION.

When we view ſome ſuch *relict*, and *refer it withal to that ſenſible Object, which in time paſt was its cauſe and original*, this is MEMORY.

Ch. IV. As the Wax would not be adequate to its buſineſs of Signature, had it not a Power to *retain*, as well as to *receive*; the ſame holds of the SOUL, with reſpect to *Senſe* and *Imagination*. SENSE is its *receptive*

Laſtly *the Road, which leads to Memory through a ſeries of Ideas, however connected, whether rationally or caſually*, this is RECOLLECTION. I have added *caſually*, as well as *rationally*, becauſe a caſual connection is often ſufficient. Thus from ſeeing a Garment, I think of its Owner; thence of his Habitation; thence of Woods; thence of Timber; thence of Ships, Sea-fights, Admirals, &c.

If the Diſtinction between *Memory* and *Phanſy* be not ſufficiently underſtood, it may be illuſtrated by being compared to the view of a Portrait. When we contemplate a Portrait, *without thinking of whom it is the Portrait*, ſuch Contemplation is analogous to PHANSY. When we view it *with reference to the Original, whom it repreſents*, ſuch Contemplation is analogous to MEMORY.

We may go farther. IMAGINATION or PHANSY may exhibit (after a manner) even *things that are to come*. It is here that *Hope* and *Fear* paint all their pleaſant, and all their painful Pictures of *Futurity*. But MEMORY is confined in the ſtricteſt manner *to the paſt*.

What

ceptive Power; IMAGINATION, its *re-* Ch. IV.
tentive. Had it Senſe without Imagination, it would not be as Wax, but as Water, where tho' all Impreſſions may be inſtantly made, yet as ſoon as made they are as inſtantly loſt.

THUS then, from a view of the two Powers taken together, we may call SENSE (if we pleaſe) *a kind of tranſient Imagination*; and IMAGINATION on the contrary *a kind of permanent Senſe* (*d*).

Now

What we have ſaid, may ſuffice for our preſent purpoſe. He that would learn more, may conſult *Ariſtot. de Animâ*, L. III. c. 3, 4. and his Treatiſe *de Mem. et Reminiſc.*

(*d*) Τί τοίνυν ἐςὶν ἡ φανλασία ὧδε ἂν γνωρίσαιμεν· δεῖ νοεῖν ἐν ἡμῖν ἀπὸ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν τῶν περὶ τὰ αἰσθητὰ, ὅιον τύπλον (*lege* τύπον) τινὰ καὶ ἀναζωγράφημα ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ αἰσθητηρίῳ, ἐγκατάλειμμά τι τῆς ὑπὸ τῆ αἰσθήσῃ γινομένης κινήσεως, ὃ καὶ μηκέτι τῆ αἰσθητῆ παρόντος, ὑπομένει τὲ καὶ σώζεται, ὃν ὥσπερ εἰκών τις

Ch. IV. Now as our Feet in vain venture to walk upon the River, till the Froſt bind the Current, and harden the yielding Surface; ſo does the SOUL in vain ſeek to exert its higher Powers, the Powers I mean of REASON and INTELLECT, till IMAGINATION firſt fix the *fluency* of SENSE, and thus provide a proper Baſis for the ſupport of its higher Energies.

AFTER

αὐτῆ, ὃ καὶ τῆς μνήμης ἡμῖν σωζόμενον ἄϊλιον γίνεται· τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐγκατάλειμμα, καὶ τὸν τοιοῦτον ὥσπερ τύπον, ΦΑΝΤΑΣΙΑΝ καλοῦσιν. *Now what* PHANSY *or* IMAGINATION *is, we may explain as follows. We may conceive to be formed within us, from the operations of our Senſes about ſenſible Subjects, ſome Impreſſion (as it were) or Picture in our original Senſorium, being a relict of that motion cauſed within us by the external object; a relict, which when the external object is no longer preſent, remains and is ſtill preſerved, being as it were its Image, and which, by being thus preſerved, becomes the cauſe of our having Memory. Now ſuch a ſort of relict and (as it were) Impreſſion they call* PHANSY *or* IMAGINATION. *Alex. Aphrod. de Animâ*, p. 135. b. *Edit. Ald.*

AFTER this manner, in the admirable Oeconomy of the Whole, are Natures ſubordinate made ſubſervient to the higher. Were there *no Things external, the Senſes* could not operate; were there *no Senſations, the Imagination* could not operate; and were there *no Imagination*, there could be *neither Reaſoning* nor *Intellection*, ſuch at leaſt as they are found in *Man*, where they have their Intenſions and Remiſſions in alternate ſucceſſion, and are at firſt nothing better, than *a mere* CAPACITY *or* POWER. Whether every Intellect begins thus, may be perhaps a queſtion; eſpecially if there be any one of a nature *more divine*, to which "Intenſion and Remiſſion and mere Capacity "are unknown (*e*)." But not to digreſs. Ch. IV.

IT

(*e*) See p. 162. The *Life, Energy*, or Manner of MAN's Exiſtence is not a little different from that of the DEITY. THE LIFE OF MAN has its Eſſence in

Ch. IV. IT is then on theſe *permanent* Phantaſms that THE HUMAN MIND firſt works, and by

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MOTION. This is not only true with reſpect to that lower and ſubordinate Life, which he ſhares in common with Vegetables, and which can no longer ſubſiſt than while the Fluids circulate, but it is likewiſe true in that *Life*, which is peculiar to him as *Man*. Objects from without *firſt move* our faculties, and thence we move *of ourſelves* either to *Practice* or *Contemplation*. But the LIFE or EXISTENCE of GOD (as far as we can conjecture upon ſo tranſcendent a Subject) is not only complete throughout Eternity, but complete in every Inſtant, and is for that reaſon IMMUTABLE and SUPERIOR TO ALL MOTION.

It is to this diſtinction that *Ariſtotle* alludes, when he tells us—Οὐ γὰρ μόνον κινήσεώς ἐστιν ἐνέργεια, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀκινησίας· καὶ ἡδονὴ μᾶλλον ἐν ἠρεμίᾳ ἐστὶν, ἢ ἐν κινήσει· μεταβολὴ δὲ πάντων γλυκύ, κατὰ τὸν ποιητὴν, διὰ πονηρίαν τινά· ὥσπερ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος εὐμετάβολος ὁ πονηρὸς, καὶ ἡ φύσις ἡ δεομένη μεταβολῆς· ἁ γὰρ ἁπλῆ, οὐδ' ἐπιεικής. *For there is not only an Energy of* MOTION, *but of* IMMOBILITY; *and* PLEASURE *or* FELICITY *exiſts rather in* REST *than in* MOTION; *Change of all things being ſweet (according to the Poet) from a principle of Pravity in thoſe who believe ſo. For*

by an Energy as ſpontaneous and familiar to its Nature, as the ſeeing of Colour is familiar to the Eye, it diſcerns at once what Ch. IV.

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in the ſame manner as the bad man is one fickle and changeable, ſo is that Nature bad that requireth Variety, in as much as ſuch Nature is neither ſimple nor even. Eth. Nicom. VII. 14. & Ethic. Eudem. VI. *ſub. fin.*

It is to this UNALTERABLE NATURE OF THE DEITY that *Boethius* refers, when he ſays in thoſe elegant verſes,

———*Tempus ab Ævo*
Ire jubes STABILISQUE MANENS *das cuncta moveri.*

From this ſingle principle of IMMOBILITY, may be derived ſome of the nobleſt of the *Divine Attributes*; ſuch as that of IMPASSIVE, INCORRUPTIBLE, INCORPOREAL, &c. Vide *Ariſtot.* Phyſic. VIII. Metaphyſ. XIV. c. 6, 7, 9. 10. Edit. *Du Val.* See alſo Vol. I. of theſe Treatiſes, p. 262 to 266—alſo p. 295, where the Verſes of *Boethius* are quoted at length.

It muſt be remembered however, that tho' we are not *Gods*, yet as *rational* Beings we have within us ſomething *Divine*, and that the more we can become ſuperior to our mutable, variable, and irrational part, and place our welfare in that Good, which is immutable, per-

Ch. IV. what in MANY is ONE; what in things DISSIMILAR and DIFFERENT is SIMILAR and the SAME *(f)*. By this it comes to behold

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permanent, and rational, the higher we ſhall advance in real Happineſs and Wiſdom. This is (as an antient writer ſays)—Ὁμοίωσις τῷ Θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν, *the becoming like to* GOD, *as far as in our power.* Τοῖς μὲν γὰρ θεοῖς πᾶς ὁ βίος μακάριος· τοῖς δ' ἀνθρώποις, ἐφ' ὅσον ὁμοίωμά τι τῆς τοιαύτης ἐνεργείας ὑπάρχει. *For to* THE GODS (as ſays another antient) *the whole of life is one continued happineſs; but to* MEN, *it is ſo far happy, as it riſes to the reſemblance of ſo divine an Energy.* See *Plat.* in Theætet. *Ariſt.* Eth. X. 8.

(f) This CONNECTIVE ACT of the Soul, by which it views ONE IN MANY, is perhaps one of the principal Acts of its moſt excellent Part. It is this removes that impenetrable miſt, which renders *Objects of Intelligence* inviſible to lower faculties. Were it not for this, even the *ſenſible* World (with the help of all our Senſations) would appear as unconnected, as the words of an Index. It is certainly not the Figure alone, nor the Touch alone, nor the Odour alone, that makes the Roſe, but it is made up of all theſe, and other attributes UNITED; not an *unknown* Conſtitution of *inſenſible* Parts, but a *known* Conſtitution of *ſenſible* Parts, unleſs we chuſe to extirpate the poſſibility of natural Knowledge.

behold a kind of *ſuperior* Objects; a new Race of Perceptions, more comprehenſive than Ch. IV.

WHAT then perceives this CONSTITUTION or UNION?—Can it be any of the Senſes?—No one of theſe, we know, can paſs the limits of its own province. Were the Smell to perceive the union of the Odour and the Figure, it would not only be Smell, but it would be Sight alſo. It is the ſame in other inſtances. We muſt neceſſarily therefore recur to ſome HIGHER COLLECTIVE POWER, to give us a proſpect of Nature, even in theſe her *ſubordinate Wholes*, much more in that *comprehenſive Whole*, whoſe Sympathy is univerſal, and of which theſe ſmaller Wholes are all no more than Parts.

But no where is this *collecting*, and (if I may be allowed the expreſſion) this *unifying* Power more conſpicuous, than in the ſubjects of PURE TRUTH. By virtue of this power the Mind views *One general Idea*, in *many Individuals*; *One Propoſition* in *many general Ideas*; *One Syllogiſm* in *many Propoſitions*; till at length, by properly repeating and connecting Syllogiſm with Syllogiſm, it aſcend into thoſe bright and *ſteady regions of* SCIENCE,

Quas neque concutiunt venti, neque nubila nimbis
Adſpergunt, &c. Lucr.

Even

Ch. IV. than thoſe of Senſe; a Race of Perceptions, *each one of which may be found intire and*

Even *negative* Truths and *negative* Concluſions cannot ſubſiſt, but by bringing Terms and Propoſitions together, ſo *neceſſary is this* UNITING *Power to every Species of* KNOWLEDGE. See p. 3. 250.

He that would better comprehend the diſtinction between SENSITIVE PERCEPTION, and INTELLECTIVE, may obſerve that, when a Truth is ſpoken, it is *heard* by our Ears, and *underſtood* by our Minds. That theſe two Acts are different, is plain, from the example of ſuch, as *hear* the ſounds, without *knowing* the language. But to ſhew their difference ſtill ſtronger, let us ſuppoſe them to concur in the ſame Man, who ſhall both *hear* and *underſtand* the Truth propoſed. Let the Truth be for example, *The Angles of a Triangle are equal to two right Angles.* That this is ONE Truth, and not *two* or *many* Truths, I believe none will deny. Let me aſk then, in what manner does this Truth become perceptible (if at all) to SENSATION?—The Anſwer is obvious; it is by ſucceſſive Portions of little and little at a time. When the firſt Word is *preſent*, all the ſubſequent are *abſent*; when the laſt Word is *preſent*, all the previous are *abſent*; when any of the middle Words are *preſent*, then are there ſome *abſent*, as well of one ſort as the other. No more exiſts at once than a ſingle Syllable, and the Remainder as much *is not*, (to Senſation at leaſt) as tho'

and whole in the ſeparate individuals of an infinite and fleeting Multitude, without departing Ch. IV.

tho' it never had been, or never was to be. And ſo much for the perception of SENSE, than which we ſee nothing can be more *diſſipated*, *fleeting*, and *detached*. —And is that of the MIND ſimilar?—Admit it, and what follows?—It follows, that *one* Mind would no more recognize *one* Truth, by recognizing its Terms *ſucceſſively* and *apart*, than *many* diſtant Minds would recognize it, were it diſtributed among them, a different part to each. The caſe is, every TRUTH is ONE, tho' its TERMS are MANY. It is in no reſpect true *by parts at a time*, but it is true of neceſſity at *once* and *in an inſtant*.—What Powers therefore recognize this ONENESS or UNITY?—Where even does it reſide, or what makes it?—Shall we anſwer with the *Stagirite*, Τὸ δὲ ΕΝ ΠΟΙΟΥΝ τοῦτο ὁ ΝΟΥΣ ἕκαστον—If this be allowed, it ſhould ſeem, where SENSATION and INTELLECTION appear to concur, that Senſation was of MANY, Intellection was of ONE; that Senſation was *temporary*, *diviſible* and *ſucceſſive*; Intellection, *inſtantaneous*, *indiviſible*, and *at once*.

If we conſider the Radii of a Circle, we ſhall find at the Circumference that they are MANY; at the Center that they are ONE. Let us then ſuppoſe SENSE and MIND to view the ſame Radii, only let Senſe view them at the *Circumference*, Mind at the *Center*; and

 parting from the unity and permanence of its own nature.

AND

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and hence we may conceive, how theſe Powers differ, even where they jointly appear to operate in perception of the ſame object.

There is ANOTHER ACT OF THE MIND, the very reverſe of that here mentioned; an Act, by which it perceives not *one in many*, but MANY IN ONE. This is that *mental Separation*, of which we have given ſome account in the firſt Chapter of this Book; that Reſolution or Analyſis which enables us *to inveſtigate the Cauſes, and Principles, and Elements of things*. It is by Virtue of this, that we are enabled to abſtract any particular Attribute, and make it *by itſelf* the Subject of philoſophical Contemplation. Were it not for this, it would be difficult for *particular Sciences* to exiſt; becauſe otherwiſe they would be as much blended, as the ſeveral Attributes of ſenſible Subſtances. How, for example, could there be ſuch a Science as *Optics*, were we neceſſitated to contemplate *Colour concreted with Figure*, two Attributes, which the Eye can never view, but aſſociated? I mention not a multitude of other ſenſible qualities, ſome of which ſtill preſent themſelves, whenever we look on any *coloured* Body.

Thoſe

AND thus we ſee the *Proceſs by which we arrive at* GENERAL IDEAS; for the Per- Ch. IV.

Thoſe two noble Sciences, ARITHMETIC and GEOMETRY, would have no Baſis to ſtand on, were it not for this *ſeparative* Power. They are both converſant about QUANTITY; *Geometry* about CONTINUOUS Quantity, *Arithmetic* about DISCRETE. EXTENSION is eſſential to *continuous* Quantity; MONADS, or UNITS, to *Diſcrete*. By ſeparating from the infinite Individuals, with which we are ſurrounded, thoſe infinite Accidents, by which they are all *diverſified*, we leave nothing but thoſe SIMPLE and PERFECTLY SIMILAR UNITS, which being combined make NUMBER, and are the Subject of ARITHMETIC. Again, by ſeparating from *Body* every poſſible ſubordinate Accident, and leaving it nothing but its *triple Extenſion of Length, Breadth, and Thickneſs*, (of which were it to be deprived, it would be *Body* no longer) we arrive at that pure and unmixed MAGNITUDE, the contemplation of whoſe properties makes the Science of *Geometry*.

By the ſame *analytical* or *ſeparative* Power, we inveſtigate DEFINITIONS of all kinds, each one of which is *a developed Word*, as the ſame Word is *an inveloped Definition*.

To conclude—IN COMPOSITION AND DIVISION CONSISTS THE WHOLE OF SCIENCE, COMPOSITION

Ch. IV. Perceptions here mentioned are in fact no other. In theſe too we perceive the objects of SCIENCE and REAL KNOWLEDGE, which can by no means be, but *of that which is general, and definite, and fixt* (*g*). Here

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TION MAKING AFFIRMATIVE TRUTH, AND SHEWING US THINGS UNDER THEIR SIMILARITIES AND IDENTITIES; DIVISION MAKING NEGATIVE TRUTH, AND PRESENTING THEM TO US UNDER THEIR DISSIMILARITIES AND DIVERSITIES.

And here, by the way, there occurs a Queſtion.—If all Wiſdom be Science, and it be the buſineſs of Science as well to *compound* as to *ſeparate*, may we not ſay that thoſe Philoſophers took *Half* of Wiſdom for the *Whole*, who diſtinguiſhed it from Wit, as if WISDOM only *ſeparated*, and WIT only *brought together?*—Yet ſo held the Philoſopher of *Malmſbury*, and the Author *of the Eſſay on the Human Underſtanding*.

(*g*) The very Etymologies of the Words ΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΗ, SCIENTIA, and UNDERSTANDING, may ſerve in ſome degree to ſhew the nature of theſe Faculties, as well as of thoſe Beings, their true and proper Objects. ΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΗ ὠνόμαϛαι, διὰ τὸ ΕΠΙ ΣΤΑΣΙΝ ϰ᾽ ὅρον τῶν πραγμάτων ἄγειν ἡμᾶς, τῆϛ

Here too even *Individuals*, however of themſelves unknowable, become objects of Knowledge, Ch. IV.

τῆς ἀοριςίας καὶ μεταβολῆς τῶν ἐπὶ μέρες ἀπάγεσα· ἡ γὰρ ἐπιςήμη περὶ τὰ καθόλε καὶ ἀμετάπ[ω]τα καταγίνεται· SCIENCE (ΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΗ) *has its name from bringing us* (ΕΠΙ ΣΤΑΣΙΝ) TO SOME STOP *and* BOUNDARY *of things, taking us away from the unbounded nature and mutability of Particulars; for it is converſant about Subjects, that are general, and invariable.* Niceph. Blem. Epit. Logic. p. 21.

This Etymology given by *Blemmides*, and long before him adopted by the *Peripatetics*, came originally from *Plato*, as may be ſeen in the following account of it from his *Cratylus*. In this Dialogue *Socrates*, having firſt (according to the *Heraclitean* Philoſophy, which *Cratylus* favoured) etymologized a multitude of Words with a view to that *Flow* and *uncleaſing Mutation*, ſuppoſed by *Heraclitus* to run thro' all things, at length changes his Syſtem, and begins to etymologize from another, which ſuppoſed ſomething in nature to be *permanent* and *fixed*. On this principle he thus proceeds —Σκοπῶμεν δή, ἐξ αὐτῶν ἀναλαβόντες πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα τὴν ΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΗΝ, ὡς ἀμφιβόλον ἐσι, καὶ μᾶλλον ἔοικε σημαίνον τι ὅτι ΙΣΤΗΣΙΝ ἡμῶν ΕΠΙ τοῖς πράγμασι τὴν ψυχὴν, ἢ ὅτι συμπεριφέρεται. *Let us conſider then* (ſays he) *ſome of the very*

Ch. IV. Knowledge, as far as their nature will permit. For then only may *any Particular* be

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Words already examined; *and in the firſt place, the Word* SCIENCE; *how diſputable is this* (as to its former Etymology) *how much more naturally does it appear to ſignify, that* IT STOPS THE SOUL AT THINGS, *than that it is carried about with them.* Plat. Cratyl. p. 437. Edit. Serr.

The diſputable Etymology, to which he here alludes, was a ſtrange one of his own making in the former part of the Dialogue, adapted to the *flowing* Syſtem of *Heraclitus* there mentioned. According to this notion, he had derived ΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΗ from ἕπεσθαι and μένειν, as if it *kept along* with things, by perpetually *following* them in their motions. See *Plato* as before, p. 412.

As to SCIENTIA, we are indebted to *Scaliger* for the following ingenious Etymology. RATIOCINATIO, *motus quidam eſt:* SCIENTIA, *quies: unde et nomen, tum apud Græcos, tum etiam noſtrum.* Παρὰ τὸ ΕΠΙ ΙΣΤΑΣΘΑΙ, ΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΗ. *Siſtitur enim mentis agitatio, et fit ſpecies in animo. Sic Latinum* SCIENTIA, ὅτι γίνεται ΣΧΕΣΙΣ ΤΟΥ ΟΝΤΟΣ. *Nam Latini, quod nomen entis ſimplex ab uſu abjecerunt atque repudiarunt, omnibus activis participiis idem adjunxerunt. Audiens,* ἀκούων ὤν. *Sciens,* χῶν ὤν. *Scal.* in Theophr. de Cauſis Plant. Lib. I. p. 17.

be ſaid to be known, when by aſſerting it Ch. IV.
to be *a Man*, or *an Animal*, or the like, we

The *Engliſh* Word, UNDERSTANDING, means not ſo properly *Knowledge*, as that *Faculty of the Soul*, where Knowledge reſides. Why may we not then imagine, that the framers of this Word intended to repreſent it as a kind of firm *Baſis*, on which the fair Structure of Sciences was to reſt, and which was ſuppoſed to STAND UNDER them, as their immoveable Support?

Whatever may be ſaid of theſe Etymologies, whether they are true or falſe, they at leaſt prove their Authors to have conſidered SCIENCE and UNDERSTANDING, not as *fleeting* powers of Perception, like *Senſe*, but rather as *ſteady*, *permanent*, and *durable* COMPREHENSIONS. But if ſo, we muſt ſomewhere or other find for them certain *ſteady*, *permanent*, and *durable* OBJECTS; ſince if PERCEPTION OF ANY KIND BE DIFFERENT FROM THE THING PERCEIVED, (whether it perceive ſtraight as crooked, or crooked as ſtraight; the moving as fixed, or the fixed as moving) SUCH PERCEPTION MUST OF NECESSITY BE ERRONEOUS AND FALSE. The following paſſage from a *Greek Platonic* (whom we ſhall quote again hereafter) ſeems on the preſent occaſion not without its weight—Εἰ ἐςὶ γνῶσις ἀκριβεςέρα τῆς αἰσθήσεως, εἴη ἂν καὶ γνωςὰ ἀληθεςέρα τῶν αἰσθητῶν. *If there be*

Ch.IV. we refer it to ſome ſuch *comprehenſive*, or *general Idea*.

Now it is of theſe COMPREHENSIVE and PERMANENT IDEAS, THE GENUINE PERCEPTIONS OF PURE MIND, that WORDS of all Languages, however different, are the SYMBOLS. And hence it is, that *as the* PERCEPTIONS *include, ſo do theſe their* SYMBOLS

A KNOWLEDGE *more accurate than* SENSATION; *there muſt be certain* OBJECTS *of ſuch knowledge* MORE TRUE THAN OBJECTS OF SENSE.

The following then are Queſtions worth conſidering,—*What* theſe Objects are?—*Where* they reſide?—And *how* they are to be diſcovered?—Not by *experimental Philoſophy* it is plain; for that meddles with nothing, but what is tangible, corporeal, and mutable—nor even by the more refined and rational ſpeculation of *Mathematics*; for this, at its very commencement, takes ſuch Objects for granted. We can only add, that *if they reſide in our own* MINDS, (and who, that has never looked there, can affirm they do not?) then will the advice of the Satiriſt be no ways improper,

——NEC TE QUÆSIVERIS EXTRA.

Perſ.

SYMBOLS *expreſs, not this or that ſet of Particulars only, but all indifferently, as they happen to occur.* Were therefore the Inhabitants of *Saliſbury* to be transferred to *York*, tho' new particular objects would appear on every ſide, they would ſtill no more want a new Language to explain themſelves, than they would want new Minds to comprehend what they beheld. All indeed, that they would want, would be the *local proper Names*; which Names, as we have ſaid already*, are hardly a part of Language, but muſt equally be learnt both by learned and unlearned, as often as they change the place of their abode. Ch. IV.

IT is upon the ſame principles we may perceive the reaſon, why the dead Languages (as we call them) are *now* intelligible; and why the Language of *modern England* is able to deſcribe *antient Rome*;

* Sup. p. 345, 346.

Ch. IV. and that of *antient Rome* to deſcribe *modern England* (*b*). But of theſe matters we have ſpoken before.

§ 2. AND now having viewed *the Proceſs, by which we acquire general Ideas*, let us begin anew from other Principles, and try to diſcover (if we can prove ſo fortunate) *whence it is that theſe Ideas originally come*. If we can ſucceed here, we may diſcern perhaps, *what kind of Beings they are*, for this at preſent appears ſomewhat obſcure.

LET

(*b*) As far as *Human Nature*, and *the primary Genera* both of *Subſtance* and *Accident* are *the ſame* in all places, and have been ſo thro' all ages: ſo far *all Languages* ſhare one common IDENTITY. As far as *peculiar ſpecies of Subſtance* occur in different regions; and much more, as far as *the poſitive Inſtitutions of religious and civil Politics are every where different*; ſo far each *Language* has its peculiar DIVERSITY. To the Cauſes of *Diverſity* here mentioned, may be added *the diſtinguiſhing Character and Genius of every Nation*, concerning which we ſhall ſpeak hereafter.

LET us ſuppoſe any man to look for the firſt time upon *ſome Work of Art*, as for example upon a Clock, and having ſufficiently viewed it, at length to depart. Would he not retain, when abſent, an Idea of what he had ſeen?—And what is it, *to retain ſuch Idea?—It is to have* A FORM INTERNAL *correſpondent to* THE EXTERNAL; only with this difference, that the *Internal Form is devoid of the Matter; the External is united with it*, being ſeen in the metal, the wood, and the like. Ch. IV.

Now if we ſuppoſe this Spectator to view *many ſuch Machines*, and not ſimply to view, but to conſider every part of them, ſo as to comprehend how theſe parts all operate to one End, he might be then ſaid to poſſeſs a kind of INTELLIGIBLE FORM, by which he would not only underſtand, and know the Clocks, which he had ſeen *already*, but every Work alſo of like Sort, which he might ſee *hereafter*.—

Ch. IV. Should it be aſked "*which of theſe Forms* "*is prior, the External and Senſible, or* "*the Internal and Intelligible*;" the Anſwer is obvious, that *the prior is the Senſible.*

THUS then we ſee, THERE ARE INTELLIGIBLE FORMS, WHICH TO THE SENSIBLE ARE SUBSEQUENT.

BUT farther ſtill—If theſe Machines be allowed the Work *not of Chance*, but of *an Artiſt*, they muſt be the Work of one, who *knew what he was about*. And what is it, *to work, and know what one is about?* —*It is to have an Idea of what one is doing; to poſſeſs* A FORM INTERNAL, *correſponding to the* EXTERNAL, *to which external it ſerves for an* EXEMPLAR *or* ARCHETYPE.

HERE then we have AN INTELLIGIBLE FORM, WHICH IS PRIOR TO THE SENSIBLE FORM; *which, being truly prior as*

as well in dignity as in time, can no more become ſubſequent, than Cauſe can to Effect. Ch. IV.

THUS then, with reſpect to Works of ART, we may perceive, if we attend, A TRIPLE ORDER OF FORMS; *one* Order, *intelligible* and *previous* to theſe Works; a *ſecond* Order, *ſenſible* and *concomitant*; and a *third* again, *intelligible* and *ſubſequent*. After the firſt of theſe Orders the Maker may be ſaid to *work*; thro' the ſecond, the Works themſelves *exiſt*, and are what they are; and in the third they become *recognized, as mere Objects of Contemplation*. To make theſe Forms by different Names more eaſy to be underſtood; *the firſt* may be called THE MAKER'S FORM; *the ſecond*, that of THE SUBJECT; and the *third*, that of THE CONTEMPLATOR.

LET us paſs from hence to Works of NATURE. Let us imagine ourſelves viewing ſome diverſified Proſpect; "a "Plain, for example, ſpacious and fer-

Ch.IV. "tile; a river winding thro' it; by the "banks of that river, men walking and "cattle grazing; the view terminated "with diſtant hills, ſome craggy, and "ſome covered with wood." Here it is plain we have plenty of FORMS NATURAL. And could any one quit ſo fair a Sight, and retain no traces of what he had beheld?—And what is it, *to retain traces of what one has beheld?*—It is to have certain FORMS INTERNAL correſpondent to the EXTERNAL, and reſembling them in every thing, *except the being merged in Matter.* And thus, thro' the ſame *retentive* and *collective* Powers, the Mind becomes fraught with *Forms natural*, as before with *Forms artificial.*—Should it be aſked, "*which of theſe natu-*"*ral Forms are prior, the External ones* "*viewed by the Senſes, or the Internal ex-*"*iſting in the Mind?*" the Anſwer is obvious, that *the prior are the External.*

THUS

THUS therefore in NATURE, as well as in ART, THERE ARE INTELLIGIBLE FORMS, WHICH TO THE SENSIBLE ARE SUBSEQUENT. Hence then we ſee the meaning of that noted School Axiom, *Nil eſt in* INTELLECTU *quod non prius fuit in* SENSU; an Axiom, which we muſt own to be ſo far allowable, as it reſpects the Ideas *of a mere Contemplator*. Ch. IV.

BUT to proceed ſomewhat farther—Are *natural* Productions made BY CHANCE, or BY DESIGN?—Let us admit *by Deſign*, not to lengthen our inquiry. They are certainly * more exquiſite than *any* Works of ART, and yet *theſe* we cannot bring ourſelves to ſuppoſe made by *Chance*.—Admit it, and what follows?—*We muſt of neceſſity admit a* MIND *alſo, becauſe* DESIGN *implies* MIND, *wherever it is to be found*.—Allowing therefore this, what do we mean

* *Ariſt. de Part. Animal.* L. I. c. 1.

Ch. IV. mean by the Term, MIND?—We mean *ſomething, which, when it acts, knows what it is going to do; ſomething ſtored with Ideas of its intended Works, agreeably to which Ideas thoſe Works are faſhioned.*

THAT ſuch EXEMPLARS, PATTERNS, FORMS, IDEAS (call them as you pleaſe) muſt *of neceſſity* be, requires no proving, but follows of courſe, if we admit the Cauſe of Nature to be A MIND, as above mentioned. For take away theſe, and *what a Mind* do we leave without them? CHANCE ſurely is as knowing, as MIND WITHOUT IDEAS; or rather MIND WITHOUT IDEAS is no leſs blind than CHANCE.

THE Nature of theſe IDEAS is not difficult to explain, if we once come to allow a poſſibility of their Exiſtence. That they are exquiſitely *beautiful, various,* and *orderly,* is evident from the exquiſite Beauty, Variety, and Order, ſeen in natural Subſtances,

ſtances, which are but their *Copies* or *Pictures*. That they are *mental* is plain, *as they are of the Eſſence of* MIND, and conſequently no Objects to any of the *Senſes*, nor therefore circumſcribed either by *Time* or *Place*. Ch. IV.

HERE then, on this Syſtem, we have plenty of FORMS INTELLIGIBLE, WHICH ARE TRULY PREVIOUS TO ALL FORMS SENSIBLE. Here too we ſee that NATURE is not defective in her TRIPLE ORDER, having (like Art) her FORMS PREVIOUS, HER CONCOMITANT, and HER SUBSEQUENT (*i*).

THAT

(*i*) *Simplicius*, in his commentary upon the Predicaments, calls the *firſt* Order of theſe intelligible Forms, τὰ πρὸ τῆς μεθέξεως, *thoſe previous to Participation*, and at other times, ἡ ἐξηρημένη κοινότης, *the tranſcendent Univerſality* or *Sameneſs*; the *ſecond* Order he calls τὰ ἐν μεθέξει, *thoſe which exiſt in Participation*, that is, thoſe merged in Matter; and at other times, he calls them ἡ κατατεταγμένη κοινότης, *the ſubordinate Univerſality* or *Sameneſs*; laſtly, of the *third* Order he ſays, that

Ch. IV. THAT *the Previous* may be *juſtly* ſo called is plain, becauſe they are *eſſentially prior*

that they have no independent exiſtence of their own, but that—ἡμεῖς ἀφελόντες αὐτὰ ἐν ταῖς ἡμετέραις ἐννοίαις, καθ' ἑαυτὰ ὑπεςήσαμεν, *we ourſelves abſtracting them in our own Imaginations, have given them by ſuch abſtraction an exiſtence as of themſelves.* *Simp.* in Prædic. p. 17. In another place he ſays, in a language ſomewhat myſterious, yet ſtill conformable to the ſame doctrine—Μήποτε ἔν τριτ[ὸν λητ[έον τὸ κοινὸν, τὸ μὲν ἐξηρημένον τῶν καθ' ἕκαςα, καὶ αἴτιον τῆς ἐν αὐτοῖς κοινότητος, κατὰ τὴν μίαν ἑαυτῆ φύσιν, ὥσπερ καὶ τῆς διαφορότητος κατὰ τὴν ϖολυειδῆ ϖρόληψιν—δεύτερον δὲ ἐςι τὸ κοινὸν, τὸ ἀπὸ κοινῆ αἰτίᾳ τοῖς διαφόροις ἐιδεσιν ἐνδιδόμενον, καὶ ἐνυπάρχον αὐτοῖς—τρίτον δὲ, τὸ ἐν ταῖς ἡμετέραις διανοίαις ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως ὑφις́άμενον, ὑς́ερογενὲς ὄν—*Perhaps therefore we muſt admit a* TRIPLE ORDER OF WHAT IS UNIVERSAL AND THE SAME; *that of the firſt Order, tranſcendent and ſuperior to Particulars, which thro' its uniform nature is the cauſe of that Samencſs exiſting in them, as thro' its multiform pre-conception it is the cauſe of their Diverſity—that of the ſecond Order, what is infuſed from the firſt univerſal Cauſe into the various Species of Beings, and which has its exiſtence in thoſe ſeveral Species—that of the third Order, what ſubſiſts by abſtraction in our own Underſtandings, being of ſubſequent origin to the other two.* Ibid. p. 21.

To

prior to all things elſe. The WHOLE VISIBLE WORLD exhibits nothing more, than ſo

Ch. IV.

To *Simplicius* we ſhall add the two following Quotations from *Ammonius* and *Nicephorus Blemmides*, which we have ventured to tranſcribe, without regard to their uncommon length, as they ſo fully eſtabliſh the Doctrine here advanced, and the works of theſe Authors are not eaſy to be procured.

Ἐννοείσθω τοίνυν δακτύλιός τις ἐκτύπωμα ἔχων, εἰ τύχοι, Ἀχιλλέως, καὶ κηρία πολλὰ παρακείμενα· ὁ δὲ δακτύλιος σφραγιζέτω τὰς κηρὰς πάντας· ὕστερον δέ τις εἰσελθὼν καὶ θεασάμενος τὰ κηρία, ἐπισήσας ὅτι πάντα ἐξ ἑνός εἰσιν ἐκτυπώματος, ἐχέτω παρ' αὐτῷ τὸ ἐκτύπωμα τῇ διανοίᾳ. Ἡ τοίνυν σφραγὶς ἡ ἐν τῷ δακτυλίῳ λέγεται ΠΡΟ ΤΩΝ ΠΟΛΛΩΝ εἶναι, ἡ δὲ ἐν τοῖς κηρίοις, ΕΝ ΤΟΙΣ ΠΟΛΛΟΙΣ· ἡ δὲ ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ τὸ ἀπομαξαμένη, ΕΠΙ ΤΟΙΣ ΠΟΛΛΟΙΣ, καὶ ὑστερογενής. Τοῦτο οὖν ἐννοείσθω καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν γενῶν καὶ εἰδῶν· ὁ γὰρ Δημιουργὸς, ποιῶν πάντα, ἔχει παρ' ἑαυτῷ τὰ πάντων παραδείγματα· οἷον, ποιῶν ἄνθρωπον, ἔχει τὸ εἶδος παρ' ἑαυτῷ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, πρὸς ὃ ἀφορῶν, πάντας ποιεῖ. Εἰ δέ τις ἐνσταίη λέγων, ὡς οὐκ εἰσὶ παρὰ τῷ Δημιουργῷ τὰ εἴδη, ἀκουέτω ταῦτα, ὡς ὁ Δημιουργὸς δημιουργεῖ, ἢ εἰδὼς τὰ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ δημιουργούμενα, ἢ οὐκ εἰδώς. Ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν μὴ εἰδὼς, οὐκ ἂν δημιουργήσει. Τίς γὰρ, μέλλων ποιήσειν τι, ἀγνοεῖ ὃ μέλλει

Ch. IV. ſo many *paſſing* Pictures of theſe *immutable Archetypes*. Nay thro' theſe it attains even a Sem-

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μέλλει ποιεῖν; ἐ γὰρ, ὡς ἡ φύσις, ἀλόγῳ δυνάμει ποιεῖ· (ὅθεν κὴ ποιεῖ ἡ φύσις, ἐκ ἐφιςάνεσα γνωσικῶς τῷ γιγνομένῳ) Ἐι δέ τι καθ' ἕξιν λογικὴν ποιεῖ, οἶδε πε πάντως τὸ γιγνόμενον ὑπ' αὐτε. Ἐι τοίνυν μὴ χεῖρον, ἢ κατὰ ἄνθρωπον, ὁ Θεὸς ποιεῖ, οἶδε τὸ ὑπ' αὐτε γιγνόμενον· ἐι δὲ οἶδεν ὃ ποιεῖ, αὐτόθι δῆλον, ὡς ἔςιν ἐν τῷ Δημιεργῷ τὰ εἴδη. Ἔςι δὲ τὸ εἶδος ἐν τῷ Δημιεργῷ, ὡς ὁ ἐν τῷ δακτυλίῳ τύπος· κὴ λέγεται τετο τὸ εἶδος ΠΡΟ ΤΩΝ ΠΟΛΛΩΝ, κὴ χωριςὸν τῆς ὕλης. Ἔςι δὲ τὸ εἶδος τε ἀνθρώπε κὴ ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἕκαςον ἀνθρώποις, ὡς τὰ ἐν τοῖς κηροῖς ἐκτυπώματα· κὴ λέγεται τὰ τοιαῦτα ΕΝ ΤΟΙΣ ΠΟΛΛΟΙΣ εἶναι, κὴ ἀχώριςα τῆς ὕλης. Θεασάμενοι δὲ τὰς κατὰ μέρος ἀνθρώπες, ὅτι πάντες τὸ αὐτὸ εἶδος τε ἀνθρώπε ἔχεσιν, (ὡς ἐπὶ τε ὕςερον ἐλθόντος, κὴ θεασαμένε τὰ κηρία) ἀνεμαξάμεθα αὐτὸ ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ· κὴ λέγεται τετο ΕΠΙ ΤΟΙΣ ΠΟΛΛΟΙΣ, ἤγουν μετὰ τὰ πολλὰ, κὴ ὑςερογενές. *Intelligatur annulus, qui alicujus, utpote Achillis, imaginem inſculptam habeat: multæ inſuper ceræ ſint, et ab annulo imprimantur: veniat deinde quiſpiam, videatque ceras omnes unius annuli impreſſione formatas, annulique impreſſionem in mente contineat: ſigillum annulo inſculptum,* ANTE MULTA *dicetur: in cerulis impreſſum, in* MULTIS: *quod vero in illius, qui illo venerat intelligentiâ remanſerit,* POST MULTA, *et poſterius*

à Semblance of Immortality, and continues Ch. IV.

rius genitum dicetur. Idem in generibus et formis intelligendum censeo: etenim ille optimus procreator mundi Deus, omnium rerum formas, atque exempla habet apud se: ut si hominem efficere velit, in hominis formam, quam habet, intueatur, et ad illius exemplum cæteros faciat omnes. At si quis resitterit, dicatque rerum formas apud Creatorem non esse: quæso ut diligenter attendat: Opifex, quæ facit, vel cognoscit, vel ignorat: sed is, qui nesciet, nunquam quicquam faciet: quis enim id facere aggreditur, quod facere ignorat? Neque enim facultate quâdam rationis experte aliquid agit, prout agit natura (ex quo conficitur, ut natura etiam agat, etsi quæ faciat, non advertat:) Si vero ratione quadam aliquid facit, quodcunque ab eo factum est omnino cognovit. Si igitur Deus non pejore ratione, quam homo, facit quid, quæ fecit cognovit: si cognovit quæ fecit, in ipso rerum formas esse perspicuum est. Formæ autem in opifice sunt perinde ac in annulo sigillum, hæcque forma ANTE MULTA, *et avulsa a materiâ dicitur. Atqui hominis species in unoquoque homine est, quemadmodum etiam sigilla in ceris;* et IN MULTIS, *nec avulsa a materiâ dicitur. At cum singulos homines animo conspicimus, et eandem in unoquoque formam atque effigiem videmus, illa effigies in mente nostrâ insidens* POST MULTA, *et posterius genita dicetur: veluti in illo quoque dicebamus, qui multa sigilla in cerâ uno et eodem annulo impressa conspexerat. Ammon.* in Prophyr. Introduct. p. 29. b.

Ch.IV. tinues throughout ages to be SPECIFI-
CALLY

Λέγονται δὲ τὰ γένη καὶ τὰ εἴδη ΠΡΟ ΤΩΝ ΠΟΛΛΩΝ, ΕΝ ΤΟΙΣ ΠΟΛΛΟΙΣ, ΕΠΙ ΤΟΙΣ ΠΟΛΛΟΙΣ· οἷον ἐννοείσθω τι σφραγιστήριον, ἔχον καὶ ἐκτύπωμα τὸ τυχόν, ἐξ οὗ κηρία πολλὰ μεταλαβέτω τοῦ ἐκτυπώματος, καί τις ὑπ' ὄψιν ἀγαγέτω ταῦτα, μὴ προκατιδὼν μηδ' ὅλως τὸ σφραγιστήριον· ἑωρακὼς δὲ τὰ ἐν οἷς τὸ ἐκτύπωμα, καὶ ἐπιστήσας ὅτι πάντα τοῦ αὐτοῦ μετέχουσιν ἐκτυπώματος, καὶ τὰ δοκοῦντα πολλὰ τῷ λόγῳ συναθροίσας εἰς ἕν, ἔχέτω τοῦτο κατὰ διάνοιαν. Τὸ μὲν οὖν σφραγιστήριον τύπωμα λέγεται ΠΡΟ ΤΩΝ ΠΟΛΛΩΝ· τὸ δ' ἐν τοῖς κηρίοις, ΕΝ ΤΟΙΣ ΠΟΛΛΟΙΣ· τὸ δὲ ἐξ αὐτῶν καταληφθὲν, καὶ κατὰ διάνοιαν ἄὕλως ὑποσὰν, ΕΠΙ ΤΟΙΣ ΠΟΛΛΟΙΣ. Οὕτως οὖν καὶ τὰ γένη καὶ τὰ εἴδη ΠΡΟ ΤΩΝ ΠΟΛΛΩΝ μέν εἰσιν ἐν τῷ Δημιουργῷ, κατὰ τὰς ποιητικὰς λόγους· ἐν τῷ Θεῷ γὰρ οἱ ἀσώματοι λόγοι τῶν ὄντων ἰδιαίως προϋφεστήκασι, καθ' οὓς λόγους ὁ ὑπερέχων τὰ ὅλα πάντα καὶ προώρισε καὶ παρήγαγεν· ὑφεστηκέναι δὲ λέγονται τὰ γένη καὶ τὰ εἴδη ΕΝ ΤΟΙΣ ΠΟΛΛΟΙΣ, διότι ἐν τοῖς κατὰ μέρος ἀνθρώποις τὸ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εἶδός ἐστι, καὶ τοῖς κατὰ μέρος ἵπποις τὸ τοῦ ἵππου εἶδος· ἐν ἀνθρώποις δὲ, καὶ ἵπποις, καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώοις τὸ γένος εὑρίσκεται τῶν τοιούτων εἰδῶν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τὸ ζῶον· κἂν τοῖς ζώοις ὁμοῦ καὶ τοῖς ζωοφύτοις τὸ καθολικώτερον γένος, τὸ αἰσθητικὸν, ἐξετάζεται· συναχθέντων δὲ καὶ τῶν φυτῶν,

θεω-

CALLY ONE, amid thoſe infinite particular Ch.IV.

θεωρεῖται τὸ ἔμψυχον· εἰ δὲ σὺν τοῖς ἐμψύχοις ἐθέλει τις ἐπισκοπεῖν καὶ τὰ ἄψυχα, τὸ σῶμα σύμπαν κατόψεται· συνδραμεῖσῶν δὲ τοῖς ἰδρημένοις τῶν ἀσωμάτων ἀσιῶν, τὸ πρῶτον γένος φανεῖται καὶ γενικώτατον· καὶ ἕτω μὲν ΕΝ ΤΟΙΣ ΠΟΛΛΟΙΣ ὑφίσηκε τὰ εἴδη καὶ τὰ γένη. Καταλαβὼν δέ τις ἐκ τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἀνθρώπων τὴν αὐτῶν φύσιν, τὴν ἀνθρωπότητα, ἐκ δὲ τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἵππων αὐτὴν τὴν ἱππότητα, καὶ ἕτω τὸν καθόλε ἄνθρωπον, καὶ τὸν καθόλε ἵππον ἐπινοήσας· καὶ τὸ καθόλε ζῶον ἐκ τῶν καθέκαςα τῷ λόγῳ συναγαγὼν· καὶ τὸ καθόλε αἰσθητικὸν, καὶ τὸ καθόλε ἔμψυχον, καὶ τὸ καθόλε σῶμα, καὶ τὴν καθολικωτάτην ἀσίαν ἐξ ἁπάντων συλλογισάμενος, ὁ τοιοῦτος ἐν τῇ ἑαυτῦ διανοίᾳ τὰ γένη καὶ τὰ εἴδη αὐλως ὑπέςησεν ΕΠΙ ΤΟΙΣ ΠΟΛΛΟΙΣ, τυτέςι, μετὰ τὰ πολλὰ καὶ ὑςερογενῶς. *Genera verò et Species dicuntur eſſe* ANTE MULTA, IN MULTIS, POST MULTA. *Ut puta, intelligatur ſigillum, quamlibet figuram habens, ex quo multæ ceræ ejuſdem figuræ ſint participes, et in medium aliquis has proferat, nequaquam prævifo ſigillo. Cum autem vidiſſet eas ceras in quibus figura exprimitur, et animadvertiſſet omnes eandem figuram participare, et quæ videbantur multæ, ratione in unum coegiſſet, hoc in mente teneat. Nempe ſigillum dicitur eſſe ſpecies* ANTE MULTA; *illa vero in ceris,* IN MULTIS; *quæ vero ab iis deſumitur, et in mente immaterialiter ſubſiſtit,* POST MULTA. *Sic igitur et Genera et Species* ANTE MULTA *in Creatore ſunt, ſecundum rationes efficientes.*

Ch. IV. cular changes, that befal it every moment (*k*).

MAY

In Deo enim rerum effectrices rationes una et simpliciter præ-existunt; secundum quas rationes ille supra-substantialis omnes res et prædestinavit et produxit. Existere autem dicuntur Genera et Species IN MULTIS, *quoniam in singulis hominibus hominis Species, et in singulis equis equi Species est. In hominibus æque ac in equis et aliis animalibus Genus invenitur harum specierum, quod est animal. In animalibus etiam una cum Zoophytis magis universale Genus, nempe sensitivum exquiritur. Additis vero plantis, spectatur Genus animatum. Si verò una cum animatis quisquam velit perscrutari etiam inanimata, totum Corpus perspiciet. Cum autem entia incorporea conjuncta fuerint iis modo tractatis, apparebit primum et generalissimum Genus. Atque ita quidem* IN MULTIS *subsistunt Genera et Species. Comprehendens vero quisquam ex singulis hominibus naturam ipsam humanam, et ex singulis equis ipsam equinam, atque ita universalem hominem et universalem equum considerans, et universale animal ex singulis ratione colligens, et universale sensitivum, et universale animatum, et universale corpus, et maximè universale ens ex omnibus colligens, hic, inquam, in suâ mente Genera et Species immaterialiter constituit* ΕΠΙ ΤΟΙΣ ΠΟΛΛΟΙΣ, *hoc est,* POST MULTA, *et posterius genita. Niceph. Blem.* Log. Epit. p. 62. Vid. etiam Alcin. in *Platonic.* Philosoph. Introduct. C. IX. X.

(*k*) The following elegant Lines of *Virgil* are worth attending to, tho' applied to no higher a subject than Bees.

MAY we be allowed then to credit thoſe ſpeculative Men, who tell us, "*it is in* "*theſe* Ch. IV.

Ergo ipſas quamvis anguſti terminus ævi
Excipiat: (neque enim plus ſeptima ducitur ætas)
AT GENUS IMMORTALE MANET.—G. IV.

The ſame *Immortality*, that is, the *Immortality of the Kind*, may be ſeen in all *periſhable* ſubſtances, whether animal or inanimate; for tho' *Individuals periſh*, *the ſeveral Kinds ſtill remain*. And hence, if we take TIME, as denoting *the ſyſtem of things temporary*, we may collect the meaning of that paſſage in the *Timæus*, where the Philoſopher deſcribes TIME to be——μένοντος αἰῶνος ἐν ἑνὶ κατ' ἀριθμὸν ἰοῦσαν αἰώνιον εἰκόνα. *Æternitatis in uno permanentis Imaginem quandam, certis numerorum articulis progredientem*, *Plat.* V. III. p. 37. *Edit. Serran.*

We have ſubjoined the following extract from *Boethius*, to ſerve as a commentary on this deſcription of TIME.—ÆTERNITAS *igitur eſt, interminabilis vitæ tota ſimul et perfecta poſſeſſio. Quod ex collatione temporalium clarius liquet. Nam quidquid vivit in* TEMPORE, *id præſens à præteritis in futura procedit: nihilque eſt in tempore ita conſtitutum, quod totum vitæ ſuæ ſpatium pariter poſſit amplecti; ſed craſtinum quidem nondum apprehendit, heſternum vero jam perdidit. In hodiernâ quoque vita non amplius vivitis, quam in illo mobili tranſitorioque*

Ch. IV. *" theſe permanent and comprehenſive* FORMS *" that* THE DEITY *views at once, without " looking abroad, all poſſible productions " both preſent, paſt, and future—that this " great and ſtupendous View is but a View " of himſelf, where all things lie inveloped " in their Principles and Exemplars, as be- " ing*

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momento. Quod igitur Temporis patitur conditionem, licet illud, ſicut de mundo cenſuit Ariſtoteles, nec cœperit unquam eſſe, nec deſinat, vitaque ejus cum temporis infinitate tendatur, nondum tamen tale eſt, ut æternum eſſe jure credatur. Non enim totum ſimul infinitæ licet vitæ ſpatium comprehendit, atque complectitur, ſed futura nondum tranſacta jam non habet. Quod igitur interminabilis vitæ plenitudinem totam pariter comprehendit, ac poſſidet, cui neque futuri quidquam abſit, nec præteriti fluxeret, id ÆTERNUM *eſſe jure perhibetur: idque neceſſe eſt, et ſui compos præſens ſibi ſemper aſſiſtere, et infinitatem mobilis temporis habere præſentem. Unde quidam non rectè, qui cum audiunt viſum Platoni, mundum hunc nec habuiſſe initium, nec habiturum eſſe defectum, hoc modo conditori conditum mundum fieri co-æternum putant. Aliud eſt enim* PER INTERMINABILEM DUCI VITAM, *(quod Mundo Plato tribuit) aliud* INTERMINABILIS VITÆ TOTAM PARITER COMPLEXAM ESSE PRÆSENTIAM, *quod Divinæ Mentis proprium eſſe manifeſtum eſt. Neque enim Deus*

" *ing eſſential to the fulneſs of his univerſal* Ch. IV.
" *Intellection?*"—If ſo, it will be proper that we invert the Axiom before mentioned. We muſt now ſay——*Nil eſt in* SENSU, *quod non prius fuit in* INTELLECTU. For tho' the contrary may be true with reſpect to Knowledge *merely human*, yet never can it be true with reſpect to

Deus conditis rebus antiquior videri debet temporis quantitate, ſed ſimplicis potius proprietate naturæ. HUNC ENIM VITÆ IMMOBILIS PRÆSENTARIUM STATUM, INFINITUS ILLE TEMPORALIUM RERUM MOTUS IMITATUR; *cumque eum effingere, atque æquare non poſſit, ex immobilitate deficit in motum; ex ſimplicitate præſentiæ decreſcit in infinitam futuri ac præteriti quantitatem; et, cum totam pariter vitæ ſuæ plenitudinem nequeat poſſidere, hoc ipſo, quòd aliquo modo nunquam eſſe deſinit, illud, quod implere atque exprimere non poteſt, aliquatenus videtur æmulari, alligans ſe ad qualemcunque præſentiam hujus exigui volucriſque momenti: quæ, quoniam* MANENTIS ILLIUS PRÆSENTIÆ QUANDAM GESTAT IMAGINEM, *quibuſcunque contigerit, id præſtat, ut* ESSE *videantur. Quoniam vero manere non potuit, infinitum Temporis iter arripuit: eoque modo factum eſt, ut* CONTINUARET VITAM EUNDO, *cujus plenitudinem complecti non valuit* PERMANENDO. *Itaque*, &c. De Conſolat. Philoſoph. L. V.

Ch. IV. Knowlege univerſally, *unleſs we give Precedence to* ATOMS *and* LIFELESS BODY, making MIND, *among other things, to be ſtruck out by a lucky Concourſe.*

§ 3. IT is far from the deſign of this Treatiſe, to inſinuate that Atheiſm is the Hypotheſis of our latter Metaphyſicians. But yet it is ſomewhat remarkable, in their ſeveral Syſtems, how readily they admit of the above *Precedence.*

FOR mark the Order of things, according to *their* account of them. Firſt comes that huge Body *the ſenſible World.* Then this and its Attributes beget *ſenſible Ideas.* Then out of ſenſible Ideas, by a kind of lopping and pruning, are made *Ideas intelligible, whether ſpecific or general.* Thus ſhould they admit that MIND was coeval with BODY, yet *till* BODY *gave it Ideas,* and awakened its dormant Powers, it could at beſt have been nothing more,

more, than *a ſort of dead Capacity*; *for* INNATE IDEAS *it could not poſſibly have any.* Ch. IV.

AT another time we hear of *Bodies ſo exceedingly fine*, that their very *Exility* makes them ſuſceptible of *ſenſation* and *knowledge*; as if they ſhrunk into *Intellect* by their exquiſite ſubtlety, which rendered them too delicate to be Bodies any longer. It is to this notion we owe many curious inventions, ſuch as *ſubtle Æther*, *animal Spirits*, *nervous Ducts*, *Vibrations*, and the like; Terms, which MODERN PHILOSOPHY, upon parting with *occult Qualities*, has found expedient to provide itſelf, to ſupply their place.

BUT the *intellectual* Scheme, which never forgets Deity, poſtpones every thing *corporeal* to the *primary mental Cauſe*. It is *here* it looks for the origin of *intelligible* Ideas, even of thoſe, which exiſt in *human* Capacities. For tho' *ſenſible* Objects may be

Ch. IV. be the deſtined medium, *to awaken* the dormant Energies of *Man*'s Underſtanding, yet are thoſe Energies themſelves no more contained in *Senſe*, than the Exploſion of a Cannon, in the Spark which gave it fire (*l*).

In

(*l*) The following Note is taken from a Manuſcript Commentary of the *Platonic Olympiodorus*, (quoted before, p. 371.) upon the *Phædo* of *Plato*; who tho' perhaps ſome may object to from inclining to the Doctrine of *Platonic Reminiſcence*, yet it certainly gives a better account how far the *Senſes* aſſiſt in the acquiſition of *Science*, than we can find given by vulgar Philoſophers.

Οὐδέποτε γὰρ τὰ χείρω καὶ δεύτερα ἀρχαὶ ἢ αἰτίαι εἰσὶ τῶν κρειττόνων· εἰ δὲ δεῖ καὶ ταῖς ἐγκυκλίοις ἐξηγήσεσι πείθεσθαι· καὶ ἀρχὴν εἶπεῖν τὴν αἴσθησιν τῆς ἐπιστήμης, λέξομεν αὐτὴν ἀρχὴν ἐχ ὡς ποιητικὴν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐρεθίζουσαν τὴν ἡμελέραν ψυχὴν εἰς ἀνάμνησιν τῶν καθόλε—κατὰ τοῦτο δὲ τὴν ἐννοίαν εἴρηται καὶ τὸ ἐν Τιμαίῳ, ὅτι δι' ὄψεως καὶ ἀκοῆς τὸ τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἐπορίσαμεθα γένος, διότι ἐκ τῶν αἰσθητῶν εἰς ἀνάμνησιν ἀφικνέμεθα. *Thoſe things, which are inferior and ſecondary, are by no means the Principles or Cauſes of the more excellent; and tho' we admit the common interpretations, and allow* SENSE *to be a Principle of* SCIENCE, *we muſt however call it a Principle, not as if it was the efficient*

IN ſhort ALL MINDS, that are, are SIMILAR and CONGENIAL; and ſo too are *their* Ch. IV.

efficient Cauſe, but as it rouſes our Soul to the Recollection of general Ideas—According to the ſame way of thinking is it ſaid in the Timæus, that through the Sight and Hearing we acquire to ourſelves Philoſophy, becauſe we paſs from Objects of SENSE *to* REMINISCENCE *or* RECOLLECTION.

And in another paſſage he obſerves—Ἐπειδὴ γὰρ πάμμορφον ἄγαλμά ἐστιν ἡ ψυχὴ, πάντων τῶν ὄντων ἔχουσα λόγους, ἐριθιζομένη ὑπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἀναμιμήσκεται ὧν ἔνδον ἔχει λόγων, καὶ τότε προβάλλεται. *For in as much as the* SOUL, *by containing the Principles of all Beings, is a ſort of* OMNIFORM REPRESENTATION *or* EXEMPLAR; *when it is rouſed by objects of Senſe, it recollects thoſe Principles, which it contains within, and brings them forth.*

Georgius Gemiſtus, otherwiſe called *Pletho*, writes upon the ſame ſubject in the following manner. Τὴν ψυχὴν φασὶν οἱ τὰ εἴδη τιθέμενοι ἀναλαμβάνουσαν ἔσγε ἐπιστήμην τὰς ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς λόγους, ἀκριβέστερον αὐτὰς ἔχοντας καὶ τελεώτερον ἐν ἑαυτῇ ἔχειν, ἢ ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ἔχουσι. Τὸ δὲ τελεώτερον τοῦτο καὶ ἀκριβέστερον ἐκ ἂν ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἴσχειν τὴν ψυχὴν, ὅγε μὴ ἐστὶν ἐν αὐτοῖς. Οὐ δ' αὖ μηδαμῶς ἀλλόθι ὃν αὐτὴν ἐξ αὐτῆς διανοεῖσθαι·

Ch. IV. *their Ideas*, or *intelligible Forms*. Were it otherwiſe, there could be no intercourſe between

νοεῖσθαι· ἃ δὲ γὰρ πεφυκέναι τὴν ψυχὴν μηδαμῆ ὄν, τι διανοεῖσθαι· τὰς γὰρ ψευδεῖς τῶν δοξῶν ἐκ μὴ ὄντων ἀλλ' ὄντων μὲν, ἄλλων δὲ κατ' ἄλλων εἶναι συνθέσεις τινὰς, ἃ κατὰ τὸ ὀρθὸν γινομένας. Λείπεσθαι δὲ ἀφ' ἑτέρας τινὸς φύσεως πολλῷ ἔτι κρείττονός τε καὶ τελεωτέρας ἀφήκειν τῇ ψυχῇ τὸ τελεώτερον τοῦτο τῶν ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς λόγων. *Thoſe who ſuppoſe* IDEAL FORMS, *ſay that the Soul, when ſhe aſſumes, for the purpoſes of Science, thoſe Proportions, which exiſt in ſenſible objects, poſſeſſes them with a ſuperior accuracy and perfection, than that to which they attain in thoſe ſenſible objects. Now this ſuperior Perfection or Accuracy the Soul cannot have from ſenſible objects, as it is in fact not in them; nor yet can ſhe conceive it herſelf as from herſelf, without its having exiſtence any where elſe. For the Soul is not formed ſo as to conceive that, which has exiſtence no where, ſince even ſuch opinions, as are falſe, are all of them compoſitions irregularly formed, not of mere Non-Beings, but of various real Beings, one with another. It remains therefore that this Perfection, which is ſuperior to the Proportions exiſting in ſenſible objects, muſt deſcend to the Soul from* SOME OTHER NATURE, WHICH IS BY MANY DEGREES MORE EXCELLENT AND PERFECT. Pleth. de *Ariſtotel.* et *Platonic.* Philoſoph. Diff. Edit. *Paris* 1541.

The ΛΟΓΟΙ or PROPORTIONS, of which *Geminiſtus* here ſpeaks, mean not only thoſe relative Proportions

between Man and Man, or (what is more important) between Man and God. Ch. IV.

FOR

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portions of *Equality* and *Inequality*, which exiſt in Quantity, (ſuch as double, ſeſquialter, &c.) but in a larger ſenſe, they may be extended to mathematical *Lines*, *Angles*, *Figures*, &c. of all which Λόγοι or *Proportions*; tho' we poſſeſs in the *Mind* the moſt clear and preciſe Ideas, yet it may be juſtly queſtioned, whether any one of them ever exiſted in the *ſenſible* World.

To theſe two Authors we may add *Boethius*, who, after having enumerated many acts of the MIND or INTELLECT, wholly diſtinct from *Senſation*, and independent of it, at length concludes,

Hæc eſt efficiens magis
Longè cauſſa potentior,
Quam quæ materiæ modo
Impreſſas patitur notas.
Præcedit tamen excitans,
Ac vires animi movens,
Vivo in corpore paſſio.
Cùm vel lux oculos ferit,
Vel vox auribus inſtrepit;
Tum MENTIS VIGOR *excitus,*
QUAS INTUS SPECIES TENET,
Ad motus ſimileis vocans,
Notis applicat exteris,
INTRORSUMQUE RECONDITIS
FORMIS *miſcet imagines.*

De Conſolat. Philoſoph. L. V.

Ch. IV. For what is Converſation between Man and Man?—It is a mutual intercourſe of *Speaking* and *Hearing*.—To the Speaker, it is *to teach*; to the Hearer, it is *to learn*.—To the Speaker, it is *to deſcend* from *Ideas* to *Words*; to the Hearer, it is *to aſcend* from *Words* to *Ideas*.—If the Hearer, in this aſcent, can arrive at *no* Ideas, then is he ſaid *not to underſtand*; if he aſcend to Ideas diſſimilar and heterogeneous, then is he ſaid *to miſunderſtand*.—What then is requiſite, that he may be ſaid *to underſtand?*—That he ſhould aſcend to certain Ideas, treaſured up *within himſelf*, correſpondent and ſimilar to thoſe *within the Speaker*. The ſame may be ſaid of a *Writer* and a *Reader*; as when any one reads to-day or to-morrow, or here or in *Italy*, what *Euclid* wrote in *Greece* two thouſand years ago.

Now is it not marvelous, there ſhould be *ſo exact an Identity of our Ideas*, if they were

were only generated from *ſenſible* Objects, infinite in number, ever changing, diſtant in Time, diſtant in Place, and no one Particular the ſame with any other? Ch. IV.

AGAIN, do we allow it poſſible for GOD to ſignify his *will* to MEN; or for MEN to ſignify their *wants* to GOD?—In both theſe caſes there muſt be *an Identity of Ideas*, or elſe nothing is done either one way or the other. Whence then do theſe COMMON IDENTIC IDEAS come?—Thoſe of *Men*, it ſeems, come all from *Senſation*. And whence come *God's Ideas?*—Not ſurely from *Senſation* too; for this we can hardly venture to affirm, without giving to *Body* that *notable Precedence of being prior to the Intellection of even God himſelf.*—Let them then be *original*; let them be *connate, and eſſential to the divine Mind.*—If this be true, is it not a fortunate Event, that *Ideas of corporeal riſe, and others of mental, (things derived from ſubjects ſo totally diſtinct)*

Ch. IV. *tinct) ſhould ſo happily co-incide in the ſame wonderful Identity?*

HAD we not better reaſon thus upon ſo abſtruſe a Subject?—Either all MINDS have their Ideas *derived*; or all have them *original*; or *ſome have them original, and ſome derived*. If all Minds have them derived, they muſt be derived from ſomething, *which is itſelf not Mind*, and thus we fall inſenſibly into a kind of Atheiſm. If all have them original, *then are all Minds divine*, an Hypotheſis by far more plauſible than the former. But if this be not admitted, then muſt *one* Mind (at leaſt) have *original* Ideas, and the reſt have them *derived*. Now ſuppoſing this laſt, whence are thoſe Minds, whoſe Ideas are derived, moſt likely to derive them?—From MIND, or from BODY?—From MIND, a thing *homogeneous*; or from BODY, a thing *heterogeneous*? From MIND, ſuch as (from the Hypotheſis) has

original

original Ideas; or from BODY, which we cannot diſcover to have any Ideas at all? (*l*)—An Examination of this kind, purſued with accuracy and temper, is the moſt probable method of ſolving theſe doubts. It is thus we ſhall be enabled with more aſſurance to decide, whether we are to admit the Doctrine of *the Epicurean Poet*,

CORPOREA NATURA *animum conſtare, animamque*;

or truſt *the Mantuan Bard*, when he ſings in divine numbers,

Igneus eſt ollis vigor, et CÆLESTIS ORIGO *Seminibus.*——

BUT

(*l*) ΝΟΥΝ δὲ ἀδὲν ΣΩΜΑ γεννᾶ· πῶς γὰρ ἂν τὰ ΑΝΟΗΤΑ ΝΟΥΝ γεννήσοι; *No* BODY *produces* MIND: *for how ſhould* THINGS DEVOID OF MIND *produce* MIND? *Salluſt de Diis et Mundo*, c. 8.

Ch. IV. But it is now time, to quit theſe Speculations. Thoſe, who would trace them farther, and have leiſure for ſuch ſtudies, may perhaps find themſelves led into regions of Contemplation, affording them proſpects both intereſting and pleaſant. We have at preſent ſaid as much as was requiſite to our Subject, and ſhall therefore paſs from hence to our concluding chapter.

CHAP.

CHAP. V.

Subordination of Intelligence — Difference of Ideas, both in particular Men, and in whole Nations — Different Genius of different Languages — Character of the Engliſh, *the* Oriental, *the* Latin, *and the* Greek *Languages — Superlative Excellence of the Laſt — Concluſion.*

ORIGINAL TRUTH (*a*), having the moſt intimate connection with the *ſupreme Intelligence*, may be ſaid (as it were) to Ch. V.

(*a*) Thoſe Philoſophers, whoſe Ideas of *Being* and *Knowledge* are derived from *Body* and *Senſation*, have a ſhort method to explain the nature of TRUTH. It is a *factitious* thing, made by every man for himſelf; which comes and goes, juſt as it is remembered and forgot; which in the order of things makes its appearance *the laſt* of any, being not only ſubſequent to *ſenſible* Objects, but even to our *Senſations* of them. According to this Hypotheſis, there are many Truths, which have been, and are no longer; others, that will be, and have

Ch. V. to ſhine with unchangeable ſplendor, enlightening throughout the Univerſe every poſſible Subject, by nature ſuſceptible of its benign influence. Paſſions and other obſtacles may prevent indeed its efficacy, as clouds and vapours may obſcure the Sun; but it ſelf neither admits *Diminution*, nor *Change*, becauſe the Darkneſs reſpects only particular Percipients. Among *theſe* therefore we muſt look for ignorance and

not been yet; and multitudes, that poſſibly may never exiſt at all.

But there are other Reaſoners, who muſt ſurely have had very different notions; thoſe I mean, who repreſent TRUTH not as the *laſt*, but the *firſt* of Beings; who call it *immutable*, *eternal*, *omnipreſent*; Attributes, that all indicate ſomething more than human. To theſe it muſt appear ſomewhat ſtrange, how men ſhould imagine, that a crude account of the method *how they perceive* Truth, was to paſs for an account of *Truth it-itſelf*; as if to deſcribe the road to *London*, could be called a Deſcription of that Metropolis.

For my own part, when I read the detail about Senſation and Reflection, and am taught the proceſs at large how my Ideas are all generated, I ſeem to view the

and errour, and for that *Subordination of* Ch. V.
Intelligence, which is their natural conſe-
quence.

WE have daily experience in the Works of ART, that a *partial Knowledge* will ſuffice for *Contemplation*, tho' we know not enough, to profeſs ourſelves Artiſts. Much more is this true, with reſpect to NATURE; and well for mankind is it found

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the human Soul in the light of a Crucible, where Truths are produced by a kind of logical Chemiſtry. They may conſiſt (for aught we know) of *natural* materials, but are as much *creatures of our own*, as a Bolus or Elixir.

If *Milton* by his URANIA intended to repreſent TRUTH, he certainly referred her to a much more antient, as well as a far more noble origin.

——— *Heav'nly born!*
Before the hills appear'd, or fountains flow'd,
Thou with eternal Wiſdom didſt converſe,
Wiſdom thy Siſter; and with her didſt play
In preſence of th' almighty Father, pleas'd
With thy celeſtial Song. ——— P. L. VII.

See *Proverbs* VIII. 22, &c. *Jeremiah* X. 10. *Marc. Antonin.* IX. 1.

Ch. V. to be true, elſe never could we attain any *natural* Knowledge at all. For if the *conſtitutive Proportions of a Clock* are ſo ſubtle, that few conceive them truly, but the Artiſt himſelf; what ſhall we ſay to *thoſe ſeminal Proportions*, which make the eſſence and character of every *natural Subject?*—Partial views, the Imperfections of Senſe; Inattention, Idleneſs, the turbulence of Paſſions; Education, local Sentiments, Opinions, and Belief, conſpire in many inſtances to furniſh us with Ideas, ſome *too general*, ſome *too partial*, and (what is worſe than all this) with many that are *erroneous*, and contrary to Truth. Theſe it behoves us to correct as far as poſſible, by cool ſuſpenſe and candid examination.

Νῆφε, καὶ μέμνησ' ἀπιστεῖν, ἄρθρα ταῦτα τῶν φρενῶν.

AND thus by a connection perhaps little expected, the Cauſe of LETTERS, and that

that of VIRTUE appear to co-incide, it being the buſineſs of both *to examine our Ideas, and to amend them by the Standard of Nature and of Truth* (*b*). Ch. V.

IN this important Work, we ſhall be led to obſerve, how Nations, like ſingle Men, have their *peculiar* Ideas; how theſe *peculiar* Ideas become THE GENIUS OF THEIR LANGUAGE, ſince the *Symbol* muſt of courſe correſpond to its *Archetype* (*c*);

(*b*) How uſeful to ETHIC SCIENCE, and indeed to KNOWLEDGE in general, a GRAMMATICAL DISQUISITION into the *Etymology* and *Meaning* of WORDS was eſteemed by the chief and ableſt Philoſophers, may be ſeen by conſulting *Plato* in his *Cratylus*; *Xenoph. Mem.* IV. 5. 6. *Arrian. Epict.* I. 17. II. 10. *Marc. Anton.* III. 11. V. 8. X. 8.

(*c*) ΗΘΟΥΣ ΧΑΡΑΚΤΗΡ ἐϛι τ' ἀνθρώπε ΛΟΓΟΣ. Stob. *Capiuntur Signa haud levia, ſed obſervatu digna (quod fortaſſe quiſpiam non putarit) de ingeniis et moribus populorum et nationum ex linguis ipſorum.* Bacon. de Augm. Scient. VI. 1. Vid. etiam *Quinctil.* L. XI. p. 675. *Edit. Capperon. Diog.* L. I. p. 58. et *Menag. Com. Tuſc. Diſp.* V. 16.

Ch. V. how the *wiſeſt* Nations, having the *moſt* and *beſt Ideas*, will conſequently have the *beſt* and *moſt copious Languages*; how others, whoſe Languages are motley and compounded, and who have borrowed from different countries different Arts and Practices, diſcover by WORDS, to whom they are indebted for THINGS.

To illuſtrate what has been ſaid, by a few examples. WE BRITONS in our time have been remarkable borrowers, as our *multiform* Language may ſufficiently ſhew. Our Terms in *polite Literature* prove, that this came from *Greece*; our Terms in *Muſic* and *Painting*, that theſe came from *Italy*; our Phraſes in *Cookery* and *War*, that we learnt theſe from the *French*; and our Phraſes in *Navigation*, that we were taught by the *Flemings* and *Low Dutch*. Theſe many and very different Sources of our Language may be the cauſe, why it is ſo deficient in *Regularity* and *Analogy*. Yet we have this advantage to compenſate the defect,

defect, that what we want in *Elegance*, we gain in *Copiouſneſs*, in which laſt reſpect few Languages will be found ſuperior to our own. Ch. V.

LET us paſs from ourſelves to the NATIONS OF THE EAST. The (*d*) Eaſtern World, from the earlieſt days, has been at all times the Seat of enormous Monarchy. On its natives fair Liberty never ſhed its genial influence. If at any time civil Diſcords aroſe among them (and ariſe there did innumerable) the conteſt was never about *the Form of their Government*; (for this was an object, of which the Combatants had no conception;) it was all from the poor motive of, *who ſhould be their* MASTER, whether

(*d*) Διὰ γὰρ τὸ δουλικώτεροι εἶναι τὰ ἤθη οἱ μὲν Βάρβαροι τῶν Ἑλλήνων, οἱ δὲ περὶ τὴν Ασίαν τῶν περὶ τὴν Εὐρώπην, ὑπομένουσι τὴν δεσποτικὴν ἀρχὴν, οὐδὲν δυσχεραίνοντες. *For the* Barbarians *by being more ſlaviſh in their Manners than the* Greeks, *and thoſe of* Aſia *than thoſe of* Europe, *ſubmit to deſpotic Government without murmuring or diſcontent.* Ariſt. Polit. III. 4.

Ch. V. whether a *Cyrus* or an *Artaxerxes*, a *Mahomet* or a *Muſtapha*.

Such was their Condition, and what was the conſequence?—Their Ideas became conſonant to their ſervile State, and their Words became conſonant to their ſervile Ideas. The great Diſtinction, for ever in their ſight, was that of *Tyrant* and *Slave*; the moſt unnatural one conceivable, and the moſt ſuſceptible of pomp, and empty exaggeration. Hence they talked of Kings as Gods, and of themſelves, as the meaneſt and moſt abject Reptiles. Nothing was either great or little in moderation, but every Sentiment was heightened by incredible Hyperbole. Thus tho' they ſometimes aſcended into *the Great* and *Magnificent* (*e*), they as frequently degenerated

(*e*) The trueſt Sublime of the Eaſt may be found in the Scriptures, of which perhaps the principal cauſe is the intrinſic Greatneſs of the Subjects there treated; the Creation of the Univerſe, the Diſpenſations of divine Providence, *&c.*

nerated into the *Tumid* and *Bombaſt*. *The Greeks too of Aſia* became infected by their neighbours, who were often at times not only their neighbours, but their maſters; and hence that Luxuriance of the *Aſiatic Stile*, unknown to the chaſte eloquence and purity of *Athens*. But of the *Greeks* we forbear to ſpeak now, as we ſhall ſpeak of them more fully, when we have firſt conſidered the Nature or Genius of the *Romans*. Ch. V.

AND what ſort of People may we pronounce the ROMANS?—A Nation engaged in wars and commotions, ſome foreign, ſome domeſtic, which for ſeven hundred years wholly engroſſed their thoughts. Hence therefore their LANGUAGE became, *like their Ideas*, copious in all Terms expreſſive of things *political*, and well adapted to the purpoſes both of *Hiſtory* and *popular Eloquence*.—But what was their *Philoſophy*?—As a Nation, it was none, if we may credit their ableſt Writers. And hence the Unfitneſs of their Language

to

Ch. V. to this Subject; a defect, which even *Cicero* is compelled to confeſs, and more fully makes appear, when he writes Philoſophy himſelf, from the number of terms, which he is obliged to invent (*f*). *Virgil* ſeems

(*f*) See *Cic. de Fin.* I. C. 1, 2, 3. III. C. 1, 2, 4, &c. but in particular *Tuſc. Diſp.* I. 3. where he ſays, PHILOSOPHIA *jacuit uſque ad hanc ætatem, nec ullum habuit lumen* LITERARUM LATINARUM; *quæ illuſtranda et excitanda nobis eſt; ut ſi*, &c. See alſo *Tuſc. Diſp.* IV. 3. and *Acad.* I. 2. where it appears, that 'till CICERO applied himſelf to the writing of *Philoſophy*, the *Romans* had nothing of the kind in their language, except ſome mean performances of *Amafanius* the *Epicurean*, and others of the ſame ſect. How far the *Romans* were indebted to *Cicero* for Philoſophy, and with what induſtry, as well as eloquence, he cultivated the Subject, may be ſeen not only from the titles of thoſe Works that are now loſt, but much more from the many noble ones ſtill fortunately preſerved.

The *Epicurean* Poet LUCRETIUS, who flouriſhed nearly at the ſame time, ſeems by his ſilence to have over-looked the *Latin* writers of his own ſect; deriving all his Philoſophy, as well as *Cicero*, from *Grecian* Sources; and, like him, acknowledging the difficulty of writing in *Philoſophy in Latin*, both from the *Poverty* of the Tongue, and from the *Novelty* of the Subject.

Nec

ſeems to have judged the moſt truly of his Countrymen, when admitting their inferiority in the more elegant Arts, he concludes at laſt with his uſual majeſty, Ch. V.

Tu

Nec me animi fallit, GRAIORUM *obſcura reperta*
Difficile inluſtrare LATINIS *verſibus eſſe,*
(Multa novis rebus præſertim quom ſit agendum,)
Propter EGESTATEM LINGUÆ *et* RERUM NOVITATEM:
Sed tua me virtus tamen, et ſperata voluptas
Suavis amicitiæ quemvis perferre laborem
Suadet—— Lucr. I. 137.

In the ſame age, VARRO, among his numerous works, wrote ſome in the way of *Philoſophy*; as did the Patriot BRUTUS, a Treatiſe *concerning Virtue*, much applauded by *Cicero*; but theſe Works are now loſt.

Soon after the writers above mentioned came HORACE, ſome of whoſe Satires and Epiſtles may be juſtly ranked amongſt the moſt valuable pieces of *Latin Philoſophy*, whether we conſider the purity of their Stile, or the great Addreſs, with which they treat the Subject.

After *Horace*, tho' with as long an interval as from the days of *Auguſtus* to thoſe of *Nero*, came the Satiriſt PERSIUS, the friend and diſciple of the Stoic *Cornutus*; to whoſe precepts as he did honour by his virtuous Life,

ſo

Ch. V.

Tu REGERE IMPERIO POPULOS, *Romane, memento,*
(Hæ tibi erunt artes) pacisque imponere morem,
Parcere subjectis, et debellare superbos.

FROM

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so his works, tho' small, shew an early proficiency in the science of Morals. Of him it may be said, that he is almost the single *difficult* writer among the *Latin* Classics, whose meaning has sufficient merit, to make it worth while to labour thro' his obscurities.

In the same degenerate and tyrannic period, lived also SENECA; whose character, both as a Man and a Writer, is discussed with great accuracy by the noble Author of the *Characteristics*, to whom we refer.

Under a milder Dominion, that of *Hadrian* and the *Antonines*, lived AULUS GELLIUS, or (as some call him) AGELLIUS, an entertaining Writer in the miscellaneous way; well skilled in Criticism and Antiquity; who tho' he can hardly be entitled to the name of a *Philosopher*, yet deserves not to pass unmentioned here, from the curious fragments of Philosophy interspersed in his works.

With *Aulus Gellius* we range MACROBIUS, not because a Contemporary, (for he is supposed to have lived

Ch. V.

FROM conſidering *the Romans*, let us paſs to THE GREEKS. THE GRECIAN COMMON-

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under *Honorius* and *Theodoſius*) but from his near reſemblance, in the character of a Writer. His Works, like the other's, are miſcellaneous; filled with Mythology and antient Literature, ſome Philoſophy being intermixed. His Commentary upon the *Somnium Scipionis* of *Cicero* may be conſidered as wholly of the *philoſophical* kind.

In the ſame age with *Aulus Gellius*, flouriſhed APULEIUS of *Madaura* in *Africa*, a *Platonic* Writer, whoſe Matter in general far exceeds his perplexed and affected Stile, too conformable to the falſe Rhetoric of the Age when he lived.

Of the ſame Country, but of a later Age, and a harſher Stile, was MARTIANUS CAPELLA, if indeed he deſerve not the name rather of a *Philologiſt*, than of a *Philoſopher*.

After *Capella*, we may rank CHALCIDIUS the *Platonic*, tho' both his Age, and Country, and Religion are doubtful. His manner of writing is rather more agreeable than that of the two preceding, nor does he appear to be their inferior in the knowledge of Philoſophy, his work being a laudable Commentary upon the *Timæus* of *Plato*.

The

Ch. V. COMMONWEALTHS, while they maintained their Liberty, were the moſt heroic Confederacy, that ever exiſted. They were the

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The laſt *Latin* Philoſopher was BOETHIUS, who was deſcended from ſome of the nobleſt of the *Roman* Families, and was Conſul in the beginning of the ſixth Century. He wrote many philoſophical Works, the greater part in the *Logical* way. But his *Ethic* piece, *On the Conſolation of Philoſophy*, and which is partly proſe, and partly verſe, deſerves great encomiums both for the Matter, and for the Stile; in which laſt he approaches the Purity of a far better age than his own, and is in all reſpects preferable to thoſe crabbed *Africans* already mentioned. By command of *Theodoric* king of the *Goths*, it was the hard fate of this worthy Man to ſuffer death; with whom the *Latin Tongue*, and the laſt remains of *Roman Dignity*, may be ſaid to have ſunk in the weſtern World.

There were other *Romans*, who left *Philoſophical* Writings; ſuch as MUSONIUS RUFUS, and the two Emperors, MARCUS ANTONINUS and JULIAN; but as theſe preferred the uſe of the *Greek* Tongue to their own, they can hardly be conſidered among the number of *Latin* Writers.

And ſo much (by way of ſketch) for THE LATIN AUTHORS OF PHILOSOPHY; a ſmall number for ſo vaſt an Empire, if we conſider them as all the product of near ſix ſucceſſive centuries.

the politeſt, the braveſt, and the wiſeſt of men. In the ſhort ſpace of little more than a Century, they became ſuch Stateſmen, Warriors, Orators, Hiſtorians, Phyſicians, Poets, Critics, Painters, Sculptors, Architects, and (laſt of all) Philoſophers, that one can hardly help conſidering THAT GOLDEN PERIOD, as a Providential Event in honour of human Nature, to ſhew to what perfection the Species might aſcend (g). Ch. V.

Now

(g) If we except *Homer*, *Heſiod*, and the *Lyric* Poets, we hear of few *Grecian* Writers before the expedition of *Xerxes*. After that Monarch had been defeated, and the dread of the *Perſian* power was at an end, the EFFULGENCE OF GRECIAN GENIUS (if I may uſe the expreſſion) broke forth, and ſhone till the time of *Alexander the Macedonian*, after whom it diſappeared, and never roſe again. This is that *Golden Period* ſpoken of above. I do not mean that *Greece* had not many writers of great merit ſubſequent to that period, and eſpecially of the philoſophic kind; but the *Great*, the *Striking*, the *Sublime* (call it as you pleaſe) attained at that time to a height, to which it never could aſcend in any after age.

Ch. V. NOW THE LANGUAGE OF THESE GREEKS was truly like themſelves, it was con-

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The ſame kind of fortune befel the people of *Rome*. When the *Punic* wars were ended, and *Carthage* their dreaded Rival was no more, then (as *Horace* informs us) they began to cultivate the politer arts. It was ſoon after this, their great Orators, and Hiſtorians, and Poets aroſe, and *Rome*, like *Greece*, had her *Golden Period*, which laſted to the death of *Octavius Cæſar*.

I call theſe two Periods, from the two greateſt Geniuſes that flouriſhed in each, one THE SOCRATIC PERIOD, the other THE CICERONIAN.

There are ſtill farther analogies ſubſiſting between them. Neither Period commenced, as long as ſolicitude for the common welfare engaged men's attentions, and ſuch wars impended, as threatened their deſtruction by Foreigners and Barbarians. But when once theſe fears were over, a general ſecurity ſoon enſued, and inſtead of attending to the arts of defence and ſelf-preſervation, they began to cultivate thoſe of Elegance and Pleaſure. Now, as theſe naturally produced a kind of wanton inſolence (not unlike the vitious temper of high-fed animals) ſo by this the bands of union were inſenſibly diſſolved. Hence then among the

conformable to their tranſcendent and universal Genius. Where Matter ſo abounded, Ch. V.

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the *Greeks* that fatal *Peloponneſian* War, which together with other wars, its immediate conſequence, broke the confederacy of their Commonwealths; waſted their ſtrength; made them jealous of each other; and thus paved a way for the contemptible kingdom of *Macedon* to enſlave them all, and aſcend in a few years to univerſal Monarchy.

A like luxuriance of proſperity ſowed diſcord among the *Romans*; raiſed thoſe unhappy conteſts between the *Senate* and the *Gracchi*; between *Sylla* and *Marius*; between *Pompey* and *Cæſar*; till at length, after the laſt ſtruggle for Liberty by thoſe brave Patriots *Brutus* and *Caſſius* at *Philippi*, and the ſubſequent defeat of *Anthony* at *Actium*, the *Romans* became ſubject to the dominion of a FELLOW-CITIZEN.

It muſt indeed be confeſſed, that after *Alexander* and *Octavius* had eſtabliſhed their Monarchies, there were many bright Geniuſes, who were eminent under their Government. *Ariſtotle* maintained a friendſhip and epiſtolary correſpondence with *Alexander*. In the time of the ſame Monarch lived *Theophraſtus*, and the Cynic, *Diogenes*. Then alſo *Demoſthenes* and *Æſchines* ſpoke their two celebrated Orations. So likewiſe in the time of *Octavius*, *Virgil* wrote his *Eneid*, and with

Ch. V. abounded, Words followed of courſe, and thoſe exquiſite in every kind, as the Ideas for which they ſtood. And hence it followed, there was not a Subject to be found, which could not with propriety be expreſſed in *Greek*.

HERE were Words and Numbers for the Humour of an *Ariſtophanes*; for the native

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Horace, *Varius*, and many other fine Writers, partook of his protection and royal munificence. But then it muſt be remembered, that theſe men were bred and educated in the principles of a free Government. It was hence they derived that high and manly ſpirit, which made them the admiration of after-ages. The Succeſſors and Forms of Government left by *Alexander* and *Octavius*, ſoon ſtopt the growth of any thing farther in the kind. So true is that noble ſaying of *Longinus*— Θρέψαι τε γὰρ ἱκανὴ τὰ φρονήματα τῶν μεγαλοφρόνων ἡ ΕΛΕΥΘΕΡΙΑ, καὶ ἐπελπίσαι, καὶ ἅμα διωθεῖν τὸ πρόθυμον τῆς πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἔριδος, καὶ τῆς περὶ τὰ πρωτεῖα φιλοτιμίας. *It is* LIBERTY *that is formed to nurſe the ſentiments of great Geniuſes; to inſpire them with hope; to puſh forward the propenſity of conteſt one with another, and the generous emulation of being the firſt in rank.* De Subl. Sect. 44.

native Elegance of a *Philemon* or *Menander*; for the amorous Strains of a *Mimnermus* or *Sappho*; for the rural Lays of a *Theocritus* or *Bion*; and for the ſublime Conceptions of a *Sophocles* or *Homer*. The ſame in Proſe. Here *Iſocrates* was enabled to diſplay his Art, in all the accuracy of Periods, and the nice counterpoiſe of Diction. Here *Demoſthenes* found materials for that nervous Compoſition, that manly force of unaffected Eloquence, which ruſhed, like a torrent, too impetuous to be withſtood. Ch. V.

WHO were more different in exhibiting their *Philoſophy*, than *Xenophon*, *Plato*, and his diſciple, *Ariſtotle*? Different, I ſay, in their character of *Compoſition*; for as to their *Philoſophy itſelf*, it was in reality *the ſame*. *Ariſtotle*, ſtrict, methodic, and orderly; ſubtle in Thought; ſparing in Ornament; with little addreſs to the Paſſions or Imagination; but exhibiting the whole with

Ch. V. ſuch a pregnant brevity, that in every ſentence we ſeem to read a page. How exquiſitely is this all performed *in Greek?* Let thoſe, who imagine it may be done as well in another Language, ſatisfy themſelves either by attempting to tranſlate him, or by peruſing his tranſlations already made by men of learning. On the contrary, when we read either *Xenophon* or *Plato*, nothing of this *method* and ſtrict *order* appears. The *Formal* and *Didactic* is wholly dropt. Whatever they may teach, it is without profeſſing to be teachers; a train of Dialogue and truly polite Addreſs, in which, as in a Mirrour, we behold human Life, adorned in all its colours of Sentiment and Manners.

And yet though theſe differ in this manner from the *Stagirite*, how different are they likewiſe in character from each other?——*Plato*, copious, figurative,

tive, and majeſtic; intermixing at times the facetious and ſatiric; enriching his Works with Tales and Fables, and the myſtic Theology of antient times. *Xenophon*, the Pattern of perfect ſimplicity; every where ſmooth, harmonious, and pure; declining the figurative, the marvellous, and the myſtic; aſcending but rarely into the Sublime; nor then ſo much truſting to the colours of Stile, as to the intrinſic dignity of the Sentiment itſelf. Ch. V.

THE Language in the mean time, in which *He* and *Plato* wrote, appears to ſuit ſo accurately with the Stile of both, that when we read either of the two, we cannot help thinking, that it is he alone, who has hit its character, and that it could not have appeared ſo elegant in any other manner.

AND thus is THE GREEK TONGUE, *from its Propriety and Univerſality, made*

Ch. V. *for all that is great, and all that is beautiful, in every Subject, and under every Form of writing.*

GRAIIS *ingenium*, GRAIIS *dedit ore rotundo*
Muſa loqui.

It were to be wiſhed, that thoſe amongſt us, who either write or read, with a view to employ their liberal leiſure (for as to ſuch, as do either from views more ſordid, we leave them, like Slaves, to their deſtined drudgery) it were to be wiſhed, I ſay, that the liberal (if they have a reliſh for letters) would inſpect the finiſhed Models of *Grecian Literature*; that they would not waſte thoſe hours, which they cannot recall, upon the meaner productions of the *French* and *Engliſh* Preſs; upon that fungous growth of Novels and of Pamphlets, where, it is to be feared, they rarely find any

any rational pleaſure, and more rarely ſtill, any ſolid improvement. Ch. V.

To be *competently* ſkilled in antient learning, is by no means a work of ſuch inſuperable pains. The very progreſs itſelf is attended with delight, and reſembles a Journey through ſome pleaſant Country, where every mile we advance, new charms ariſe. It is certainly as eaſy to be a Scholar, as a Gameſter, or many other Characters equally illiberal and low. The ſame application, the ſame quantity of habit will fit us for one, as completely as for the other. And as to thoſe who tell us, with an air of ſeeming wiſdom, that *it is Men*, and *not Books*, we muſt ſtudy to become knowing; this I have always remarked, from repeated Experience, to be the common conſolation and language of Dunces. They ſhelter their ignorance under a few bright Examples, whoſe tranſcendent abilities, without the common

Ch. V. common helps, have been ſufficient *of themſelves* to great and important Ends. But alas!

Decipit exemplar vitiis imitabile—

In truth, each man's Underſtanding, when ripened and mature, is a compoſite of *natural Capacity*, and of *ſuper-induced Habit*. Hence the greateſt Men will be neceſſarily thoſe, who poſſeſs *the beſt* Capacities, cultivated with *the beſt* Habits. Hence alſo moderate Capacities, when adorned with valuable Science, will far tranſcend others the moſt acute by nature, when either neglected, or applied to low and baſe purpoſes. And thus for the honour of CULTURE *and* GOOD LEARNING, *they are able to render a man, if he will take the pains, intrinſically more excellent than his natural Superiors.*

AND ſo much at preſent as to GENERAL IDEAS; *how we acquire them; whence they are derived; what is their Nature; and what their connection with Language.* So much likewiſe as to the Subject of this Treatiſe, UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR.

End of the THIRD BOOK.

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ADVERTISEMENT.

THE following Notes are either Tranſlations of former Notes, or Additions to them. The additional are chiefly Extracts from Greek Manuſcripts, which (as the Author has ſaid already concerning others of the ſame kind) are valuable both for their Rarity, and for their intrinſic Merit.

ADDITIONAL NOTES.

PAG. 95.——TO STOP, *&c.*] The Quotation from *Proclus* in the Note may be thus rendered—THAT THING IS AT REST, *which* FOR A TIME PRIOR AND SUBSEQUENT IS IN THE SAME PLACE, *both itſelf, and its Parts.*

P. 105. In the Note, for γιγνόμενον read γενόμενον, and render the paſſage thus—*For by this faculty* (namely the faculty of Senſe) *we neither know the Future, nor the Paſt, but the Preſent only.*

P. 106. NOTE (*d*).] The paſſage of *Philoponus* here referred to, but by miſtake omitted, has reſpect to the notion of beings *corporeal* and *ſenſible*, which were ſaid *to be nearly approaching to Non-Entitys.* The Author explains this among other reaſons, by the following—Πῶς δὲ τοῖς μὴ ἔσι γειτνιάζει; Πρῶτον μὲν, ἐπειδὴ ἐνταῦθα τὸ παρελθόν ἐσι καὶ τὸ μέλλον, ταῦτα δὲ μὴ ὄντα· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἠφάνισαι καὶ οὐκ ἔτι ἐσὶ, τὸ δὲ οὔπω ἐσι· συμπαραθέει δὲ τῷ χρόνῳ τὰ φύσικα πάνλα, μᾶλλον δὲ τῆς κινήσεως αὐτῶν παρακολούθημά ἐσι ὁ χρόνος. *How therefore is it that they approach nearly to Non-Entitys? In the firſt place, becauſe* HERE (where they exiſt) *exiſts* THE PAST *and* THE FUTURE, *and theſe are* NON-ENTITYS; *for the one is vaniſhed, and is no more, the other is not as yet. Now all natural Subſtances paſs away along with* TIME, *or rather it is upon their Motion that* TIME *is an Attendant.*

P. 119—in the Note here ſubjoined mention is made of the REAL NOW, or INSTANT, and its efficacy. To which we may add, that there is not only a *neceſſary* Connection between *Exiſtence* and *the Preſent Inſtant*, becauſe *no other Point* of Time can properly be ſaid *to be*, but alſo between *Exiſtence* and *Life*, becauſe whatever *lives*, by the ſame reaſon neceſſarily *Is*. Hence *Sophocles*, ſpeaking of *Time preſent*, elegantly ſays of it—

——χρόνῳ τῷ ζώντι, καὶ παρόντι νῦν·
THE LIVING, *and Now preſent* TIME:
Trachin. V. 1185.

P. 227.—The Paſſage in *Virgil*, of which *Servius* here ſpeaks, is a deſcription of *Turnus*'s killing two brothers, *Amycus* and *Diores*; after which the Poet ſays of him,

——*curru abſciſſa* DUORUM
Suſpendit capita——

This, literally tranſlated, is—*he hung up on his chariot the heads of* TWO *perſons, which were cut off*, whereas the Senſe requires, *of* THE *Two perſons*, that is to ſay, of *Amycus* and *Diores*. Now this by *Amborum* would have been expreſt properly, as *Amborum* means THE *Two*; by *Duorum* is expreſt improperly, as it means only TWO *indefinitely*.

P. 259.—The Paſſage in Note (*o*) from *Themiſtius*, may be thus rendered—*Nature in many inſtances appears to make her tranſition by little and little, ſo that in ſome Beings it may be doubted, whether they are Animal, or Vegetable.*

P. 294.

P. 294. Note (*c*)—*There are in the number of things many, which have a moſt known* EXISTENCE, *but a moſt unknown* ESSENCE; *ſuch for example as* Motion, Place, *and more than either of them,* Time. *The* EXISTENCE *of each of theſe is known and indiſputable, but what their* ESSENCE *is, or Nature, is among the moſt difficult things to diſcern.* The Soul *alſo is in the ſame Claſs: that it is ſomething, is moſt evident; but what it is, is a matter not ſo eaſy to learn.* Alex. Aphrod. p. 142.

P. 340.—LANGUAGE—INCAPABLE OF COMMUNICATING DEMONSTRATION.] See Three Treatiſes, or Vol. I. p. 220, and the additional note on the words, *The Source of infinite Truths,* &c.

P. 368.—in the Note—*yet ſo held the Philoſopher of* Malmeſbury, *and the Author of the Eſſay,* &c.]

Philoponus, from the Philoſophy of *Plato* and *Pythagoras,* ſeems to have far excelled *theſe Moderns* in his account of WISDOM or PHILOSOPHY, and its *Attributes,* or *eſſential Characters.*—Ἴδιον γὰρ φιλοσοφίας τὸ ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς ἔχουσι διαφορὰν δεῖξαι τὴν κοινωνίαν, καὶ τὸ ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς ἔχουσι κοινωνίαν δεῖξαι τίνι διαφέρουσιν· ὁ γὰρ δυσχερὲς τὸ δεῖξαι φάτνης (*lege* φάτης) καὶ περιστερᾶς κοινωνίαν (πάντα γὰρ πρᾶπλον), ἀλλ' ὅ (*lege* ὅπερ) τὸ διάφορον τούτων εἰπεῖν· ὁδὲ κυνὸς καὶ ἵππου διαφορὰν, ἀλλὰ τί κοινὸν ἔχουσιν. IT IS THE PROPER BUSINESS OF PHILOSOPHY TO SHEW IN MANY THINGS, WHICH HAVE DIFFERENCE, WHAT IS THEIR COMMON CHARACTER; *and* IN MANY THINGS, WHICH HAVE A COMMON CHARACTER, THRO' WHAT IT IS THEY DIFFER. *It*

is indeed no difficult matter to ſhew the common Character of a Wood-Pigeon and a Dove (for this is evident to every one), but rather to tell where lies the Difference; nor to tell the Difference between a Dog and a Horſe, but rather to ſhew, what they poſſeſs in common. Philop. Com. MS. in Nicomach. Arithm.

P. 379—THEY ARE MORE EXQUISITE THAN, *&c.*] The Words of *Ariſtotle*, here referred to, are theſe—μᾶλλον δ' ἐϛι τὸ ἕ ἕνεκα ϗ τὸ καλὸν ἐν τοῖς τῆς φύσεως ἔργοις, ἢ ἐν τοῖς τῆς τεχνῆς. THE PRINCIPLES OF DESIGN *and* BEAUTY *are more in the Works of* NATURE, *than they are in thoſe of* ART.

P. 379.—WE MUST OF NECESSITY ADMIT A MIND, *&c.*] The following quotation, taken from the third Book of a *manuſcript Comment of* Proclus *on the* Parmenides *of* Plato, is here given for the ſake of thoſe, who have curioſity with regard to the doctrine of IDEAS, as held by antient Philoſophers.

Ει δὲ δεῖ συντόμως ἐιπεῖν τὴν αἰτὶαν τῆς τῶν ἰδεῶν ὑποθέσεως, δι' ἣν ἐκείνοις ἤρεσε, ῥητέον ὅτι ταῦτα πάνϗα ὅϛα ὁρατὰ, ὑράνια ϗ ὑπὸ σελήνην, ἢ ἀπὸ ταυϗομάτε ἐϛὶν, ἢ κατ' αἰτίαν· ἀλλ' ἀπὸ ταυϗομάτε ἀδύνατον· ἔϛι γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ὑϛέροις τὰ κρείϗονα, νᾶς, ϗ λόγος, ϗ αἰτία, ϗ τὰ αἰτίας, ϗ ἅτω τὰ ἀποτελέσματα κρείϗω τῶν ἀρχῶν, πρὸς τῷ ϗ ὅ φησιν ὁ Ἀριϛοτέλης· δεῖ πρὸ τῶν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς αἰτίων εἶναι τὰ καθ' αὐτὰ, τέτων γὰρ ἔκβασις τὸ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· ὥϛε τῷ ἀπὸ ταυϗομάτε πρεσβύτερον ἂν ἦν τὸ κατ' αἰτίαν, εἰ ϗ ἀπὸ ταυϗομάτε τὰ Θειότατα ἦν τῶν φανερῶν. *If there-*

therefore we are to relate concisely the Cause, why THE HYPOTHESIS OF IDEAS *pleased them* (namely *Parmenides, Zeno, Socrates,* &c.) *we must begin by observing that all the various visible objects around us, the heavenly as well as the sublunary, are either from* CHANCE, *or according to a* CAUSE. FROM CHANCE IS IMPOSSIBLE; *for then the more excellent things (such as Mind, and Reason, and Cause, and the Effects of Cause) will be among those things that come last, and so the* ENDINGS *of things will be more excellent than their* BEGINNINGS. *To which too may be added what* Aristotle *says; that* ESSENTIAL CAUSES OUGHT TO BE PRIOR TO ACCIDENTAL, *in as much as* EVERY ACCIDENTAL CAUSE IS A DEVIATION FROM THEM; *so that whatever is the Effect of such essential Cause* [as is indeed every work of Art and human Ingenuity] *must needs be prior to that which is the Effect of Chance, even tho' we were to refer to Chance the most divine of visible objects* [the Heavens themselves].

The Philosopher, having thus proved a *definite Cause* of the World in opposition to *Chance*, proceeds to shew that from the Unity and concurrent Order of things this Cause must be ONE. After which he goes on, as follows.——

——Εἰ μὲν οὖν ἄλογον τοῦτο, ἄτοπον. ἴσαι γάρ τι πάλιν τῶν ὑστέρων τῆς τούτων αἰτίας χρεῖττον, τὸ κατὰ λόγον καὶ γνῶσιν ποιοῦν, ἴσως τοῦ Παντὸς ὄν, καὶ τοῦ Ὅλου μέρος, ὅ ἐστιν ἀπ' αἰτίας ἀλόγου τοιοῦτο. Εἰ δὲ λόγον ἔχον, καὶ αὐτὸ γινῶσκον, οἷδεν ἑαυτὸ δήπου τῶν πάντων ἄτιον ὄν, ἢ τοῦτο ἀγνοεῖν, ἀγνοήσει τὴν ἑαυτοῦ φύσιν. Εἰ δὲ οἶδεν, ὅτι κατ' οὐσίαν ἐστὶ τοῦ παντὸς ἄτιον, τὸ

δὲ ὡρισμένως εἰδὸς θάτερον, καὶ θάτερον ὄιδεν ἐξ ἀνάγκης, ὄιδεν ἄρα καὶ ἔ ἔστιν αἴτιον ὡρισμένως· ὄιδεν ἂν καὶ τὸ Πᾶν, καὶ πάντα ἐξ ὧν τὸ Πᾶν, ὧν ἐστι καὶ αἴτιον. Καὶ εἰ τοῦτο, ἤτοι εἰς ἑαυτὸ ἄρα βλέπον, καὶ ἑαυτὸ γινῶσκον, ὄιδε τὰ μετ' αὐτό. Λόγοις ἄρα καὶ εἴδεσιν αὐλοις ὄιδε τὰς Κοσμικὰς Λόγους, καὶ τὰ εἴδη, ἐξ ὧν τὸ Πᾶν, καὶ ἔστιν ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ Πᾶν, ὡς ἐν αἰτίῳ, χωρὶς τῆς ὕλης.——*Now* IF THIS CAUSE BE VOID OF REASON, *that indeed would be abſurd; for then again there would be ſomething among thoſe things, which came laſt in order, more excellent than their Principle or Cauſe. I mean by more excellent, ſomething operating according to Reaſon and Knowledge, and yet within that Univerſe, and a Part of that Whole, which is, what it is, from a Cauſe devoid of Reaſon.*

But if, on the contrary, THE CAUSE OF THE UNIVERSE BE A CAUSE, HAVING REASON *and knowing itſelf, it of courſe knows itſelf to be the Cauſe of all things; elſe, being ignorant of this, it would be ignorant of its own nature. But if it know, that from* ITS VERY ESSENCE IT IS THE CAUSE OF THE UNIVERSE, *and if that, which knows one part of a Relation definitely, knows alſo of neceſſity the other, it knows for this reaſon definitely the thing of which it is the Cauſe.* IT KNOWS THEREFORE THE UNIVERSE, *and all things out of which the Univerſe is compoſed, of all which alſo it is the Cauſe. But if this be true, it is evident that* BY LOOKING INTO ITSELF, AND BY KNOWING ITSELF, IT KNOWS WHAT COMES AFTER ITSELF, AND IS SUBSEQUENT. *It is, therefore, through certain* REASONS *and* FORMS DEVOID OF MATTER

that it knows thoſe mundane Reaſons and Forms, out of which the Univerſe is compoſed, and that the Univerſe is in it, as in a Cauſe diſtinct from and without the Matter.

P. 380—AGREEABLE TO WHICH IDEAS THESE WORKS ARE FASHIONED, *&c.*] It is upon theſe Principles that *Nicomachus* in his *Arithmetic*, p. 7. calls *the Supreme Being an Artiſt*—ἐν τῇ τῶ τεχνίτε Θεῶ διανοίᾳ, *in Dei artificis mente.* Where *Philoponus*, in his *manuſcript Comment*, obſerves as follows —τεχνίτην φησὶ τὸν Θεὸν, ὡς πάντων τὰς πρώτας αἰτίας καὶ τοὺς λόγους αὐτῶν ἔχοντα. *He calls* GOD *an* ARTIST, *as poſſeſſing within himſelf the firſt Cauſes of all things, and their Reaſons or Proportions.* Soon after ſpeaking of thoſe Sketches, after which Painters work and finiſh their Pictures, he ſubjoins —— ὥσπερ οὖν ἡμεῖς, εἰς τὰ τοιαῦτα σκιαγραφήματα βλέποντες, ποιοῦμεν τό δέ τι, οὕτω καὶ ὁ δημιουργὸς, πρὸς ἐκεῖνα ἀποβλέπων, τὰ τῇδε πάντα κεκόσμηκεν· ἀλλ' ἰστέον, ὅτι τὰ μὲν τῇδε σκιαγραφήματα ἀτελῆ εἰσιν, ἐκεῖνοι δὲ οἱ ἐν τῷ Θεῷ λόγοι ἀρχέτυποι καὶ παντέλειοί εἰσιν. *As therefore we, looking upon ſuch Sketches as theſe, make ſuch and ſuch particular things, ſo alſo the Creator, looking at thoſe Sketches of his, hath formed and adorned with beauty all things here below. We muſt remember, however, that the Sketches here are imperfect; but that the others, thoſe* REASONS *or Proportions, which exiſt in* GOD, *are* ARCHETYPAL *and* ALL-PERFECT.

It is according to this Philoſophy, that *Milton* repreſents *God*, after he had created this viſible World, contemplating

——————how it ſhow'd
In proſpect from his throne, how good, how fair,
ANSW'RING HIS GREAT IDEA——
P. Loſt, VII. 556.

Proclus proves the Exiſtence of theſe GENERAL IDEAS or UNIVERSAL FORMS by the following Arguments.——εἰ τοίνυν ἐϛὶν αἰτία τῦ πανὸς αὐτῷ τῷ εἶναι ποιῦσα, τὸ δὲ αὐτῷ τῷ εἶναι ποιῦν ἀπὸ τῆς ἑαύτῦ ποιεῖ ὐσίας τῦτό ἐϛι πρώτως, ὅπερ τὸ ποιύμενον δευτέρως καὶ ὃ ἐϛι πρώτως, δίδωσι τῷ ποιυμένῳ δευτέρως· οἷον τὸ πῦρ καὶ δίδωσι θερμότηϛα ἄλλῳ, καὶ ἔϛι θερμὸν, ἡ ψυχὴ δίδωσι ζωὴν, καὶ ἔχει ζωὴν, καὶ ἐπὶ πάνϛων ἴδοις ἂν ἀληθῆ τὸν λόγον, ὅσα αὐτῷ τῷ εἶναι ποιεῖ. καὶ τὸ αἴτιον ἓν τῦ πανὸς αὐτῷ τῷ εἶναι ποιῦν τῦτό ἐϛι πρώτως, ὅπερ ὁ κόσμος δευτέρως. εἰ δὴ ὁ κόσμος πλήρωμα εἰδῶν ἐϛὶ πανοίων, εἴη ἂν καὶ ἐν τῷ αἰτίῳ τῦ κόσμυ ταῦτα πρώτως· τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ αἴτιον καὶ ἥλιον, καὶ σελήνην, καὶ ἄνθρωπον ὑπέϛησε, καὶ ἵππον, καὶ ὅλως τὰ εἴδη, τὰ ἐν τῷ πανί. ταῦτα ἄρα πρώτως ἐϛὶν ἐν τῇ αἰτίᾳ τῦ πανὸς, ἄλλος ἥλιος παρὰ τὸν ἐμφανῆ, καὶ ἄλλος ἄνθρωπος, καὶ τῶν εἰδῶν ὁμοίως ἕκαϛον. ἔϛιν ἄρα τὰ εἴδη πρὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν, καὶ αἴτια αὐτῶν τὰ δημιυργικὰ κατὰ τὸν εἰρημένον λόγον, ἐν τῇ μιᾷ τῦ κόσμυ πανὸς αἰτίᾳ προϋπάρχονϛα. *If therefore* THE CAUSE OF THE UNIVERSE *be a Cauſe which operates merely by exiſting, and if that which operates merely by exiſting operate from its own proper Eſſence,* SUCH CAUSE IS PRIMARILY, WHAT ITS EFFECT IS SECONDARILY, *and that, which it is primarily, it giveth to its Effect ſecondarily. It is thus that Fire both giveth Warmth*

to

to ſomething elſe, and is itſelf warm; that the Soul giveth Life, and poſſeſſeth Life: and this reaſoning you may perceive to be true in all things whatever, which operate merely by exiſting. It follows therefore, THAT THE CAUSE OF THE UNIVERSE, *operating after this manner,* IS THAT PRIMARILY, WHICH THE WORLD IS SECONDARILY. *If therefore the* WORLD *be the plenitude of* FORMS *of all Sorts, theſe* FORMS MUST ALSO BE PRIMARILY IN THE CAUSE OF THE WORLD; *for it was the ſame Cauſe, which conſtituted the Sun, and the Moon, and Man, and Horſe, and in general all the Forms exiſting in the Univerſe. Theſe therefore exiſt primarily in the Cauſe of the Univerſe; another Sun beſides the apparent, another Man, and ſo with reſpect to every Form elſe. The* FORMS *therefore,* PREVIOUS *to the ſenſible and external Forms, and which according to this reaſoning are their* ACTIVE *and* EFFICIENT CAUSES, *are to be found* PRE-EXISTING IN THAT ONE AND COMMON CAUSE OF ALL THE UNIVERSE, *Procli* Com. MS. in Plat. Parmenid. L. 3.

We have quoted the above paſſages for the ſame reaſon as the former; for the ſake of thoſe, who may have a curioſity to ſee a ſample of this *antient* Philoſophy, which (as ſome have held) may be traced up from *Plato* and *Socrates* to *Parmenides*, *Pythagoras*, and *Orpheus* himſelf.

If the Phraſe, *to operate merely by exiſting*, ſhould appear queſtionable, it muſt be explained upon a ſuppoſition, that *in the Supreme Being* no Attributes are *ſecondary*, *intermittent*, or *adventitious*, but all *original*, *ever perfect* and *eſſential*. See p. 162, 359.

That we ſhould not therefore think of a *blind unconſcious* operation, like that of Fire here alluded to, the Author had long before prepared us, *by uniting Knowledge with natural Efficacy*, where he forms the Character of theſe *Divine* and *Creative* Ideas.

But let us hear him in his own Language.—ἀλλ' εἴπερ ἐθέλοιμεν τὴν ἰδιότητα αὐτῶν (ſc. Ἰδεῶν) ἀφορίσασθαι διὰ τῶν γνωριμωτέρων, ἀπὸ μὲν τῶν φυσικῶν λόγων λάβωμεν τὸ αὐτῷ τῷ εἶναι ποιητικὸν, ὧν δὴ καὶ ποιοῦσι· ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν τεχνικῶν τὸ γνωστικὸν, ὧν ποιοῦσιν, εἰ καὶ μὴ αὐτῷ τῷ εἶναι ποιοῦσι, καὶ ταῦτα ἐνώσαντες φῶμεν αἰτίας εἶναι τὰς Ἰδέας δημιουργικὰς ἅμα καὶ νοερὰς πάντων τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ἀποτελεσμένων. *But if we ſhould chuſe to define the peculiar character of* IDEAS *by things more known to us than themſelves, let us aſſume from* NATURAL PRINCIPLES THE POWER OF EFFECTING, MERELY BY EXISTING, *all the things that they effect*; *and from* ARTIFICIAL PRINCIPLES THE POWER OF COMPREHENDING *all that they effect, although they did not effect them merely by exiſting*; *and then uniting thoſe two, let us ſay that* IDEAS *are at once the* EFFICIENT *and* INTELLIGENT CAUSES *of all things produced according to Nature.* From book the ſecond of the ſame Comment.

The Schoolman, *Thomas Aquinas*, a ſubtle and acute writer, has the following ſentence, perfectly correſponding with this Philoſophy. *Res omnes comparantur ad Divinum Intellectum, ſicut artificiata ad Artem.*

The

The Verſes of *Orpheus* on this ſubject may be found in the tract *De Mundo*, aſcribed to *Ariſtotle*, p. 23. *Edit. Sylburg.*

Ζεὺς ἄρσην γένετο, Ζεὺς κ. τ. λ.

P. 391—WHERE ALL THINGS LIE INVELOPED, *&c.*]

—ὅσα πέρ ἐϛι ΤΑ ΠΟΛΛΑ κατὰ δή τινα μερισμὸν, τοσαῦτα καὶ ΤΟ ΕΝ ἐκεῖνο πρὸ τῦ μερισμῦ κατὰ τὸ πάνῃ ἀμερές· ἓ γὰρ ἕν, ὡς ἐλάχιϛον, καθάπερ ὁ Σπεύσιππος ἔδοξε λέγειν, ἀλλ' ΕΝ, ΩΣ ΠΑΝΤΑ. *As numerous as is* THE MULTITUDE OF INDIVIDUALS *by* Partition, *ſo numerous alſo is that* PRINCIPLE OF UNITY *by univerſal* Impartibility. *For it is not* ONE, *as a* MINIMUM *is one (according to what* Speucippus *ſeemed to ſay), but it is* ONE, *as being* ALL THINGS. Damaſcius περὶ Ἀρχῶν, MS.

P. 408—THE WISEST NATIONS—THE MOST COPIOUS LANGUAGES.] It is well obſerved by *Muretus* ——*Nulli unquam, qui* res *ignorarent*, nomina, *quibus eas exprimerent, quæſierunt.* Var. Lect. VI. 1.

P. 411.——BUT WHAT WAS THEIR PHILOSOPHY?] The ſame *Muretus* has the following paſſage upon the ROMAN TASTE FOR PHILOSOPHY.—— *Beati autem illi, et opulenti, et omnium gentium victores* ROMANI, *in petendis honoribus, et in prenſandis civibus, et in exteris nationibus verbo componendis, re compilandis occupati, philoſophandi curam ſervis aut libertis ſuis, et Græculis eſurientibus, relinquebant. Ipſi, quod ab avaritia,*

tia, quod ab ambitione, quod a voluptatibus reliquum erat temporis, ejus ſi partem aliquam aut ad audiendum Græcum quempiam philoſophum, aut ad aliquem de philoſophia libellum vel legendum vel ſcribendum contuliſſent, jam ſe ad eruditionis culmen perveniſſe, jam victam a ſe et profligatam jacere Græciam ſomniabant. Var. Lect. VI. 1.

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